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HANDBOOK

OF THE

MOORISH ARMY

1909.

PREPARED BY THE GENERAL STAFF.



LONDON:
PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE,
BY MACKIE AND CO., LTD.,
WARRINGTON AND LONDON.

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NOTE.

The information given in this Handbook is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press, or to any person other than those holding Official positions in His Majesty's Service.

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NOTE.

This account was compiled by the officer of the General Staff who accompanied the British Mission to Fez in the Spring of 1909.

General Staff,

July, 1909.

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HANDBOOK OF THE
MOORISH ARMY.*General Remarks on the Army.*

The first thing to note about the Moorish Army is that it cannot be compared in a civilized way with any European Army—nor indeed with any other. It is useless to attempt to classify it, or to divide it up, except on the very broadest and loosest lines: for what may hold good during one year does not necessarily hold good during the next. Much depends on the character of the Sultan, or on the influence of some particular Kaïd, or on the time of year, or on the success or failure of the harvest, or on the relations with Foreign Powers, or on the state of the Treasury, or on the presence or absence, or nationality, of foreign military missions, or on the submission, or revolt, of certain tribes. Everything is in a constant state of change, everything is hand-to-mouth, everything is happy-go-lucky. And beneath it all is the terrible hand of corruption.

It is, furthermore, necessary to bear in mind the following points:—

1. The Sultan of Marocco has always had to maintain his authority as an autocratic ruler at the point of the sword.

2. There are no proper means of communication in the country; no roads, canals, telegraphs, or railways.

3. The system of government is such that the Bashas of provinces, though owing allegiance to the Sultan, are themselves practically autocratic.

4. A large extent of the country is inhabited by tribes who either will not acknowledge the Sultan's temporal authority at all, or refuse to pay him the tribute imposed on them.

Hierarchy.

The Sultan is the head of the Moorish Army. Occasionally the Grand Vizier has a secretary calling himself the Minister of War, whose nominal duties are the organization and direction of the forces. This personage, however, has usually little or no power, since all his orders really emanate from the Sultan. His establishment consists of one or two secretaries and a clerk, and his work is purely executive. Sometimes the Minister of War happens to be Grand Vizier also.

No grades exist in the Moorish forces corresponding to the higher ones in European armies. There is no rank above that of Kaïd er R'ha or Colonel, for fear of officers in command of a large number of troops obtaining too much power in the land.

When it is necessary to nominate the chief of an expedition or an officer to take charge of a large body of men, the Sultan often selects any person of influence, importance, or of good family, for the post, without much reference to his military capabilities.

The ranks in the Army are as follows:—

1. Kaïd er R'ha* (Chief of 1,000), corresponding more or less to Colonel.
2. Khalifa=Major or Assistant-Commander.
3. Kaïd el Miya (Chief of 100)=Captain.
4. Mulazim=Lieutenant.
5. Mokaddem=N.C.O.
6. Maûn (pl. Muawin)=Corporal.

But here again no comparison can be made with an European organization: the Kaïd er R'ha may have a large force under him, or only one or two men, or

* i.e. "Chief of the millstone"—each thousand men in the old days being entitled to one millstone for grinding their corn.

indeed he may have no appointment at all; and the Kaïd el Miya is, as a rule, merely the head man, or a man of some standing, from the duar (village) whence his men are taken. There are very few Mulazimin. The Mokaddemin are very variable in quantity (and quality).

Foreign Military Missions.

Various military missions, from different countries, have been appointed as instructors at different times to the Moorish troops. British, Spanish, Italian and French officers have all tried their hands at it and met with varying measures of success. Much depended on the goodwill of the Sultan and his chief advisers, or on the jealousy of the different Kaïds. Much depended also on the regularity or otherwise of the receipt of their salaries. Kaïd Sir Harry Maclean, K.C.M.G., formerly a British officer, was invited by the Sultan, Mulai Hassan, some 30 years ago, to drill and organize his army. He remained until the late Sultan, Abdul Aziz, was defeated and, so far, has not been taken on by the present Sultan, Mulai Hafid.

Various Spanish military missions have been at times attached, but there are none at present, nor likely to be in the future.*

Different Italian officers have been attached, mostly with reference to Artillery and technical matters. At present the only representatives are M. Campini, technical head of the Arsenal at Fez, and two subordinates.

One or two German officers offered their services, but they were only a few months in the country, in 1907-08.

* There are, however, some Spanish officers and N.C.Os., besides French ones, in the Police, as constituted by the Algeiras Convention (v. last chapter).

Under the recent arrangements, consequent on the accession of Mulai Hafid, the position of Military instructors to the Army is now occupied by a French Military Mission. Nothing definite is laid down in the way of numbers or ranks, the French Government reserving to itself the right to increase or decrease the number, &c. At present it consists of about 6 officers and 12 N.C.O's.

Of the above one officer and 3 N.C.O's are at Tangier; 4 N.C.Os. are "mobile," carrying out inspection duties in the coast towns; and the remainder are at Fez, or with the Sultan. Their duties are nominally confined to instructional, administrative, and advisory work, but occasionally some of them are, all the same, sent out with expeditions and entrusted with some executive supervision, notably that of the artillery accompanying the "*Mehalla*."

The ordinary pay ($\frac{1}{2}$ peseta a day and rations) is as a rule issued personally by the French officers to the men; there is therefore much more likelihood of the latter receiving and keeping it than if it were handed *en bloc* to their own officers.

The pay of the French officers is the pay of their own (French Army) rank, plus a "supplément" of about £1 a day. This is issued by the French Government and recovered from the Makhzen.

ORGANIZATION.

In order to understand the present state—one can hardly call it organization—of the Moorish Army, one must study the history of the country, and realize that it has never been a homogeneous Empire under one ruler. Even at the present day only rather more than one-fifth of Morocco acknowledges the administrative and political authority of the Sultan and his government, the Makhzen. The remaining four-fifths

acknowledge the Sultan vaguely as an Overlord and as the religious head of the country, but otherwise they only obey their own rulers. They have no scruples in bearing arms against the Sultan and his representatives or troops if the latter oppress them or attempt to enforce the Sherifian authority.

The loyal fifth above-mentioned is termed the Bled el Makhzen, or Government country; and it is from this small portion of the Empire alone that the tribal contingents forming the army are drawn. The remaining three or four-fifths go by the name of the Bled es Siba, or conquered country; and the tribes of this portion would only provide armed men—one can hardly call them troops—to follow the Sultan in case a Holy War were proclaimed or the integrity of the country were threatened. (Even then there would be so much discord between the tribes that no combined action throughout the Empire would be possible.)

It may be said, roughly, that the Bled el Makhzen contains so-called Arab tribes, and the Bled es Siba Berber tribes; but there are so many exceptions to this that it cannot be taken as a hard-and-fast rule. The tribes, by the way, whose names begin with Beni and Ait (*e.g.* Beni M'tir, Ait Yussi, &c.) are almost invariably Berber, and those beginning with Uled (*e.g.* Uled el Haj, Uled Haris, &c.) invariably Arab tribes.

In the old days, the Sultan was dependent for an army on certain tribes and military colonies which at various times in the history of the country had been exempted from taxes and tribute and were, in return, bound to furnish the Sultan with soldiers when called upon—something like the Cossacks of Russia. These tribes, termed Makhzen (or Government) tribes, or Makhzenia, varied in number and extent. Sometimes a tribe revolted and fell away; at other times fresh tribes were granted Makhzen privileges; or, in order to

keep certain other turbulent tribes in order, loyal tribes were divided up and made to settle as military colonies in different districts.

On the accession of Mulai Ismaïl in 1672 these colonies, or tribes, had reached very large dimensions, and exercised a considerable influence on the politics of the country. In order to counteract this danger to the throne, Mulai Ismaïl procured a large number of negroes from the Sudan, and formed for himself a powerful cavalry body-guard, well known in history as the "Bokhari" (Bu Ak'her) guard. The Bokharis increased rapidly, and at the Sultan's death in 1727 are said to have numbered 100,000 men. They were employed to a great extent in putting down the revolts of the "Makhzenia" tribes, who were jealous at seeing their old power and privileges usurped by this new force.

After the death of Mulai Ismaïl general confusion prevailed in the country. The vacancies in the Bokhari guard were not filled up, so that soon their numbers and power greatly diminished. The Makhzenia tribes became disorganized, and many of them refused fealty to the successors of Mulai Ismaïl unless their old power and privileges were restored. The consequence was that they were put down with a strong hand, several of them being deprived of their lands and sent into different districts. A few only, the Sherarda, Udaya, and Sheraga tribes, remained loyal, and were rewarded by contingents from them being permanently attached to the Sultan's person. The Sheraga and Sherarda tribes live near Fez; the Udaya were broken up at a later date, and the greater part of this tribe is now near Rabat. The Bokharis were rewarded by gifts of land in the same way as the Makhzenia had been, and gradually became, to all intents and purposes, a Makhzenia tribe themselves.

The descendants of these 4 tribes, and these 4 tribes only, now form the Gîsh*—the organization of which will be explained below. The term "Makhzenia" tribes has given rise to considerable confusion. Makhzen, or Makhzenia, tribes mean at the present day merely tribes living in the Bled el Makhzen, *i.e.* tribes under Government control; they do *not* mean what the term formerly signified, *i.e.* those Cossack-like tribes above described. The only "Cossacks" now in existence are the 4 Gîsh tribes above-mentioned. At the same time, a Gîsh man on special duty is still termed a Mokhazni (pl. Mokhaznia), as being an employé of the Government. The term is, indeed, very vague and confusing.†

After the collapse of the old system the Sultans drew their men from loyal tribes, just as they happened to want them, keeping the Gîsh more or less as a body-guard, and for special duties: and it is practically this system which now obtains.

In 1845 an attempt was made by the Sultan Mulai Abd er Rahman to form a modern Standing Army of 10,000 men on the European system. The natives were however entirely opposed to the idea, and the plan of forming a "Nizam," as it was then called, after the Turkish model, gradually fell to the ground. The nucleus however remained, and in 1859 Mulai Mohammed revived the idea and organized a body of men, giving it the name of Askar. This body he and his successor, Mulai Hassan, enlarged and, procuring European instructors for the men, raised to a considerable strength. Mulai Abdul Aziz, the late Sultan, who took little real interest in military matters, did little for it, and its organization,

* Gîsh means Army.

† For a thorough and excellent description of the subject the reader is referred to "Pierre Aubin" (Emile Décos)'s book "Le Maroc Moderne," chapter "Le Makhzen."

what there was left of it, fell rather to pieces. The name of Askar, as applied to a definite force, is no longer known. The present ruler, Mulai Hafid, who feels his throne insecure and at the same time is a man of much more energetic and military mould than his predecessor, is resuscitating the Standing Army and doing his best to make his troops into a valuable force: but the want of money interferes seriously with his efforts.

The forces of the Sultan may, therefore, be said to consist to-day of—

1. The Gîsh.
2. The Standing Army of Tribal Contingents.

But these 2 parts cannot be treated as totally distinct forces. For although, during peace time, their functions are different, in war time they fight side by side. The Artillery is, indeed, entirely Gîsh.

The Gîsh.

As explained above, the Gîsh consists of the male descendants of the Udaya, Sheraga and Sherarda tribes, and of the old Bokhari Guard, which can almost now be looked upon as a tribe.

The Udaya tribe has been intentionally scattered and distributed, partly to prevent them becoming too strong and acting all together and partly in order to act as loyal garrisons in different disaffected localities. With its original location in the hills, 15 miles to the N. and to the W.N.W. of Fez, it now has portions in the Sus, and round Rabat. A few of the tribe live also in the Shawia country.

The Sheraga and Sherarda tribes live near Fez, the latter inhabiting the country adjacent to the Beni Hasen and along the left bank of the Sebu to the S.E. of Fez,

whilst the former* dwell somewhat more to the North, their centre being about 20 miles N.N.W. of Fez, on the right bank of the Sebu. The headquarters of the Bokhari are in Meknes, and families of them are scattered about that district and in other places.

There are in addition a good many Gîsh in the different towns. These have special leave to live there, and provide the escorts for travellers, the officials and subordinates for the Bashas and Kaïds, customhouse guards, and any men required for repressive or gendarmerie duties. Liberated slaves share these duties with them. These people are termed Mokhazni, (pl. Mokhaznia). Tangier and the Fâs district near Tangier are largely populated with Gîsh men.

The privileges of the Gîsh tribes are:—

1. No payment of taxes.
2. Precedence at ceremonies.
3. Receipt of a fixed *rateb* or pay, even when not called out.
4. Provision of recruits for the artillery (the *arme d'élite*).

(*En passant*, it may be mentioned that the *rateb* of a $\frac{1}{4}$ peseta (1½d.) a day is but rarely paid.)

In return for these privileges every man is bound to serve the Sultan when called upon, finding his own arms and his own horse when he can. Each of the four tribes could find, roughly, about 4,000 men, of which about one-third would be mounted. But this does not mean that 16,000 men are always in the field: as a rule not more than 2,000 or 3,000 are available, the remainder being either employed on Mokhazni duties or not being called out at all.

* Their name signifies "people from the East," for they originally came from Algeria.

The only distinctive mark of uniform about the Gîsh or Mokhaznia (Gîsh men when actually on special duty) is a pointed red *sheshia* (cap), sometimes encircled by a tight white turban.

Each of these Gîsh tribes provides one standing *tabor* or contingent, in addition to the artillery. These 4 tabors were much broken up and disorganized during the recent change of Sultans; they are being reconstituted. Each consists of both foot and horse. Their armament consists of a more or less modern rifle of some sort, with a few cartridges, and, generally, a sword or dagger or both. Their costume is as a rule the national one of a coloured *kaftan*, two or more white shirts, a blue or white burnous (*jelab* or *sulham*), loose Moorish breeches, the red pointed tarbûsh (*sheshia*) aforesaid and yellow slippers. This dress, though exceedingly picturesque, can hardly be called practical, for it is in the wearer's way when fighting, and forms a conspicuous mark for the enemy's aim.

The artillery-men are by way of wearing a dark blue tunic with orange facings, but this dress is by no means *de rigueur*. They number perhaps 600 altogether, the distribution of which in May, 1909, was approximately as follows:—

With expeditions, 250; at Tangier, 60; in nine other coast towns, 300.

There is also a large contingent of Gîsh employed in military or quasi-military duties in and near the Palace or near the Sultan's person.

Besides these there is a personal bodyguard for the Sultan, composed of about 500 negroes, Palace slaves or ex-slaves. These are dressed in red tarbûshes, red tunics and red breeches, and are fairly well armed and drilled. They have quite a decent band, instructed by a French drum-major.

The Standing Army of Tribal Contingents.

The name of "Standing Army" is really a misnomer: for there is, strictly speaking, no Standing Army, or indeed any regular army at all, except the Gîsh contingents. Any men required outside the latter are merely drawn from his subjects by the Sultan, given rifles, and told they are soldiers. But for the purpose of description we may perhaps term them a Standing Army.

This Army is a varying quantity. *E.g.*, as far as one could tell, the whole of the Government forces of Morocco were in June, 1909, distributed as follows:—

On Mehalla against the Beni M'tir...	6,500, including
	2,000 Gîsh
" " " Bu Hamara ...	1,700, including
	500 Gîsh
Coming to Fez from the South	...2,500
Being raised in the South	...3,000
Sultan's Bodyguard (Negro Infantry)...	450 and 50 being
	recruited
Garrisons of Coast towns (10)	...1,600
Garrison of Marrakesh	... 200

This would give a grand total of some 16,000; but of these certainly 3,000 or thereabouts are Gîsh. It is impossible to give exact figures, as no lists are kept, and desertions and additions take place every day. The then strength of the Standing Army could however be broadly taken at about 12,000 to 13,000 men; and as at the date mentioned there was a time of stress, it is not likely that it would ever amount to much more.

These troops of the Standing Army are recruited from the Kabyles, or tribes, in the Bled el Makhzen, by a process analogous to European conscription, but only applied from time to time and at the Sultan's will. If his army is shrinking, or if he is going to make war or

chastise some tribe, he sends round to certain tribes who happen to be handy, or particularly thick in population, or whom, for different reasons, he may wish to punish, or to honour, and demands a certain number of men. The Kaïds thereupon collect any men between 16 and 60 years of age, and these are sent off at once to the head-quarters of the tabors, often in chains if they show signs of wishing to desert. Little distinction is made between healthy and diseased men, nor are any physical qualifications necessary. The result is that a certain number of the soldiers are maimed or deformed, and curious sights are seen of old men and boys alongside each other in the ranks.

Strictly speaking, the contingents demanded are supposed to be limited to one man per house or family—but like most regulations in Marocco this is not always strictly adhered to.

A certain number of men enlist voluntarily—usually in order to save themselves from destitution. Since the recent advent of the French Mission men have been paid quite regularly, and this fact offers considerable inducement to enlist. The number of volunteers has been given as high as 5,000 altogether by a competent authority, but this would seem rather a large proportion.

In normal times the Standing Army would not exceed 4,000 to 8,000 men at the outside.

Service is unlimited; but, as a matter of fact, if a man dislikes it he often deserts, and no notice is taken of his desertion except occasionally to make his family pay a fine, if they can afford it, and to recover the rifle if possible. Sometimes the deserter is beaten if caught.

The constitution of the Standing Army is purely tribal. It is divided into "tabors," often translated as regiments, or battalions; but they have no equivalent in European armies. A tabor means merely the military unit formed by the contingent drawn from

each particular tribe*; it may be of any size, according to the importance and size of the tribe, and to the number of men drawn from it. Thus, at the date above mentioned, of 2 tabors alongside each other on Mehalla one numbered 42 men and the other 1,950.

There are a few tabors which are not strictly tribal. These are composed either of men drawn from several quite small tribes who unite together, or else of deserters and volunteers from different tabors or tribes. *E.g.* the best trained and equipped tabor in existence at present is that of one Bu Auda, who enjoys a high military reputation. His tabor consists almost exclusively of deserters from other tabors.

A tabor includes both horse (Khayali, pl. Khiyala) and foot (Mushat), the mounted proportion being larger in the case of the plain, and smaller in that of the hill, tribes. In some of the hill tabors there are practically no mounted men except the Kaïd er R'ha and a subordinate or two.

The subdivisions of a larger tabor are termed "mîyas," or hundreds, each under a Kaïd el mîya; but in some cases a Kaïd el mîya commands as many as 200 men, and in others has only two or three men under him. The same with the lower ranks: when required, a mîya is subdivided and a few men of more or less influence are put in charge of the subdivisions and termed mulazimin; and, if necessary, mukaddemin or sergeants, and even muawin or corporals, are told off and put in charge of squads. But the numbers vary or disappear according to the exigencies of the moment.

Each tabor has a group of drummers and buglers and *khait* (native hautboy) players. Some of the buglers are extraordinarily good, even according to European ideas. There is also a standard-bearer to each tabor—the standard may be of any colour or design—and each

* A tabor of Police, however, corresponds more nearly to the European idea of a battalion. v. pp. 32, &c.

miya is supposed to have a flag as well; it is generally a piece of coloured cloth or silk tied to a fixed bayonet or long stick.

Each tabor is under a Kaïd er R'ha, almost always of the tribe of which the tabor is composed, and often appointed by the caprice of the Sultan. Once a Kaïd er R'ha always a Kaïd er R'ha, unless reduced by the Sultan; and in some few cases the appointment is hereditary. There are also a certain number of Kaïds er R'ha outside the tabors. Sometimes they have commands, and at other times they are without appointments of any sort.

There is no definite promotion. A Kaïd el Miya, for instance, will remain in that rank all his life unless he is reduced or appointed Kaïd er R'ha at the Sultan's will. The "Khalifa" is merely a sort of second in command and adjutant combined, and cannot be termed an exact rank or appointment, *e.g.* if a Kaïd er R'ha dislikes his Khalifa he turns him adrift and gets another, perhaps from the ranks. In large tabors there are sometimes 2 Khalifas, a Kebir and a Sghair ("Great" and "Small").

There are no "states," and as officers are constantly being shifted they do not, in many cases, know their own men. If a man dislikes his Kaïd el miya he merely attaches himself to another miya without notice or leave; and as desertions are constantly taking place, no officer knows exactly how many men he has under him. A successful action is not always an advantage to the commander, for his men disperse in search of loot, and if a man gets 20 or 30 dollars by looting he will desert and disappear, deeming himself rich for life.

The Artillery, as already stated, is manned by men of the Gîsh. Its present distribution by numbers has been given. *v. p. 14.* It only remains to be added that there are by way of being 12 Artillery tabors of varying strengths.

5 of these were (in June, '09) on Mehalla, and the remainder were distributed in various coast towns or attached to the Sultan. One or two of these only consist of a Kaïd er R'ha with no men.

The total number of tabors then in existence was about 45, namely:—

Gîsh—4 large ones and 12 small Artillery ones, mostly on "Mehalla."

Standing Army—19 on "Mehalla," 4 in the coast towns, 2 at Marrakesh, 6 or 8 in process of being formed or marching from the south.

But these cannot be taken in the least as permanent figures. After a few months many will have deserted or been disbanded, and others will perhaps have been formed as required.

There is no Cavalry apart from the horsemen forming part of the tabors.

There is nothing in the shape of Engineers except an odd man or two in the Palace or Arsenal, a few men having happened to have had some training abroad.

There is nothing in the shape of a Transport Corps.

The so-called Haraba (instructor) regiment, which had been properly organized and drilled under Kaïd Maclean; has disappeared.

There is no medical corps, nor arrangements for looking after the sick or wounded, at all: nor are there any hospitals.*

After an action, the wounded are left to die or to help themselves. Occasionally a European doctor, if one is handy, is sent out to help, but he gets no assistance, financial or other.

ARMAMENT.

Rifles.—The rifles in the hands of the Moorish troops

* The only native hospital in Marocco is one for sick storks, at Fez.

are of almost every conceivable military description. The following varieties were noted during the recent mission to Fez, May 1909, and there are doubtless other varieties:—

Chassepots	...	...	In large numbers.
Gras	...	...	" "
Martini Henry	...	...	" "
Mauser	...	...	(A few new ones with magazine holding 9 cartridges in the fore-end. (Spandau.)
Winchester ("S'tashi" = 16 loader).			Largely carried by horse-men and officers.
Wetterli-Vitali	...	...	A few.
Lee Metford rifles and carbines ("Ashari" = 10 loader).			A few in the hands of horsemen.
Lebel	...	...	A few.
Snider	...	...	A good many.
Werndl	...	...	" "
Remington ("Riffia")	...	...	" "
Mannlicher	...	...	A few.

Most of the rifles are in a filthy condition, full of dirt and dust, and many of them rusty. No musketry is carried out, and backsights have little meaning for the men. Except in certain tabors of the better sort, there are hardly any bayonets.

With the above variety of rifles it is not surprising that the question of ammunition presents some difficulty. It is kept, nearly all, in the Arsenal (some being stored in the various Palaces), and issued with great economy.

The Arsenal at Fez has turned out, in its time, a large number of Martini Henry rifles (14,000) and ten million M.H. cartridges. At high pressure it could turn

out 20,000 rounds a day; but both rifles and cartridges are reported as being poor. The powder for the cartridges comes from Europe.

At present the Arsenal* is engaged in converting old Chassepot rifles into Gras rifles by hand. It can turn out about 40 a day.

Guns.

There are about 60 field-guns, more or less serviceable, of which 12 are mountain pieces; and 56 good machine guns, with three mortars, besides 121 old useless broken-down guns. The most modern ones are:

6 7.5 cm. Schneider-Canet field guns, with draught harness. When intended for use, however, they are mostly carried in pieces on camels. (One was taken by the Beni M'tir on 17-4-09 and subsequently recovered, much damaged; and another is out of order.)

4 80 mm. French mountain guns, pack transport—good.

12 3.7 cm. German Q.F. guns, belt supply. Kept in the Palace, presumably for the Sultan's own defence. Very heavy, but useful.

It is impossible to give a correct list of all guns, for, as far as is known, none is in existence. The Moors do not themselves know what they have. There is a fair supply of ammunition for them, nearly all being kept in the Palaces.

The guns are for the most part ill-kept according to European ideas, in spite of the efforts of the European instructors.

The larger guns are carried on camels if they have to be moved. If a gun is too heavy for one, it is slung between two, or even four, camels. The carriages, ammunition, &c., are carried on two or more camels.

* v. below, p. 22.

Pack transport is the best method of moving guns, though there are some tracks in the country along which they could be drawn.

When going on Mehalla, a selection of the various guns, field, Q.F., or machine, is sent with each column, always in charge of a European officer or N.C.O. (e.g. with one of the recent columns were sent 2 Hotchkiss, 2 Gardners, 1 Krupp and 1 Schneider; with another 1 Hotchkiss, 3 Maxims and 4 80 mm. mountain guns, and so on). The crews are drawn from the Artillery tabors.

The Arsenal at Fez can carry out simple repairs to guns, but cannot manufacture either guns or shell. The latter are imported from Europe.

There are only some 60 men employed here. The machinery and general arrangements and efficiency are very poor, for the men are almost untrained and there is very little money available.

There is plenty of machinery, including milling plant for coinage: but most of it is rusty and out of use. The power is provided by 4 turbines (one of 25 and 3 of 35-h.p.) driven by the canalized Wad Fas.

Cavalry.—The horsemen of the various tabors all carry rifles, and a good many carry a sword or a dagger, or both, in addition. Lances and spears are practically unknown. A few revolvers are to be seen, but not many.

Clothing and Equipment.

The Standing Army is by way of being clothed in uniform, i.e. red tarbûsh, scarlet tunic with yellow facings, loose blue breeches and yellow slippers: but the clothing is extremely various. So that one often sees, in one tabor, or even in one miya, a selection of colours amongst the men which make them look, at a distance, like a highly variegated *troupe*: scarlet, plum colour, bright green, brilliant mauve, yellow, apricot, violet,

brown, crimson, pink, purple or pale blue. Their breeches are of every shade of blue, and occasionally yellow, white, or green, or of the haphazard colour of their tunic. Where there are facings they are generally yellow, but not necessarily so, and the tunic itself is mostly an apology for such a garment, as regards both fit and shape.

As regards equipment, men of the best tabors generally have a cartridge-pouch, or belt, or bag, or bandolier of some kind, in which to carry their ammunition. Sometimes belts are seen and occasionally a bayonet, rarely in a scabbard. Water bottles, haversacks, and other articles are conspicuous by their absence.

It is not always safe to issue uniforms or equipment to the men, for if they are in want they sell them, and calmly rejoin their unit in their own rags, or else desert with the proceeds.

As regards *Engineers*, there are a few broken-down pieces of engineer equipment, such as pontoons, sextants, &c., but they are generally lost, or not to be got at when wanted; and in any case no natives know how to use them.

Training.

Infantry: The training is extremely limited. The foreign officers and N.C.O.'s do their best to instil a little drill and minor tactics into the officers and men—but these are hurried off on Mehalla when, or even before, they are half trained. Of musketry there is practically none; ammunition is too valuable.

It has been found very difficult to instruct the ordinary Moorish soldier in drill and tactics according to the European plan. Some of the men march well enough on parade, and are fairly efficient at drill in extended order, but beyond this they cannot go. Battalion drill has been tried, but with poor results; and drill with larger units has been found quite

impracticable. Even the best instructed troops, when in the field, forget their training, and fight according to the native idea, *i.e.*, each man for himself.

The *Artillery* requires more intelligence, and the men composing it are consequently better treated in the way of training. But though eager to learn, their mind is not built in a European mould, and they have great difficulty in understanding the guns. Nor can they be trained to treat the guns and their more delicate parts with respect; they are perpetually losing essential parts, or selling them, or breaking them. The gunners are, however, plucky, and do their best in an action. In Fez they carry out their practice by firing from the barrack square at a hill a mile or two outside the town. No danger flags are hoisted.

The training of the *Khayala* (horsemen) is practically nil. They have little or no idea of working together, except in tribal groups. Their idea of action is to gallop towards the enemy, discharge their rifles (whilst mounted), swerve to the flank, and repeat the process. They make, however, fair scouts, though they have no definite system for passing on information.

European officers report that on the whole the Moorish soldier is of good material, plucky, intelligent and anxious to learn: but circumstances are against him.

Horses.

The horses are not as a rule good-looking, and are often small and ill-bred; they are, however, very hardy and useful animals, and are well taken care of by their masters. The daily ration on service, when allowed, is 6½ lbs. of straw and barley. The horses required for the artillery receive 13 lbs. of corn a-day, and come from the Sultan's stables.

The best horses come from the Abda and Dukala country: the type is that of a well-bred cob.

Horses are shod with thin iron plates which sometimes cover the whole hoof. The native veterinary-surgeons (*bitar*) are said to be good, but their science is of a very rudimentary kind.

The saddles are the great cumbrous red-cloth covered ones of the country, with a high peak fore and aft and strong breast strap. They weigh about 2 stone or more, and are much prized by the owners. There are no straps or arrangements for tying on equipment, &c.

The stirrups are slung so far back that the rider is thrown forward, most uncomfortably according to European ideas. When galloping, the rider has to stand up.

Moors are naturally good riders.

The means of inducement are three, the most ordinary being the sharp corners of the heavy square stirrups. The long end of the rein is also used as a whip, and, in addition, a long spike-like spur is sometimes fastened to the heel and scraped along the flank.

Pay.

The nominal cash pay is termed "*muna*."* For ordinary soldiers this amounts to half a Moorish peseta (an imaginary coin) or 2 *bilyuns* a day, *i.e.* about 3d. Besides this they are entitled to rations, for which the money (*munat hamiya*) is handed to the *kateb* (or clerk) of the tabor.

The pay of the upper ranks varies. The *Kaïd el Miya* gets 4 pesetas (2s. 2d.) when on *Mehalla*; when at Fez or at the ports 1½ pesetas (9½d.) or more. The *Kaïd er R'ha* gets from 1 to 5 dollars a day (2s. 8d. to 14s. 8d.), according to the favour of the Sultan. The intermediate

* *Muna* also means provisions or rations.

ranks (Khalifa, mulazim and mokaddem) get intermediate rates, according to circumstances.

As already stated, each man of the Gish is entitled to a quarter peseta ($1\frac{1}{2}d.$) a day, whether on duty or not; but he seldom gets it.

The pay is often so much in arrears that both officers and men take to any trade to make a livelihood. Men, however, sometimes receive a bounty from their tribe.

The artillery receives a slightly higher rate of pay.

Horsemen receive the equivalent of $5d.$ a day; out of this they have to forage their horses.

Discipline.

There is hardly any discipline, as we understand it, in the Army. The higher ranks of officers, *i.e.*, the Kaïd er R'ha, the Khalifa, and the Kaïd el Miya, are generally obeyed through fear of punishment, but the Mulazimin (lieutenants) have little or no authority, and the non-commissioned officers practically none whatever. No salutes are paid to the officers.

At the same time, the Moorish soldier has a healthy idea of authority, and knows that if he disobeys an order he is liable to corporal punishment.

Dispersal in search of loot is not looked upon as a crime—for all do it.

The most general means of correction in the Army is flogging, which is used summarily on all offenders. Officers are punished in this fashion as well as the men. As the punishment is usually inflicted on the spot by the orderly of the officer who orders it, it often happens that a superior is thus thrashed by an inferior.

There is no form of military law or court-martial; and the only form of military imprisonment is that the offender's neck is imprisoned in an iron collar attached to a heavy chain, and he is obliged to sit in the open-air, sun or rain, for so many hours or days.

Sometimes there are as many as 50 collars attached to one chain. (This article is also of use for bringing in prisoners of war.)

Barracks.

There is very little barrack accommodation for the troops. The men are lodged either in stables, out-houses, or sheds, wherever practicable; or else they have to find their own lodging. The places inhabited by the troops are generally dirty, as no sanitary rules exist. No bedding is provided.

In Fez, however, there are several Kasbas, or walled enclosures and houses combined, which form fair barracks according to Moorish ideas.

*On Mehalla.**

The greater part of the Army accompanies the Sultan when he moves; he rarely makes a journey of any length without taking 3,000 or more men with him. These are intended partly as escort and partly for the purpose of punishing and ravaging certain tribes which require to be brought to a proper sense of duty. This form of expedition is termed "haraka," and in former days it was looked on almost as an annual duty or excursion of the Sultan.

Expeditions against rebellious tribes usually take place in the beginning of the summer; the days are long, the rivers low, the crops are getting ripe for plunder, and the troops do not mind the heat; it is only cold and wet that they dread, against which they have no protection.

The usual order of march is as follows:—

First a body of infantry with the baggage and mules, in order to get things ready at the next halting place.

* *Mehalla* means, strictly speaking, a camp; hence an expedition, active service, or even a column of troops

This service, *i.e.*, pitching tents, &c., is done by the "feraigia" or camp-men.

Then comes the main body of infantry, either Standing Army or others, with the Minister of War at their head. After these comes the cavalry, the mounted musicians, and the artillery in turn. Behind the whole travels the Sultan, preceded by his servants, and surrounded by his ministers and a huge escort of horse and foot. His Majesty, however, whose horses are faster, often passes the main body by some miles or so. The only alteration in war time appears to be that advanced, flanking, and rear-guards are sent out for some distance, and the column closes up. Baggage animals then march with their tabors, and there is some cavalry with the vanguard.

When encamped, the Sultan's tent* is pitched on the highest ground. This circle forms the "Aferag." The ministers, councillors, artillery and escort cavalry, and black body-guard form a concentric ring at some distance from the "Aferag," with the guns on the outside, each having his appointed place from time immemorial.

The Minister of War forms a second circular camp in like manner, being surrounded by the ammunition, the infantry, baggage-mules, and pack-animals of the infantry in the order named.

Between the two camps is instituted a market, at which every man buys what he wants. The inhabitants of the country readily bring their provisions for sale, as, if they did not, their produce would be taken by force. There is always a large crowd of camp followers, besides the camp pitchers, and a water-carrying (*rawaia*) corps. The transport animals are often cruelly used, but manage somehow to do their work very well. Bullocks'

* Distinguished from the rest by a large brass ball on top and by separate high canvas walls forming an enclosure round the tent.

hides, coated inside with tar, are used for water. A camel or a mule carries two of these.

A large number of dogs usually accompanies an army, and these, to a great extent, act as sentries.

There is no organized "train" or transport corps, though on the march and in time of war bodies of foragers and water carriers are formed; but for transport purposes on marches and expeditions the Kaïd er R'ha of each tabor collects a few mules, or, in exceptional circumstances, some are issued to him from Headquarters.

The tents are small thin circular bell-tents, without walls, each being intended to hold about 20 men. The officers have larger ones, generally decorated with an immemorial design of blue or black jug-like shapes in rows. A mule can carry about 12 small bell-tents with ease. No mats, sleeping-gear, blankets, or personal baggage are allowed for the men.

For the rest, each man takes with him into the field what equipment he can. Most of them wear or carry a jelab (thick brown or grey hooded cloak), but many of them possess nothing at all, not even a blanket or a mat. There is no regulation equipment or transport for the miya or the tabor.

As for supplies and rations, they vary according to circumstances. Sometimes, if in a friendly country, markets are opened and supplies and forage are bought from the inhabitants by the katebs or other officers of the tabors and issued to the men (minus a proportion as their own perquisite); and sometimes the crops are plundered, if the inhabitants' politics are doubtful. In a hostile country, supplies are of course taken by force.

The following gives an average daily ration as supplied to one well-ordered column on service:—

Meat	-	3 lbs. Moorish	(=5½ lbs.)	per 10 men
Oil	-	½ "	(=¾ lb.)	"
Kusksu meal	4½ "	"	(=8 lbs.)	"
Vegetables	about 1 "	"	(=1¾ lbs.)	"

The men have to provide tea and sugar out of their own pay.

When expeditions are sent out to chastise tribes, proceedings generally begin by a summons to the enemy to submit. This is as a rule disregarded, so the the Sherifian troops begin to harry and pillage the country and to kill a few harmless inhabitants. If the country is rich, the men get their fill and then proceed to desert; if not, they desert because they see no chance of making anything. There is seldom a pitched battle. When there is, and a crushing defeat is inflicted on one side or the other, the victory is not followed up, but is made the basis of negotiations.

When a victory is gained over the rebels the dead bodies of a number of the enemy are decapitated and their heads pickled and sent in to the Sultan. These are then set up on a principal gate (if in a town) as an earnest of the force of the Sultan's arms.

Inter-tribal fights are of a more businesslike and savage description than the mere chastising of rebels, for either side has generally some important interest at stake.

The Nation in Arms.

In the above, a description has throughout been given of the Government Army. A few words remain to be said about the fighting elements in the rest of the country.

As already stated, the Government Army, including the Gish, is drawn, on the whole, only from the Bled el Maghzen, which amounts to only a little more than one-fifth of the country in extent. The remaining four-fifths, Bled es Siba, comprise tribes which are either independent, semi-independent, or in revolt against the Sultan. These include the tribes of the Riff and of the country towards the Algerian frontier, the Jebala—or

people of the hills, a vague expression meaning practically all the mountaineers, mostly Berbers—and some of the large tribes to the South and South-West, whose Kaïds are more or less independent: *e.g.* the Sus and Draa provinces, many of the Atlas tribes, and the big tribes who have latterly been fighting the French, *e.g.* the Shawia, the M'dakra, &c., both Arabs and Berbers.

Now it may be said at once that, as regards the armament of these people, practically every man possesses a gun or a rifle of sorts, with a limited amount of ammunition; and as regards training, there is none at all, for the tribesmen fight in an incoherent mob in which there is rarely any definite purpose or unity of command. A proportion of the men are mounted, but there is no artillery; nor, if there were, could they use it.

The men are active and accustomed to hardship, and would be formidable adversaries in guerilla and mountain warfare. Possessing, however, as they do, neither discipline, cohesion, instruction, nor arms of precision, they would be much less dangerous in the open country. Their only ideas of tactics are to get round one of the enemy's flanks, or to feign a retreat and return to attack the enemy while he is looting. Little combined action can be expected. Probably the contingents would fight better in and near their own districts than away from them.

Their arms would consist for the most part of native flint lock muzzle-loading muskets, (though many of the tribesmen now possess Winchesters and Remingtons, especially on the Riff coast,) and swords or daggers, and their dress would be that usual in the tribe to which they belong. Some tribes are said to tie daggers to rods and use them as lances. Latterly many of the Riff, Sus, and other coast

tribes have obtained breech-loading rifles, while there are said to be a good many in the interior also, smuggled from Spain or procured, taken, stolen or bought from the Makhzen Army.

Provisions and ammunition would be brought with them from their own tribes; there is no system whatever of supply—each man looks after himself.

THE POLICE.

The Police were constituted under European supervision by the Algeiras Convention of 1906.

Strength and organisation.

The Force is composed of all three arms—infantry, cavalry and artillery.

It consists of 10 "Tabors," of which two each are apportioned to Tangier and Casablanca, and the remaining six to the six other ports (Tetuan, Larash, Rabat, Mazagan, Safi and Mogador).

Each Tabor consists of a varying number of "miyas" (companies) and "jemaas" (sections) of (generally) all three arms. 1 miya = 2 jemaa = 4 rubaa.

A Tabor of Police numbers 100 to 500 men, and a Miya from 42 to 78*; a jemaa 12 to 16.†

The force is organized entirely in mixed Tabors; i.e., there is no central or separate command of Infantry, Cavalry or Artillery.

It is commanded entirely by Moors, 57 Moorish officers altogether. There are 12 French and 8 Spanish officers, who are Instructors only, under the Swiss Inspector-General, Colonel Müller.

The men are drawn, irrespective of tribe, from all parts of the country.

* Nominally 60.

† Nominally 12 (Arty).

Armament.

The Infantry are armed with the Gras rifle and bayonet, the Cavalry with Gras carbine and bayonet and sword (French pattern), and the Artillery will probably be armed with a certain number of mountain guns,* but mainly with machine guns.† (About half the required guns and machine guns have now arrived. July, '09.) Officers carry revolvers.

Recruitment of men.—The men are recruited by voluntary enlistment, and have to pass a strict medical examination. They are a fine, well-set-up lot, at all events as far as Tangier and Larash are concerned. Many of the men come from as far as Ujda to join the police. They look happy and contented and get their pay regularly.

They are housed and clothed (at least the men are), but have to find their own food.

The service is consequently popular and the ranks are filled to overflowing. Engagements are for five years, but many men get bored with the discipline before their time is up and desert. Many of the men are married and live with their wives in barracks.

Barracks.—There are three Police Barracks outside Tangier and one inside. The barracks in the other towns are good.

* 1 per jemaa.

† 2 per jemaa.

Distribution.

The distribution is as follows :—

	Tabor No.	French or Spanish control.	Arm.	How divided.	Men.	Total.
Tangier ...	1	French*	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	4 miyas 5 „ 2 jemaa	265 211 24	} 500
„ ...	2	Spanish†	{ Infy. Cavy	4 miyas 4 men	246 4	} 250
Casablanca	3	French†	{ Infy. Cavy	2 miyas 4 men	96 4	} 100
„ ...	4	Spanish*	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	2 miyas 3 „ 2 jemaa	147 129 24	} 300
Tetuan ...	5	Spanish	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	3 miyas 1 jemaa 2 „	235 16 24	} 275
Laraish ...	6	Spanish	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	2 miyas 1 jemaa 2 „	135 16 24	} 175
Rabat ...	7	French	{ Infy. Cavy Arty.	3 miyas 2 jemaa 2 „	219 32 24	} 275
Mogador...	8	French	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	3 miyas 2 jemaa 2 „	219 32 24	} 275
Mazagan...	9	French	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	2 miyas 1 jemaa 2 „	135 16 24	} 175

* For work outside the town.

† For work inside the town.

Distribution—continued.

	Tabor No.	French or Spanish control.	Arm.	How divided.	Men.	Total.
Safi	10	French	{ Infy. Cavy. Arty.	2 miyas 1 jemaa 2 „	135 16 24	{ 175
Total Infantry ... 1,832						
Cavalry ... 476						
Artillery ... 192						
Grand Total					2,500	

Uniform.—The Infantry are dressed in red tunics with dark blue collars (with number of Tabor in brass on it) and cuffs with three buttons; dark blue Moorish breeches, putties, and ankle boots. Brown belts. As great coat Infantry and Artillery have the brown jelab, and Cavalry a dark blue sulham. Red *Sheshia* cap, flattened like a tarbûsh.

Pay.—The daily pay is as follows :—

Kaïd Tabor	-	-	-	20 pesetas†
Mutessarif*	-	-	-	15 „
Kaïd Miya	-	-	-	7½ „

There are no subalterns

Imâm (priest)	-	-	-	3 „
Mokaddem (sergeant)	2.75	pesetas	at Tangier ;	
	elsewhere	2.50	„	
Maûn (corporal)	2.25	„	at Tangier ;	
	elsewhere	2.00	„	
Askari (1st class)	1.75	„	at Tangier ;	
	elsewhere	1.50	„	
Askari (2nd class)	1.50	„	at Tangier ;	
	elsewhere	1.25	„	

* Administrative officer.

† Spanish.

According to the Algesiras Act there were not to be more than 600 or less than 150 at any port ; but Tangier required not less than 750, so in order to allot more to that port the numbers at some of the other places were reduced.

Thanks to the close supervision by European officers the Police is quite a respectable disciplined force, and carries out its duties satisfactorily in the coast towns. A good many difficulties are of course encountered by the instructors, but it is hoped that they will disappear in time, and that the force will become a really valuable one.

For further details regarding the Police Force see the "Règlement sur les Corps de Police institués dans les 8 Ports de la Côte Marocaine d'après l'Acte d'Algésiras, 1907" (slightly modified since printing).

Pay.—The daily pay is as follows:—

20 pesetas	For the day
15 "	" "
12 "	" "

There are no emoluments

8 "	For the night
20 pesetas at Tangier	For the night
15 "	" "
12 "	" "
8 "	For the night
20 pesetas at Tangier	For the night
15 "	" "
12 "	" "
8 "	For the night
20 pesetas at Tangier	For the night
15 "	" "
12 "	" "

Administrative officer.