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407.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MEHEMET ALI'S

INTENDED

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

PART I.

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ABSTRACT OF CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MEHEMET ALI'S INTENDED DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

THE first account which was received in England of the intention of Mehemet Ali to declare himself independent, is contained in a report from the French Consul-General in Egypt, M. Cochelet, dated the 3rd of May, which Count Molé read to Lord Granville on the 1st of June. It appeared from that despatch that the Egyptian Government had decided that the time was come for such a declaration, but that it was expedient before making it, to have some communication with Foreign Powers. Mehemet Ali himself told M. Cochelet, that having expended large sums in the improvement and civilization of his territories, and being unwilling that the inheritance should not pass to his children, he had resolved at all risks to declare himself independent; and to M. Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General, he said that neither the blockade of his ports by the squadrons of France and England, nor the invasion of his territory by the Russians should deter him, and that he had 200,000 men to resist the latter.

On this intelligence Count Molé said, that it was important that France and England should act in concert, that the first question was whether the Consuls of the Two Powers should threaten Mehemet Ali with a blockade, in case he should carry his plan into execution; and the next, whether eventual instructions to that effect should be given to the French and English Admirals. Count Molé however said that he must take the opinion of the Council, before he could speak officially on the matter; but he was persuaded that the conduct of the Porte would be in accordance with the views of Russia in the East, and would be regulated by the advice of that Power.

The reports of the Russian Consul-General in Egypt coincided with those of M. Cochelet, and he added that France, England, Austria, and Russia must unite in making the strongest representations to Mehemet Ali, in order to deter him from his proposed course. Count Medem, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, told Count Molé that he did not doubt the inclination of the Russian Government to exert itself to prevent Mehemet Ali from acting as he intended; and Count Molé replied, that the views of France on that point were in accordance with those of Russia. Count Molé, however, told Lord Granville that he doubted the policy of a joint representation of the Four Powers, particularly if it was to be coupled with a menace; for if France and England were to menace with blockade, Russia would threaten with an army, and upon the whole it appeared advisable that the Consul of each Government should act separately.

Count Molé wrote to M. Cochelet on the 4th of June, that pending the deliberation of the French Cabinet on the course to be adopted, he was to use his utmost exertions to deter the Pasha from carrying into immediate effect his declared intention; and Lord Granville, in obedience to his instructions, stated that the British Government would give early attention to this matter.

B

Lord Granville,
No. 192, June 8,
1838.

Count Medem told Lord Granville what he had said to Count Molé; and added that he was so fully convinced of the wish of the Emperor of Russia to maintain things in their present state between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, that he had urged the French Government to lose no time in taking steps to prevent the execution of Mehemet Ali's intentions; but that if the Sultan's rights were attacked, the Emperor would march an army to his assistance.

Lord Granville,
No. 195, June 11,
1838.

Lord Granville told Count Molé, in reply to an inquiry made by that Minister, that he had heard privately from Lord Palmerston that the question respecting Mehemet Ali had been submitted to Cabinet, and that he expected soon to be instructed to state that the British Government would resist the separation of Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire, and send a fleet to the vicinity of Alexandria, with which it would be proposed that a French squadron should co-operate. Count Molé agreed in the policy of this course, and said that he would submit it to the Council, in order that preparations might be made; but that the naval means of the French Government were at present for various reasons somewhat straitened. Count Molé considered it most expedient that separate declarations should be made to Mehemet Ali by each of the Powers; for that Russia would never be a party to an agreement by which her freedom of action would be contracted; and the Sultan would never enter into any Convention with France and England which should interfere with his Treaty with Russia. Lord Granville is satisfied with the professions of the King and Count Molé, and he does not perceive in them any disposition to step forward as Mediators between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, on the basis of the acknowledgment of the latter's independence, as M. Cochelet seemed, by his despatches, to wish should be the case.

Lord Granville,
No. 203, June 15,
1838.

With reference to a report made by Count Sebastiani of a conversation with Lord Palmerston, Count Molé told Lord Granville that the King of the French approved of a French squadron being sent to Alexandria to co-operate with the English fleet; and that it was desirable that the two squadrons should make their appearance off that port at the same time. Baron Roussin was also instructed to urge the Porte, in the event of Mehemet Ali declaring his independence, not to adopt any immediate measures against him, but to trust to the Allies of the Sultan for the assertion of his rights.

Lord Granville,
No. 207, June 18,
1838.

A few days after this conversation Count Molé communicated to Lord Granville further despatches from M. Cochelet, of the 23rd and 26th of May, reporting that Mehemet Ali had acquainted him with his determination to declare his independence, and had only, in answer to his remonstrances, agreed to wait a sufficient time to ascertain the disposition of the French and English Governments to settle amicably, by mediation with the Sultan, the question of his independence. M. Cochelet intimates a suspicion that England is not indisposed to favour the views of Mehemet Ali, grounding the suspicion on the advantages afforded by the Pasha to the communication with India, and upon the language of Dr. Bowring to the Pasha. M. Cochelet also again intimates a wish that France should assume the office of Mediator; but these insinuations of M. Cochelet have not made any impression on the French Government, who appear satisfied that the only chance of peace in the East is in the intimate union between France and England. Count Molé was anxious to know what instructions would be given to Colonel Campbell and the British Admiral, and seemed prepared to threaten the Pasha on the part of France with a blockade of all his ports, and if necessary to carry that threat into execution.

Lord Granville,
No. 215, June 22,
1838.
Lord Ponsonby,
No. 134, May 27,
1838.

Lord Granville having mentioned to Count Molé the language held by Baron Roussin to Lord Ponsonby, on the necessity of not allowing the Ottoman fleet to go to sea, (before any notion of Mehemet Ali's intention had been obtained at Constantinople), was led to believe that the language of Baron Roussin was unauthorized by any instructions from his Government; but Count Molé suggested whether it might not be expedient to invite the co-operation of the Russian Minister at Constantinople

with Baron Roussin and Lord Ponsonby, with a view to prevent collision between the Turkish and Egyptian fleets.

With reference to what is said by M. Cochelet respecting Dr. Bowring, it may be stated, that it appears from Dr. Bowring's letters that he was in the habit of talking on political matters with the Pasha and Boghos Bey, and that the language held to him by them satisfied him that the Pasha would declare his independence if any occasion were given to him to do so.

Mr. Waghorn too appears to have been encouraging the Pasha in his ambitious schemes; and it was with reference to Mr. Waghorn's language that Colonel Campbell was instructed to say that Mr. Waghorn was not in the confidence of the Government; and that the Pasha would act unwisely if he were to rely on his asserted influence either in England or in India.

On the 9th of June, a few days after the first intelligence reached England of Mehemet Ali's intention, but before any communication on the subject had been received direct from Colonel Campbell, Colonel Campbell was told, with reference to that intelligence, that it was to be feared that the Pasha might have been influenced by the unguarded conversation of some irresponsible British subjects, or by the designing language of others, to suppose that England would either sanction or acquiesce in his renunciation of his allegiance to the Sultan; and Colonel Campbell was instructed to lose no time in dispelling any error under which the Pasha might labour, as to the course which England would take in any contest which might arise between him and the Sultan on such a ground.

The first communications from Colonel Campbell were received in London on the 18th of June. It appears that even so early as the latter end of March, Mehemet Ali's language led M. Laurin, the Austrian Consul-General, to anticipate a declaration of independence from him; but M. Laurin inferred that it was not his intention to attack the Sultan, but to do everything to provoke an attack. The Pasha justified his armaments by the allegation of other armaments being made on the side of the Porte; and Colonel Campbell, referring to M. Laurin's opinion on the subject, says that every expression of the Pasha shows that he is resolved to assert and declare his independence. The amount of Egyptian forces in Syria is 75,000 regulars of all arms, and 30,000 irregulars; in Egypt, Candia and Arabia, 38,000.

Mehemet Ali, about this time, (the middle of May) assured Colonel Campbell that it was not his intention to pass the frontiers of Syria, or to commit any aggression on the Porte; and that his armaments were entirely defensive; that he should be happy if he could, with safety to his family, reduce his forces; and if his position was changed to what it ought to be, it would be seen how anxious he was for peace.

The Pasha appears to have held similar language to Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General in Egypt, on receiving from him a communication of an instruction from Count Nesselrode, dated the 14th of March, 1838, in which the motives of his armaments in Syria were demanded, and a warning given that the Emperor was bound to assist the Sultan if attacked. The Pasha asked Count Medem if the Great Powers would object to his making an arrangement with the Porte for his independence; to which the Count replied, that he did not suppose they would to any amicable arrangement. Count Medem's conviction was, that the Pasha would seize the first favourable moment for throwing off his allegiance; and in this view Colonel Campbell concurred; referring, as the ground of his opinion, to the course pursued by France in 1836, as encouraging the Pasha to entertain the notion of independence; to the sanction given to that notion by the Sultan in the negotiation carried on by Sarim Effendi, as Turkish Plenipotentiary, in 1837; and to the language held on the matter in private conversation, both by the Pasha and his minister, showing that neither of them expected that the maritime Powers would allow Russia to march troops into Asia Minor, or themselves incur any expence to support the Sultan; and that Mehemet Ali would be joined by the whole Mussulman popula-

Dr. Bowring,
Nov. 28, Dec. 8,
1837.
March 27, April 7,
1838.

Colonel Campbell,
Separate, April 16,
1838.
To Col. Campbell,
No. 16, May 22,
1838.

To Col. Campbell,
No. 19, June 9,
1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 30, May 14,
1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 33, May 19,
1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 34, May 20,
1838.

Col. Campbell's,
Nos. 41, 45, and
54, of 1836.
Col. Campbell's,
No. 16, 18, and 39,
of 1837.

tion of Turkey against the Russians. To this was to be added the professed reluctance of the Pasha to leave his family to the mercy of the Porte, and to make over to the Porte the inheritance of all that he had created in Egypt.

Lord Granville,
No. 212, June 22,
1838.

With reference to a statement in Colonel Campbell's despatch, No. 28, that M. Cochelet would not co-operate with him respecting Mehemet Ali's armaments, Count Molé told Lord Granville that the instructions which M. Cochelet would subsequently receive, would enable him cordially to co-operate with Colonel Campbell in expressing the dissatisfaction of the two Governments with Mehemet Ali's intention to declare himself independent.

Lord Granville,
No. 221, June 25,
1838.

With reference to what is stated in Colonel Campbell's No. 34, Lord Granville was assured by M. Désages, in the absence of Count Molé, that Baron Roussin had never attempted to bring about the independence of Mehemet Ali, but that on his own responsibility he had sought to persuade the Pasha to receive as a boon from the Sultan the investiture of the Pashalics of Syria, and to purchase by the abandonment of the other places now occupied by him, the reversion of a part of his Syrian possessions in favour of his son. Also with respect to Sarim Effendi's negotiation, M. Désages said, that the basis of that negotiation, was the reversion to the sons of the Pasha of his actual tributary position of vassal to the Porte; and that the acknowledgment of his independence was not at that time mooted.*

Colonel Campbell,
No. 36, May 26,
1838.

It was not, however, until the 25th of May, that Mehemet Ali declared to Colonel Campbell that he was fully resolved to declare himself independent; the interests of his family required that he should take that step, but before doing so, he would wait awhile, in the hope that the British Government would take such measures as might preserve peace, at the same time that his independence was established. Colonel Campbell replied, that it was a serious matter, and he hoped that he would suspend any active measure until accounts could be received from England, and in the meantime pay his tribute to the Porte. To this Mehemet Ali assented.

Colonel Campbell is persuaded that the Pasha will persevere in his resolution. The Pasha calculates upon the opposition of France and England, to the advance of a Russian army into Asia Minor, or failing that opposition, to his being able to rouse the Mussulman population against the Russians, which Colonel Campbell considers it probable that he might do. The Pasha further calculates upon the reluctance of England and France to incur the expence of armaments against him; and upon the resources of Egypt and Syria, as rendering nugatory any blockade of those coasts; he is ready to make every reasonable pecuniary sacrifice to purchase the acknowledgment of his independence by the Sultan; and he asserts that such a course would be advantageous to the Porte, which can never resume its rule over Syria; he cannot consent that the fruit of all his toils should revert to the Sultan to the ruin of his own children. The Pasha, Colonel Campbell states, made, about the same time, similar communications to the Austrian, French, and Russian Consuls-General.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 139, June 6,
1838.

Dr. Bowring, on arriving at Constantinople, on the 4th of June, apprized Lord Ponsonby of the step which Mehemet Ali had announced his intention to take; which Lord Ponsonby and Baron Roussin thereupon made known to the Porte. The Reis Effendi replied, that nothing would ever induce the Sultan to submit to the dismemberment of his empire, and that the Porte relied on the good faith of England.

Sir F. Lamb,
No. 55, June 19,
1838.

Prince Metternich, on communicating to Sir F. Lamb, the reports

* Dr. Bowring's letters of 22nd May, contain accounts of what the Pasha meditated doing, and of the language held by the Pasha and by Boghos Bay to him and Colonel Campbell, at interviews previous to that day. The formal communication was however only made to Colonel Campbell on the 25th of May.

which he had received from Constantinople on this subject, authorized Sir Frederick Lamb to propose that Austria, England, France, and Russia should come to an understanding in London, as to the measures best calculated to prevent Mehemet Ali from declaring his independence, and as to those to be employed in case he should make the declaration. Prince Metternich did not seem to anticipate any objections to this course from other quarters, if approved by Her Majesty's Government.

Some time before any of the foregoing accounts were received in London, but when the reports from Egypt showed that nothing but independent sovereignty could satisfy Mehemet Ali's ambition, and that all his armaments were being made with that object, Lord Palmerston conversed with the Austrian, French, and Russian Ambassadors on that subject, and received from each of them the assurance that his Government was resolved to discountenance any such attempt on the part of the Pasha, and was anxious that the Consuls of the Four Powers at Alexandria should be instructed simultaneously to deter him from such an attempt, and Count Pozzo di Borgo proposed that the British fleet should be sent to the coasts of Egypt and Syria, to give weight to Colonel Campbell's remonstrances.

On the 24th of June, after Mehemet Ali's intentions became known, Lord Palmerston, in conversation with Prince Esterhazy, referred to what had been already agreed upon by the Four Great Powers as to the warning to be given by their respective Consuls to Mehemet Ali; but added that it was fitting that the Powers should be prepared to carry, if necessary, into execution any threats they might make; supposing always that the Sultan should resent the conduct of Mehemet Ali, and solicit aid from his Allies. In such a case, England and France could immediately afford naval assistance; but that would not suffice at the beginning of the campaign. The Russians then would probably send an army to the assistance of the Sultan, and occupy the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; and, however, injuriously such a proceeding would affect the interests of France, Austria, and England, those Powers could hardly, under the circumstances, effectually interfere to prevent it. It was expedient, therefore, to devise by previous concert of the Four Powers, some means of affording military assistance to the Sultan. England might, indeed, send an army from Bombay, but that would occasion jealousy in other Powers, and would only accelerate the march of the Russians; and a French military expedition would have the same effect. Austria, however, might do so without creating any such jealousy on the part of Russia, and if Austria were inclined to do so, means of transport could be found in the Mediterranean. Prince Esterhazy said, that he thought Russia would be willing to enter into arrangements on these matters with other Powers. Lord Palmerston added, that he wished Prince Esterhazy to explain to his Government, that the British Government had only thrown out this as a general notion, and not as making a proposition; but from a desire to know Prince Metternich's own opinions.

On the 25th of June, Lord Palmerston, in communicating to Count Pozzo di Borgo the substance of the accounts from Egypt, and the intention of the British Government to return to Mehemet Ali the answer which the Four Powers had agreed upon, observed that the Pasha might have been influenced in his decision by some irresponsible British subjects in Egypt, and by his correspondents in England, who had misled him as to the views of the British Government, and also by his speculation on the jealousy with which France and England would view the advance of a Russian army into Turkey, and the disunion which might consequently arise between the Great Powers; to prevent this, it appeared expedient to establish a previous concert between the Powers. Count Pozzo di Borgo appeared to acquiesce in this, and did not imply that Russia would be adverse to such previous concert.

On the 26th of June, Lord Palmerston told Count Sébastiani what had passed between himself and Prince Esterhazy and Count Pozzo di Borgo, and asked his opinion upon the communication Lord Palmerston had made to Prince Esterhazy. Count Sébastiani concurred in the views of Lord Palmerston, and said that it was absolutely necessary to prevent

To Lord Granville,
No. 297, July 3,
1838.

the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; that a naval operation would be insufficient; that the isolated action of Russia would be a great evil, and could only be prevented by previous concert, and that Prussia should be invited to be a party; that military assistance should be afforded by one Power alone; that Lord Palmerston should propose to the several Ambassadors and Ministers in London, that the Five Powers should offer to the Sultan naval and military assistance; that England, France, and Russia should afford naval, and Austria military aid; and Prussia, if required, send more officers to organize the Sultan's army. Count Sébastiani added that these, however, were only his own personal sentiments.

Lord Palmerston concludes his despatch by stating that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that such a concert of the Five Powers would afford the best chance of preventing Mehemet Ali from declaring his independence, or of preserving the peace of Europe if he did so; and Lord Granville was instructed to communicate with Count Molé on this point.

With reference to Count Sébastiani's report of the above conversation with Lord Palmerston, Count Molé told Lord Granville that he was of opinion that it would be inexpedient to suggest the employment of Austrian troops; that the Court of Vienna would never consent to it; and that the mere proposition would give umbrage to Russia. Count Molé was not, however, prepared to propose another course, but was inclined to think that the Consuls of Austria, England, France, and Russia, should separately, rather than jointly, warn Mehemet Ali of the determination of their Courts to support the rights of the Sultan; though it was a point to be considered whether some expectation should not be held out to the Pasha, that the Four Powers would employ their good offices to obtain for his children the reversion of his present tenure of the territories now governed by him, as the overthrow of the Power of Mehemet Ali was not to be desired, on account of the barrier it offered to the ambition of Russia.

Count Molé at the same time communicated to Lord Granville, despatches from M. Cochelet of the 31st of May, and 5th of June, in which it appeared that, although M. Cochelet had endeavoured to dissuade Mehemet Ali from an early execution of his intention, he had not sought to crush any hopes which the Pasha might have formed of eventually obtaining the good offices of France in favour of his views; and Count Molé expressed strongly his disapprobation of M. Cochelet having allowed any doubt to exist on that point. In his despatch of the 5th of June, M. Cochelet said that the Pasha meant to delay his declaration until he returned to Alexandria in October from a visit to the gold mines.

The French Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna reports that Prince Metternich seems to be of opinion that Mehemet Ali will not carry his threat into execution, and that he only uttered it, in order to see how far the Great Powers of Europe were disposed to interfere in support of the Sultan.

Colonel Campbell was instructed by the Mail of the 7th of July, to state to the Pasha that Her Majesty's Government regretted to receive his communication, but hoped that he would still on consideration abandon his intention, the attempted execution of which would be destructive to his own fame, and fatal to the interests of his family. Success was impossible, for all the Powers of Europe would side with the Sultan. The British Government for itself declared that, in such a case, Great Britain would support the Sultan in his attempt to obtain redress, and in order to prevent the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, and the Pasha must not expect that any jealousies among the Powers of Europe would prevent them from affording every necessary assistance to the Sultan for upholding, enforcing, and vindicating his just and legitimate rights.

Lord Granville read to Count Molé Lord Palmerston's despatch

Lord Granville,
No. 230, July 2,
1838.

To Col. Campbell,
No. 21, July 7,
1838.

Lord Granville,
No. 236, July 6,
1838.

No. 297, who said that he must have some time to reflect upon it, before he could discuss its contents.

Afterwards Count Molé told Lord Granville that on reflection he saw nothing in Lord Palmerston's No. 297, to induce him to alter his instructions to Count Sébastiani. Count Molé disapproved of the plan of applying to Austria to send an army into Asia Minor, to which he conceived Prince Metternich would not consent, and which Count Molé evidently disliked as tending to the occupation by an Austrian army, for an uncertain period of time, of a portion of the Turkish territory. Count Molé was ready to concert measures for preventing Mehemet Ali from taking the step he meditated, and to concur in a simultaneous, or even a joint declaration on the part of the Powers that they would resist the assertion of his independence; and in reply to an observation made by Lord Granville, that the mere threat of opposition might not deter the Pasha, counting as he did upon disunion being occasioned among the Powers by the advance of a Russian army into Turkey; whereas the knowledge of an arrangement being entered into for the eventual employment of an Austrian army might have that effect; Count Molé said that he relied on the effect of the appearance of the British and French fleets, and was even not adverse to proposing that those fleets should be joined by a Russian squadron.

Upon being informed by Lord Granville of Prince Metternich's opinion as to the expediency of the Great Powers concerting not only the measures to be adopted to deter Mehemet Ali, but also those to be employed in case he should persevere; and that this concert should be come to in London; Count Molé remarked, that the Conference, if established, had better be held at Paris, as neutral ground between Russia and England, the two Powers most jealous of each other. Lord Granville supposes that jealousy of Count Sébastiani was at the bottom of this suggestion.

Lord Granville having shown Count Molé the despatch to Colonel Campbell, No. 21, the Count in return read his instructions to M. Cochelet, by which that Agent was directed to remind Mehemet Ali of the interest which France had shown in his welfare and in that of his family, and to express regret at the step which he was about to take, and which would end in his ruin: that France, in common with all the Great Powers, would oppose his attempt to dismember the Turkish Empire. Count Molé then said to Lord Granville, that he thought the identity of the language held by the Great Powers, must make an impression on Mehemet Ali, especially if backed by the appearance of a British and French fleet off Alexandria; and he therefore objected now to enter into arrangements for affording military aid to the Porte.

The King of the French, on informing Lord Granville that Count Sébastiani had reported that Lord Palmerston was satisfied with the course which the French Government intended to pursue, added that the instructions which it was proposed to give to M. Cochelet* would be communicated to the British Government, but not despatched, until it was known that they were in accordance with its sentiments. The King also was sanguine as to the effect on Mehemet Ali of the declared opposition of the Great Powers; but His Majesty thought Mehemet Ali would be more readily induced to abandon his project, if a hope had been held out to him, that the good offices of France and England would be employed at Constantinople to aid him in obtaining the reversion of his power for his son.

In reply to this despatch, Mr. Aston was told that Count Sébastiani agreed with Lord Palmerston in opinion, that it would be inexpedient for England and France to endeavour to renew the negotiation which was carried on some time ago between the Porte and Mehemet Ali, for securing to Ibrahim Pasha the reversion of the Pashalics of Egypt and of Acre; such an arrangement being a purely domestic matter between

Lord Granville,
No. 247, July 9,
1838.

Lord Granville,
No. 249, July 13,
1838.

Lord Granville,
No. 254, July 16,
1838.

To Mr. Aston,
No. 1, July 20,
1838.

* It is presumed that the papers communicated by Count Sébastiani on the 19th of July, are the papers referred to. M. Cochelet was to be instructed to present a strong note to Mehemet Ali, threatening him with the presence of a French squadron off Alexandria.

the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, in which Foreign Powers are not entitled to interfere uninvited.

Prince Metternich in a despatch to Prince Esterhazy, of the 26th June, says that there can exist no doubt as to the wishes of Mehemet Ali on the subject of his independence, and that it is possible that he may attempt to give effect to those wishes, although it does not therefore follow that he will succeed. The Pasha is doubtless in possession of more material power than the Sultan; but that power depends on himself alone. The idea of establishing a dynasty in his family, is repugnant to the spirit of Mahomedanism: the only dynasty which that recognizes is in the person of the Caliph, as devolving in regular family succession: and all notions of family which are cherished by the Arabs, have relation to their tribes: and Mehemet Ali is not an Arab. Mehemet Ali could only establish an Empire for his own life; neither could Ibrahim Pasha do more. Prince Metternich looks upon Mehemet Ali as playing a part; but he considers that he will not persevere if he sees the Powers opposed to his plans. Consequently, in the opinion of the Prince, it rests with the Powers to decide the course of events.

The Prince considers the language of Mehemet Ali to be characterized by irresolution. Having first broached the subject of his independence with the Austrian Consul-General, and subsequently with the Consuls-General of the other Powers, and received no encouragement, he shortly afterwards resumed the subject with the Austrian Consul-General, in the shape of inviting the opinion of Prince Metternich on the subject of his independence.

The conclusion which Prince Metternich draws from the accounts from Alexandria is, that Mehemet Ali is seeking, in a greater or less degree, to deceive the Maritime Powers and Russia. All the Powers, however, have concurred in one view of the matter; and it is only important that uniformity of opinion, should lead to uniformity in the course to be pursued.

Prince Metternich conceives that the Powers should declare at Cairo and at Constantinople, that they will not recognise the independence of Mehemet Ali, though they will insist upon the execution of the Treaty of Kutaya: and the Prince considers that by adopting this course, the danger of Mehemet Ali's declaring his independence will be in a great degree obviated, if not entirely removed.

In a conversation with Sir Frederick Lamb about the same time, Prince Metternich expressed his concurrence in the propriety of a British squadron being sent to the Levant, to keep Mehemet Ali in check; and on a subsequent occasion, he requested Sir Frederick Lamb to convey to Her Majesty's Government his deliberate opinion, that although Mehemet Ali would not give way to mere reasoning, he would not proceed, if satisfied that by doing so, he would hasten his own destruction. The opposition, therefore, of the Four Powers, would induce Mehemet Ali to pause; but though approving of the employment of a joint British and French squadron, Prince Metternich conceived that the efficacy of such a demonstration would depend upon its being made with the approbation, and therefore, upon its being considered as speaking the sense of the Four Powers.

Prince Metternich further approved of the Sultan being advised to abstain from attacking Mehemet Ali, considering the Four Powers to be capable of checking, and, if necessary, of punishing Mehemet Ali.

The Austrian and Russian Consuls-General at Alexandria, concur in attributing Mehemet Ali's declaration to the encouragement which he received from Dr. Bowring.

The subsequent accounts received from Alexandria up to the 2nd of July, appear to have confirmed Prince Metternich in his opinion, that the sole object of Mehemet Ali's language up to that time, was to acquire a knowledge of the attitude which would be assumed by Austria and Russia, as well as by England and France. The wishes of the Pasha, to which he will doubtless take the first favourable opportunity for giving effect, are clearly to be the founder of a Great Empire, and to transmit it to his posterity. Prince Metternich repeats his conviction, that this

Sir F. Lamb, No. 57, June 27, 1838.

Sir F. Lamb, No. 63, July 3, 1838.

Prince Metternich to Prince Esterhazy, July 27, 1838.

idea, being at variance with the principles of Mahomedanism, rests on no solid foundation. The only way indeed, in which an Egyptian Empire could be maintained, would be by destroying the Ottoman Empire: Mehemet Ali never could be a faithful and useful Ally of the Porte; and he only now puts forward that notion in the hope of profiting by the rivalry of the Great Powers. His present language is held rather for the purpose of feeling his way, than with any serious intention of acting up to it. But supposing that he should resolve to run all risks, in that case, the safety of the Porte will consist in the attitude which Austria and Russia are determined for themselves to assume, and which will doubtless be assumed by the Maritime Powers. The Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, and the Internuncio at Constantinople, will hold the same language with their colleagues; and the Emperor of Russia agrees with the Austrian Government, that the language of menace to the Pasha, and of support to the Sultan, to be effectual, must be simultaneously used. The Prussian Government will join in the declarations made by the other Powers, and thus prove equally to Mehemet Ali and to the Sultan, that the views of the Christian Powers in favour of the maintenance of tranquillity in the East are identical.

It has been stated above, that on learning the intention of Mehemet Ali to declare his independence, Lord Ponsonby and Baron Roussin made known the intelligence to the Porte. They both at the same time recommended the Porte to avoid any act of aggression, but still to prepare to resist any attack. The ground taken by Baron Roussin, was the certainty of Mehemet Ali being victorious in any contest, on account of his superiority of force: but Lord Ponsonby, who does not admit that superiority, rested his argument in favour of a pacific policy on the ground of prudence, and of deference to the views of France and England, and on the expediency of leaving the odium of being the aggressor on Mehemet Ali. Lord Ponsonby too, at the instigation of Baron Roussin, urged the Porte not to send the Turkish fleet to sea, being moved to this step by the apprehension that a collision might in such case ensue between the Egyptian and Turkish fleets; and further by a desire that the Porte should not give umbrage to France, which Power, from considerations respecting Tunis, was specially anxious to prevent the sailing of the fleet.

Speaking of the course which he had pursued in this matter, Lord Ponsonby says that his first object was to induce the Porte to abstain from hostilities, in which he hoped he had been successful; and the next to strengthen the military power of the Turkish Government, for which purpose he had urged the Porte to give the virtual command of the army to General Chrzanowsky, which the Porte appeared to be inclined to do.

The Russian mission, it appears, assured the Turkish Government that they need not be uneasy as to the projects of Mehemet Ali, as the Russian fleet and army were ready to succour the Sultan if attacked by the Pasha.

Lord Ponsonby states a rumour that Mehemet Ali was coining money in his own name; and His Excellency further remarks upon the consequence to the Sultan, in his sovereign capacity, of Mehemet Ali becoming the independent sovereign of the Holy Cities, the possession of which is considered in some degree to confer a right to the Caliphate.

Colonel Campbell having obtained from the French Consul-General a copy of the circular of the Porte of the 24th of June, by which it appeared that the Turkish Government were about to send a frigate with some troops to Cyprus, took occasion to express to Mehemet Ali, his hope that the Egyptian vessels which might fall in with any vessels of the Sultan, might be instructed to avoid any collision or even communication with them. This the Pasha promised, disclaiming at the same time all intention to commit hostilities.

But, on a subsequent occasion, the Pasha declared to Colonel Campbell that, if the Turkish squadron should approach Alexandria, he would attack it; and he denied that he could be considered the aggressor in such a contingency.

The Pasha went on to say, that it was probable that France and England would use very strong language towards him; to which he

Lord Ponsonby, No. 143, June 11, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby, No. 144, June 14, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby, No. 157, June 25, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby, No. 156, June 24, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby, No. 160, June 25, 1838.

Colonel Campbell, No. 46, July 8, 1838.

Colonel Campbell, No. 49, July 12, 1838.

would reply; but that England did not appear to understand his position, and how impossible it was for him to leave his family unprovided for: and in reply to some observations of Colonel Campbell, he said that the uncertainty of his position had compelled him to keep up large establishments, and exact heavy imposts; for this the Powers, who kept him in that position, were in some way to blame; and the only remedy was, that he should declare his independence.

On receiving the despatch No. 19, Colonel Campbell waited on the Pasha to communicate it: and in reply to his inquiry as to the meaning of one passage, Colonel Campbell said, that he conceived Great Britain would regard as an act of hostility on his part, any attempt to throw off his allegiance, and would not acquiesce in it. The Pasha said, that this despatch was no reply to his communication of the 25th of May: till such reply was received he would commit no act of aggression. He went on to say, that he had reason to believe the Sultan would listen to his proposals for independence, and he wished to know, whether England and France would oppose such an arrangement. Colonel Campbell said, he thought not, if the act of the Sultan was voluntary; but he thought that England would not recommend it. The general opinion of all the Consuls at Alexandria, except the French, is, that Mehemet Ali will not forego his views of independence. The late Russian Consul thought otherwise, but Count Medem considers that the Pasha will sooner or later risk everything to obtain it.

The French Consul-General appears to have expressed the contrary opinion to his Government, as the result of a conversation which he had with Mehemet Ali, before he received any instructions from his Government corresponding with those contained in No. 19, to Colonel Campbell.

Those instructions indeed did not reach M. Cochelet till the 15th of July, being dated the 23rd of June. He was desired in them to tell Mehemet Ali, that any attempt to throw off his allegiance would be a direct collision with all Europe, and that France and England specifically were resolved to use coercion to keep him within his allegiance. M. Cochelet told Colonel Campbell that he inferred from Mehemet Ali's language, on receiving this communication, that the Pasha would not commit any unprovoked aggression on the Sultan; that he would not declare his independence, relying upon the good will of France and England; and that his fleet, after a short cruise on the Syrian and Egyptian coasts, would return into port.

The version, however, of this conversation with M. Cochelet, which the Pasha gave to Colonel Campbell and Count Medem, was far different. It appears that Mehemet Ali, having entered at length into the motives of his conduct, went on to say to M. Cochelet, that he would wait for the answers of the other Great Powers, and would, in the interval, engage in no unprovoked hostility with the Sultan: that even, if the answers were negative, he would make a further appeal to the Powers, but if he found he had nothing to hope from them, he would declare himself independent.

The Pasha then said to Colonel Campbell and Count Medem, that, if he chose, he could raise up all Turkey in his favour; but, that he had reason to hope, that the Capitan Pasha, who he understood was coming from Constantinople, would be the bearer of propositions from the Porte, which would arrange all difficulties.

The Turkish Government having alleged that one of the objects of sending their fleet to sea, was to exercise the crews, Lord Ponsonby was instructed to offer, that a division of the Turkish fleet might cruise with the British squadron: and in the instructions on this point given to the Admiralty, it is said that the Admiral of the British squadron must bear in mind that the Turkish squadron, while in company with him, is not to commit hostilities with any other vessels; must use his influence, but not force, to prevent such hostilities; and, failing to do so, must separate and take no part in them. Moreover, he must not proceed with the Turkish ships to the coasts of Egypt or of Syria.

The Turkish Government having accepted this proposal, Sir Robert Stopford was directed to make arrangements for acting upon it.

Colonel Campbell,
No. 47, July 9,
1838.

Mr. Aston, No 10,
July 27, 1838.

Colonel Campbell,
No. 50, July 17,
1838.

To Lord Ponsonby,
No. 146, July 25,
1838.

To Admiralty,
August 3 and 17,
1838.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 192, August
21, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby, in a despatch written before he received a copy of the instruction to Colonel Campbell of the 7th of July, insists upon the necessity of the British Government using actual force against Mehemet Ali, and thereby effecting a cordial union with the Sultan, who his Excellency says, is ready to contract the closest alliance with England, but who, if England does not act, will undoubtedly throw himself into the arms of Russia, as he will prefer submission to Russia to submission to Mehemet Ali.

Subsequently Lord Ponsonby communicated to Reshid Pasha the instruction to Colonel Campbell; on which the Pasha expressed the gratitude of the Porte for the friendship manifested towards it by the British Government. (The Turkish Minister at Berlin, Kiamil Pasha, expressed to Sir George Hamilton the same sentiment, with reference to this despatch.)

Reshid Pasha told Lord Ponsonby that the Russian Mission had informed the Porte, that the Emperor had advised the British Government to send a fleet to Alexandria, as the best means of opposing Mehemet Ali, adding, that, if England failed to check Mehemet Ali, Russia had a fleet and army ready to give aid and security to the Sultan: but Reshid Pasha told Lord Ponsonby, that the aid of Russia would neither be asked nor accepted.

A communication was in fact made to Her Majesty's Government by Count Pozzo di Borgo on the 8th of August, of a despatch from Count Nesselrode, stating, that the Russian Government was pleased to find the views of the British Government correspond with its own respecting Mehemet Ali. The Russian Government were resolved to discountenance the projects of the Pasha; to keep him within the bounds of his obedience; and to prevent every thing which might lead to an alteration in the relations between the Porte and Egypt. All the Powers, Count Nesselrode says, concur in the opinion, that it is necessary to preserve the affairs of the East in their present position; to this end all their efforts must be directed; and, with this view, they must seek to destroy the hopes which Mehemet Ali may have formed of being aided in his projects by the jealousies of the Powers;—by declaring to the Pasha that the Powers would not recognize the independence of Egypt, but would consider it as still forming an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, and the relations of Mehemet Ali to the Sultan as still those of a vassal to a Suzerain.

The instructions given to the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria, were to the above purport; but he was desired not to act upon them until the Agents of the other Powers at Alexandria had received instructions; for the Court of Russia laid great stress upon the communications to Mehemet Ali being simultaneous.

In order, however, still further to satisfy Mehemet Ali that he had no reason to expect a difference of opinion arising between Russia and England on this matter, Count Pozzo di Borgo was instructed to say that Russia would see without distrust the appearance of a British naval force on the coast of Egypt, with the avowed object of retaining the viceroy within the bounds of his allegiance: would approve of the measures which Great Britain might take for that purpose, the rather because the success of those measures would relieve Russia from the imperious necessity of interfering herself in the affairs of Egypt, which she will defer doing as long as possible, but which, at the demand of the Sultan, she will not hesitate to do, if Mehemet Ali commits an unjust aggression.

The knowledge of these sentiments on the part of Russia would prove to the Pasha of Egypt, that it would not be in his power to disturb the unanimity of the Powers with reference to the affairs of the Levant; and the communication thus made to the Court of London would offer a new guarantee for the general peace, in the evidence which it supplied of the confidence which Russia placed in England.

The Russian Government moreover considered it important that the same unanimity which prevailed in the language of the representatives of the Powers at Alexandria, should be exhibited at Constantinople: that friendly language should be addressed to the Sultan; that it should be announced to him that the whole of Europe would continue to respect

To Admiralty,
September 14,
1838.
Lord Ponsonby,
No. 181, July 30,
1838.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 194, August
22, 1838,
Sir George Hamil-
ton, No. 40,
August 29, 1838.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 195, August
24, 1838.

Count Nesselrode,
to Count Pozzo di
Borgo, July 14,
1838.

his authority and his rights of sovereignty over Egypt, even though Mehemet Ali should attempt to disturb them; that the Sultan should in return be exhorted to take no precipitate step; not to give the signal for hostilities, but to leave to the allies of the Porte the task of bringing Mehemet Ali back to his allegiance: and the Russian Government suggested the expediency of instructions to the above effect being sent to Lord Ponsonby.

To Count Pozzo di Borgo, September 3, 1838.

In reply to this communication, Lord Palmerston expressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo the thanks of the British Government for this proof of confidence; and said that they considered Mehemet Ali's projects called for serious attention, and that the concurrence of all the Powers in their views respecting them was very satisfactory. The British Government is resolved to discourage the projects of Mehemet Ali; is convinced of the danger which would arise to the peace of Europe from a rupture between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan; and is at the same time aware that the Pasha calculates upon the disunion of the Powers of Europe; on which point the British Government agrees with Russia as to the necessity of undeceiving him. The British Government, however, conceives it to be necessary that the Powers should be prepared for the contingency of Mehemet Ali persevering in his plans; and, therefore, Lord Palmerston repeated in writing the proposition already made by him verbally to Count Pozzo di Borgo, and the representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, that a concert should be established at London between the Five Powers as to the measures which it would become expedient for them to adopt, in the event of Mehemet Ali casting off his allegiance to the Porte.

To Sir F. Lamb, No. 137, Sept. 10, 1838.
To Sir G. Hamilton, No. 39, Sept. 4, 1838.

In transmitting to Sir Frederick Lamb and to Sir George Hamilton a copy of the above letter, Lord Palmerston instructed them to apply to the Austrian and Prussian Governments respectively to instruct their representatives at London to enter upon this matter.

Colonel Campbell, No. 53, August 11, 1838.

Colonel Campbell received the instruction No. 21, of the 7th of July, on the 2nd of August; and forthwith made its contents known to Mehemet Ali. The Pasha replied, he would commit no aggression on the Porte, would keep within his own frontiers, but would not renounce his intention to declare his independence. He hoped, he added, to be able to arrange matters amicably with the Capitan Pasha whom he expected at Alexandria, in which case he would be satisfied with the succession in his family. He should be absent some months on a visit to the gold mines of Sennaar, during which affairs might assume a more favourable aspect. He would pay his tribute to the Porte. He accused the Porte of intriguing against him in Syria and in the Nedjeb. Colonel Campbell adds that, in his opinion, a blockade of the coasts of Egypt and of Syria would not prevent Mehemet Ali from supplying his army in Syria, as he could easily obtain sufficient camels for the transport of his supplies; while at the same time it might be apprehended that the fact of a blockade, would probably call forth an immediate declaration of independence on the part of the Pasha.

Colonel Campbell, No. 55, August 16, 1838.

On the 15th of August, M. Cochelet, in pursuance of instructions from Paris dated the 24th of July, addressed a note to the Egyptian Government, in which it was said that the French Government had learnt with as much surprise as regret the determination of Mehemet Ali to renounce his allegiance; and was firmly resolved not only not to acknowledge him in the new position he proposed to assume, but to declare that they would regard his step "*comme non avenue*;" would oppose every obstacle to it; and would begin by sending a squadron before Alexandria and to the coast of Syria. To this note the French Government demanded a categorical reply. On the following day M. Cochelet saw the Pasha, in company with Colonel Campbell, when a conversation ensued, of which Colonel Campbell afterwards showed a minute to the Pasha, who corrected it, and of which the following is the substance:

Colonel Campbell, No. 56, August 23, 1838.

Mehemet Ali said, that he would not give a written answer to the French Government, lest his arguments should offend; that he had long since enabled the British and French Governments to judge of his position and of his wishes; that as he was going to Sennaar, it could not be sup-

posed that he would commit hostilities; that he relied upon the good disposition of France and England, whom he regretted to see opposed to him at present, but who, he predicted, would shortly change their opinion; that if, as he hoped, the question respecting the inheritance of his authority should be satisfactorily settled, he would be content with that; but if forced to have recourse to arms, he would declare his absolute independence; that he would not suffer his hands to be tied by the Powers, in order to sacrifice him to the Porte; and that he would rather perish than leave his family and his people in a state of uncertainty as to their future fate; that he sought nothing contrary to the interests or policy of the Powers of Europe, who on their part, ought to have some regard for his position and treat him as a man; that if the Powers did not acquiesce in his views, and guarantee the stability of the existing order of things, and if he was thus left to his own resources, he would take the steps which he considered most expedient, and would sacrifice himself to escape from his present position; that certainly, if he should be unanimously opposed by the Four great Powers, he must perish; but they would derive no renown from overpowering him; the chances he knew were against him; but the issues of war were uncertain, and if by any luck they should prove favourable to him, he left it to the Powers to judge what consequences would ensue.

In reply to this report of Mehemet Ali's language, the French Consul-General was directed to express the dissatisfaction of his Government at the evasive answer of the Pasha, and to declare that the French Government would in consequence continue to watch his movements.

In a conversation which Mehemet Ali had with the Austrian Consul-General a few days afterwards, the Pasha said that he calculated that France and England might, in the event of their opposing his declaration of independence, bring against him a force of 40,000 men. These, the Pasha said, he could resist by the forces of Egypt, and detachments from Arabia; while his forces in Syria would march against those of the Sultan. The Pasha moreover calculates upon his influence in Roumelia and in Albania; and further upon his means of working upon the fanaticism of the Mussulman population to aid him against his Christian adversaries.

When the intelligence of the conclusion of the Commercial Treaty between England and Turkey reached Paris, Count Molé expressed to Mr. Aston his apprehension lest the knowledge of the Article which it contained respecting the abolition of monopolies, might not induce the Pasha at once to declare his independence of the Porte: and Count Sébastiani was instructed to make a communication to the same effect to Lord Palmerston.

In reply it was stated that the British Government certainly did not intend to allow any objection on the part of Mehemet Ali, to interfere with the full and complete execution of that stipulation in every part of the Turkish dominions.

Lord Granville having communicated this answer to Count Molé, the Count said that he admitted the general advantage to all nations of the monopoly Article, but he apprehended the result of the determination to enforce it against Mehemet Ali, must be war. Still Lord Granville was of opinion that Admiral Roussin will be directed to sign a similar Treaty between France and the Porte; but Count Molé told him on a subsequent day, that he should suspend his instructions on that point.

Baron Roussin says that M. de Bouteneff, on his arrival at Constantinople, expressed his surprise and dissatisfaction at the Treaty; and M. Cochelet writes on the 6th September, that Mehemet Ali had declared to him that he would not submit to the monopoly Article. Count Molé said that this account confirmed his apprehensions as to the effect of the Article. Count Molé also regretted that the communication on the subject had been made in writing to Count Sébastiani; Count Molé doubts the prudence of attempting to compel Mehemet Ali to fulfil the stipulation.

Sir George Hamilton having urged Baron Werther to send instructions to Baron Bülow respecting Mehemet Ali, the Prussian Minister said

Earl Granville, No. 257, Sept. 17, 1838.

Mr. Aston, No. 72, Sept. 10, 1838.

Colonel Campbell, No. 57, August 24, 1838.

Mr. Aston, No. 72, Sept. 10, 1838.

Count Molé to Count Sébastiani, Sept. 10, 1838.

To Mr. Aston, No. 77, Sept. 15, 1838.

To Count Sébastiani, Sept. 20, 1838.

Earl Granville, No. 262, Sept. 21, 1838.

Earl Granville, No. 268, Sept. 28, 1838.

Sir George Hamilton, No. 43, Sept. 12, 1838.

that he entirely concurred in the view taken by the British Cabinet of the state of affairs in the East, and felt disposed to adopt the measures recommended in the note to Count Pozzo di Borgo of September 3; but he doubted whether Russia would consent to a Conference on the question. In fact, Count Nesselrode, before communicating with the Emperor, expressed to Sir George Hamilton his doubts as to the necessity of a Conference in London on Eastern affairs, the Powers being all agreed on that subject; and he said that Russia would gladly leave Mehemet Ali to be dealt with by the English and French fleets.

The formal answer of the Russian Cabinet was in conformity with Count Nesselrode's language to Sir George Hamilton. That Cabinet did not consider it necessary to authorize Count Pozzo di Borgo to enter into the concert proposed by Lord Palmerston with the Ministers of the other Powers respecting Mehemet Ali, because the Powers having, without previous concert, arrived at the same conclusion, there was no reason why they should not do so in future; and because it was probable that the language held by the representatives of the Powers at Alexandria would effectually check the Pasha, and render unnecessary any further measures; and consequently no good could result from discussing what should be done in a hypothetical case, while such discussion would be more likely to produce difference than unanimity.

On receiving this communication, Lord Palmerston observed to Count Pozzo di Borgo that his proposition had a twofold object;—First, that the Five Powers should agree to act by mutual concert in the affairs of the Levant; and, secondly, that such concert should immediately be established, as it was probable that immediate action might be required. Count Nesselrode, however, without adverting to the first point, confined himself to denying the urgency of immediate concert. Lord Palmerston was glad that His Excellency had offered no objection to the principle of the first proposition, which his Lordship considered was one of great importance to all Europe. Although Mehemet Ali might for the present be deterred from taking his meditated step, there was no answering for the future; and circumstances might arise to render necessary the interference of the allies of the Sultan. If such a case were to arise, it was evident that Europe never would allow the matter to be settled by any one Power alone; consequently, that the only way in which Turkey could be assisted without risking a disturbance of the peace of Europe, would be by establishing that concert between the Five Powers which Her Majesty's Government have proposed.

In the course of a conversation which Sir F. Lamb had with Prince Metternich, at Venice, on the 3rd of September, in which the former repeated what had just passed between him and Count Nesselrode, respecting the relations between England and Russia, and also respecting the affairs of the East, Prince Metternich rejected the idea of an exclusive Austrian expedition to Syria, as exceeding the means of Austria; but was silent as to a combined operation.

Sir F. Lamb, having subsequently taken occasion to communicate to Prince Metternich Lord Palmerston's note to Count Pozzo di Borgo of September 3, the Prince expressed his full concurrence in the views expressed therein, and his intention to give the required instructions to M. Hummelauer. He said that it would be necessary to show to Mehemet Ali, that behind the unity of language held by the Five Powers, were the allied armies, which he would have to encounter if he undertook operations against the Porte. Subsequently Prince Metternich said he could not draw up his instructions to M. Hummelauer till his return to Vienna, engaging that he would then do so. Prince Metternich admitted that the proposition contained in Lord Palmerston's note, was the same which Sir F. Lamb had at his desire transmitted to England in June.

Baron Werther, having been informed by Sir George Hamilton of the nature of the answer given by Mehemet Ali, in September, to the Russian demands, expressed his doubts whether it might not be expedient to make an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, securing

Sir C. Hamilton,
No. 51, Sept. 26,
1839.

Count Nesselrode
to Count Pozzo di
Borgo, September
21, 1838.

To Lord Clanricarde,
No. 6, Oct.
10, 1838.

Sir F. Lamb, No.
72, Sept. 8, 1838.

Sir F. Lamb, No.
84, October 25,
1838.

Sir George Hamilton,
No. 62, Oct.
24, 1838.

to the latter the hereditary succession, on his giving up a part of Syria. This was, however, only an idea which had crossed his mind.*

An account is given in the 12th and subsequent pages of this memorandum, of what passed between the British and French Consuls-General, and Mehemet Ali on the 2nd and 16th of August, upon their communicating to him the sentiments of their respective Governments contained in despatches of the 7th and 24th of July, on his proposed declaration of independence.

On the 28th of August, the Consuls-General of Austria and Russia, and the Consul of Prussia received the instructions of their respective Governments, dated at Toplitz; those of Austria, on the 5th of August; those of Russia on the 2nd of August; and those of Prussia on the 24th of July.

The purport of the Austrian instructions was, to declare to Mehemet Ali, that if he proclaimed his independence, it would not be recognized by Austria, which Power would still consider Egypt as an integral part of the dominions of the Ottoman Empire, and the relations of Mehemet Ali towards the Sultan those of a vassal to his Suzerain. Moreover, that this declaration was the result of the union which subsisted between the European cabinets on the subject of Egypt.

M. Laurin made a written communication to Mehemet Ali to the above effect on the 29th of August, and had an interview with him the next day, when Mehemet Ali said, that he could give no other answer than that which he had already given to the Consuls-General of England and of France; that he was aware that he could not resist the Powers; that he would endeavour to make the Powers understand, that what he demanded was just and beneficial to the question of the East; that he demanded his independence in order to preserve his family from destruction, but that he would be satisfied if the Porte would grant the hereditary succession. Mehemet Ali enlarged upon these topics, and in reply to an intimation from M. Laurin, that the Powers would probably force him to disarm, he said that such a demand would be equivalent to his destruction, and that he would never consent to it; but the hereditary succession once settled, he would reduce his forces to the amount requisite for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, and for restraining the ambitious designs of his neighbours, and would devote himself to the improvement and civilization of Egypt.

The purport of the Russian instructions was, that the Great Powers were satisfied of the necessity of maintaining Egypt in its present position, and consequently declared through their representatives, that they would not recognize the independence of Egypt, if proclaimed by Mehemet Ali; but they would continue to consider it as an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, and the relations of Mehemet Ali towards the Porte, as those of a vassal towards his Suzerain. Moreover, Russia had stated to England that she would see without jealousy a British naval force employed on the coasts of Egypt, to keep the Pasha within the bounds of his allegiance; would approve the measures which Great Britain might take for that purpose, and the rather because the success of those measures would relieve Russia from the imperious necessity of herself interfering in the affairs of Egypt, which she will defer doing as long as possible, but which, at the demand of the Sultan, she will not hesitate to do, if Mehemet Ali commits an unjust aggression. It is desirable that the communication to the above effect should be simultaneously made by the agents of all the Powers, and the Consul of Prussia will be directed to act with the others, and thereby disavow the encouragement which Prussian travellers may have given the Pasha.

Mehemet Ali's answer to this communication, when verbally made to

* Subsequently on learning from Lord W. Russell the answer of Prince Metternich, reported in Sir F. Lamb's, No. 84, Baron Werther said, that the proposals made by Great Britain to Russia were approved by Prussia, whose opinions on this matter coincided with those of Austria; but that the question was now set at rest by the union of the Powers.—Lord W. Russell, No. 65, Nov. 21, 1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 61, of Sept. 5,
1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 62, of Sept. 6,
1838.

Col. Campbell,
No. 63, of Sept. 7,
1838.

him by Count Medem, was the same as that which he gave to the French Consul-General on the 16th of August, but he went on to remark, on no mention being made of the French squadron, and on the Prussian Consul being called upon to interfere in the matter.

The instructions given to the Prussian Consul enjoined him to make to Mehemet Ali a declaration similar to that made by the Consuls-General of the other Powers, which he executed by sending to Boghos Bey a copy.

In reply to this communication, Mehemet Ali sent a memorandum to the Prussian Consul, saying that he had represented to the Four Great Powers his position and desires, which latter not being directed to a disturbance of the tranquillity in the east, were not opposed to the interests of Europe; that he had no intention to commit hostilities, but would be satisfied if he could obtain the hereditary succession, which was all he desired; and that he hoped the Great Powers would change their opinion with respect to him.

In a memorandum which Mehemet Ali transmitted on the 4th of September, to the Austrian and Russian Consuls-General, he says that he considers he has already sufficiently explained to the Great Powers his position and desires; that he hopes the Emperor will in time change his opinion, and cease to oppose his desires, which were not opposed to the interests of Europe or to the tranquillity of the east; that from regard for his family, he sought the hereditary succession, which would satisfy him, and which he would be glad to obtain by negotiation. Meanwhile, he had no intention to commit hostilities, and was going to Sennaar. But he would not allow his hands to be tied so as to be a victim to the Porte, and would prefer to perish rather than leave the fate of his family and people undecided. If he failed to compass his desire by the assistance of the Powers, he would adopt the measures which he should deem expedient to relieve him from his present position; and if forced to have recourse to arms, he would proclaim his independence; that the Powers might destroy him, but would not increase their fame in doing so, whereas if he chanced to succeed, all the glory would be on his side.

Colonel Campbell, in commenting upon the foregoing events, suggests whether Mehemet Ali may not look to inducing the Powers to propose some arrangement for him, and thereby relieve themselves from the embarrassment attendant on the existing state of affairs. But certainly, Mehemet Ali will not be satisfied without some stipulations being made regarding his family.

In a subsequent despatch, Colonel Campbell says, with reference to what is stated in Lord Ponsonby's despatch, No. 160, that as far as he can ascertain, the coinage of the Pasha bears the Sultan's "toura," and on the reverse, the words "coined at Cairo." In other respects, Colonel Campbell agrees with Lord Ponsonby, as to the impossibility of any sincere reconciliation being effected between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. The latter, certainly, derives great moral weight from the possession of the Holy Cities, but Colonel Campbell is not aware that he ever aspired to the Caliphate; notwithstanding that it appears that he might have been led to entertain that idea, by the communications made to him in 1833, by M. Prokesch, as agent of the Court of Vienna. The notion suggested by M. Prokesch, in a note dated May 17, 1833, was, that Egypt, Nubia, Sennaar, Darfour, Cordofan, the whole of Arabia as far as the Persian Gulf, the right bank of the Euphrates, and the whole of Syria, should be erected into an Arab Empire, and that Mehemet Ali should declare himself the avenger of the Caliphs.

Colonel Campbell adds, that he believes the late French Consul-General, M. Mimaut, to have held out very flattering hopes to Mehemet Ali; but that Dr. Bowring had constantly in his communications with Mehemet Ali, impressed upon the Pasha, that what he said must only be regarded as the expression of his own private opinion, for that he was not authorized by his Government to make any proposition on political, or even on commercial matters to the Pasha.

Subsequent reflection seems to have induced Mehemet Ali to

recede from the determination which he had in the first instance announced to the French Consul-General, not to submit to the Commercial Convention concluded between Great Britain and the Porte. On the 15th of September, at the moment of his embarkation for Cairo, he announced to the French, English, and Austrian Consuls-General, that he would execute the Treaty; that upon reflection he found that its terms were advantageous to him; and that he could contrive to keep up prices at rates which would not be burthensome to the proprietors of produce, or to himself, as a great proprietor of a portion of Egypt. The French Consul-General concludes his report by saying, that the tribute to the Porte will be paid, and the Treaty executed by the Pasha: that the question of his independence is waived; and that the fleet will re-enter the port, and the army in Syria abstain from hostilities. It is to be hoped, therefore, that during the absence of Mehemet Ali, the Powers will settle in his favour the question of hereditary succession; and not leave it to be discussed with Reshid Pasha, who is stated to be instructed to demand the delivery of the Egyptian fleet to the Porte, the reduction of the army, and the surrender of Syria; to which conditions Mehemet Ali will certainly not agree.

Colonel Campbell gives the same report as M. Cochelet, with respect to the intention of the Pasha to execute the Treaty. The Pasha said that his monopolies only produced 50,000 purses, or 1,250,000 dollars, a year, whereas the additional duties on imports and exports fixed by the Treaty, would yield him a larger sum. The greater part of the cotton, Colonel Campbell says, is the produce of the Pasha's own lands. The system of monopolies, too, in Egypt differs from that of Turkey. In the latter it consists in exclusive privileges conferred on certain people; whereas in Egypt it is the Pasha who is the sole merchant, from whom or from whose agents alone produce is to be purchased. The produce is raised on the Pasha's own land, which he either cultivates himself, or lets to others on condition that the specified produce should be sold to himself at a fixed price: and the merchandize is obtained from his own manufactures, and must stand competition with the foreign merchandize. The abolition of monopolies in Egypt will apply only to wines, indigo, wool, rice, sugar, &c., and the produce of Soudan and Arabia, which can now only be sold by the Pasha. But these monopolies are rather occasioned by the Pasha from his wealth being enabled to purchase the commodities, and also by the fact of all the most fertile lands of Egypt being in the hands of the Pasha and his family. If the Pasha were to change his system, and allow the cotton and other produce of his lands to be sold by the renters or growers, the immense capitals, now locked up in the coffers of many of his principal officers, would soon be applied to the cultivation of cotton, and the produce would be greatly increased. The commerce of Soudan and Arabia is not only a monopoly, but an usurpation on the part of the Pasha; who imposed such restrictions and prohibitions on it, as enabled his delegates to get the whole produce into their hands at a low price. The caravans have in consequence gradually diminished; but if, as a consequence of the Treaty, the commerce should hereafter be open, merchants will be able to send their agents into the countries. But if the Pasha chooses to withdraw his troops from the countries, European merchants will be afraid to trade in Soudan.

With reference to the foregoing despatch, Lord Ponsonby denies that the Pasha is the sole proprietor of the lands in Egypt, and maintains that he only holds the lands by permission of the Sultan, who can take away at his pleasure the administration of the lands, and make any other arrangement. If, therefore, the Pasha attempts to evade the Convention, the Sultan may be advised to exert his authority in that respect, and it would be a most fortunate thing for Egypt if the Sultan should be supported in such a course by Her Majesty's Government, because the Sultan might then be induced to let the lands to tenants on advantageous terms, and allow strangers the right of possessing property. The Sultan would thus not only deprive the Pasha of power, but acquire great increase of revenue. Such a plan would enlist in its favour, as

against the Pasha, all those who might hope to reap benefit from it. Lord Ponsonby concludes by saying, that he believes it to be impossible to maintain the *status quo*; that the British Government will soon have to decide between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan, and cannot decide against the latter without a breach of faith, and insuring the triumph of Russia.

Lord Clanricarde,
No. 9, Nov. 20,
1838.

Lord Clanricarde communicated to Count Nesselrode on the 7th of November, Lord Palmerston's despatch No. 6. With reference to the allusions contained in it to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and to the acquisition by Russia of the mouths of the Danube by the Treaty of Adrianople, Count Nesselrode said, on the first point, that Russia regarded the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi as a burthen, from which it could derive benefit only in case of war; and, on the second point, he spoke of the acquisition of the mouths of the Danube as trifling. He denied that he had ever intimated that a Russian army might occupy Syria; but he made no remark on Lord Palmerston's proposal of a joint representation from the Five Powers to Mehemet Ali. On a previous occasion, the Count had said that Russia desired the same end as England, but to arrive at it in a different manner.

Earl Granville, No.
59, Feb. 15, 1839.

Nothing further passed on this subject, and the question was dropped from that time until the month of February, when Count Molé in a conversation with Earl Granville, alluding to the approach of the period at which Mehemet Ali would return from Sennaar, expressed his wish that the French and English Governments should be prepared to act in concert, when the Pasha should renew the subject of his independence. Count Molé said, that without such previous concert a divergence might appear in the language and proceedings of the two Governments, which could not fail to be prejudicial to the object which both had in view. Lord Granville said that he had no doubt the British Government would give the most favourable attention to any proposal having for its object to secure unity in the language and proceedings of the two Governments, and he recapitulated what had taken place last year, and the success which had attended the menaces of the Four Powers. Count Molé said that he could not rely upon the effect of those menaces, if no hope was held out to Mehemet Ali of an arrangement with the Sultan in favour of his descendants. Nothing, in his opinion, would tend more to stave off a crisis in the East, than leading Mehemet Ali to expect that the good offices of England and France would be employed at Constantinople to secure to his son the succession to the Government of Egypt.

No answer was returned to this proposition.

M. Hummelauer,
April 8, 1839.
Mr. Milbanke,
No. 33, March 28,
1839.

On the 8th of April, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires communicated to Lord Palmerston a despatch from Prince Metternich of the 28th of March, directing him to call the attention of the British Government to the evident intention of the Porte to attack Mehemet Ali. Prince Metternich inclosed a copy of a despatch from M. Bouteneff to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, dated the 13th of March, and saying that notwithstanding the formal assurances given to him by the Porte a month before, the question of an immediate conflict between the Turkish and Egyptian troops in Syria was now in agitation; that the Turkish Ministers had desired the Russian dragoman to inform M. Bouteneff, that Hafiz Pasha had reported that from the movements of the Egyptian troops, he was led to apprehend an immediate attack, and had requested permission to advance towards the Syrian frontier, in order to be in readiness to repel any such attack. The Porte, it was added, was inclined to approve the plan, but before doing so, wished to ascertain what would be the opinion of Europe, and of Russia, and specifically whether if a collision should ensue, the Sultan would be held responsible for that event. M. Bouteneff replied, as appears also from his instruction to his dragoman, of which the Internuncio gave Lord Ponsonby a copy, that being without instructions he could only offer his own opinion on the matter; that without adverting to military considerations, he con-

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 76, March 23,
1839.

sidered it incredible that Mehemet Ali, during his absence in Upper Egypt, should attempt an attack on the Sultan's forces; that it was equally incredible that Mehemet Ali, who had recently yielded to the declarations of opposition on the part of the Powers, should now commence hostilities with the certainty of encountering the same opposition; that the approach of the Turkish troops to the Syrian frontier might lead to a collision, the immediate effect of which would be a declaration of independence on the part of Mehemet Ali; that it would depend upon the Porte as to which party would be responsible; that as long as the Porte continued in its present peaceful policy, it might reckon upon the support and goodwill of the Powers; but that the matter would be viewed differently, if the Porte had recourse to measures which should appear to provoke hostilities; that as to the sacrifices which the existing state of things imposed upon the Porte, great as they were, they were trifling in comparison to the chances of a war, which might become general; that Russia had nothing to do with the establishment of the existing state of things, but had done everything to prevent it; but, once established, the Powers, who saw in it the only guarantee of peace in the East, were resolved to maintain it; that, lastly, it would be advisable for the Porte to communicate frankly on the matter with other Governments. M. Bouteneff closes his despatch by saying that he was far from feeling sure that his advice would be followed; and that the accounts from Hafiz Pasha's camp served to show that the crisis was at hand.

Prince Metternich's despatch goes on to say, that it was his intention immediately to instruct the Internuncio to hold the same language with M. Bouteneff, and to add that the Sultan must be assured that Austria, in common with her allies, would retain Mehemet Ali within the bounds of allegiance, and if he attempted to transgress them, all Europe would be leagued against him; that, on the other hand, if the Sultan should be the aggressor, Austria would consider herself released from all obligations with respect to the Sultan. Prince Metternich added that it was desirable that Lord Ponsonby should have corresponding instructions, and be directed to co-operate with his colleagues.

To M. Hummelauer,
April 10, 1839.

In reply to this communication, M. Hummelauer was informed that Lord Ponsonby had already and frequently been instructed to endeavour to dissuade the Sultan from hostilities against Mehemet Ali; that he had acted upon those instructions; and would be again instructed in the same sense.

The first instructions to Lord Ponsonby on this subject, in the year 1839, were dated on the 15th of March. In the early part of the year Lord Ponsonby reported that the Sultan had been advised to propose that the Great Powers should hold a Conference on the eastern question; but that the Russian Minister had represented that such a measure would be productive of danger to the Porte, as England and France might take advantage of it to suggest a course prejudicial to the rights of the Porte. On the 22nd of January, a grand Council was held to discuss the question of peace or war with Mehemet Ali, and the Russians were supposed to be exciting the Sultan to the latter course. Rumours of war continued to prevail; and Lord Ponsonby considered that the mission of the Russian dragoman Franchini to Persia was connected with a scheme for drawing the Sultan into hostilities with Mehemet Ali. Lord Ponsonby says that he has been doing his best to induce the Sultan not to deviate from his intention of waiting to see the result of Reshid Pasha's embassy.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 18, Jan. 27,
1839.

On the 4th of February another grand Council was held for the discussion of the question of peace or war, at which a proposition was said to have been made for raising Rayah regiments.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 20, Feb. 6,
1839.

Subsequently Lord Ponsonby was induced to believe that the Sultan would not immediately commence hostilities, His Highness having caused him to be assured that he would do nothing precipitately. The Turkish Minister also stated to the Russian Minister, who had said that the Emperor would learn with great dissatisfaction that the Sultan had done anything to disturb peace, that the Porte had no intention whatever of making war.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 24, Feb. 8,
1839.

A few days afterwards, however, Lord Ponsonby received information that war was in fact determined upon: that the Sultan placed little

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 28, Feb. 12,
1839.

reliance upon France and England; but confiding in the support of Russia, was resolved to triumph or perish; and that the Ministers of the Porte were not fully aware of the real state of things.

Earl Granville,
No. 107, March 11,
1839.

This account tallied with that received by the French Government, who were moreover informed that Ibrahim Pasha, although he would be cautious not to be the aggressor, was resolved in the event of being attacked, and of succeeding in repelling the attack, to march immediately upon Constantinople.

To Lord Ponsonby,
No. 38, March 15,
1839.

Lord Ponsonby was informed that his continued attempts to keep the Sultan quiet were approved, and he was instructed to press strongly on the Sultan that while, on the one hand, Great Britain would undoubtedly assist him to repel any attack on the part of Mehemet Ali, the question would, on the other hand, be different if war was begun by the Sultan.

To Lord Ponsonby,
No. 43, April 12,
1839.

Lord Ponsonby was further instructed in the following month, with reference to M. Hummelauer's communication, to continue to co-operate actively with his colleagues, in endeavouring by all means in his power to prevail upon the Sultan to abstain from any hostile proceedings against Mehemet Ali.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 59, March 7,
1839.

Lord Ponsonby learnt on the 20th February, that the Sultan had sent a Hatti-Sherif to the Great Council, saying that Hafiz Pasha had reported that he could defeat the Egyptian army, and the Capitan Pasha that he could destroy the Egyptian fleet; and the Sultan called upon the Council to be courageous and do its duty. The Council replied that it would do all in its power to conform to the pleasure of the Sultan.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 253, Dec. 6,
1838.

Lord Ponsonby, reasoning upon the probability of Russia, having contributed to inflame the warlike propensities of the Sultan, reverts to what he had written at the close of 1838, of an arrangement having been proposed to the Porte by M. Bouteneff, for the restoration of a good understanding between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, on the basis of the surrender of Syria to the Sultan, and of the recognition of the hereditary right of the family of Mehemet Ali to the Government of Egypt. Nothing, however, had been done in the matter in December, 1838, though Lord Ponsonby understood that the Sultan was likely to consent to such an arrangement; which, in Lord Ponsonby's opinion, was impracticable.

At the present time, Lord Ponsonby conceives that there may be many reasons for Russia being inclined to abandon the policy of allowing things to remain as they are.

On the 2nd of March, Lord Ponsonby received a message from Nourri Effendi saying, that the Porte had some slight hope of a favourable result from Reshid Pasha's mission, but adding that the burthen and expense to the Porte of the present state of things was intolerable.

Lord Ponsonby concludes by saying, that he has done all in his power to persuade the Sultan of the advantage of delaying all hostile movements, and that he hopes that the Sultan will not act at present against Mehemet Ali.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 67, March 18,
1839.

On the 18th of March, Lord Ponsonby received a message from the Porte stating, that Hafiz Pasha had reported from Malatia towards the end of February, that a large body of Egyptian troops had arrived at Adana, under Kourschid Pasha, and that the troops at Aleppo were being reinforced; and that he had been advised by the Prussian Officers in his Camp, to move nearer to Adana, from which he was now 60 leagues distant. The Porte wished Lord Ponsonby to advise what answer should be given to Hafiz Pasha. Lord Ponsonby replied that he was not competent to give an opinion on a military matter, but that he begged the Porte to act with prudence and caution, as a false step might occasion irremediable mischief.

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 71, March 19,
1839.

It appeared, indeed, from information received by Lord Ponsonby that Hafiz Pasha and the Prussian Officers were urging the Porte to attack Mehemet Ali, alleging that there would never again be so

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 72, March 20,
1839.

that favourable an opportunity for driving him out of Syria; and the information which the Internuncio received, led him to anticipate the speedy

Lord Ponsonby,
No. 76, March 23,
1839.

advance of Hafiz Pasha, in which case hostilities appeared inevitable. The Internuncio subsequently communicated to Lord Ponsonby, M.

de Bouteneff's instruction to his dragoman which is in the same sense as that Minister's despatch to M. de Tatistcheff referred to in page 18 of this Abstract, but in transmitting it home Lord Ponsonby says that there can be no doubt that the Russian agents have been exciting the Porte to war. His Excellency adds that he had received a message on the 21st of March from the Turkish Minister, indicating that his advice would be followed: and he thought that nothing would be done at present to disturb the peace. In a subsequent despatch Lord Ponsonby says that he is inclined to discredit the report of the Prussian officers with Hafiz Pasha being instruments of Russia.

On the 4th of April Lord Ponsonby conveyed to the Porte the substance of a communication which he had received from Lord Palmerston, stating that he had agreed with Reshid Pasha on the principle of the proposed Treaty, and was employed in preparing the details; and Lord Ponsonby added the best reasoning he could use to induce the Porte to abandon warlike policy for the present; and he urged delay. Nourri Effendi replied that the Sublime Porte could not be satisfied with the Treaty, which was not what Reshid Pasha wished to make it; that the Porte wished to destroy the *status quo*, and the proposed Treaty not only maintained it, but bound the Porte not to take advantage of any future favourable opportunity; that the Treaty merely provided that England should unite with the Porte in case Mehemet Ali, or a successor of his family, should declare his independence or commit any aggression. Tahar Pasha, Chief of the Staff under the Seraskier, was sent to the head quarters of Hafiz Pasha, after the Treaty had been under the consideration of the Turkish Ministers. Lord Ponsonby fears his instructions are not of a satisfactory nature.

Lord Ponsonby adds that he believes M. Bouteneff has been seriously endeavouring to prevent war; and that the Internuncio and the French Ambassador have done the same. Lord Ponsonby's advice was that at all events the Porte should delay, if it would not altogether abstain from everything that might commit the Sultan in a perilous enterprise.

On the 18th of April Lord Ponsonby got from Nourri Effendi a copy of the draft of Treaty which Reshid Pasha had sent to his Government. It consisted of a Preamble and 2 Articles, and professed to provide for the case of a renunciation on the part of Mehemet Ali of his obedience as a subject, and likewise for the case of similar disobedience being manifested by any member of his family; in which cases the Sultan grants permission to the British fleet to detain ships of war and merchantmen belonging to Mehemet Ali, while the Turkish fleet will visit, and, if necessary, detain neutral vessels employed by the Pasha for the conveyance of provisions and military stores;—the two fleets shall act in concert on the coasts of Egypt and Syria.

Lord Ponsonby, in the absence of any information from home as to the terms of the Treaty, still thought it right to endeavour to counteract the persons who advised the Porte to reject it, and accordingly entered into a discussion with Nourri Effendi on the matter. The Turkish Minister said he was convinced that no Treaty would benefit the Porte which had not for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali, and consequently that the Porte ought not to make any Treaty.

The Porte not having given Lord Ponsonby any answer on the 22nd, he determined to wait no longer, but to send off his Messenger with a report that the information which he had received from other quarters, authorized him to believe that no hostile movement would at present be made by the Porte; although he could not speak positively on that point.

On the 23rd of April, the Internuncio told Lord Ponsonby that he had stated to the Porte, that an attack upon Mehemet Ali might be considered by the Great Powers as a justification of their taking the part of the Pasha. The Turkish Ministers urged the misery and ruin produced by the *status quo*; but the impression on the Internuncio's mind was, that the Porte would not at present begin hostilities, though they might arise from accident; and, at all events, the state of affairs in the Country could not be preserved as it was.

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Lord Ponsonby,
No. 108, May 1,

The answer of the Porte to Lord Ponsonby's representations respecting Mehemet Ali, was given on the 28th of April. It began by referring to a communication from the Internuncio, having for its object to induce the Sultan to abandon his warlike preparations against Mehemet Ali, and to adopt some middle course to put an end to the question respecting him. The Sultan's reply was, that Mehemet Ali had been long making preparations, that he oppressed the people and country under his rule, raised fortifications and levied troops. The Porte, on the other hand, had only very lately raised fortifications, but as the conduct of Mehemet Ali was such as to leave no security to the Porte, the latter had been obliged to send troops and military stores to Sivas and Conia. It would be inconsistent with the relations between the Porte and the Great Powers that the latter should not raise their voice against the rebellion of Mehemet Ali, at the same time that they prevented the Porte from acting; and it was clear that if Mehemet Ali should commit an aggression, the Porte could not remain inactive; and it was equally clear that if Mehemet Ali remained within the limits of his allegiance, the Porte would not have recourse to war. What, however, was to be done to secure the Porte against the projects of Mehemet Ali? As long as the present state of things existed, there was no security or tranquillity, and the Porte was obliged to maintain an army at a great expence. With regard to the middle course proposed by the Internuncio, that referred to the return of Mehemet Ali to his position as a subject; but that could only be by his delivering up Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and by his reducing his forces within the limits compatible with his position as a subject. If the Great Powers would endeavour to create such a state of things, the Sultan would acquiesce in it. With regard to the special communication of Lord Ponsonby, if the British Government was disposed to do an act of friendship and kindness in adhering to a Treaty of Alliance drawn up in the sense just stated, the Porte would accept it with pleasure.

The foregoing answer was contained in a letter from Sayd Bey, the Sultan's private secretary, to Nourri Effendi.

On the 24th of May, intelligence was received in London by telegraph from Marseilles, that Mehemet Ali on the 7th of May, stated to the Consuls of the European Powers in Egypt, that hostilities had commenced in Syria.

Two days afterwards despatches were received from Colonel Campbell, by which it appeared that intelligence up to the 27th of April, had reached Alexandria from Damascus, stating that the forces of the Sultan had crossed the Euphrates at Bir, and having thrown up some fortifications there, had continued their advance. The Egyptian forces in Syria, under the command of Ibrahim Pasha, were being concentrated at Aleppo, sixty miles distant from Bir, but Mehemet Ali had sent orders to Ibrahim Pasha not to make any movement, unless he should receive certain intelligence of the advance of the Sultan's forces, in which case he was to take his measures accordingly.

Foreign Office, May 30, 1839.

Col, Campbell,
No. 26, May 4,
1839.

Col. Campbell.
No. 27, May 5,
1839.