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THE EMPIRE AT WAR

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H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CONNAUGHT

President of the Royal Colonial Institute

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THE EMPIRE AT WAR

EDITED FOR THE

ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE

BY

SIR CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

VOLUME IV



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VOLUME IV

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PREFACE TO VOLUME IV

As in the case of all the other volumes, my principal colleagues have been Mr. R. L. Atkinson, M.C., who acts as sub-editor, and Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, who has revised, in the main, the military parts of the book. Mr. Emery Walker has again been responsible for the maps and reproducing the illustrations. The maps of East Africa have been checked by reference to official maps kindly lent for the purpose to the Royal Colonial Institute by the War Office. The general map of the East African campaign is partly based on one for which the Editor is indebted to Sir George Smith, K.C.M.G.

The rulings of the Royal Geographical Society's Permanent Committee on Geographical Names have been followed, with certain exceptions. In some cases the maps were struck off before the Committee's list was available and the spelling (e. g. Jaunde) in the map has been retained in the text to correspond. Many German names (e. g. Bismarckburg) now replaced by native ones have been retained, as having been the forms in use during the War. Cross references to the standard forms are given in the Index.

My warm acknowledgements are due to Sir Lawrence Wallace, K.B.E., C.M.G., late Administrator of Northern Rhodesia and author of the Northern Rhodesia section, for having read through the whole volume both before and after it was in print, and made various corrections and suggestions. The book is the outcome of co-operation from many quarters, and I am most grateful for all the help received. It may

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PREFACE TO VOLUME II

As in the case of all the other volumes, my principal colleague
have been Mr. R. L. Atkinson, M.C., who acts as editorial
and Mr. C. T. Atkinson, Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford,
has revised, in the main, the military parts of the chapters.
Mr. Emery Walker has again been responsible for the maps and
reproducing the illustrations. The maps of
been checked by reference to official maps
purpose to the Royal Colonial Institute by the
The general map of the East African
based on one for which the Editor is indebted to the
Smith, K.C.M.G.

The rulings of the Royal Geographical Society's
Committee on Geographical Names have been followed in
certain exceptions. In some cases the maps
before the Committee's list was available,
(e.g. Jaunde) in the map have been altered to
correspond. Many German names of places
replaced by native ones have been adopted
forms in use during the War
forms are given in the Index.

My warm acknowledgments are due to Major
Wallace, K.B.E., C.M.G., late Administrator
Rhodesia and author of the History of the
having read the proofs of the chapters
it was in many cases due to his suggestions that
The help rendered by Mr. H. Wilson Fox, C.B., of the Royal Colonial
and Mr. Hugh Fraser, C.M.G., late Secretary of the British Legation

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possibly be criticized on the ground of repetition, especially in regard to the war in German East Africa. My apology is that I found it impossible to do justice to the war efforts of the various British colonies and Protectorates in Africa without following the fortunes of their respective contingents, and, in doing so, covering more or less the same ground though from different angles.

C. P. LUCAS.

December 1924.

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PART I

WEST AFRICA

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

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PREFACE

BY THE EDITOR

THE British colonies and Protectorates on the West Coast of Africa are four in number, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria. They increase in size from north to south, the Gambia being by far the smallest, Nigeria by far the largest. The Gambia and the Gold Coast include the earliest British footholds on the West African coast. Sierra Leone stands out as having been the first British West African colony in the ordinary sense and as being an Imperial coaling station garrisoned by Regulars. The Gold Coast has made almost phenomenal progress during the present century, and the same can be said of the great province of Nigeria, by far the youngest of the four, which only became a single unit on the eve of the war. The Gold Coast bordered on German Togoland, Nigeria on German Cameroons. Sierra Leone and the Gambia had no German neighbours.

Apart from the Regular detachments forming the garrison of Sierra Leone the fighting forces of British West Africa were embodied in the West African Frontier Force, of which some account has been given in the first volume, and to which the following reference is made in *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–20*.[1]

'The strength of this force was approximately :

Nigeria Regiment	175 officers,	101	British N.C.O.'s,	4,996	native ranks
Gold Coast Regt.	39 ,,	11	,,	1,433	,,
Sierra Leone Battn.	28 ,,	1	,,	644	,,
Gambia Company	2 ,,	2	,,	128	,,

[1] March, 1922, p. 383. The figures given below under the different sections do not in all cases accord with the totals here given.

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'During the course of the war, the total numbers employed with the West African Frontier Force amounted to the following:

Nigeria Regiment	1,587	Europeans	13,980	native ranks
Gold Coast Regt.	397	,,	9,890	,,
Sierra Leone Battn.	48	,,	646 [1]	,,
Gambia Company	20	,,	351	,,

Thus, according to these statistics, nearly 25,000 (24,867) native combatants served in the force during the war.

[1] This figure can hardly be correct.

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SECTION I

THE GAMBIA[1]

Mainly by Sir Edward Cameron, K.C.M.G.

THE Gambia is the northernmost and the smallest of the British West African dependencies. The area of the Colony and Protectorate is some 4,000 square miles, more than half the size of Wales, and the population is estimated at under 160,000, principally Mohammedans. It is, in effect, both banks of the Gambia river for 250 miles from the sea, enclosed on all sides by French territory. When the war came it was following an even course of quiet prosperity. The revenue more than covered expenditure, for there was an accumulated surplus and no public debt. More than three-quarters of the receipts were derived from Customs duties, including an export duty on ground-nuts. These oil nuts represented the natural wealth of the Gambia and by far its greatest export, being sent in the main to France. The Governor, Mr. E. J. Cameron, C.M.G. (now Sir E. J. Cameron, K.C.M.G.), was comparatively a new-comer, having arrived in the Colony and assumed the government on the 10th of April 1914. On receipt of the news of war having broken out the prescribed Proclamations were issued, and measures of defence were taken according to the scheme laid down.

The troops in the Colony consisted of the local Gambia Company of the West African Frontier Force, comprising a Captain, two Lieutenants, two European non-commissioned officers, and 130 rank and file, subsidiary to which was the local armed Police. Colonel Dobell (now Major-Gen. Sir Charles Dobell), the Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force, had visited the Colony in April 1914, inspected the local Company and been favourably impressed by its smartness and general efficiency. On his appointment as Brigadier-General to conduct the operations in the Cameroons, he asked for the signallers of the Company to be placed at his disposal, which request was at once acceded to, and 14 men under Lieutenant Inglis (now Major Inglis, D.S.O.) embarked

[1] This Section was, in the main, kindly supplied by Sir Edward Cameron, K.C.M.G., who was Governor of the Gambia throughout the war.

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on the S.S. *Appam* on the 10th of September 1914, the General himself being on board. Subsequently half the remainder of the Company was requisitioned and left under command of Captain Thurston on the 15th of January 1915, and the rest, under Lieutenant Freeman, left on the 19th of September 1915. From that time until the return of the Company from Duala, the Colony had to depend entirely for protection from external aggression and internal disturbance on the Police Force.

The behaviour of the Gambia Company in the Cameroons was the subject of favourable report from all quarters. The Company Sergeant-Major, Ebrimah Jallow, was awarded the D.C.M., and two other similar awards were also subsequently made, the recipients being Sergeant Samba Bah and Private Saljan Sidibi.

Of the Civil Service, a doctor, two nursing sisters, and the Commissioner of Police, were all lent to the Cameroons Expeditionary Force. One of the Public Works Department officers, on leave in England, joined up at once on the outbreak of war and served with his regiment throughout the war; while the Assistant Colonial Secretary, who went on leave in May 1915, obtained a commission and was continuously engaged on military duty. Three others of the West African Medical Staff, stationed in the Gambia, were employed with the fighting forces.

In 1917 the services of the Gambia Company were requisitioned for East Africa, where the Company was attached to the Nigerian Brigade. They left Bathurst on the 15th of April 1917, numbering five British officers and non-commissioned officers, and 130 native rank and file, and returned on the 8th of April 1918, having been relieved during the time by H Company of the West African Regiment from Sierra Leone. A training centre for recruits was established at the same time and two drafts were sent to reinforce the Company. Before the war ended recruiting was stopped by order from home as being no longer necessary, but, had it been continued, the ice having been broken, it is probable that a good number of very serviceable men would have been forthcoming as a result of the efforts of explanation and inducement which were made. In round numbers the strength of the Gambia Company at the beginning of the war was 130, and 250 were recruited during the war, making a total of 380 fighting natives, while 37 transport carriers were forthcoming from the Colony.

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The immediate effect of the outbreak of war upon the fortunes of the Gambia was shown by a fall in revenue for 1914 far below the level of the previous year, from £125,000 to £86,000. The Colony's prosperity is entirely dependent upon the ground-nut trade, the buying and selling season being as a rule, in normal times, from November to about April. This trade was very seriously affected, so far as the native growers were concerned, during the first year of the war, owing to the great uncertainty then existing as to prices, facilities for shipment, and other factors. The price paid to the natives, which averages ordinarily from 1*s.* 9*d.* to 3*s.* per bushel, fell for a time as low as 3*d.* to 4½*d.*, and much disappointment and disheartening was thereby caused. Prices rallied, however, towards the end of the season, with the final result that the middlemen and merchants made very large profits. After the first year conditions, except as to shipment, did not vary much from normal. Though the crops grown and shipped were somewhat smaller, as a result of the check in 1914 and the stringent necessity for the natives to grow very ample crops of foodstuffs for their own support, on the other hand the prices realized for the nuts were eventually very high. One effect of the war upon this industry was largely to divert the export of nuts from the French market, which had almost monopolized them, to the United Kingdom. Whereas in 1913 less than 7 per cent. of the total exports were sent to the United Kingdom, against more than 59 per cent. to France, and more than 24 per cent. to Germany, in 1917 the United Kingdom took, in value, 79 per cent., as against only 18 per cent. sent to France. In 1917 the steady recovery which followed the depression of 1914 and the early months of 1915, helped by an increase in the *ad valorem* Customs duties as from the beginning of 1916, brought back the revenue returns nearly to the level of the 1913 figures, the accumulated surplus assets considerably exceeded a year's revenue, and the export returns in value surpassed all former years. In a word, the Colony did not suffer any hardship or appreciable check to its prosperity through the war, though, like all others, it experienced numerous difficulties and inconveniences. Three good officers were lost through the sinking of the *Abosso* in April 1917, and the Legislative Council subsequently voted £1,000 to King George's Fund for Sailors as a tribute to the splendid courage and endurance of British merchant seamen.

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It was a very loyal and large-hearted Council. On the announcement of the institution of the Prince of Wales's Relief Fund, at once, on the 19th of September 1914, it passed the following resolution, whereby a sum of £10,000 was contributed to that Fund:

'This Council, on behalf of the local Government and the inhabitants of all classes of the Colony of the Gambia, European and Native, Official and Unofficial, including the Chiefs and population of the different tribes and districts of the Protectorate, whose keen and loyal interest in the present conflict in which the Empire is engaged has been manifested in various ways, desires to express its unswerving allegiance to the Throne and Government of His Majesty the King.

'The Colony having in recent years of continued quiet prosperity under British rule amassed a substantial surplus fund free from liability, this Council, subject to the consent of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, hereby undertakes to provide a sum of £10,000, to be defrayed from the surplus aforesaid, as a contribution to the National Relief Fund inaugurated by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales for the relief of persons in the British Isles who are the dependants of men serving their Country at the front, or who may be suffering poverty and distress from unemployment or otherwise as a result of the existing state of war.'

From the table opposite it will be seen that the Government contributions to War Funds amounted to £40,000, including two sums of £10,000 each for the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund and for aeroplanes respectively.

The sum of £16,000 paid to the Imperial Government in December 1919 represented the amounts paid from time to time by the Government of the Gambia in connexion with the dispatch of the Gambia Company to East Africa, its maintenance in East Africa, and the enrolling and training of additional troops at the Gambia as drafts to make good wastages. The expenses had been incurred and the sums entered as an advance to the War Office, but subsequently the Gambia assumed the whole burden and charged the total £16,000 to its own revenue.

The private subscriptions, as shown by the second table, amounted to £5,693 0*s.* 1*d.*, the Red Cross being the principal beneficiary.

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CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GAMBIA, 1914–18

Date.	*Amount and Fund into which paid.*				*Total.*	*Year.*
	Prince of Wales's National Relief.	*Imperial (for War purposes).*	*British Red Cross Society.*	*King George's Fund for Sailors.*		
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	
1914						
September . . .	10,000 0 0	—	—	—	10,000 0 0	1914
1916						
November . . .	—	—	1,000 0 0	—	1,000 0 0	1916
1917						
January . . .	—	10,000 0 0	—	—	11,000 0 0	1917
December . . .	—	—	1,000 0 0	—		
1918						
July	—	—	—	1,000 0 0	2,000 0 0	1918
December . . .	—	—	1,000 0 0	—		
1919						
December . . .	—	16,000 0 0	—	—	16,000 0 0	1919
	10,000 0 0	26,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	1,000 0 0	40,000 0 0	

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PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE GAMBIA, 1914–18

Date.	Amount and Fund into which paid.									Total.	Year.
	Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund.	French National Relief Fund.	Overseas Aircraft Fund.	Belgian Relief Fund.	British Red Cross Society.	French Red Cross Society.	Admiralty, for sick and wounded Sailors.	Gambia Native Soldiers Comfort and Relief Fund.	King George's Fund for Sailors.		
	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	£ s. d.	
1914											
December . .	44 4 7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	44 4 7	1914
1915											
January–July .	296 10 0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
March. . .	—	289 5 11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		
May . . .	—	—	6 6 0	—	—	—	—	—	—		
October . .	—	—	—	192 18 6	—	—	—	—	—	901 10 9	1915
October–December	—	—	—	—	99 0 4	—	—	—	—		
December . .	—	—	—	—	—	17 10 0	—	—	—		
1916											
April . . .	—	—	—	—	—	300 0 3	—	—	—		
May . . .	—	—	—	210 14 6	—	—	—	—	—	1,501 17 0	1916
June–November .	—	—	—	—	991 2 3	—	—	—	—		
1917											
May . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	6 16 10	—	—		
June–November .	—	—	—	—	—	362 2 8	—	—	—		
October . .	—	—	—	231 13 8	—	—	—	—	—	1,784 10 4	1917
November . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	83 3 2	—		
December . .	—	—	—	—	1,100 14 0	—	—	—	—		
1918											
March. . .	—	—	—	—	4 0 0	—	—	—	—		
July . . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	349 13 4	1,460 17 5	1918
December . .	—	—	—	—	1,107 4 1	—	—	—	—		
	340 14 7	289 5 11	6 6 0	635 6 8	3,302 0 8	679 12 11	6 16 10	83 3 2	349 13 4	5,693 0 1	

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H.M.S. *DWARF* AT SIERRA LEONE

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SECTION II

SIERRA LEONE

By the Editor, from material supplied from the Colony

THE Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone, with an area of 31,000 square miles, may be compared in size to Scotland or Ireland. The census of 1911 estimated the population at about 1,400,000, and the capital, Freetown, was a town of 34,000 inhabitants. Like the Gambia, unlike the Gold Coast and Nigeria, it was remote from any German dependency, its neighbours being French Protectorates and the Liberian Republic. Singularly enough, what had been in origin the scene of a philanthropic settlement had, long before 1914, in virtue of a fine natural harbour, been constituted a fortified Imperial coaling station, the only station of the kind in British West Africa. This was the outstanding feature of Sierra Leone during the war. Under stress of the submarine warfare it became more than ever a port of call and naval base. Here it was that towards the end of the war, in September 1918, the veteran Australian explorer and statesman, Lord Forrest, was buried, having died on the voyage from Australia to England.

Sierra Leone had a Legislative Council of the ordinary type, empowered to legislate for the Protectorate as well as the Colony. At the beginning of the war the Governor was Sir Edward Merewether, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., who, like Sir Hugh Clifford, had served his administrative apprenticeship in the Malay Peninsula. At the end of 1915 he was appointed Governor of the Leeward Islands and, on his return voyage to England in 1916, in order to go out to the West Indies, he was taken prisoner on board the *Appam* by the Germans and carried off to the then neutral United States. His successor, as Governor of Sierra Leone, was Mr. R. J. Wilkinson, C.M.G., whose previous service had also been in the Malay Peninsula.

Being an Imperial station, Sierra Leone was garrisoned by Regular troops, and in the Protectorate was also stationed

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the Sierra Leone battalion of the West African Frontier Force. During the war, in 1915, a volunteer ordinance was passed empowering the Governor to enrol volunteers to serve with the Regular Forces. The finances of the Colony and Protectorate were sound, and there was a comfortable balance; the revenue was expanding year by year, Customs receipts being the principal item; trade was also growing, palm products being the chief export. Germany took nearly half the exports, and Hamburg was the great market for the palm kernels. The effect of the war here, as elsewhere in British West Africa, was to transfer the German trade mainly to the British and the American markets; the trade with the United States in 1915 doubled in value as compared with 1913, and there was a further increase as the war went on.

In spite of general prosperity, there had been in 1914, prior to the war, a slight temporary setback, the prices of staple products, palm kernels, rubber and ginger, having fallen in Europe, and this depression was inevitably accentuated by the war. The trade returns for 1914, in consequence, showed a marked falling off from the previous year. It was much the same in 1915, and the current revenue for that year did not cover the expenditure in spite of increased import duties. These increases, imposed in March and July 1915, were subsequently amended and consolidated by an ordinance which took effect from the 1st of January 1916. The 10 per cent. *ad valorem* duties were raised to 15 per cent.; some articles, such as foodstuffs, which had previously been exempted, were brought into the *ad valorem* list, and in the case of certain other imports, which paid specific duties, wine, ale, spirits, tobacco, the duties were greatly increased. From the 1st of January 1918 export duties were levied upon palm kernels, palm oil, and kola nuts. In 1916 the current account showed a small balance on the right side, and from this time onward there was an upward tendency in the revenue and trade returns, although, inasmuch as the shortage of shipping became more and more serious as the war went on, any improvement in the trade statistics was due to higher prices, not to increased volume of imports and exports. In the case of Sierra Leone there was no such great disparity between the war years as there was on the Gold Coast and in Nigeria. The war had a depressing effect, but not to any exceptional extent, and, on the other hand, it

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did not call forth any new and profitable development or industry or stimulate existing products in an extraordinary degree. No difficulty was found with the native population: from the first the Chiefs in the Protectorate were uniformly and actively loyal, contributing to war funds, storing rice for the use of the Government, and providing carriers for overseas service.

[1] Among the various military units stationed at Sierra Leone at the outbreak of the war the Sierra Leone Company of Royal Garrison Artillery had been in existence since 1889. It contained representatives of almost every tribe in the Protectorate, the majority being Mohammedans, and its establishment at the time consisted of five European officers, four European non-commissioned officers and 83 native soldiers, with six 2.95 inch mountain guns. On the 1st of September one section, comprising one British officer, one British non-commissioned officer and 22 native gunners, with two guns and ammunition, was placed under orders for the Cameroons, and embarked on the 12th on the *Appam*, which carried General Dobell. A second section of equal strength was embarked on the same day, the men being most keen to join the expedition, though only a few hours' notice had been given. They were accompanied by 312 untrained gun carriers. Experience in the Cameroons proved the necessity for trained carriers and subsequently, in 1917, a certain number were added to the establishment. The two sections served throughout the campaign, though rarely in combination with each other. They took part in the attacks on Jabassi, in the operations in the Kribi district, on the northern railway, and in the final advance from the head of that line to Dschang and Fumban. The casualties were insignificant, and the health and conduct of the men were excellent. They gained two unexpected recruits. These were two natives of Sierra Leone who had taken service with the Germans, deserted when war was declared, enlisted with the battery and, after good service throughout the campaign, returned with the battery to Sierra Leone in March 1916. In January 1917 two sections were again placed under orders for overseas service in Nigeria, in consequence of the Tuareg rising in the French territory of the

[1] The material for what follows was mainly supplied through the Colonial Government by the commanding officers of the units.

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Niger, but the orders were subsequently cancelled. The Lieut.-Col. commanding the Royal Artillery at Sierra Leone summed up his opinion of the native soldiers of the company in the following words:

'The men of the Sierra Leone Company, Royal Garrison Artillery, have shown themselves loyal and willing soldiers, and, provided that they have had good Europeans over them, their ability to turn their hands to any work demanded of them has been remarkable.'

The Royal Engineers were represented at Sierra Leone by a native half of the 36th Company. A section commanded by Captain Jackson, R.E., and consisting of one British non-commissioned officer and 12 native non-commissioned officers and sappers, left in the *Appam* for the Cameroons on the 12th of September 1914 and served with the French Senegalese troops in their advance along the midland railway to Edea, with Lieut.-Col. Haywood's British column operating up the northern railway, and in the first occupation of Dschang, one officer being killed and two sergeants, one a native, being mentioned in dispatches. In June 1915 the native sappers were relieved by a draft of equal number and sent home. The new-comers were in October reinforced by a second draft of one British non-commissioned officer and ten natives, and the section, now commanded by Lieut. Banks Keast, R.E., did valuable work in the later stages of the final advance on Jaunde, facilitating the transport of the 4.5 howitzer which accompanied the British column, constructing defence works at selected points on the road, and repairing bridges and culverts. They were subsequently employed at Lolodorf and in the Kribi district, repairing at Lolodorf in seven days, and under great difficulties, a timber bridge of large dimensions. They finally left Duala for Sierra Leone on the 26th of April 1916.

The West African Regiment, whose Commandant was Colonel Gorges, D.S.O., consisted before the war of headquarters and seven companies stationed at Freetown, and five more companies distributed at three points in the Protectorate. The regiment was duly mobilized in the early days of August, and the *Appam* carried to the Cameroons on the 12th of September, Colonel Gorges himself, 17 British officers, 7 British non-commissioned officers, and 645 native rank and

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file, 6 companies in all, with 2 machine guns. Colonel Gorges having been given the command of the whole British contingent of the Expeditionary Force, the command of the regiment devolved on Major Vaughan. The reinforcements which were sent in the course of the campaign numbered 4 British officers, 8 British non-commissioned officers, and 222 native rank and file. The regiment suffered somewhat severely in the first attack on Jabassi and had hard fighting at the head of the northern railway in the spring of 1915, notably at Stoebel's Farm on the 4th of March, when it covered retirement from an unsuccessful attack and rescued a 2.95 gun. Captain Dinnen was killed on this occasion. Detachments of the regiment took part in most of the operations in the Southern Cameroons, but more especially in the Kribi district, in the Jabassi area, in the latter part of the final advance on Dschang and Fumban, and, in the latest stage of the campaign, on the border of Spanish Muni. The casualties were 7 British officers and non-commissioned officers killed and four wounded or injured, 27 native ranks killed, 17 died of disease, and 41 wounded. Colonel Gorges received the C.B., 2 British officers the M.C., and in all 5 British officers and 8 natives were mentioned in dispatches. The natives were unfortunate in that, being on the War Office establishment, they were ineligible for the W. A. F. F. Distinguished Conduct Medal and were not recommended for the Imperial decoration. The regiment left Duala for Sierra Leone on the 18th of April 1916, and in the absence in East Africa of the battalion of the West India regiment which normally forms part of the Freetown garrison, it was the only infantry unit in the Colony. Notwithstanding, at the beginning of January 1917, four companies and four machine guns were, at the urgent request of the Governor-General of Nigeria, sent to Nigeria to replace the Nigerian troops operating in support of the French in the Agadez area; they were held in reserve at Zaria for some two months and returned to Sierra Leone in March and April. Further, from the beginning of March 1917 to the beginning of May 1918, a company was sent to the Gambia to garrison Bathurst in the absence in East Africa of the Gambia Company of the West African Frontier Force, and from February 1917 to February 1918 another company did garrison duty in Togoland.

The 1st Battalion of the West India Regiment was stationed

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at Sierra Leone at the beginning of the war. It was represented in the Cameroons campaign by a major and signalling section of 14 N.C.O.'s and men, who left for the Cameroons on the 18th of October 1914. In 1915 the Battalion was transferred to Jamaica and replaced by the 2nd Battalion, which supplied a detachment to the Cameroons and served in East Africa.

The Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force was not, like the units which have been previously mentioned, on the British establishment. When mobilization orders were received on the 30th of July 1914, it was under the command of Captain and Temporary Lieut.-Col. J. G. F. Newstead. On the 22nd of August two companies were embarked for Togoland. There they were not actively engaged and, after a fortnight at Lome, they were sent on to the Cameroons. They took part in the operations prior to the surrender of Dualâ, were subsequently formed with two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment into a composite battalion, operated on the northern railway with the troops under Lieut.-Col. Haywood's command, and took part in the successful attacks on Jabassi and Buea. On the 27th of January 1915 they were joined at Duala by the other four companies of the battalion from Sierra Leone and the battalion was now again completely united. It was immediately moved up to the head of the northern railway, and on the 3rd of February four companies under Colonel Newstead attacked an enemy position at Hartmann's Farm, while the 1st Nigerian Regiment made a simultaneous attack on another position some miles to the east. The attack, however, was broken off and the force retired, having lost one officer and 54 rank and file in killed and wounded. On the 27th of February the battalion co-operated with the West African Regiment in an attack on Mbureku in the same area and, on the 4th of March, four companies of the battalion of 50 men each, together with 2 companies of the West African Regiment, and two guns, marched from Bare against an enemy force in position at Stoebel's Farm, still in the same district. The enemy, numbering some 300 rifles with four machine guns, were found strongly entrenched behind a deep impassable donga, some 350 yards wide. Their machine gun fire was heavy and accurate, and their rifle fire grew in intensity, when one of the two British guns had been put out of action. In vain attempts to reinforce the advance guard of

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the Sierra Leone men, which was held up at the edge of the donga, the commanding officer, Colonel Newstead, was mortally wounded, and eventually the attack was abandoned and the troops withdrawn covered by the two companies of the West African Regiment. The casualties were two officers and 17 rank and file. At a later date two companies took part in the first advance on Jaunde, and during the subsequent rainy season the battalion, now under the command of Lieut.-Col. Hastings, D.S.O., was split up, one company being detailed to join a column operating on the Spanish border. With the exception of this company, the rest of the battalion, on the resumption of active fighting, took part in the second advance along the Jaunde Road and the occupation of Jaunde. Eventually the battalion reached Sierra Leone again on the 26th of April 1916, after an absence of 20 months on active service, the total casualties having amounted to three officers and 108 rank and file. Six officers were mentioned in dispatches, one of whom received the Military Cross, and four men were awarded the D.C.M. Though the battalion was in January 1917 again mobilized for overseas service, the orders were cancelled and it saw no further fighting in the war.

The first West African contribution to the Inland Water Transport Service in Mesopotamia was the *Ivy*, the Nigerian Government yacht, which after most excellent service throughout the Cameroons campaign, as is told later on, was sold to the Imperial Government and left for Mesopotamia early in 1917, carrying 40 West African recruits for water transport, in addition to a crew of 49 West Africans. A little later, in May 1917, a transport took on board at Sierra Leone a West African contingent for the same purpose, numbering 889 natives. Thus, West Africa supplied 978 natives for this distant overseas service, one of the most interesting illustrations of Imperial co-operation in the war. The transport carried also reinforcements for the Gold Coast Regiment in East Africa and the Gambia Company, and on arrival at Dar es Salaam, so useful did the men of the transport contingent prove themselves in the work of unloading and landing cargo, that the naval authorities of the port were permitted to keep 100 men out of the number. The rest reached Karachi in July. In August a detachment of 168 were sent on to Basra, and the remainder, after an outbreak of cholera which caused 29 deaths,

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landed at Basra on the 19th of October. On arrival in Mesopotamia the contingent was largely split up. They formed crews for the river steamers, were trained as drivers of motor launches, were detailed for dock construction. Three hundred were sent to Qurna and employed in unloading. Here the winter brought on bronchitis and pneumonia, from which about 30 deaths resulted, and the men were moved to the ocean port of Nahr Umar, about 22 miles above Basra, where their health was good and excellent work was done. In January 1918 the contingent manned eight monitors of the *Fly* class, taken over from the Royal Navy, which plied on the Middle and Upper Euphrates, and others were employed in various ways and at various points on that river and the Tigris, 50 men only remaining at Nahr Umar. The contingent was embarked at Basra for repatriation on the 30th of July 1918. At Bombay one company of 108 was placed in quarantine owing to a case of small-pox, the remainder being carried on in another transport as far as Capetown. Here they were landed, together with a detachment of the Sierra Leone carrier corps returning from East Africa, and waited for three months to be taken home. It was at the time of the great influenza epidemic in South Africa, and the West Africans, who, with few exceptions, kept excellent health, gave most valuable assistance in coping with the epidemic. It was not until the 7th of January 1919 that they landed once more at Sierra Leone.[1]

Sierra Leone had supplied a number of carriers for the Cameroons, and in January 1917 recruiting began for a corps of carriers to serve with the units of the West African Frontier Force in East Africa. There was an enthusiastic response to the call for men, and within a very short time 3,500 men were enrolled, formed into companies of 500, each under 2 European officers and 3 European non-commissioned officers, and for a short time drilled and disciplined. They sailed from Freetown on the 22nd of April; on the 30th of May two companies landed at Kilwa Kisiwani and joined the Gold Coast Regiment.

[1] The figures given in this paragraph do not quite tally with those given in *The Inland Water Transport in Mesopotamia*, compiled by Lieut.-Col. L. J. Hall, O.B.E., R.E. (Constable & Co., 1921). This first-hand account states (pp. 185–6) that 67 marine ratings from the Nigerian Marine arrived in Mesopotamia on board the *Ivy*, and that the West African Contingent, which arrived in 3 drafts, numbered 702. The West African Contingent was under the command of Captain Nosworthy, R.E., and the deaths in Mesopotamia numbered 45 (pp. 193–4). One member of the Nigerian Marine also died.

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The rest were carried on to Dar es Salaam and, after detention in quarantine, were attached to the Nigerian Brigade. The corps saw continuous service with these West African units, serving them as first and second line transport from June to December 1917, and after the Germans had been driven across the Ruvuma, it was actively employed in Portuguese East Africa until the Armistice. While it was in East Africa it was reinforced by two more companies and, had there been need, further reinforcements would have been forthcoming at short notice from Sierra Leone. Throughout the whole of the operations the men of the carrier corps maintained in full measure their reputation as hard and willing workers, and their excellent transport work for the fighting units was an important element in the successful operations which cleared German East Africa. They had appreciable casualties in action and more from disease. Repatriation was slow because of restricted shipping facilities, but the majority reached Sierra Leone again by the end of 1918. The pay of the carriers recruited for service in East Africa was a charge upon Imperial funds. The Sierra Leone Government paid the normal cost of the Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force during the operations in the Cameroons, extraordinary charges being borne by the Imperial Government. A sum of £5,000 was voted by the Colonial Government as a contribution to Imperial War Funds, and the following voluntary subscriptions were raised :

	£	s.	d.
Children of the Empire	76	15	11
Comforts—British local troops	3	19	10
Friends of Belgium	61	16	6
British Red Cross	7,441	17	7
Soldiers Tobacco Fund	10	0	0
Interned Soldiers Parcel Fund	10	0	0
Aeroplane Fund	1,587	10	5
	9,192	0	3

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SECTION III

THE GOLD COAST INCLUDING THE CONQUEST OF TOGOLAND[1]

By the Editor, from material supplied from the Colony

In 1914 the Gold Coast Colony with its two dependencies, Ashanti and the Northern Territories, covered an area of nearly 80,000 square miles, a rather smaller area than Great Britain. It marched on the west and north with the French Ivory Coast and Sudan, on the east with a German dependency, Togoland. Among the very oldest of British footholds beyond the sea, the Gold Coast, in the days when, for Europeans, it was a coast and nothing more, had been singularly cosmopolitan. Portuguese, Danes, Dutch, even Brandenburgers for a while, had been sojourners there before, late in the nineteenth century, it passed into exclusively British keeping. The colony of the Gold Coast came into existence in typically British fashion. It grew by gradual expansion inland from a series of isolated forts and factories on the sea-shore, by acquiring power and jurisdiction without annexation. Until comparatively recent years the Gold Coast was almost entirely a protectorate, not a colony; and, though at length the soil was constituted British soil, the colony remained in essence and was administered as 'a collection of small states, each of which is self-contained and entirely independent of its neighbours'; the tribal system still held the field, tribal boundaries were respected, and such unity as was secured came from above not from below, from the establishment of British rule. Behind the colony proper Ashanti, now also British territory, had been in its turn, and is to this day, a federation of similar small and mutually independent states.

[1] This section has been mainly compiled from official reports, but the Editor is greatly indebted to Sir Hugh Clifford, G.C.M.G., who was Governor of the Colony throughout the war, and to Captain C. E. Cookson, of the Gold Coast Government service.

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

CHRISTIANSBORG CASTLE, ACCRA

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Under the paramountcy of Kumasi, however, it developed into a comparatively centralized military power, the overthrow and disintegration of which resulted in permanent peace and contentment within as well as without its borders. Behind Ashanti the Northern Territories were still a protectorate, whose eastern frontier was formed by an Anglo-German line which did not correspond with tribal boundaries, a standing source of native unrest.

The census of 1911 credited the 80,000 square miles with a population of 1,500,000, probably an under-estimate. The Europeans numbered little more than 1,600. Professing native Christians had very largely multiplied in the colony proper, where they amounted to fully one-tenth of the total population. Only in the Northern Territories was there an appreciable proportion of Mohammedans, and Mohammedanism showed no signs of growth. The great majority among the various tribes were pagans. The natives dwelt for the most part on the countryside; there were no large centres of population, no towns with as many as 20,000 inhabitants, though the residents at Accra, the growing capital of a growing colony, and at Kumasi, the chief town of Ashanti, were hardly short of that number. Taking the colony alone, foreigners did not amount to one-quarter of the scanty white population; and out of the 305 white foreigners, 148, or nearly one-half, were Germans. The 148 Germans included over 50 missionaries. There were two missions with a German connexion, the Basel mission, nominally a Swiss mission, but on the Gold Coast represented almost entirely by Germans, and the Bremen mission. The Basel mission, in particular, had a record of many years of sound and effective work: it headed the list of missionary societies in number of schools and scholars. But, as the war went on, and enemy sympathies intruded into missionary and educational work, it was found necessary to disestablish both missions. The Bremen missionaries were deported in 1916, the Basel missionaries towards the end of 1917: the Bremen mission schools were taken over by the Government, the majority of the Basel mission schools were at the outset taken over also, and the religious work of the latter mission was taken in charge by the United Free Church of Scotland. As a safeguard against enemy propaganda in future the Legisla-

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tive Council passed in March 1918 an alien missionaries and teachers' restriction ordinance.

Before the war the Gold Coast had prospered amazingly: there were annual surpluses, and in consequence very large reserves. Trade abounded, cocoa heading the list of exports, with an old-time product, gold and gold dust, in the second place. Great Britain sent considerably more than two-thirds of the imports and took a like proportion of the exports. Germany came second—*longo intervallo*—in either case, but year after year German trade was steadily expanding. The year 1914 promised to put into shade the trade records of all former years, and in August of that year few provinces of the British Empire could compete with the Gold Coast in solid wealth and material prosperity, both present and prospective. Gold had given the colony its name, and gold mining prospered. Meanwhile a geological survey, initiated in 1913, was beginning to disclose other valuable mineral resources, including bauxite and manganese. Rich and extensive deposits of manganese were opened up in 1914, 30,000 tons of which were three years later, in 1917, shipped to England for the benefit of the Ministry of Munitions. But the greatest source of wealth was agricultural not mineral, the cocoa industry. Cocoa was an imported not an indigenous product. It did not figure as a still very minor export till twenty years before the war, the early shipments of cocoa being mainly sent to Germany. Yet so favourable were the local conditions, so great was the development, that in 1917 the output of the Gold Coast and Ashanti represented over a quarter of the total annual production of cocoa for the whole world. The industry was in native hands: in every way it enriched and benefited the people. It initiated them into permanent and systematic, as opposed to spasmodic, cultivation, and raised them into the position of peasant proprietors, producing for profit and not merely for the food of the moment. Its great success had one counterbalancing drawback, that it discouraged other agricultural industries, and the export of palm oil and kernels, the great speciality of West Africa, dwindled, in the case of the Gold Coast, to insignificant proportions.

The Governor of the Colony was Sir Hugh Clifford, who, like two of his predecessors, had learnt the trade of administra-

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tion in the Malay Peninsula. He brought to his post experience gained in both east and west, singular first-hand knowledge of native races and native problems, great literary gifts. He took up the government on December 26, 1912, and was governor still when the war came to an end. August 4 found him on leave in England, but he reached the Gold Coast again before the end of the month. In his absence, Mr. W. C. F. Robertson administered the government, and faced the crisis with marked ability and success. The colony was of the standard type, with a nominated Legislative Council of eight members in addition to the Governor, four official and four unofficial members. Of the latter, two were Europeans and two were natives. In the course of the war, in 1916, the Council was greatly enlarged, the number of officials being raised to eleven, and of unofficials to nine, six of whom were natives. The Governor legislated for Ashanti and the Northern Territories; and, under his authority, they were administered by Chief Commissioners. In either case the same man was Chief Commissioner throughout the war, Mr., now Sir, F. C. Fuller, K.B.E., C.M.G., of Ashanti, Captain C. H. Armitage, C.M.G., D.S.O., of the Northern Territories; and the implicit confidence placed in these capable and experienced men was reflected in the unhesitating loyalty of the native population. The armed forces, of which a fuller account is given a little later, consisted of the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force, mainly recruited from the Northern Territories but having its head-quarters at Kumasi, of semi-military police, and of volunteers to whom the mines of the colony and of Ashanti and the railway staff contributed members. The efficiency of the various branches of the Government was amply demonstrated when the strain of war came, and when, though their numbers were greatly depleted, they added to responsibility for the well-being of the colony the successful administration of half of Togoland.

Thus, the Gold Coast entered upon the war well equipped in men and money, side by side with the chief ally of the British Empire and with its greatest enemy, having a somewhat close acquaintance with that enemy and presented with an opportunity for immediate action; above all, with a prosperous and contented native population whose British sympathies were shared on the German side of the border.

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For from the first native feeling was uniformly and actively loyal, and so it remained to the end in spite of straitened conditions in the later stages of the war and economic depression. In the colony we are told that 'the loyalty of the people to the Administration was clearly demonstrated at the outbreak of war'; and, when the war was coming to an end, that, among the manifold anxieties which it had brought in its train, want of confidence in the goodwill and support of the native population had never found a place. On the part of the Ashantis loyalty was spontaneous and sincere, it was no mere lip service, but very practical loyalty. At the outbreak of the war, carriers were provided, a service of day and night runners was established, and a cordon of native scouts was formed on the line of the Volta river.

In the Northern Territories the season had not been so favourable as farther south, and deficient rainfall had resulted in scanty crops. But the outbreak of war and the movement of men caused no disturbance: the Mohammedans were not troubled or troublesome when Turkey joined in the war: the chiefs gave all the help they could and all the money, and the frontier chiefs in particular hailed the prospect of reunion under British protection of the kindred tribes of Togoland—Dagomba and Mamprusi.

Every month of the war, as in its latest stages it brought growing commercial depression, must have added to the possibilities of unrest, but native loyalty and co-operation were solid to the last and were very especially attested in two respects. In the first place, in the course of the war the whole territory was at times almost entirely denuded of the armed forces which had been thought necessary in normal times of peace: yet no ill results followed. Only in the Northern Territories, in districts farthest removed from civilization and most affected by baseless rumour, were there signs of unrest, as one British official and another were called away from the outposts, and the impression gained ground that the white man was leaving. On one occasion, in 1916, a faction fight developed into defiance of Government authority, but order was speedily restored by a detachment of constabulary. In the second place, native contributions to war and relief funds, details of which are given later, were large in amount and consistently maintained, varying from gifts of aeroplanes for

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the army to a subscription from a chief in the interior to the Edith Cavell fund.

It has been noted that the cocoa industry had turned the native agriculturists of the colony and Ashanti into producers for export, and the fact that year by year they were being enriched from seaborne traffic brought in its train reasoned appreciation of British sea-power and resolve to support it. 'It is generally realized', said the report on the colony for 1915, 'that the existence of the colony, as it is to-day, depends upon its communications by sea, and this fact, perhaps, more than any other, has brought home to the community their dependence on the Crown and their immediate concern in the fortunes of the War.' Moreover, when native peoples, living under British control, have an opportunity of drawing comparisons, their attachment is doubly assured. Finally conquered only in 1900, the Ashantis by defeat were freed from the rule of militant barbarism, and in 1914 were solid for the British cause. On the eastern border of the Gold Coast, British lenity was in evidence side by side with German worry and compulsion, with the result that before the war there was continuous immigration from German into British territory, and that when the invasion of Togoland began there was no need to proclaim, though it was proclaimed, that the invaders came with no ill-intent to the native population.

On the night of July 29 warning was received by cable from England of imminent danger of war; precautions were taken in accordance with instructions, and by July 31 the Gold Coast Regiment was mobilized. Additional European volunteers were enrolled, a censorship was established, ordinances and proclamations were drafted, and much had been done before, at midnight on August 4, news came that war with Germany had begun. The next day a formal proclamation was issued to that effect, the Legislative Council met, and a beginning was made of war legislation. It is interesting to note, as a sign of the times, that the first ordinance passed to meet war conditions was an 'aerial navigation ordinance'. Two other ordinances were passed on this first day of the war. One, a bank-holiday ordinance, was designed to give breathing space to make the necessary financial arrangements to meet the crisis; the other, an ordinance amending the criminal code, was the

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first of various measures here, as elsewhere throughout the Empire, directed against dealings with the enemy. In all the colonies and protectorates, war legislation, so far as there were no special local conditions to the contrary, was modelled from home, and followed the lines on which emergency laws were framed in the United Kingdom. On the Gold Coast legislation during the war, and called forth by the war, included three ordinances for the defence of the colony, six relative to trading with the enemy, seven on the subject of the control and disposal of enemy property, and two, in 1916 and 1918, calling for returns of British property in enemy countries and British claims against enemies.

In the first weeks of the war the Acting Governor, with his colleagues, lost no time, omitted no precautions, and gave the military authorities unsparing support. Yet a wise discretion was exercised in not overrunning the necessities of the case. Martial law was not proclaimed in any district of the colony, lest the native mind might be unduly disturbed, and native levies were not called out to supplement the organized armed forces, for fear of exciting tribal feuds. Reinforcements were obtained by requisitioning two companies from Sierra Leone.[1]

In Togoland the Germans owned a territory of nearly 34,000 square miles, an area slightly larger than Ireland, with a comparatively numerous native population of over a million. It was the smallest of the German dependencies in Africa, but financially the soundest. It widened out inland, but on the south it was compressed by the Trans-Volta district of the Gold Coast colony running in like a wedge from the west, with the result that its coast-line was no more than 32 miles in length, and its capital, which was also the chief port, Lome, was within three-quarters of a mile of the British border. The main settlement of the Trans-Volta district, Quittah, was less than 25 miles away; 35 miles farther west, at the mouth of the Volta, is Addah, where on August 5 two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment were concentrated, having been brought up from Accra. A hundred miles due north of Lome, connected with it by both road and rail, about 8 miles south by east of a place named Atakpame, was the wireless station of Kamina, where there was an installation of surpassing size. In Sir

[1] See above, p. 16.

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KAMINA WIRELESS STATION: BASE OF ONE OF THE NINE MASTS

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Hugh Clifford's words, it was 'destined to be the pivotal point of the German world-wide wireless system', and 'designed to be able to communicate with Berlin on the one hand, with Windhoek in German South-West Africa, and with Dar es Salaam on the east coast, on the other'. It had only been opened at the very end of July 1914, and had a life of no more than four weeks.

Sandwiched in between the Gold Coast on the west and French Dahomey on the east, bounded on the north by French territory, on the south by a sea commanded by British shipping, Togoland could be, and was, invaded at all points from all sides. Nevertheless, its defenders, had they been efficiently handled, and inspired by the spirit that animated von Lettow-Vorbeck and his troops in German East Africa, should have proved well able to make a good fight. The native armed police, it is true, were not very numerous, and they were armed for the most part with rifles which had been used by the Prussians in the Franco-German War of 1870; but Major von Doering, the Acting Governor of Togoland, had at his disposal some 200 Europeans who had all undergone military training, and whose equipment was in readiness for any emergency. This force, armed as it was with machine guns, and assisted by the native Askari, should have amply sufficed not only to prevent the advance of the Gold Coast Regiment, but to drive it into the sea or back across the frontier before any efficient aid could be afforded by the French levies, the greater part of which consisted of irregular mounted troops hastily enrolled. From first to last, however, the German command and the European rank and file displayed a singular reluctance to offer any determined resistance. Papers subsequently captured in the British zone of occupation furnished abundant evidence to this effect. They showed, moreover, that the Germans were, with good reason, very nervous as to the attitude of the local native population, and were prepared to accept as gospel every lying rumour concerning the numbers opposed to them, and the efficiency of their equipment and artillery, which any of their scouts, native or European, chose to palm off upon them under the name of 'information'.

As a consequence, the Germans in Togoland were beaten men before ever the fighting began. The retreat from Lome into the interior shook the morale of white men and native

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soldiers alike; and thereafter only a paltry resistance was offered to the invaders, whose advance through difficult country was hindered mainly by attempts to damage the railway line, which had very little practical result, whereas a moderately stubborn opposition might well have reduced them to considerable straits. Judged from the German point of view, the fall of Togoland during the first month of the war makes a humiliating page in their national history; while a handful of young British officers, commanding a little force of native troops, attacked their enemy with all the impetuous lack of caution proper to their youth, and attained success by sheer fearlessness and dash. An immense service was thereby rendered to the British colony of the Gold Coast on the one side, to the French colony of Dahomey on the other, and incidentally to the prestige of the Allies in West Africa. Before the month of August 1914 had worn to a close, fighting in this region was at an end; Great Britain and France were in a position to take joint action against the German Cameroons farther east and south; and, most important of all, the pivotal point of the German overseas wireless system had been reduced to a scrap-heap. If the approaches to Kamina had been defended as they could and ought to have been defended, and if, as might easily have been the case, the campaign in Togoland had been prolonged for months, as subsequently happened both in the Cameroons and in East Africa, there would have been less light and more shade in the history of the Gold Coast during the great war.

On August 5 von Doering telegraphed to Accra, proposing neutrality as between Togoland and the Gold Coast—a policy which would have admirably suited German interests in Africa generally. Reference to England brought an immediate refusal, and on the 6th the officer commanding the troops at Addah, Captain Barker, was sent to Lome with an ultimatum. Its terms were that, as three British columns were ready to attack from the west, two French columns from the east, a third French column from the north, resistance was useless. Surrender was accordingly invited, an answer to be given in twenty-four hours. Barker went from and returned to Quittah on the 6th. On the 7th he went back to Lome and found that the Governor had retired up the railway in the direction of the precious wireless station, surrendering or purporting to

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surrender Lome and all the territory behind for a distance of 120 kilometres, in other words up to a point some 28 miles short of Kamina. Lome was at once occupied by the troops from Addah, who met with no resistance; communications with the Lieutenant-Governor of Dahomey and the Governor-General of French West Africa at Dakar ensured a full measure of French co-operation from the east and north: authority was obtained from England to advance inland, and on August 12 the main body of the little expeditionary force, brought by sea from Sekondi, and having called at Accra on the way, was landed at Lome. The total available fighting strength was a little short of 600, nearly all belonging or attached to the Gold Coast Regiment, and there were some 2,000 native carriers and workmen.

In the absence both of the colonel commanding the Gold Coast Regiment and of the second in command, Captain F. C. Bryant, R.A., was in charge of the enterprise, and was given the local rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He realized that rapidity was of the essence of success, and that initial and rapid success would, by its effect upon the native population, double the value of victory. His main trouble was difficulty of communication and of co-operative action in an advance along a broken railway and a parallel but not always adjacent road, amid swamp and bush and long grass, in face of machine guns and of an enemy mobile as commanding the line and the rolling stock. 'And yet he moved,' and moved swiftly. At once, on the 12th, patrols were pushed forward, to forestall as much as possible the destruction of bridges. On the 15th the main body came into touch with the enemy, and there was a small skirmish. Meanwhile a company of the Gold Coast Regiment, under Captain Potter, sent on far in advance, and from the evening of the 14th out of reach of communication, was, in the face of superior numbers, boldly and skilfully handled, in the neighbourhood of Agbelafoe station, between 30 and 40 miles north of Lome. The result was that a train was intercepted and wrecked, a number of prisoners was taken, and the rest of the enemy retreated in such haste that the line was left clear and intact for a long distance to the north. Reinforced on the 18th by a body of 150 French Senegalese Tirailleurs from Dahomey under Captain Castaing, with the railway and telegraph being rapidly repaired behind him, in communication

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on the one side with another small British column marching in a south-easterly direction on Kamina from Kete Krachi on the Volta river, on the other side with a French column under Major Maroix, directed south-west on the same point from Tchetti on the Dahomey frontier, Bryant on the 20th had concentrated his force more than half-way to Kamina. On the following day the enemy were found very strongly entrenched some distance farther north, at a village named Chra, situated on the northern bank of a stream of the same name, the railway bridge over which had been blown up. Here, on the 22nd, Bryant attacked in two columns—along the road and the railway—the French being on his right. There was obstinate fighting: the troops worked their way round both flanks of their opponents, but the entrenchments had not been carried when night fell. Bryant laid his plans to renew the attack at dawn, in strength on the left, while containing the enemy in front and on the right; but when daylight came it was found that the position had been evacuated under cover of darkness, and that its defenders, fearing to be again intercepted, had fled to the north. This was the decisive action—the one stand-up fight. French and British troops, native troops under white officers, matched each other in gallantry; one white officer was killed in either case, and the total casualties amounted to 17 per cent. of the small force engaged. On the night of the 24th there were sounds of explosion in the direction of Kamina, indicating the destruction of the wireless station, and, with its destruction, the end of a grave menace to British shipping and sea communications. On the 25th, when Bryant was within 20 miles of Kamina, two Germans arrived to offer terms of capitulation. They were told that the surrender must be unconditional; on the following day they surrendered unconditionally, and on the 27th Bryant entered Kamina. The European prisoners exceeded 200, and the captured arms and ammunition were plentiful. In the matter of ammunition, the rules of The Hague Convention had, in German fashion, been wholly ignored.

The campaign had lasted just a fortnight. It had been markedly successful and carried out with a skill and energy which were duly and deservedly recognized. Bryant, who received the C.M.G.,[1] had proved himself to be a most competent

[1] For later services he was also awarded the D.S.O. and C.B.E.

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CHRA BRIDGE AND VILLAGE

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leader, and the backing which he had received from the Gold Coast Government was worthy of all praise. From the Gold Coast came men to repair railway and telegraph, to organize transport and signalling, to tend the sick and wounded. Most admirable was the work on the lines of communication of the army signal and railway staff under Majors Gosling and O'Shaughnessy. In short the administrative services were excellent, and the colony supplied them, as it supplied the fighting men on the British side, and paid the whole cost of the British share of the operation, amounting to a few pounds short of £60,000. The first colony taken from Germany was conquered, in concert with the French, by the Gold Coast and at the sole expense of the Gold Coast.

The German *débâcle* would not have been so quickly accomplished had not the advance been so keenly pressed. On the other hand, Bryant's force, unaided, could not have achieved in a fortnight what was achieved. As he himself pointed out, the Germans were being herded together to Kamina by converging columns, and the natives of Togoland were their foes, not their friends. French co-operation was admirably effective, and beyond question hastened the surrender. On the 27th, immediately after the capitulation, Maroix's column from the east reached Kamina, while the British column from Kete Krachi was near at hand. At an earlier date, in the far north of Togoland, another French force had borne down on the chief German centre in this northern area, Sansanne Mangu, a small British column marching to meet it in a direction south-east from Gambaga in the north-eastern corner of the Northern Territories. In the south-western corner of this same Sansanne Mangu district is Yendi, the centre of the Dagomba country on the German side of the line. Yendi lies almost due east of Tamale, the seat of government of the Northern Territories, and the intervening district is peopled by Dagombas. On August 14 a handful of Northern Territories constabulary under a British officer occupied Yendi, and, following them in a week's time, the Chief Commissioner, Captain Armitage, received an unbounded welcome from the native King of Yendi and his people, who formally placed themselves under British protection, and prayed to be reunited to their kinsfolk under the aegis of the British flag.

Returned from England, the Governor reached Lome on

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August 29. A provisional agreement, which he made with the Lieutenant-Governor of Dahomey for the administration of Togoland during the war, and which was sanctioned, as it stood, by the home authorities, left the western districts, including Lome, and the railways, in British keeping, the eastern districts in that of France. Military occupation was only a name: one company of soldiers from the Gold Coast or Sierra Leone sufficed for a garrison in the British sphere of occupation. Relieved from an oppressive poll tax, from forced labour for private employers or outside the limits of their own districts, having their cases tried in open court, governed as far as possible through their own tribal system, which had found no favour with the Germans, the natives of Togoland were well content with the change of masters. The Gold Coast annual report for 1916 recorded that in the British half of Togoland the provisional administration was self-supporting, and that the area under cultivation had increased by 33 per cent. during the two years since the English had replaced the Germans. Officials from the Gold Coast establishment carried on the administration throughout the war; private German merchants were left unmolested until 1916, when it was found necessary to deport them; and in 1916 and 1917 the German missionaries were deported also.

The outbreak of war inevitably caused dislocation in the trade of the Gold Coast. German and Austrian firms were closed down, German steamers ceased to call, British steamers plying to West Africa were diverted to war work, orders for goods from England were cancelled, the beginning of the war almost coincided with the cocoa season and damaged the selling prospects of the staple crop of the colony. Yet, in spite of all, when the year ended there had been but a small decrease in value of imports and exports, as compared with 1913. But for the war there would have been a great excess. The output of gold was a record, so was the quantity of cocoa exported, though in the latter case fall in prices resulted in a decrease in value. The revenue for the year was a record.

Throughout the British Empire the war stimulated the production within the Empire of such articles as are either necessaries of life or in demand for war purposes, and, before German submarines had greatly multiplied and were let loose

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for indiscriminate destruction, British mastery of the sea ensured more or less adequate, though restricted, means of transport. Moreover, such a large proportion of Gold Coast trade had always been with the Mother Country, that the closing of German and Austrian markets, after the first few months of initial disturbance, was not a serious disaster. Accordingly, the year 1915 was a year of prosperity for the colony now relieved from all apprehension of a neighbouring enemy. The revenue, which was reinforced by an increase in Customs duties, easily exceeded that of all former years, and the total value of trade was also a record. There was a slight decrease in the value of commercial imports, due in part to fewer ships, in part to difficulty in getting the desired goods manufactured in the United Kingdom, but the value of commercial exports was much larger than before the war. Cocoa was 'in increasing demand at increasing prices', the export showed an increase of 46 per cent. in quantity, 66 per cent. in value. The export of gold was also a record, though there was a diminution in the output. Exports formerly sent to Germany found their way to the United Kingdom, to France, to the United States. Trade with the United States, in particular, grew rapidly and greatly, cocoa and Gold Coast mahogany being in special demand in America. As the war went on, monthly steamers, in addition to sailing vessels, plied to and fro between the Gold Coast and the United States, and imports and exports were shipped direct instead of through the United Kingdom. Figures, quoted by the Governor, showed that the American trade of the colony in 1917 was nearly five times in value that of 1913.

The war-time prosperity of the Gold Coast was mainly due to the great growth of trade with the United States, a direct result of the war, and it culminated in 1916. The value of the total trade in this year, nearly £10,500,000, far exceeded the records of all previous years. The increase was in imports, for the total value of commercial exports was slightly less than in 1915, though the value of the cocoa export—in spite of the fact that a somewhat smaller quantity was exported—was higher than ever before. There was also a marked revival during the year of the rubber industry, which had fallen away in 1914 and 1915. The revenue was by far the largest received in any one year, exceeding the expenditure by £370,000. An export duty

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on cocoa of a farthing a pound—£2 6*s.* 8*d.* a ton—was imposed in October 1916.

In the latter months of 1916 the price of cocoa had been falling, and 1917 brought in its train more difficult conditions for the staple industry and more straitened times in general. The British blockade of Germany was drawn tighter, precluding any chance of cocoa finding its way into enemy countries through neutral markets. The Germans, in turn, ran amok with their submarines; British shipping losses increased, and the available ships were taken up more exclusively than ever with the transport of the prime necessaries of war. Cocoa was not one of them, oil products were, being in special demand for munitions, and the Gold Coast had cause to regret that palm oil and kernels had been so completely supplanted by cocoa. Nor did the new export of manganese, which was a feature of the year, compensate for the low prices in the great agricultural industry. The situation, however, was saved by a further large increase in exports to the United States, and, as a matter of fact, more tons of cocoa were sent out of the colony than ever before, especially from Ashanti, though the fall in price made the sterling value of the export less than in either 1915 or 1916. The total trade returns of the year showed a decrease in value in both imports and exports; very large in the case of imports, small in that of exports. The revenue, too, was smaller than in 1916, but there was a further slight increase in customs duties, and again the year ended with a handsome balance on the current account.

In 1918 the Gold Coast felt sorely the continuance of the war. When on October 28 the Governor laid before the Legislative Council the budget for 1919 and, in doing so, gave an exhaustive review of past and present, he had but a depressing account to give of the current year so far as the months had run. The estimates had been revised in the direction of economy: customs and stamp duties were raised to supplement the drooping revenue, but it promised to fall short of the receipts for 1917 by nearly £400,000, and to leave a deficit on the account of the year of £230,000, to be made good out of the surpluses of the two previous years. The trade statistics told the same tale, for the total value of the commercial imports and exports bid fair to be lower than for eight years past. Want of shipping space for cocoa was the root of the evil; the

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only remedy was return of peace, and the remedy was at hand, for, in a fortnight from the date of Sir Hugh Clifford's review, the armistice was signed and peace was in sight. The end came none too soon to the Gold Coast, as indeed to all parts of the Empire. A limited number of British officers, civil and military, constantly being depleted, yet perpetually called upon to add to their duties and their responsibilities, serving for much longer terms without change of climate than in normal times, inevitably felt the strain.

The part played in the war by the self-governing dominions and India was on so great a scale, their armies were so large, their gifts so splendid in money and in kind, that the more modest contributions to the cause of the commonwealth made by the smaller provinces tend to be overshadowed. All the more reason, therefore, is there to make known that the efforts of the colonies and protectorates were, in proportion, equally entitled to recognition, and no better illustration of patriotism, energy, and forwardness can be given than the case of the Gold Coast. Of the four German possessions in Africa, one, German South-West Africa, was accounted for by the Union of South Africa alone. In the conquest of the other three the Gold Coast had a share, and in one case, that of Togoland, so far as it was a British conquest, it was the work of the Gold Coast alone. All the men and all the funds for reducing Togoland and subsequently administering the British sphere of occupation were found by the Gold Coast; not one penny of the expense was borne by the Mother Country. The cost of the Gold Coast Regiment when serving in the Cameroons was met from the colonial treasury, and the colony supplied native labour for the enterprise as well as fighting men. To East Africa it sent both soldiers and labourers, though not mainly at its own cost. The Legislative Council voted £200,000 to the Imperial war exchequer and invested £500,000 in the British war loan. Private subscriptions, largely native subscriptions, gave over £80,000 to war and relief funds, and eleven aeroplanes to the War Council. All the time the colony with its dependencies provided on land for its own security, ordered its own life, opened a direct trade in rapidly growing dimensions with the United States, sent its cocoa, gold, and timber, as far as shipping allowed, across the sea, and developed its new-found store of manganese, more nearly within reach of the British munition

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factories than any other supply of the kind. This is what was done for the war and during the war, not in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe, not in the civilized and ordered East, but on the West Coast of Africa, associated in the public mind with bad climate, evil tradition, and native races only emerging from barbarism, in a dependency where, as has been told, there were at most some 1,300 men of British race, officials of the Government or representatives and employees of trading or mining companies and ministers of religion, and where missionary influence had been largely coloured by German affinities. Under such conditions, not only to have kept peace within, not only to have carried on and more than carried on, but, in a marked degree, to have given active and substantial help to the Empire, outside and beyond the limits of the colony, is notable evidence of the competence of British rule and the trust which it inspires.

It remains to give a brief summary of the assistance in men, money, and material furnished by the Gold Coast Colony to the Imperial Government during the war.

PART I. MEN

1. The Gold Coast Regiment, and its Services in East Africa.

The original function of the battalion known as the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force at the time of its formation was to safeguard the peace in Ashanti. Thus, the head-quarters of the regiment were at Kumasi, one company at Accra and a smaller detachment at Cape Coast being the only military forces in the colony itself. Long before the outbreak of war, however, the necessity for the maintenance of this force in order to preserve the internal peace of the Gold Coast and its dependencies had practically ceased to exist, and at the outbreak of war the regiment was immediately available for aggressive action. In fact, with two brief intervals of rest, it was on active service in Togoland, the Cameroons, and East Africa continuously up to the last months of the war.

Its services in Togoland have been recorded above. The capture and occupation of Lome, the capital and chief port of

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German Togoland, on August 7, 1914, by a small detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment, was the first success which attended British arms after the declaration of war. It paved the way for the landing at Lome of the main body of the regiment (under Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. Bryant), which, after a rail and sea journey from Kumasi, reached that port on August 12, 1914. Finally, a vigorous pursuit, some sharp skirmishes along the line of railway towards Kamina, and a stiff engagement at the Chra river, where the regiment received its baptism of fire, ended in the surrender of the German Governor and military forces to the British on the approach of the main French force from the north, which made further resistance hopeless. Thus, the Gold Coast Regiment was mainly instrumental in the conquest of Togoland within little more than three weeks from the outbreak of war, for the Germans capitulated on August 26, 1914, after destroying the famous wireless station at Kamina.

After a short rest, the Gold Coast Regiment was called upon to join the Expeditionary Force in the Cameroons. Two companies with a pioneer company and a battery of artillery went on almost immediately and were followed a little later by the rest of the regiment. Under Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Rose, C.M.G., D.S.O., it served with great distinction from September 1914 to April 1916, as is told in the story of the Cameroons campaign. It was twice mentioned in Sir Charles Dobell's report on the campaign. The hardships and casualties suffered by the regiment during these operations were infinitely greater, and their achievements even more meritorious, than during the brilliant little campaign in Togoland. So good a reputation did they earn, that at the outset of General Smuts's campaign in East Africa, the regiment was, in spite of the comparatively high cost of transporting a relatively small body of men several thousands of miles by sea, specially selected for service in German East Africa.[1]

The regiment left Accra on the 6th of July 1916, landed at Kilindini on the 26th, and reached the fighting line on the 8th of August, at the time when the Germans were being driven across the central railway. Their first real contact with the enemy was on the 4th of September, near Matombo

[1] The following account is mainly taken from *The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign*, by Sir Hugh Clifford, G.C.M.G. (John Murray, 1920).

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mission station, south of the railway in the Uluguru mountains. In this action, which lasted for two and a half days and ended in the capture of Kikarunga Hill, they had the misfortune to lose a most gallant officer, Captain Jack Butler, who had won the V.C. and the D.S.O. when serving with the regiment in the Cameroons campaign. A few days later, from the 11th to the 13th of September, there was further fighting round Mikese, which was followed by outpost and patrol work until in November the regiment was moved by sea to a more southerly area, with Kilwa for its base. The immediate object of the new operations was to confine the enemy to the Rufiji valley during the wet season by seizing the Kibata and Mtumbei Pass. In the fighting near Kibata on December 14/15, the regiment distinguished itself by capturing and holding against particularly severe counter-attacks the height west of Kibata, since known as Gold Coast Hill. In one of the skirmishes of the next few months Lieutenant Shields, the Head Master of the Government Boys' School at Accra, fell a victim to a treacherous German ruse; on the 11th of April 1917 Lieutenant Kinley brought off a very successful ambush near Makangaga; and on the 18th of April the battery of the regiment and its escort extricated themselves most gallantly from a very dangerous position after close fighting and bringing the guns back over a flooded river. In July 1917 a general advance from Kilwa began. It was covered by a feint attack which B Company of the regiment, led by Lieutenant Eglon, who was killed shortly afterwards, carried out with great effect. After a fortnight of marching, varied only by advance guard skirmishes and a very laborious attempt to cut a motor road through the tall thick grass, the Gold Coast men came again into action on the 19th of July at Narongombe. After a stiff fight over exposed ground, with the further drawback of blazing grass, though they failed to carry by assault the enemy's carefully chosen and prepared position, they found on the next day that it had been evacuated during the night. The advance was not resumed until the 18th of September. On the next day the regiment came into action at Mihambia, and were fighting almost continually till the 22nd, suffering agonies from want of water in addition to shortage of rations. The enemy retired across the Mbemkuru river and made a fresh stand at Nahungu, but withdrew from this position on the night of the 27/28th

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September after an engagement in which the regiment took a prominent part but suffered comparatively few casualties. In this action an exposed picket of the regiment was rescued from being cut off by the promptitude and gallantry of its company commander, Captain Methven. In another sharp fight at Mitoneno on October 1 for a time want of ammunition caused serious difficulty, but the situation was saved by the carriers of the battery, who were diverted from their ordinary duties for the purpose by their commanding officer, Captain Foley. When Mnero mission station was reached, the second phase of the regiment's campaigning in East Africa, which comprised the operations in the Kilwa area, was completed, for the columns were now abreast of the more southerly port of Lindi. On the 10th of October an important enemy depot at Ruponda was captured, and on the 16th the southward advance was resumed. On the 18th came the most trying experience for the regiment in the whole campaign, an attack on the mission station at Lukuledi. The station stood at the top of a bare slope, and the regiment had advanced unopposed for a considerable way up the slope when they were caught by very heavy rifle fire, making it impossible either to go forward or to retire. Lieutenant Saunderson, a member of the Gold Coast government service, was killed heading a gallant but unsuccessful attack and the regiment was forced to lie out in the open on the bare hillside with no effective target for their aim. The situation was somewhat eased by the arrival of the 27th (Indian) Mountain Battery (whose commander, Lieutenant Foster, effected a very gallant rescue of a wounded Gold Coast officer) and of other troops, but it was not until nightfall that it was possible to retire. Out of 160 actually engaged, 3 Europeans and 12 Africans were killed and three officers and 33 Africans were wounded. In the subsequent advance, which met with little opposition, the regiment was not seriously engaged. After the capture by the column on the 21st of November of Newala, von Lettow's last stronghold in German East Africa, the main body of the enemy made good their retreat into Portuguese territory, but subsequent operations in the Ruvuma valley, in the course of which the Gold Coast men accomplished a march of 174 miles in 9 days, resulted in the capture of a large detachment under Major von Tafel. The British forces were now reorganized and redistributed, and the

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Gold Coast Regiment, numbering 19 British officers, 8 British N.C.O.'s, and 2,822 Africans, of whom 1,305 were carriers, was withdrawn to Lindi and thence shipped to Portuguese territory, where by the 11th of January 1918 it was concentrated some 10 miles inland from Porto Amelia, which formed the new base. In the next few weeks there was much patrol work and occasional small skirmishes, the most notable of which took place on February 8th, when Lance-Corporal Etanga Etun with six other Gold Coast soldiers beat off an attack on their post by two Germans and forty Askari, capturing from them a considerable quantity of valuable material. The services of this gallant native corporal in East Africa won for him both the D.C.M. and the M.M. On the 7th and 8th of April the regiment was again in action, and on the 10th the Germans made their first serious stand in Portuguese territory at Medo, from which they were only dislodged after a series of difficult operations, which lasted for three days. In this fighting the regiment lost a considerable number of its oldest and most experienced soldiers. Advancing inland with the columns, the regiment was in action with the German rear-guard on the 23rd and 24th of May, and on the following day reached Korewa, 200 miles west of Porto Amelia. Here it became evident that the whole of the German forces had retired southward across the river Lurio into the province of Mozambique, from which they could not be dislodged without a fresh campaign based on Mozambique itself. In this campaign the Gold Coast Regiment took no part. It was recognized that they had well earned a rest such as the Nigerians, who had come out later, were already enjoying. Accordingly they were withdrawn to the base area and embarked for home, at the end of July, reaching the Gold Coast in the first week of September, to be triumphantly welcomed after an absence of a little over two years. Their operations had been almost continuously in a pestilential climate, against which the climate of the Gold Coast does not seem in any way to have ensured them, for more died of disease than were killed in action. They suffered extremes of cold, heat, wet, and thirst. They were subject to the constant strain of advancing in a blind and pathless wilderness against an elusive enemy, who only made a stand when he had the advantage of position. They were serving far from their homes in a country which had practically no exist-

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ence for them before the war and in a campaign in which they had no such direct interest as in Togoland or even the Cameroons. Yet their loyalty to their white officers never wavered, and their morale never gave way, however severe was the strain. In German East Africa, where competition amongst native troops was greater than in the Cameroons—for not only the King's African Rifles but a number of Indian regiments fought in East Africa—the regiment speedily won a reputation second to none. This statement is borne out not only by the official reports, which were uniformly good, but also by unofficial accounts of complimentary addresses to the regiment by generals in the field and by statements of impartial observers. The author of *With the Nigerians in German East Africa*[1] wrote: 'The Gold Coast has set an example which other British dependencies in Africa should be proud to follow, from the point of view both of the regiment and of the co-operation and assistance rendered by all in the colony, so that their troops might want for nothing.' The Legislative Council of the Gold Coast did well to record its proud appreciation of the reputation won by the Gold Coast Regiment in East Africa. Although the regiment itself took no part in the final campaign in Mozambique, the colony was represented by four troops of Mounted Infantry formed in 1918 out of a newly arrived draft of recruits for the regiment. The men chosen were more or less accustomed to horses, but only a very few were able to ride, so that all had to be trained from the very beginning. Notwithstanding, they acquitted themselves very creditably in the final campaign, though they had their share of mishaps. The first troop formed part of a force which was cut off at Nyamirue, and after a determined resistance compelled to surrender, while the second and third troops suffered such heavy losses that at the end of July they had to be withdrawn. The fourth troop, however, kept the field, doing very good work as scouts, especially in the month of August, work which of itself alone would have justified the formation of this unit.

The Gold Coast Regiment was the first West African unit to be sent to East Africa, and it was the last to return. In East Africa, as in the Cameroons, it had been commanded by

[1] *With the Nigerians in German East Africa*, by Capt. W. D. Downes, M.C., Methuen & Co., 1919, p. 43. One Indian unit fought in the Cameroons. See below, pp. 100, 103.

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Lieut.-Col. Rose except when he was in command of a column. The original Expeditionary Force sent to East Africa, including carriers, numbered 1,428. The reinforcements amounted to 2,615, making 4,043 who served in East Africa. The casualties numbered 1,690, including 215 killed and 270 died of disease.

The decorations won in the three campaigns by Europeans included 1 V.C., 2 C.M.G.'s, 5 D.S.O.'s, 1 bar to D.S.O., 12 M.C.'s, 4 bars to M.C., 1 O.B.E., 4 brevet Lieut.-Colonelcies, 1 brevet Majority, 5 D.C.M.'s, 1 bar to D.C.M., 1 M.M., 1 M.S.M., 1 Legion d'Honneur, 1 Croix de Guerre, 1 St. Maurice and St. Lazarus silver medal.

The V.C., as already stated, was won in the Cameroons campaign by Captain J. F. P. Butler, of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, attached to the Pioneer Company of the Gold Coast Regiment, two occasions, on the 17th of November and the 27th of December 1914, being specified on which he showed 'most conspicuous bravery'. On the second occasion he swam a river held by the enemy, alone and in the face of a brisk fire, reconnoitred the farther bank and returned in safety.

The decorations won by natives included 39 African D.C.M.'s and 2 bars, 24 M.M.'s, and 3 M.S.M.'s.

During October 1918 arrangements were made for the reorganization of the Gold Coast Forces, and the formation of a Gold Coast brigade for service in Palestine. The brigade was formed on the 1st November, but the collapse of the enemy made this further effort unnecessary.

2. Gold Coast Volunteer Detachments sent Overseas.

In September 1915 a detachment of 37 volunteers, non-commissioned officers and men—consisting mainly of educated natives from Cape Coast, one of whom was a practising barrister—were sent to the Cameroons and attached to the Gold Coast Regiment, serving with them until the end of the campaign in April 1916. Again, in November 1916, a volunteer company, consisting of 3 European officers and 150 native non-commissioned officers and men, proceeded to East Africa, and most of these were serving with the regiment to the end of the war.

3. Gold Coast Police and Preventive Service.

Both the Gold Coast Police and the Customs Preventive Service consist of native rank and file (with a small proportion

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of European officers), who undergo semi-military training in peace time and are armed with carbines; and many of them were enrolled in the Gold Coast Volunteers at the outbreak of war. A number of preventive service men so enrolled were attached to the Gold Coast Regiment during the Togoland campaign and behaved with conspicuous gallantry; while some police, similarly enrolled and attached to the regiment, rendered no less good service. The officer in charge of the preventive service stationed at Danoe—on the border of Togoland and within two miles of Lome itself—before any actual fighting took place, contrived, by making his handful of men fire volleys from time to time, and sending out his bugler to blow the 'Last Post' at different points, to convey to the Germans at Lome an impression of large forces massing on the frontier. One detachment, under Mr. Bellington, who was then Deputy Inspector-General of Police, not only supplied a nucleus of a civil police force at Lome, but also provided guards (the men being all enlisted volunteers) on the lines of communication during the actual military operations.

It may be added that when the regiment first went to the Cameroons, the police force was for a short time the only guarantee of law and order in the colony. Yet at no time, except for a few faction fights in the central province, was there any disturbance or recrudescence of crime in the colony; and, though this was no doubt principally due to the general feeling of loyalty existing among the civil population, still the police deserve their meed of praise.

4. Reinforcements for Overseas and the Defence of the Colony.

Enlistment in the Gold Coast Regiment, wholly voluntary enlistment, was before the war limited to natives in the Northern Territories, no natives of the coast being admitted, while the Gold Coast Volunteers consisted principally of coast natives. From first to last the recruits for the regiment from the Northern Territories far exceeded the numbers enlisted farther south, but so well did the small detachment of Gold Coast Volunteers, mentioned above, acquit themselves in the Cameroons that it was decided to extend enlistment for the regiment, for the period of the war, to the coast tribes.

In January 1917 a recruiting campaign in the most populous

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of the three provinces of the Gold Coast Colony was undertaken by the Acting Governor (Mr. Slater), accompanied by the Acting Colonial Secretary (Mr. Harper), and the Director of Recruiting in West Africa (Colonel Haywood), all of whom addressed large and representative meetings throughout the provinces, where the appeal for recruits met with a good response.

Ashanti recruits also, who before the war had been considered ineligible, were, in 1917, for the first time invited and came forth in appreciable numbers, although this was 'the force which they had been taught to look upon as their natural foe', and recruitment implied overseas service under conditions which had nothing in common with the traditions of their tribal organization. The colony had long been attuned to peace, not to war: the Ashantis had been carefully weaned from war. The natives had changed from fighting tribesmen into men of substance with property as well as life to lose. It was much to ask of them, when no enemy was within measurable distance, to become disciplined soldiers of their own free will, with the prospect of leaving home to fight on the other side of Africa. But no difficulty was experienced in keeping the regiment in East Africa up to full strength by drafts from the colony. Moreover, the nucleus of a defence force was formed to supplement the single company of reserves —the sole garrison left for the Gold Coast Colony and its dependencies, with the exception of the police force—though the organization of the new force was nominally, and principally, one designed for the rapid training and drafting overseas of recruits to fill the gaps caused by wounds and sickness in East Africa.

In this connexion it may be mentioned that it was found convenient to place one of the training centres at Lome, recruits being sent there by batches from Accra and other ports of the Gold Coast, and that in January 1918 this training centre—containing, as it did, a sufficient number of advanced recruits to provide a striking force, if necessary—took over the garrisoning of the British portion of the occupied territory. Thus, the detachment of the West African Regiment from Sierra Leone, which had constituted the British forces in Togoland some months after the Gold Coast Regiment left for East Africa in July 1916, was released for service elsewhere.

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5. SUMMARY OF NATIVE MAN-POWER EFFORT.

The Gold Coast regiment at the outbreak of war had an approximate strength of . .	1,386
There were recruited during the war . .	7,595
making a total combatant native ranks of .	8,981

Among non-combatants were :

Gun carriers	486
Transport carriers	4,830
Motor Transport drivers (about) . . .	1,000

The Motor Transport drivers were employed mainly in East Africa, and for this branch of the service the Gold Coast supplied the great majority of the drivers who were recruited from British West Africa. In the spring of 1917 volunteers were invited from the small seafaring population of the Colony for the Inland Water Transport service in Mesopotamia, but of those who came forward only two were eventually accepted and went to Mesopotamia.

6. CIVIL OFFICERS SECONDED FOR WAR SERVICE.

On August 4th, 1914, the European establishment of the Gold Coast and its dependencies numbered 613 officers. During the war it was reduced by 15 per cent., the European establishment towards the end of the war numbering only 521 men. Of the 92 men who collectively represented this reduction, the great majority were serving with His Majesty's naval or military forces or otherwise engaged in war work.

Of the reduced establishment of 521, 24 officers were seconded for service in the British sphere of occupation in Togoland, and 63 others for military service with the Gold Coast Regiment, with other of his Majesty's armed forces, or for war service in some part of the Empire other than West Africa.

Of an establishment of 521, only 434, therefore, were available for duty in the Gold Coast and its dependencies, as compared with 613 in August 1914—a reduction of 179 men, or of nearly 30 per cent. This entailed the prolongation of the tours of these officers, the repeated curtailment of the leave to which they were ordinarily entitled, and heavier work than in normal times—sacrifices which were borne by them with exemplary cheerfulness.

Out of the 613 officers who were serving in civil capacities in the Gold Coast and its dependencies on August 4th, 1914, no fewer than 223 were, at one time or another since that date, seconded for service in connexion with the war, and some officers were temporarily seconded on more than one occasion.

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PART II. MONEY [1]

7. IMPERIAL WAR FUND (contribution by Gold Coast Government).

£80,000 was the sum first proposed as a suitable contribution from the Gold Coast Colony towards the expenses of the war, and His Excellency Sir Hugh Clifford, who initiated the proposal, suggested that this sum should be paid in four annual instalments of £20,000 each. The question, however, was further discussed at the opening of the enlarged Legislative Council in September 1916, on which occasion it was resolved that 'the war contribution be increased to £200,000, payable in ten yearly instalments of £20,000, arrears for 1915 and 1916 being paid out of surplus revenue'.

Out of the Gold Coast contributions eight fighting aeroplanes were purchased at the end of 1915, and eight more at the end of 1916—photographs of which are hung in the Council chamber.

8. BRITISH WAR LOAN (investment by Gold Coast Government).

In February 1917 it was proposed at a meeting of the Legislative Council to invest a sum of £500,000 out of the colony's balances in the 5 per cent. British War Loan. The native member of Council who seconded the motion (the Honourable T. Hutton-Mills) prefaced his speech with a reference to 'the desire in every part of the Empire that the allied forces should bring the war to a speedy, successful termination'; and the motion was carried unanimously, though this locking-up of capital, loans to colonial governments being out of the question at the time, meant the postponement of many local enterprises which native members might be more particularly expected to have at heart. It is also of interest to note that at a Council debate on November 21st, 1917, when it was clearly explained that the financial outlook necessitated the strictest economy and excision of capital expenses, another native member of Council (the Honourable J. E. Casely Hayford) said of this £500,000 war loan: 'I should have been very sorry if a penny of this were mortgaged.'

[1] Not including £60,000 paid for the Togoland campaign.

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9. Prince of Wales's Fund (National Relief).

Soon after the outbreak of war a movement was started by native gentlemen to send gifts of cocoa to Great Britain. The Secretary of State, however, while acknowledging the proposal in appreciative terms, pointed out that the West Indies had already given all the cocoa necessary; and thus the movement was diverted to the raising of a special Gold Coast contribution towards the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund. This fund originated at Sekondi, but contributions came from all over the country, irrespective of class, race, or creed: in the same subscription list might be seen the name of a native chief, a European district commissioner, a native lawyer, a Hausa trader, labourers, &c. · District vied with district in swelling the total. The money thus subscribed eventually reached a grand total of £29,600, out of which Ashanti contributed £9,300, and the Northern Territories, £1,800.

10. Aeroplane Fund.

It was not long before the more educated natives began to take an intelligent interest in the details of the struggle, and through them filtered stories of some of the wonderful engines of destruction employed by the white men in modern warfare, none of which touched the imagination of the people so much as aircraft with its (to them) almost superhuman activity and structure. Contributions to this fund may be said to have come into fashion about August 1915, and in all, up to the beginning of 1917, ten aeroplanes are recorded as the special contribution of the Gold Coast people; two by the Aborigines Rights Protection Society of Cape Coast, one each by the chiefs and people of Kwahu, Eastern Krobo, New Juaben, and Akim Abuakwa, one by the residents of Accra, two from Ashanti, and one by the residents of Sekondi and the western province with the help of the Overseas Club, which made up a deficit of £600.

In July 1917 the Omanhene of Adansi, one of the most powerful Ashanti chiefs, offered £1,000 towards another aeroplane; this was quickly made up to the necessary £1,500 by others, notably the Omanhene and people of Juaben, who gave £250, and a draft was sent home for the purchase and presentation of 'Ashanti No. 3'.

In December 1917 the people of the Quittah district con-

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tributed £374 14*s.* for the purchase of an aeroplane to be named 'Awuna'. The amount was forwarded to the Overseas Club Fund.

11. Red Cross Fund. Total subscriptions, £50,260.

A special appeal on October 21, 1915, by the British Red Cross Society resulted in a sum of £8,110 being raised and sent to the Society. In 1916 a similar appeal was made, £8,900 in all was transmitted, and a small balance carried forward to 1917. In 1917 collections amounting to £15,750 were forwarded, a small balance being carried forward to 1918, as was the case in the previous year. This was specially creditable to the people of the Gold Coast, as the restrictions placed upon the importation of cocoa into the United Kingdom and the shortage of shipping had caused money to be less abundant in the colony than at any period during the past decade. In 1918, again in spite of the straitened conditions which prevailed, the Red Cross collections were larger than ever, amounting to £17,500.

12. Lady Clifford's Fund for Indian Soldiers.

This fund, subscriptions to which in the Gold Coast were initiated by Lady Clifford, realized £211 10*s.* 6*d.*, and was principally subscribed by ladies in Accra and the other coast towns, native and European.

13. Belgian Relief Fund.

In answer to an appeal from the National Relief Committee for Belgium in July 1915 a sum of £208 14*s.* 9*d.* was contributed. Of this sum the Omanhene and people of Eastern Akim gave £75, and a concert at Tarquah produced £108, while a special appeal for the children at Christmas produced the balance.

14. Lord Roberts's Memorial Workshops.

In June 1917 Lady Clifford made an appeal on behalf of this fund, the results of which were £286 collected by profits on tournaments, and £165 by donations from individuals. Further sums were realized by the raffling of two cars, offered at cost price by Messrs. Millers and Messrs. Swanzy to Lady Clifford for that purpose, the clear profits being £210 and £254 respectively. By such means a net total of £1,023 14*s.* 8*d.* was raised.

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15. Star and Garter Fund.

Tarquah and Abontiakoom—two European mining centres—were enabled by a concert and collections to remit £163 2*s.* 6*d.* in aid of this good cause.

16. King George's Fund for Sailors.

Chief Anasi of Dutch Sekondi opened this subscription list with a contribution of £25. The total subscriptions up to July 1919 amounted to £707 17*s.* 9*d.*

17. Minor Contributions.

The Elminas, perhaps from their kinship with the sea, were moved by Lord Kitchener's death to contribute to his memorial fund, and the major portion of the £15 7*s.* 9*d.* subscribed to this fund came from them.

The Omanhene of Eastern Akim, reading in the *Weekly Times* the story of Nurse Cavell, was much touched, and sent through Government a personal gift of £10 to this fund. A sum of £25 was subscribed to the Falaba Relief Fund by the Omanhene and people of Akim Abuakwa. The *Falaba* disaster was one which peculiarly affected West Africa, and several officials and others known on the Gold Coast lost their lives thereby. A sum of £105 was collected for the Overseas Club Tobacco Fund by Mr. Richard Parsons of the Bank of British West Africa, Ltd., Accra, and the amount was handed over by him to the officer commanding troops, Gold Coast, at Accra in September 1917, to purchase tobacco and clay pipes for the men of the Gold Coast Regiment in East Africa. In August 1917 the ladies of Cape Coast, having raised by subscriptions amongst themselves the sum of £11 3*s.*, expended the money in purchasing presents for the men of the Gold Coast Regiment in East Africa. In November 1917 Mr. J. Mensah Vanderpuye, native planter of Anyerang in the eastern province of the colony, presented 5,000 kola-nuts to the men of the Gold Coast Regiment.

18. Fund for Relief of Disabled Soldiers, Gold Coast Regiment.

It was felt that the men of the regiment which had done so much to promote the prestige of the colony deserved some unofficial as well as official recognition of their risks and sacrifices. Accordingly a fund was raised to supplement the

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pensions and gratuities accorded to disabled soldiers, of which there are known to be a very large number. The first subscription to this fund came from a race meeting organized in Accra by the late Mr. Reece (treasurer), which produced £200. The native paper at Cape Coast, *The Gold Coast Leader*, then started a subscription list, which resulted in a specially noteworthy addition to the fund of £169 19*s.* 2*d.*, while subsequent contributions brought the total up to £5,052 4*s.* 8*d.*

19. S.S. 'MARINA'.

On August 13, 1914, a small steamer flying the German mercantile flag, and with her decks crowded with passengers, anchored in the Accra Roads. It was found that she was the S.S. *Marina*, bound from Duala to Monrovia with Krooboys who the Cameroons Government had no desire should remain in Duala or Victoria to swell the number of natives whose dislike it might have to face. It appeared that after leaving Duala the natives, uncertain of their fate, mutinied and compelled the commander to put in at Accra. He was only too thankful to do so and to surrender his ship to the British Government. He with his officers and crew were interned, and the native passengers proceeded as opportunity offered to their own country, or accepted work on the Gold Coast. A retired naval officer was in charge of one of the political districts in the colony, and he was summoned to Accra to report on the ship. He found her to his liking and volunteered to take command. In a few hours he collected a ship's company. The European members of the crew he obtained from the education department; two of the instructors from the technical school, engineers by profession and with seafaring experience, shipped as engineers, and the head master of the boys' school, who had played forward for Scotland, signed on as a boatswain. The native members of the crew were soon forthcoming at a coast town. During the Togoland operations the *Marina*, under her new commander, plied as a transport between the Gold Coast and Togoland, and when these operations came to an end she was armed with a gun and used in connexion with the Cameroons expedition. Her career and her connexion with the Gold Coast came to an end in the Prize Court, where she was condemned as a naval prize.

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

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SECTION IV

NIGERIA AND THE CAMEROONS [1]

CHAPTER I

NIGERIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

By the Editor

On the 1st of January 1914 Nigeria became a single unit, the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Of its constituent parts, Lagos, Colony and Protectorate, was an expansion of the first permanent British foothold on the Bight of Benin, dating from 1861. In 1906 Lagos was amalgamated with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, which had originated in the 'eighties as the Oil Rivers Protectorate, and the combined provinces were known as the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, comprising the territories taken over on the 1st of January 1900 from the Royal Niger Company, was combined with Southern Nigeria by an Order in Council of the 22nd of November 1913, which took effect on the following New Year's Day.

Under the new constitution the three divisions were still recognized, with modifications. There was the Colony proper, which had previously been annexed and whose boundaries were now specifically defined, and there were the Northern and the Southern provinces, embodying respectively the Protectorates of the north and south. An Administrator was given to the Colony, and Lieut.-Governors to the Northern and Southern provinces, though subsequently one and the same man acted as Administrator of the Colony and Lieut.-Governor of the Southern provinces. Supreme over the whole was the Governor-General, now the Governor, of Nigeria. The Colony

[1] In the compilation of all chapters of this section the Editor has been very greatly indebted to Sir Frederick Lugard and his officers for the collection of a great mass of material for the purposes of the book and for revision. Help and correction has also been supplied from other sources.

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SIR FREDERICK LUGARD

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retained a Legislative Council of the ordinary Crown Colony type, with an assured official majority and presided over by the Governor-General, but from this date it no longer legislated for the Protectorate. For the Protectorate the Governor-General in Council was the fountain of legislation, and the terminology of those ordinances which applied to the whole of Nigeria was 'Be it enacted by the Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, so far as the provisions hereof relate to the Colony'. There was an Executive Council for the whole territory, consisting of the Governor-General, the Administrator and Lieut.-Governors, and the heads of the principal departments; and a Nigerian Council was called into being, to meet once a year at least, for the purposes of discussion, but having no legislative or executive powers. This Council included officials, representatives of trade, and leaders of the native population.

The Governor-General was Sir Frederick Lugard. Well over 56 years of age when the crisis began, he saw Nigeria through the war, only retiring in 1919. He had been specially selected for the task of amalgamating Northern and Southern Nigeria, with the personal title of Governor-General, which was to lapse when a new Governor took over a completed unit, and, preparatory to the union of the territories, he had from 1912 combined the Governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

No man of the time, perhaps, had such unrivalled knowledge of tropical Africa, and none had deserved better of it, alike in East and West. He had played a leading part in the making of Northern Nigeria in the days of the Royal Niger Company. He had been commissioned by the Government to raise the West African Frontier Force, as told in the first volume,[1] and he had been the first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria under the Crown. Leaving Northern Nigeria in 1906, after a term as Governor of Hong-Kong he came back in 1912, and the war found this largest and most important of the British possessions in West Africa under the guidance and control of the man who among living Englishmen best understood and appreciated the races and the problems of Nigeria.

It was a great sphere of administration, great in size, in resources, in diversities. The area of the Colony was returned

[1] Vol. i, p. 259.

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at 1,400 square miles, of the Southern provinces at 78,600, of the Northern at 255,700, making a total of 335,700 square miles, with a population of 17 millions; in other words an area approximating to three times that of the United Kingdom, peopled by somewhat more than one-third of the population of the United Kingdom. As in the case of the Dominion of Canada, union had been made possible by the railway alone. From the coast at Lagos a trunk line had been carried for 712 miles into the interior as far as Kano, passing through the populous native centres of Abeokuta and Ibadan and crossing the Niger at Jebba. One of its two branches served the tin-bearing districts of Northern Nigeria. The second branch, 111 miles long, led southwards from Minna to Baro, a port on the Niger, and had in point of fact constituted a portion of the main line thence to Kano, before the junction with the line from Lagos was effected. On the eastern side of the territory, starting from a new port in embryo at the head of the Bonny estuary, which was christened Port Harcourt after the Colonial Secretary of the day, a second trunk line was being constructed for 151 miles north by east to the Udi coalfields, designed to be carried farther in a semicircular course across the Benue river to join the main line at Kaduna.

From Lagos to Lake Chad is, as the crow flies, a distance of 850 miles. The land varies from the swamps of the Niger delta to the comparatively open plateaux of the interior, the people from pagan tribes of the midland and the coast belt, where but a few years back the zenith of barbarism had been attained at Benin, to the organized and at one time militant Mohammedan emirates of the north. Before the war the revenue, of which Southern Nigeria provided by far the larger proportion, greatly exceeded the expenditure, and there were ample balances for works of development. Trade was growing by leaps and bounds, palm oil and kernels, products of the coast region, being by far the most valuable export, while tin from the north had risen to the second place. Some 44 per cent. of the exports found their way to the German markets, and German shipping was a good second to British. It is a curious fact that in various parts of the Empire, widely distant from each other, the beginning of the war coincided with the ending of a time either of drought or of commercial

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depression from other causes. There was no commercial depression in Nigeria, but for agriculture the year 1914 was, apart from the war, not a prosperous year. For the second year in succession the rainfall was deficient, and the young promising cotton industry suffered in consequence, while in the Northern provinces, especially in the province of Kano, failure of foodcrops produced a near approach to famine.

Like the Gold Coast, Nigeria had for its neighbours the French on the west and north, in Dahomey and the military territories of the French Sudan; the Germans in the Cameroons, on the eastern and south-eastern side. On the south it faced the gulf of Guinea, having at the date of the war a coast-line of over 500 miles, which runs east, south-east, and south from Dahomey to the Cameroons, its central feature being the Niger delta with its network of river mouths, which juts out between the Bight of Benin and the Bight of Biafra. In the extreme west, farthest removed from the Cameroons, was Lagos, by far the greatest port of the territory and the terminus of the trunk railway, where extensive harbour works were in hand. The easternmost port of any size, and the nearest to German territory, was Old Calabar on the river of that name, a feeder of the Cross river estuary. From this estuary to the then border creek of Rio del Rey is about ten miles. Among the ports of the Niger delta Forcados stood first, having most water on its bar.

To serve a long coast-line, honeycombed with creeks and lagoons, and for navigation of the Niger and Benue rivers, Nigeria had much use for vessels of light draught. There had been a Marine Department alike in Southern and in Northern Nigeria, and the two departments were combined when the territories were combined, the marine head-quarters being at Lagos. The Director of Marine was Lieut. Child, R.N.; he was on leave of absence at the beginning of the war, and Lieut. J. Percival, R.N.R., was acting for him. A little later, on the 21st of October, Child was, while on active service, unfortunately drowned in the Njong river on the coast of the Cameroons, and Percival became Director in his stead. The military forces were combined at the same time as the marine, and the outcome was the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force under a single command. At the beginning of the war its nominal strength all told was well over 5,000, 175 British officers, 101 British non-commissioned officers,

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4,996 native rank and file, 387 gun and maxim carriers, together with 63 non-combatants. There were four infantry battalions, a battalion of mounted infantry, and two batteries of 2·95 guns. It was a well organized and disciplined unit, and the Assistant Commandant was Lieut.-Col. Cunliffe, who had lately returned from leave and who succeeded to the command of the regiment on the 8th of September. The rank and file of the Nigeria Regiment had in past times been recruited almost exclusively from Hausas and Yorubas; but latterly there had been a greater admixture of elements, the chief recruiting areas being all in the more northerly districts. In Nigeria there was nothing approaching compulsory military service, such as prevailed in French West Africa, and as British administration consolidated peace and intertribal fighting died away, men who had been wont to defend their homes and families against slave raiders no longer found use for arms, trade became more secure and therefore more profitable, military service lost its attraction, and recruits were, under normal conditions, less plentiful. The military forces were supplemented by an armed civil police, with a nominal strength of 20 officers and 851 rank and file in the Northern provinces, who were largely recruited from ex-soldiers, 15 officers and 885 rank and file in the South.

The war began at the time of year when, in the ordinary course, many officers from West Africa are taking leave in England. Among them in 1914 was the Governor-General, who reached Lagos again on the 2nd of September. While he was away, and when the 4th of August came, Mr., now Sir, A. G. Boyle was acting as his deputy. On the previous day, the 3rd of August, all telegraphic messages were placed under censorship in anticipation of war, and in the next few days various proclamations and Orders in Council, Imperial and local, appeared in the Government Gazette, the local proclamations and orders being at a later date covered by the Defence of Nigeria ordinance, so far as local confirmation was deemed necessary. That ordinance, the local edition of the inevitable Defence of the Realm Act, became law in the following November, and two other war-time ordinances were passed in October and November, a Trading with the Enemy ordinance, and an Aliens Restriction ordinance. The first two of these three ordinances were amended from time to time as the war went on.

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OFFICERS AND N.C.O.'S OF A COMPANY OF THE WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE

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were forthcoming from the stores of the Nigeria Regiment: the head-quarters companies had efficient signallers and machine-gun sections, and wherever possible a short course of musketry was carried out. Though it saw no active service as a single unit, the force was used for escort duties for German European prisoners, supplied at Ibadan for several months the guards for the German European internment camp, manned the trenches at Lagos and Calabar during alarms, and provided gun-teams to work the naval guns lent by the Navy for the defence of Lagos. The Commandant and moving spirit of the whole, though Lagos only was under his immediate supervision, was Captain C. T. Laurence.

An Order in Council of the 13th of August required the entire police force of the Southern provinces to serve with the military forces and to take part in any military operations; and throughout Nigeria, in north and south alike, the police supplemented the Nigeria Regiment, took over garrison duties, dealt with any native disturbances, and on occasion faced and fought the enemy in the field. While they were being diverted to military duties, ordinary civil police work in the coast towns was taken over to some extent by native special constables enrolled under an order of the 7th of August. Side by side with these defence preparations two committees of control were constituted for the north and south respectively, and were entrusted with very wide powers of prohibition, restriction, and requisition. Export of food, prices of foodstuffs, sale of spirits and petrol, and, in general, provisions for the maintenance of law and order were within the scope of their work. They were not, however, long in existence, but were dissolved early in November.

Nigeria, like the Gold Coast, derived one advantage from the neighbourhood of a German Protectorate, that, within range of the border line, the natives were able to mark the difference between British and German methods of administration. 'It is notable', wrote Sir Frederick Lugard in the annual report for 1915, 'that the tribes nearer to the German frontier, who could appreciate the contrast between British and German rule, gave loyal and ungrudging assistance.' He was writing of 'the more primitive tribes', pagan tribes of the midland districts more especially, among whom, even under normal conditions, sporadic disturbances were common and who

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needed as yet continuous supervision. Among them, away from the border, the war caused a certain measure of unrest, as troops and political officers were withdrawn for active service elsewhere, and rumours gained ground in consequence that the British Government was leaving the country. But any outbreaks were local and isolated, soon suppressed, and throughout Nigeria the great majority of the people were reported as thoroughly loyal and law abiding. Early in 1916 the Resident of the border district of Ogoja, at the head-waters of the Cross river, wrote in similar terms to those of the Governor-General: 'In Ogoja, Obudu, and Ikom, where concrete knowledge of German administrative methods existed, the various tribes appeared to have had a general and common object in giving Government all possible support and assurance during a somewhat trying period.' The beginning of the war was a peculiarly trying time and this particular province was critically placed, for in the earliest stages of the war a column, which had moved forward from Ikom, met with grave disaster.

In the more settled regions of the coast-line, and in the western states between Lagos and the Niger, the peoples were heartwhole for the British cause, while in the Northern provinces, where, if there had been trouble, the trouble would have been serious and far-reaching, Mohammedan appreciation of British rule, and contentment with the wise handling, whereby native rulers had been enlisted in the administration and native methods adapted to the régime, were most marked. Not only was there no occasion for uneasiness or apprehension, but from the first, as the Lieut.-Governor of the Northern Provinces wrote, the Emirs and native chiefs, having heard of the active participation in the war by the princes of India, wished to follow their example and to give practical proof of their loyalty. They too had a sense of being in the war of their own right, as owing allegiance to the King-Emperor and as members of his realm. 'We are warring against proud and stiff-necked people, as the Germans are,' wrote the Emir of Bornu; the British cause was his cause also. 'That which is good news for you is good news for us, and any loss you may sustain is ours also,' were the terms of a letter from the Emir of Kontagora. The proofs of their loyalty were given in unmistakable fashion. From the revenues which accrued to the native treasuries for purely native administration a sum

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Among the earliest of the initial proclamations was one of the 5th of August which created two European contingents, a Nigerian marine contingent and a Nigerian land contingent. The Marine contingent included *en bloc* the Marine Department, which was constituted a combatant force for service afloat or ashore. Very heavy and very responsible was the work which devolved upon the Director and his staff, especially the engineering staff, from the beginning of August onwards until the close of the Cameroons campaign. On them devolved the task of preparing the various harbours for defence against attack from the sea. When war came, two German gunboats, the *Panther* and the *Eber*, were known to have been lately at Duala, whereas the nearest British warship, the *Dwarf* gunboat, was at the time at Sierra Leone. For the protection of Lagos and the neighbouring dockyard at Apapa, over against the town, the measures taken included observation mines, coast patrols and special look-outs, preparation of ships to be sunk in the channel in case of need to block the entrance. Similar precautions to a lesser extent were taken at Forcados, Bonny, and Calabar, and at Calabar was organized a light transport service to ply up and down the Cross river. After the first month Nigeria became the naval base for the conquest of the Cameroons, and then ensued much work in armour plating and equipping the little ships which formed the Nigerian flotilla, followed by repairing, replacing, endless details of work, all of it done by the residue of a staff other members of which were in charge of the ships on active service, mine-sweeping, fighting, transporting men and stores on river and sea, threading their way through creeks and channels, often under close fire from the banks, or again salving enemy vessels, which the Germans had sunk in vain, or administering the port and dockyard at Duala.

The land contingent was not the embodiment of a Government Department, but simply a European volunteer force, recruited from both inside and outside the Government service. At the out-stations, for want of numbers and facilities, the movement did not extend much beyond enrolment for service in case of necessity, but it was otherwise at the main centres and the threatened points, especially at Lagos and Calabar. Here the volunteers added to their daily duties continuous and substantial training for bush fighting. Arms and equipment

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of £38,000 was placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the war, and it was subsequently proposed from the same source and for the same object to make an annual contribution of £50,000. Personal subscriptions were offered before specific funds were opened, and when the funds were opened they were heartily supported. Most substantial help was given in securing intelligence of enemy movements, providing carriers, transport animals, and food supplies; and as it was with the leaders of the people, so it was with the peoples themselves. The taxes were promptly paid and recruits were forthcoming alike for combatant and for non-combatant service. In the north, as farther south, proximity to the German border proved to be an additional incentive to loyalty. In the north-east of Nigeria is the Sultanate of Bornu, oldest of the Mohammedan states in this part of Africa. In its vicinity there were initial reverses to both British and French troops, and fighting continued for a longer time than was the case with any other Emirate, for the German stronghold of Mora, in the far north of the Cameroons and near to Bornu territory, held out till the very end of the campaign. 'The war is close to us at Mora,' wrote the Emir. Furthermore, Bornu was one of the areas which, when the war came, were on the verge of famine. Yet the Resident reported that the outstanding feature was 'the unquestioned and unaffected loyalty' of native ruler, chiefs, and people. Farther south was Yola, the chief inland military base in the direction of the Cameroons, and over against another German stronghold, Garua. Here again the war opened with a serious setback to a Nigerian force, but the Emir and his chiefs were not affected and gave all the assistance and support in their power. In the case of both Bornu and Yola the frontier line had severed kindred tribes, as the Dagombas had been severed by the Gold Coast—Togoland demarcation, and in all these cases the hearts of the natives on the German side of the line were with the invaders, their only apprehension being lest they should be handed back to Germany. The entry of Turkey into the war in no way disturbed the confidence and goodwill of the Moslems in Nigeria, whether they were sojourners or born in the land. As were the Emirs and their subjects, so were Syrian traders at Lagos, though claimed as Ottoman subjects, or again Arabs from Tripoli living at Kano; and after the successful Darfur

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campaign had reopened the direct road to Mecca, large numbers of returning pilgrims added their testimony to the success of the Allied arms and the advantages which had thereby accrued to Islam. The attitude of the millions of Mohammedans throughout Nigeria was summed up in the words, 'Among the Mohammedan population tranquillity reigned supreme.' It was a great tribute at once to British policy throughout the Moslem world and to the men on the spot, to Sir Frederick Lugard and his officers, who, few among many, were the personal embodiment of British rule.

Such was Nigeria, and such were the Nigerians, when the die was cast and war was no longer an imminent danger but a present fact. The immediate task was now to safeguard the territory against German raids or more subtle German propaganda, and to eliminate the Germans from the Cameroons.

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CHAPTER II

THE CAMEROONS CAMPAIGN[1]

By the Editor

THE German flag was first hoisted in the Cameroons on the 12th of July 1884, a week after a German Protectorate had been proclaimed in Togoland. Before the war, therefore, the Germans had borne rule in West Africa for exactly thirty years. The war placed the Cameroons, like Togoland, in a position of the utmost danger, for its immediate neighbours were, with one exception, enemy powers. On the west and north-west were the British in Nigeria, on the south, east, and north the French in French Congo and Equatorial Africa, while at two extreme points of the German Protectorate only a river divided it from the Belgian Congo. But the Cameroons had, what Togoland had not, an adjoining block of neutral territory. This was the small quadrilateral of Muni or Spanish Guinea, an enclave in the German sphere, of material assistance to the Germans as a base of supplies and intelligence, especially at the beginning of the war, before the sea-power of the Allies made itself felt, as was also the Spanish island of Fernando Po, directly over against the Cameroon river. Muni was subordinate to the Governor of Fernando Po.

The Anglo-German boundary ran for over 1,000 miles, and the last of the many conventions which delimited the different sections of the line was only signed in March 1913. Less than three years before the war, by an agreement of November 1911, following upon the Agadir trouble, France had, in exchange for a free hand in Morocco, ceded to the Germans a net 100,000 square miles of the French Congo on the southern and eastern sides of the Cameroons, giving to the German Protectorate access to the Congo and Ubangi rivers, and enclosing Spanish Guinea. The right of pre-emption of Spanish Guinea, which the French had previously enjoyed by treaty, was now transferred to Germany, and an exhaustive convention for the

[1] The Editor has been specially indebted to Lt.-Col. A. E. Beattie, C.B.E., M.C., for suggestions and corrections in this account, and many others have given help.

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delimitation of the whole new frontier was signed in September 1912, less than two years before the war. Those who study history and the map of Africa will realize what strength was added to the Germans in Africa by this deal with France and what a potent factor was Africa in promoting the Great War. Germany's policy was in characteristic fashion consolidating a central position on the African continent, a position for striking, from east and west alike, at the core of the continent, the Belgian Congo.

The territory acquired from the French brought the area of the Cameroons up to some 306,000 square miles, 30,000 square miles short of the area of Nigeria, larger by one-third than the area of Germany itself. The population, relatively as well as actually, was much smaller than that of Nigeria, 3½ to 4 millions, including, according to the received account, less than 2,000 Europeans. German methods were not calculated to encourage an increase of the native population. 'We know well', wrote a Nigerian Emir of the Germans, 'that they are an evil people of evil customs.' They were not without friends in the north of their territory, but in the Protectorate as a whole, apart from notorious instances of cruelty in the past, forced labour, perpetual flogging, and the creation of a privileged caste of native soldiers, infected with the arrogant militarism of Germany, made the life of the people an unlovely existence. A proclamation of the German Governor, Ebermaier, to the natives of the Protectorate on the 8th of August 1914 spoke for the German system. 'He who serves the Germans faithfully will be treated more like a German and share in the privileged position of the Germans.' On the same day appeared another proclamation intimating that the native King of Duala had been hanged. Over and above their experience of German methods in the coast region of the Cameroons, the natives had special reason for leaning to the British side. Victoria, the name of the town on the shore of Ambas Bay, tells its own tale. Here, earlier than any German factory, an English Baptist mission station had been planted as far back as 1858, and even before this date Baptist missionaries had been at work in the Cameroons. The British Government never annexed Victoria until a week after the German flag had been hoisted on this coast. The place was then declared to be British and was reserved as British when Lord Granville

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formally recognized the German Protectorate. But he agreed to hand it over to the German Government if the latter could come to terms with the missionaries. Under the circumstances the missionaries had in effect no choice but to consent to be bought out, Victoria was handed over to Germany in March 1887, and the Basel Missionary Society and the German Baptist Mission took over the Englishmen's work. But it had been done too well for either the teachers or the language in which they taught to be forgotten. When the war came, though an interval of nearly thirty years had passed, there were numbers of native Christians whose hearts were with England, the large majority of the native population at Duala were British in sympathy, for purposes of communication between Europeans and natives 'pidgin' English was the *lingua franca* of the coast belt and beyond, and German military officers gave orders to their Dualaese troops in English.

From its apex and northernmost point in Lake Chad the Cameroons Protectorate widened out from north to south. From Lake Chad to the sea its length was over 700 miles, the greatest breadth from east to west was about 600. The French cession had given to the Protectorate three narrow arms on the eastern and southern sides, like three tentacles of an octopus. One ran south-east to the Ubangi river, a feeder of the Congo; the second ran nearly due south, down the Sanga river to the main Congo; the third, a very narrow strip, projected due west to the sea along the southern border of Spanish Guinea. On the north the coast-line began at the Rio del Rey in the corner where the shore of Africa turns south from the Gulf of Guinea and ran south-east and south along the Bight of Biafra for over 200 miles to the Spanish enclave, south of which was the narrow outlet already mentioned. It is a coast more or less like that of Nigeria, a region of swamps, of river mouths and estuaries, among which the Cameroon river, the estuary on which the capital, Duala, stood, had more depth of water than any other port south of Sierra Leone, though the depth on the bars was only maintained by dredging. Lower down are the mouths of the Sanaga, the Njong, and other rivers, and the estuary of the Muni river has a natural depth approximating to that of the Cameroon. The most distinctive feature, unique on the West Coast of Africa, is the volcanic Cameroon mountain at the turn of the coast, overlooking

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Ambas Bay and Victoria. The higher of the two peaks rises to over 13,000 feet. On its south-eastern slope, 3,000 feet above the sea, is Buea, the Simla of the German Protectorate, with adjoining plantations, which as the outcome of the war were eventually [1] taken over by the Government of Nigeria. From Bota, a small village on Ambas Bay, about two miles from Victoria, a mountain railway ran up to Sopo, a military cantonment, about the same distance from Buea. With the exception of this little line there were only two railways in the Protectorate, both starting from the administrative centre on the Cameroon river. The Northern Railway, designed at some future date to reach Lake Chad, had its terminus at Bonaberi, on the opposite side of the Cameroon river to Duala, and slightly higher up the river. It ran north and north-east for about 100 miles, and the railhead in 1914 was Nkongsamba. The Midland Railway, starting from Duala itself, had been carried south of east for some 110 miles in the direction of the Jaunde district. Its railhead was Eseka, and about half-way to this point it passed through Edea, a town which was for war purposes well prepared and strongly held, and which, in addition to the railway, had direct access to the sea by the Sanaga river. The Sanaga is the largest river on this side of the Protectorate, but the limit of navigation is at Edea where there are waterfalls in the river, and the bar at the mouth makes it difficult for vessels. The first occasion on which steamers of any size were taken up the river was when the Allies occupied Edea. There is an island in the river at Edea, of which the railway took advantage, crossing the river at this point by two iron bridges, one of them with a single span, the largest or one of the largest in Africa. Inland, as on the coast, the face of the country in general character and outline is akin to Nigeria. The mangrove swamps of the sea belt are succeeded by forests, and forests by more open plateau lands. The centre of the Protectorate is a broad belt of high land, whereas in the Lake Chad region of the far north, as in the far south towards the sea, always excepting the Cameroon mountain district, lowlands and swamp predominate. The western side

[1] At first the plantations were dealt with under General Dobell by Captain Fuller, R.N., and Mr. Stobart, a Nigerian political officer serving in the expeditionary force, and it was not until after the first cocoa crop, subsequent to the British occupation, had been picked and sold, that the Nigerian Government took over the plantations. See below, p. 82.

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of the Protectorate, including the isolated Mora mountain group in the far north, is much more mountainous than the eastern. In the north are the upper waters of the Benue, which enters Nigeria near Yola on its way to the Niger; while for a long distance on the north-eastern side, the Logone river, flowing to Lake Chad, delimited the Protectorate from French Equatorial Africa.

The climate and products of the Cameroons are much as in Nigeria, but the West African Allied troops suffered more from the climate than had been anticipated, and jiggers were a constant pest to the barefooted soldiers. The campaign was to a large extent, as Sir Charles Dobell emphasized, an amphibious campaign, rivers and creeks playing a great part in it; and whereas the dry season, from October to April, was the time for fighting and marching on land, the wet season, when the rivers and creeks were full, was the time for transport and action on water. Palm oils and kernels, rubber, cocoa in the Cameroon district, timber, including mahogany, plantation and forest products of different kinds, and cattle-rearing were the staples of the Protectorate, but it never paid its way, and year by year was a heavy charge upon the German Exchequer.

Sir Charles Dobell in his published dispatch wrote of the Cameroons as 'defended by a well-led and well-trained native force, plentifully supplied with machine guns'. An intercepted German letter spoke of a supply of modern rifles as being specially needed, but otherwise all the accounts point to ample preparations, some field guns, many machine guns, a large stock of ammunition, and considerable fighting strength. It seems, however, almost impossible to give an accurate statement or even approximate estimate of the numbers which the Germans had at their disposal, or called into existence as the campaign went on. The fighting men have been placed as high as 3,000 Germans and 20,000 natives, but these numbers must be an exaggeration. Before the war, the number of Europeans in the Cameroons was, as has been stated, returned at under 2,000, the Regulars at 1,550 native rank and file, with 175 German officers and N.C.O.'s, the police at 27 Europeans and 1,155 natives. Lecturing before the Royal Colonial Institute in January 1914, Professor Moritz Bonn gave the German population of the Cameroons as 1,537, including more than 200 women and children; and 500 of them were classed

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by him as merchants. When the war came the European population was given as 2,171, including men from the merchant ships and small Government vessels taking shelter in the Cameroon river. Early in 1915 about 1,000 male Europeans, nearly all of fighting age, had been taken prisoners and deported. A little later it was estimated that about 500 Germans were still fighting. A French account has placed the initial defence force, including the called-up reservists and sailor men, at nearly 6,000 well-trained native troops and 2,500 Europeans, and the native troops were at least kept up to strength by compulsory recruitment; but the most reliable estimate gives, at the beginning of the war, 1,800 European fighters and 7,000 native Regulars and trained police. In the last six months of the campaign the active forces on the German side appear to have averaged about 3,000 native soldiers led by under 500 Germans, but the number eventually driven over the frontier of Spanish Guinea was much larger, including in all from 800 to 1,000 Germans, between 7,000 and 8,000 native soldiers, and many thousands of native carriers. There seems to have been an appreciable number of native reservists, and all accounts agree that the native levies were most skilfully trained and disciplined, and that their commander, Colonel Zimmermann, proved himself to be a competent leader. Whatever the actual numbers were, the Germans started the campaign with some very definite advantages. No doubt they were forewarned and forearmed; they had an administration based upon military lines, readiness for war, and ample munitions of war. The operations were in a very large and most difficult country, fortified by climate, adapted by nature for prolonging resistance, well known to its owners but for the most part unknown to the invading armies. The Germans of necessity held the inner lines and controlled the roads and railways, in other words they had mobility on their side. Against them were superiority in numbers, present or prospective, command of the sea by their enemies with its inevitable consequences, a native population held less by liking than by fear, a frontier vulnerable at all points, and one of their enemies, the French, peculiarly dangerous as set on regaining territory which had only yesterday passed out of their hands.

Before August ended there was one more substantial factor to be placed on the debit side of the German account, the

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loss of Togoland. It set free forces to fight against them in the Cameroons, it deprived them of the great West African wireless station at Kamina, it told to native West Africa a tale of German failure, it illustrated on a smaller scale the success of converging attacks, and it cemented Franco-British co-operation in such attacks, precisely on the lines which must be followed in the Cameroons. A detachment of the Nigeria Regiment, it should be noted, served in Togoland.

The Germans had substantial reasons for wishing and proposing to keep the war out of Africa, as in Africa the war, however prolonged, could only have one issue; and the argument that the future of Africa would in any case be determined in Europe may well have appealed to those among the Allies who wished to concentrate the whole allied military effort upon the Western Front. But it cannot be doubted that the decision to attack the German overseas possessions at all points was sound and wise. It was of immediate and paramount importance to deprive the enemy of his wireless stations and of bases for sea raids, while, looking to the future, whatever the outcome of the war might be, it was obviously expedient to secure as many German pawns as possible. In the event of ill-success in the main theatre of war, they must have been valuable assets in the process of bartering: in the event of Allied victory, retention of ground already occupied and administered would be a more obvious and less debatable measure than appropriation of lands which were still in German keeping.

The campaign falls into two distinct geographical areas and into two distinct periods of time. There was on the one hand the dense bush of the southern Cameroons, on the other the open country or at worst the grass-lands, burnt up in the dry season, of the east and north. Over and above the greater prevalence of malaria, military operations in the forest zone were infinitely more difficult than outside. Concealing defensive positions, providing ambushes, the bush was wholly in favour of the Germans, who knew the country. Again, knowledge of the country and of its conditions, gained by previous reverses and mistakes, differentiated the later stage of the campaign, more especially in this southern forest region, from the earlier months of fighting prior to the rainy season of 1915. The Allies started with very poor intelligence. They had no maps up to date,

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they were ignorant of the exact numbers of the enemy, of the location of his posts, of the roads and railways. Communications were slow for want of telegraph material, and wireless was found of little or no use in the bush. The roads were not adapted to wheeled traffic, and the advancing troops were wholly dependent for supplies upon native carriers. The respite from active fighting, which was given by the rains, enabled these deficiencies to be in great measure remedied, and, when fighting began again, largely over the same ground, the advantages with which the Germans had started were a vanishing quantity.

The story which follows is, in accordance with the plan of the book, told more especially from the British and Nigerian side. It is therefore all the more necessary at the outset to do full justice to the French effort, and to emphasize the very large share which French forces took in the campaign. French ships were active and effective at sea, while on land a somewhat larger proportion of the troops, taken in all, was French. Apart from their contingent to Sir Charles Dobell's main force, approximately half of that force, and to the force led by General Cunliffe, French columns, operating on the outer circle, from south, south-east, and north-east, distracted the attention of the enemy, contained him on those sides, supplemented, together with General Cunliffe's troops from the north, the operations of the main army, and eventually carried out under the direction of General Aymerich, Commander-in-Chief in French Equatorial Africa, a concerted converging movement with much accuracy and skill.

Serving with the French was a detachment from the Belgian Congo, three companies of infantry, with some artillery, and supported by an armed steamer on the Sanga river. They were attached to Colonel Hutin's column which operated in the Sanga basin, and at the end of the campaign they received high commendation from General Aymerich.

The French went to work, when war was declared, speedily and with a will, at outlying points of German territory. In the extreme north a French column, sent out by Colonel Largeau, commanding at Fort Lamy, the French base on the eastern side of the German apex, made an unsuccessful attempt against the neighbouring German post of Kusseri. A second venture succeeded, and the place was taken on the 25th of September.

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Meanwhile four Nigerian columns or detachments had been concentrated at different points near the frontier, one in the far north at Maidugari, lying north-west of the German mountain stronghold at Mora, the second at Yola on the Benue river,[1] the third, the Cross river column, much farther south, at Ikom, the fourth at Calabar. The last, originally intended to make a land advance upon Buea, was absorbed into the main expeditionary force: of the other three none met with success, and one of them encountered disaster.

All of them crossed the boundary line on or about the 25th of August. Mora proved too strong for the Maidugari column, which fell back and took up a position to the south to cut the road from Mora to Garua, being joined in the middle of October by the French force under Lieut.-Col. Brisset, which had succeeded in taking Kusseri. The Yola column, after a preliminary but somewhat expensive skirmish close to the border, attacked Garua on the night of the 29/30th of August, failed with heavy casualties, and was withdrawn to Yola. Still more unfortunate was the Cross river column. The advanced troops of the column, numbering about 236 in all, took up a position five miles within German territory at Nsanakang. On the 6th of September they were surprised by a much larger German force rushed up from Duala and, after a most gallant resistance, over a half of the total number, including 8 out of 11 British officers and N.C.O.'s, were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, while the remainder succeeded in cutting their way out back to Ikom. On the British side it was not a good opening of the campaign.

[1] The first and second columns mentioned in the text, the Maidugari and Yola columns, were, as a matter of strict accuracy, two sections of one—the Yola column, which was composed at the outset of 4 companies of infantry and 1 of mounted infantry each about 120 strong and two 2·95 guns. The casualties in the action by the Maidugari detachment on the 25th of August, in which only mounted infantry were concerned, were very small, 2 officers killed, 2 officers wounded, and 2 native rank and file wounded. In the action at Garua by the main column on the 29/30th of August, 4 officers were killed, 3 wounded, 28 native rank and file killed and missing, and 28 wounded. The Cross river column when concentrated at Ikom early in August consisted of 4 companies of infantry each about 120 strong and a battery of 2·95 guns. It was reinforced later in the month and early in September by two more companies. The advanced troops of this column, who were cut up at Nsanakang, consisted of 2 weak companies of infantry and 1 section of guns, in all 8 officers, 3 British N.C.O.'s, and about 225 native rank and file. Of these, 2 officers, 1 British N.C.O., and 71 native rank and file were killed, 1 officer and 19 rank and file were wounded, 3 officers, 1 British N.C.O., and 24 rank and file were taken prisoners.

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Before these two reverses took place, on the morning of the 29th of August, H.M.S. *Cumberland*, commanded by Captain Cyril Fuller, arrived at Lagos, under orders to reconnoitre the coasts of Fernando Po, reported to be harbouring German cruisers, and subsequently to operate against the Cameroons. The *Dwarf* gunboat, under Commander Strong, had come on with her from Sierra Leone and, as far as Lome, a transport carrying Sierra Leone troops for service in Togoland, together with the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir Hugh Clifford. The *Cumberland* had called at Lome on the previous day, when the Togoland campaign had just ended. The Allied Governments having decided upon the invasion and conquest of the Cameroons as of Togoland, it was resolved to make the first main objective the Cameroon river, where was the capital and chief port of the Protectorate and the starting-point of the railways, together with a number of German vessels in the harbour, a floating dock, and a wireless station. Now came the call for the Nigerian Marine, for boats drawing little water, and men who knew West African shoals and creeks. By the end of the campaign the flotilla numbered 18 vessels, but at the outset the captain of the *Cumberland* arranged with the Acting Director of the Marine for the immediate service of seven. There was the Nigerian Government steam-yacht *Ivy*, under Commander Hughes: this was the flagship of the tiny fleet.[1] There were two steam-tugs, the *Balbus* and the *Walrus*, the latter of which had been the property of the Woermann Company of Hamburg: these two vessels were selected specially for mine-sweeping, but at a later stage the *Balbus* was fitted up with three guns from the French warship *Bruix*. There were two steam launches, the *Vampire* and the *Vigilant*, and two light motor launches, the *Crocodile* and *Alligator*: the last two had been built exclusively for inland water work, making it doubtful whether they would survive, though they did survive, the sea passage to the Cameroons. What could be done at once was done, by day and night work at the Lagos and Forcados dockyards, to equip these vessels, strengthen their structures, and protect with steel plates their vital parts. The Nigerian Marine found the native crews and white officers, but the guns and men to direct and work the guns were to be supplied from the men-of-war. This was the flotilla which,

[1] For the later service of the *Ivy* see above, p. 17.

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together with a collier, on the night of the 5/6th of September, in accordance with Captain Fuller's instructions joined the *Cumberland* off Ambas Bay. Meanwhile, on the vessels which had been left behind, and others which were subsequently commandeered, war work proceeded apace, including, when a requisition came from the Cameroon river for light draught vessels to carry heavy guns, the conversion of a 300-ton lighter of the Elder Dempster Line into an 'Apapa Dreadnought' to carry a 6-in. gun, and a similar transformation of a dredger, the *Mole*. The engineers of the Marine proved themselves to be ingenious and resourceful men.

A reconnoitring party had, on the 4th, landed at Victoria in Ambas Bay without opposition and found a large shed filled with stores for the enemy, but during the night a strong body of German soldiers arrived on the scene, necessitating the re-embarkation of the landing party at daylight on the following morning. The shed was bombarded and the stores destroyed, but Victoria was not permanently occupied until the middle of November. On the night of the 6/7th, however, the skilful cutting-out from the inner harbour of four enemy lighters was credited to the *Walrus* and *Vampire*, with picked men from the *Cumberland* on board and covered by the guns of the *Dwarf*, which, in spite of her name and size answering to the name, played throughout the part of big brother, or big sister, to the Nigerian boats. Having collected the Nigerian flotilla, the *Cumberland* and *Dwarf* moved with them to the southward and on the 7th anchored off the entrance to the Cameroon river, about 12 miles from Cape Cameroon, the S.S. *Kamerun*, which was the German guardship at the entrance, being driven up the river. Cape Cameroon is the northern gatepost of the Cameroon estuary, the southern is Cape Suellaba, and the distance across is about 4½ miles, rather less than the distance from Sheerness to Shoeburyness, at the mouth of the Thames. On the inner side of Suellaba point there is ample area of deep water and a sheltered anchorage. Here it was decided to form a naval base, but the entrance was commanded from the two capes, the buoys which marked the channel amid widespreading shoals had been removed, and mines were to be expected. Two days were spent in finding, marking, and sweeping the channel, the small craft prospecting in front, the big ship following. When the two capes were well under the *Cumber-*

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land's guns, parties were landed from the *Ivy* on the northern cape, from the *Dwarf* at Suellaba. Both points were found undefended, and on the 10th the *Cumberland* and all the rest of the flotilla were safely lodged in the haven where they would be.

The estuary known as the Cameroon river is formed by at least three distinct rivers, of which the Wuri is the largest. Of the others the Lungasi or Dibamba river comes in on the southern side not far above Suellaba. On this same southern bank, about 15 miles higher up than Suellaba, not as far as London Bridge is from Erith, is the town of Duala, a composite town with a European and a native quarter, lining the shore for some 2½ miles.

Rather short of half-way to Duala the Germans had blocked the channel with nine sunken ships and several large sunken lighters, some of them filled with concrete. Both below and above this barrier either shore was intersected with a network of creeks, making a direct advance by land impossible, and providing endless opportunities for ambuscade. In order to take Duala by water it was necessary either to blast a channel through the sunken ships, or to find a way round them; and, if the main passage could be cleared, it was still necessary to provide a vessel of sufficiently light draught to come within range of the town and with sufficient gun power to have it at her mercy. There was no sign of the elusive *Panther* and *Eber*, but the Germans were known to have inside the sunken ships at least two armed steamers of appreciable size, the *Nachtigal* and the *Hertzogin Elizabeth*, the latter being the German Governor's yacht. Time was of the essence of the enterprise, for the rainy season was drawing to a close and the rivers were running down. There was now a busy fortnight preparatory to a final effort. The small craft, multiplied by new-comers from Lagos, were mounted with guns. The channel was swept and marked up to the sunken ships and cleared beyond to within six miles of Duala. No other waterway for a large ship being found, the work of blasting a road through was taken in hand. The *Dwarf* and then the *Ivy*, now carrying a 12-pounder gun, kept guard at the barrier lest the Germans should undo the day's work by sinking more ships at night. There was enough water for the picket boats and the *Dwarf* to pass between or outside the wrecks, and they hunted out the creeks,

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in one of which the *Dwarf* ran up against the *Nachtigal*, blew her to pieces and in turn was rammed and maimed. At length a channel through the obstacle, with 19 feet of water, was reported clear.

By this time the main body of the expeditionary force, together with its commander, had reached Suellaba. The commander was Brigadier-General (now Major-General Sir Charles) Dobell. Canadian born, a man of 45 years of age, he had seen no little active service, and was at the time Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force. That force, it will be remembered, was, and is normally, under the authority of the Colonial Office. At the outset, therefore, the land operations against the Cameroons were directed from the Colonial Office, but subsequently they passed under direct War Office control. Dobell left England towards the end of August on the *Appam*, a vessel which, after serving as a hospital ship at Duala, was on a later voyage taken by the Germans and carried off to the United States. He brought with him the head-quarters staff and some details and, while Captain Fuller and his ships were clearing the Cameroon river, he was coming down the west coast, calling at the various British ports, and gathering his forces as he came. Like Captain Fuller, he was set upon the taking of Duala as the one thing needful at the beginning of the campaign, and was confirmed in his view by news of the ill-success which had attended the first attempts to advance over the Nigerian frontier. He tells us that he had immediately to hand, when he started the campaign, 4,300 West African native troops. Approximately half of them were French troops, Senegalese, embarked at Dakar, under the command of Colonel Mayer.

The ships carrying most of the troops arrived at the Suellaba base on the 23rd of September, and on the 25th came the French native contingent from Dakar, convoyed by the French cruiser *Bruix*.

To the British contingent Nigeria contributed 2 infantry battalions of 4 companies each, and a battery of artillery less one section, making in all 65 British officers and non-commissioned officers, and 1,260 native rank and file with 4 guns and 8 maxims. This force would have been stronger by another infantry battalion and 4 guns but for the untimely reverses, already recorded, which held them back to defend

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SIR CHARLES DOBELL

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the boundary line. Half the large number of native carriers required for the expedition came from Nigeria. Of the two Nigerian battalions, No. 1 Battalion,[1] commanded by Lieut.-Col. Cockburn, was composed of Northern Nigeria troops; No. 2 Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. Haywood, mainly consisted of Yorubas from Southern Nigeria.

The British transports had been escorted by the light cruiser *Challenger*, commanded by Captain Beaty Pownall. An opening having been made in the wreck barrage, steps were at once taken to lighten her to a draught which would enable her to pass through. The *Dwarf*, speedily repaired from the *Cumberland* after her action with the *Nachtigal*, was, as always, to hand; owing to the knowledge which he had acquired of the river, it was arranged that Commander Hughes of the *Ivy* should pilot the *Challenger* through the wrecks and, as it was known that she would touch in passing through, the powerful tug *Remus* was held in attendance, to tow her if necessary. She crossed the barrier, however, easily on the morning of the 25th and moving upstream along the cleared channel was anchored at a safe distance from a point where it had been correctly inferred that mines had been placed across the fairway, but near enough to Duala to bring her guns to bear upon the town, which was about 7,000 yards away. A summons to surrender, with a time limit, was received with characteristic German evasions and delays, no further progress had been made by nightfall, and at dawn of the next day, the 26th, the *Challenger* opened fire. Simultaneously a strong body of about 1,000 troops, principally the West African Regiment, was sent for some three miles up the Dibamba creek, with various armed boats, prominent among which were two later comers from the Nigerian dockyards than the original flotilla, the steam-tug *Remus*, already mentioned, and an old paddle-wheel steamer, the *Porpoise*. There was some track or road leading to Duala from near the river at the point aimed at, and higher up again the river was bridged by the railway from Duala to Edea, by which line it was expected that the Germans would, and by which they did, retreat. There had already been reconnaissances and skirmishes up the creek as far as the railway bridge, and now, while a landing in force was attempted, some of the river craft went on higher up and opened

[1] Nos. 1 and 2 for the campaign only.

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a fresh bombardment. It was calculated that if the enterprise was successful, it would cut the German retreat; if it failed in effecting a landing and subsequent advance, it would yet have substantial value as a feint. The latter was the net result. There was some fighting between river and bank, grounding of transports, landing in the mud, and abortive attempts to go forward on land; nothing was achieved in this direction, but the Germans in Duala were alarmed, and the surrender of the town was hurried up. It took place on the morning of the 27th, the formal terms being arranged on board the *Ivy*. Duala and Bonaberi were handed over, with four field guns from a battery—the Joss battery—which at an earlier stage had been silenced by the *Dwarf*, with ships in the river, railway plant on shore, and some 400 Germans, including a number of women and children. The wireless station had been destroyed, the floating dock and the *Hertzogin Elizabeth* had been sunk, but were subsequently salved; and in due course the *Hertzogin Elizabeth* was re-christened the *Margaret Elizabeth*, commissioned in the Royal Navy, and, under British command, rendered valuable service in taking the Cameroons from her former owners. On the 28th the head-quarters staff were established in the Government House at Duala, Cockburn's 1st Nigerians supplied a garrison and outposts for the town, and the first stage in the conquest of the Cameroons was most successfully ended.

Dobell lost no time in following up the retreating Germans. Amid the background of swamp and forest there were three main avenues for an Allied advance or a German counter-attack, the two lines of railway and the Wuri river, which is navigable in the wet season for some 40 miles up to Jabassi, an important administrative centre under the German régime. The Midland Railway, running out east from Duala, at from 9 to 10 miles distance from the town, crosses at Japoma the Dibamba creek. From the river mouth and by the river the bridge is rather over 20 miles distant and there is enough water to carry light vessels up as far as the bridge. As has been seen, the lower reaches of the creek had been hunted out prior to the taking of Duala, and it was now decided, while advancing by land along the railway, to send a flotilla up the river and thus by a converging attack to carry and secure the Japoma crossing. The enterprise was entrusted to French

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troops supported by a naval contingent, and the Nigerian *Remus*, whose crew was strengthened by officers and men from the *Cumberland*, led on the water. On the 3rd of October she anchored near the bridge, shelled the German position, grounded on the way down, floated again, and went upstream once more next day with a string of boats carrying a number of troops. The bridge had been broken in two places, but on the 6th the French forced the position most gallantly in the face of rifle and machine-gun fire; Duala was thereby made secure in this quarter, and one great obstacle to a further advance along the line to Edea was surmounted. In due course the bridge was repaired by a French railway section, and was reopened for traffic on the 18th of December.

Meanwhile, preparations had been made for an advance up the Wuri river against Jabassi. In this case there was no question of a double advance by land and water, the waterway was the only practicable way, and there were many miles of slow upstream work to where Jabassi stood on comparatively high ground in a clearing in the forest on the right bank of the river. The force was under the command of Colonel Gorges, the troops employed were mainly his own battalion of the West African Regiment, with two companies of Cockburn's 1st Nigerians and a naval contingent. They were carried on boats of all descriptions, from tugs to surf-boats, and with them were the picket-boat and steam pinnaces of the *Cumberland* and *Challenger*, and the *Mole* with a 6-in. gun. They went up on the 7th and 8th; early on the 8th troops, principally the West African Regiment, were landed on the right bank three miles below Jabassi, and, under cover of the flotilla's guns, advanced on the town. For two-thirds of the way there was little opposition, but about a mile short of the town, when the final attack was being opened, there was a fierce outburst of rifle and machine-gun fire from the thickets on the other side of the river, directed alike against the boats and the troops on shore. New to bush fighting in the face of machine guns, and exhausted with the heat, the soldiers made no further way, lost heavily, were taken back on the boats, themselves exposed to heavy fire, and the whole expedition retreated downstream, leaving the steam-tug *Balbus* in the enemy's hands. The reverse had to be made good without delay. The flotilla was reorganized, fresh troops being

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employed, and on the 12th went up again. This time the conditions were better known, the troops were landed on both banks, and the opposition was not so strong. The boats were headed by the *Walrus* towing the 'Apapa Dreadnought' with a 6-in. gun. On the 13th and the 14th the guns shelled both banks below the town and the town itself. Covered by their fire, the 1st Nigerians under Cockburn on the right bank, and the Gold Coast Regiment under Lieut.-Col. Rose on the left, moved steadily forward, the river craft keeping pace with the men on shore and the artillery clearing the bush in front of them. The enemy was driven back into the main defences of the town, two naval 12-pounders were landed within easy range, the Nigerians turned the position, and, after a short fight, by the evening of the 14th the whole place was taken and its defenders fled into the forest. The river was falling fast, and on the 17th the flotilla went back down-stream, bringing with them the recaptured but much damaged *Balbus*, and leaving the Nigerians to garrison Jabassi and clear the country round. There were some bush skirmishes, two attempts by the Germans to recover the place were beaten off, Nyamtan, 20 miles east of the Wuri, was taken, and the enemy forces were broken up. At the beginning of November, however, when the garrison was being relieved, the Germans were found to be again holding the banks of the river below Jabassi, and attacked Jabassi itself. They were driven off, but, in view of the rapid falling of the river, Jabassi was for the time evacuated in favour of a post at Dibambe lower down the stream.

While the Duala side was thus being cleared, good progress had been made up the Northern Railway from Bonaberi. Here the operating force was mainly the 2nd Nigerians under Lieut.-Col. Haywood. The line runs north-west as far as Maka, which is not quite so far from Bonaberi as Japoma is from Duala, and then turns north, the next point of any consequence being Susa, which again is much the same distance from Maka as Maka is from Bonaberi, the distance in either case being about 8 miles. The advance was wholly on land, the engineers repairing the line behind the troops. Maka was secured in the first days of October and by the 12th the way was cleared up to Susa, including a broken railway bridge at that point. A week later a heavy enemy counter-attack was

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repulsed. From Susa a road and telegraph line communicated westward with Buea, crossing the intervening Mungo river at Mpundu, and then circling round by the north.

The next stage in the operations was, on the one side to follow up the Midland Railway and secure Edea, which in size and importance was the second town in the Protectorate, and on the other to clear the Cameroon mountain district,

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occupy Victoria on the coast, and take Buea inland. In either case a threefold converging movement was organized, the advance on Edea taking precedence in time. This eastern advance was, as in the case of the previous movement on Japoma, entrusted to Colonel Mayer and his French troops, supported as before by naval flotillas. Edea, along the line, is rather over 50 miles distant from Duala, as far as Colchester is from London. It stands on the left, the southern bank of

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the Sanaga, and is about 45 miles by that river from the sea. The Sanaga has two mouths, the main entrance is the southern mouth, the Bungo Creek, 20 miles distant from Suellaba. About 15 or 16 miles up the river at Lobethal a subsidiary creek comes in from the Cameroon estuary, known as the Kwa Kwa Creek. The river is most difficult to enter because of the bar and a strong current, and, when entered, to navigate because of the current and shoals. Twenty-three miles south of the Bungo mouth is the mouth of the Njong river. Its upward course is north-east for the first 30 miles, in the direction of Edea. At the point then reached, Dehane, which is near the head of navigation, it turns away towards the east, but from Dehane there is a land track for 26 miles to Edea. Edea could thus be reached, along the railway, by the Sanaga, and by the Njong route ; and all three ways were used, over 1,000 French troops, commanded personally by Colonel Mayer, being dispatched by the Njong route under convoy of the *Cumberland*, the *Dwarf*, and the French gunboat *Surprise*. The *Ivy* and other small vessels had been exploring both rivers and sounding the channels, frequently under fire, and while steady progress was made with the help of a naval 12-pounder gun along the railway, two flotillas left Suellaba on the 20th of October, and on the following day were off the Sanaga and Njong respectively. Commander Braithwaite was in charge of the Sanaga venture, most difficult and hazardous, the *Remus* took a prominent part in it, and so did the *Mole* with her 6-in. gun. There was much grounding and tugging of one vessel and another, but there was no serious mishap, and, joined at Lobethal by some small boats which had found their way up the Kwa Kwa Creek, on the 26th the flotilla reached Edea and found that on that same morning the French had occupied the town without opposition. The news that a big gun was coming up the river would seem to have hastened the German retreat. Captain Fuller himself was with the Njong expedition, and nearly lost his life in the surf on the bar on the 21st of October through the capsizing of a boat. It was then that Captain Child, the Director of the Nigerian Marine, was drowned, together with Commander Grey and a French officer, Colonel Mayer's Staff Officer, Captain Franqueville. After this initial disaster the troops were taken up to Dehane, which was occupied on the 22nd. On the 23rd they began their land march, and though

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they encountered serious opposition, they were the first of the columns to reach and occupy Edea.

Earlier in October, the ubiquitous *Ivy* had been paying visits to Victoria and paroling Germans both at Victoria and at Bota. But Victoria had not been occupied, and what was done in the way of surrender by civilians in the absence of German troops was undone when the troops appeared again. With November, the time came for clearing the district of German soldiers and taking permanent possession of Victoria, Sopo,



and Buea. While a feint of landing was made by the *Dwarf* at Bibundi, north of Ambas Bay, a detachment of Marines was sent round to the bay, the *Ivy* leading the small ships and the French *Bruix* covering the movement with her heavy guns. A summons to surrender on the morning of the 13th met with a refusal, a bombardment followed, the Marines landed and took the village of Bota, then marched on Victoria, and by noon Victoria was finally occupied. Between Ambas Bay and the Cameroon estuary is the Bimbia Creek, a deep-water creek running inland in a north-easterly direction. Some 8 or 9 miles up the creek, on its western side, is Tiko, where were the

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wharves and landing-stage of a German fruit company, and from which a road led due north-west to Buea, from 12 to 14 miles distant, but well in sight on the slopes of the Cameroon mountain. This was the route chosen for the main attack. Captain Beaty Pownall of the *Challenger* was in charge of the flotilla, Colonel Gorges commanded the troops, which were composed of the 1st Nigerians and the Nigerian battery, a detachment of French Senegalese and a naval contingent. They left Duala on the 12th of November. On the 13th there was a short bombardment of Tiko, after which the troops were landed and on the 14th moved forward. There was little or no opposition for the first half of the distance, but about half-way, at Dibamba, the enemy were found in a strongly prepared position. There was a small action before it was carried, and the resistance might have been more prolonged but for the rapid approach of a force from the north. This was the Gold Coast Regiment under Colonel Rose, which had come from Susa on the Northern Railway via Mpundu on the Mungo river. Mpundu lies west of Susa, roughly equidistant between that place and Buea and about 13 miles from Buea. The track from Susa struck the river at Mbanjo lower down than Mpundu and followed the river up to Mpundu. Rose, by arrangement, met on the 12th at Mbanjo a flotilla of small boats, which moved upstream keeping pace with the troops on either bank and carrying on board some of them and their commander. On the 13th the Germans were shelled out of Mpundu, and from it, as an advanced base, the Gold Coast men continued their march on the same day. The two forces joined hands on the 15th, followed up the Germans in hot pursuit and early in the afternoon of that day, with little loss, occupied Buea. A considerable number of German residents became prisoners, Government stores and official records fell into British hands, and, when the surrounding district had been cleared by the Gold Coast Regiment, full control was taken of the valuable cocoa, rubber, and oil palm plantations, which were worked by the former native labourers under British instead of German supervision. A Nigerian political officer, Mr. Stobart, who had been mobilized with the Nigerian troops, was placed at the head of the district administration, and the senior naval officer dealt with the transport and sales of the first crop. A few months later the labour supply was increased by refugees

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

CAMEROONS: CARRIERS AND STRETCHER-BEARERS ON THE ROAD TO DSCHANG

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transported, for fear of German revenge, from Kribi and the Njong area.

Meanwhile Cockburn had led the 1st Nigerians back across country to the Northern Railway and joined up with Haywood's 2nd Battalion, which had been continuously operating up the line. They concentrated at Mujuka, some 25 miles higher up the railway than Susa, and on the 30th of November, under the command of Colonel Gorges, the combined force, with the help of a naval 12-pounder, proceeded to clear the whole remaining length of the line up to the railhead at Nkongsamba. The Germans maintained a stubborn rearguard resistance, but on the 10th of December Nkongsamba was occupied, the booty, in addition to railway stock, including two aeroplanes, the first that had been seen in West Africa. Nkongsamba lies some 2,500 feet above the sea, where the forest zone ends and the more open grass-lands begin, leading up to the central plateau. In addition therefore to the advantage of having secured the whole railway, the railhead provided a position which, as compared with other scenes of fighting farther south, was of the nature of a sanatorium. Five miles north of it is Bare, which had been the district head-quarters of the German administration. This was occupied shortly after the capture of Nkongsamba. Fifty more miles farther north, in the middle of the grass-lands, is Dschang, the district station, fort, and military head-quarters of the Germans in this part of the Protectorate. It stands 4,000 feet above sea-level, connected with Nkongsamba by a well-made road, winding up continuously towards the high main plateau of the Central Cameroons. The country round Dschang consists of grass-covered hills, it is well watered, healthy for Europeans, and supporting a large native population. This was the next objective and, starting towards the end of December, Gorges led a column, including the 1st Nigerians, on a rapid advance through a comparatively open area. The march was continuously molested by the enemy, but the only sharp fighting was in forcing the passage of the Nkam river, and on the 3rd of January 1915 Dschang was taken. Hard marching, continual skirmishing, and mounting casualties had by this time told upon the troops, communications had become long and insecure, it had never been Dobell's intention to hold the position when taken, and accordingly it was decided, after destroying

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the fort at Dschang, to withdraw from the district and concentrate at Nkongsamba and Bare. This decision was carried out at the end of January. It was a necessary step but had unfortunate results. Both inland and at the coast ports which from time to time were visited by the Allies and for want of sufficient forces left again, the returning Germans took vengeance on the natives whenever there was any suspicion of friendly feeling towards the Allies, and there were on occasions pitiful scenes of natives entreating to be taken into refuge with the retiring garrisons. The net outcome, however, of the main campaign up to the end of 1914 was eminently satisfactory. Duala and Buea had been taken for good and all. The whole Northern Railway was held, and the Eastern Railway up to Edea. The rich Cameroon mountain district was entirely in the hands of the Allies. The seaboard was constantly patrolled at all points and partially occupied, including the port of Kribi, which on the 2nd of December was garrisoned by a French detachment, but subsequently evacuated. On the other hand, reinforcements were badly needed to replace wastage and to make good the numbers required for garrisons and the lines of communication, while sickness, the main enemy against which the Allies had to contend, was becoming more prevalent. The *Bruix* left for France in the middle of November, being replaced by the *Pothuau* and later by the *Friant*, and early in December the *Cumberland* left also. But, to the great advantage of the Allied cause, Captain Fuller remained on the station and as senior British naval officer at Duala saw the campaign through to the end. The *Challenger* stayed for some time longer and was then replaced by the *Astraea*, sent up from the Cape. The services of the *Dwarf* were continuous and invaluable from first to last. With a view to the administration of the occupied districts and to the further prosecution of the war, it was manifestly desirable that the Governor-General of Nigeria should personally visit the Cameroons, and on the 24th of November Sir Frederick Lugard was welcomed at Duala.

There was plenty of fight still left in the Germans, and with the New Year they made a strong effort to retake Edea. They seized a time when Dobell's forces were much strung out along the Northern Railway and no reserves were available at Duala. Moreover, sickness had reduced the number of effectives in

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the garrison of Edea, and connexion with Duala was still hampered by the broken railway bridge, not yet repaired for heavy traffic. But Colonel Mayer, who was in command, was a skilled soldier and a determined man, and his Senegalese troops were fine West African fighters. The Germans made two almost simultaneous attacks. The first was directed against an outpost at Kopongo on the railway from Duala, where the line, rather under 10 miles short of Edea, makes a sharp turn from east to south; but the attack had been anticipated, the post had been strengthened, and, beyond cutting communications, the enemy achieved nothing. More serious was the attempt, on the 5th of January, against Edea itself. The clearing in which the town stood was surrounded by bush, the buildings were scattered, the ground was uneven. Taking advantage of the cover the Germans struck hard. The defences, however, had been well planned, behind them were good marksmen, and in the result the assailants were beaten off with a loss of a quarter of their strength, leaving over 200 killed and wounded on the field as against 15 French casualties. The Germans learnt their lesson. In the words of General Dobell's dispatch, it was the last as it was the first occasion on which they attacked on a relatively large scale.

A little later the head of the Northern Railway was the scene of some heavy fighting. Here Nkongsamba and its outpost at Bare were held by the 1st Nigerians, who had been reinforced by the Sierra Leone Battalion of the West African Frontier Force. The 2nd Nigerians had been sent back to Duala for rest and reorganization and were not put into the field again until April. Colonel Cockburn, having planned a night march against an enemy concentration, early in the morning of the 3rd of February encountered at Mbureku the Germans, who in turn were advancing on Bare. After a stiff fight at close quarters the Germans were worsted by the Nigerians, and their camp and equipment taken. There was a simultaneous attack by four companies of the Sierra Leone Battalion upon a position at Hartmann's Farm near Bare, but it was broken off with substantial loss. On the 27th of February the Sierra Leone Battalion co-operated with the West African Regiment in a second attack on Mberuku, and on the 4th of March portions of the same two units, four companies of the Sierra Leone Battalion and two of the West African Regiment, made an

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unsuccessful attack in the same area upon a very strong position at Stoebel's Farm. One of two guns was put out of action, the Sierra Leone men were held up, their Commander, Lieut.-Col. Newstead, was killed, and an enforced retreat was covered by the West African companies. The Germans, however, must also have suffered heavily, for shortly afterwards they withdrew altogether from the district.

By this time the 1st Nigerians had lost half their numbers and, like the sister battalion, were withdrawn from the fighting line and relegated to garrison duty at Buea and elsewhere until the following June. Reinforcements, both French and British, had come in from the West African dependencies of the two Powers. Half the Gambia Company, other than the signallers already mentioned, came in January 1915, sixty in number, the other half followed in September. In January the two companies of the Sierra Leone Battalion were joined by the other four, 400 strong, and the battalion was reunited. The Gold Coast Regiment was similarly reunited and brought up to strength, being supplemented in September by a small detachment of Gold Coast Volunteers. In May, Dobell established a training depot at Duala, as later a similar depot was instituted at Lome in Togoland. Moreover, in some areas a small number of native levies were enlisted for local service for purposes of scouting and intelligence and to repel raids, and a valuable armed police force was recruited and trained at Duala, which, under Captain Elphinstone, relieved the troops of much garrison work and on some lines of communication. But the forces were still insufficient for the work in hand, more insufficient as the campaign extended farther afield, and so far no general plan of concerted invasion had been evolved and worked out. In January, Colonel Cunliffe, now commanding the troops in Nigeria, visited Duala and conferred with General Dobell with a view to stronger action in the Northern Cameroons; and in March the Lieutenant-Governor of the French Congo, with whom was the chief of the Staff to General Aymerich, also arrived at Duala to propose an early advance on Jaunde in co-operation with the French columns from the east and south-east. It was late in the season and the rains were already beginning, the enterprise demanded more men than Dobell had at his disposal, long distances made effective co-operation between the advancing forces more than proble-

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matical; but he was assured that in any case the movement from the east would go forward, his support was invited and could not be withheld, there was a chance of striking a decisive blow and, against his better judgement, he consented to take the risk. This marked the second stage in the campaign. It was a first attempt at a converging movement which failed. Later came the third and final stage, which was a repetition of the attempt, with stronger forces, more preparation, and reduced distances, and which in consequence was brilliantly successful.

The French operations on the eastern side of the Protectorate will be told presently, as also the campaign on the Nigerian side in the Northern Cameroons. Though what was being done on east and north must necessarily have had some effect upon the Jaunde venture, drawing off and engaging the attention of a considerable proportion of the German forces, yet, in the main, the first advance on Jaunde resolved itself, immediately and directly, into a movement of Dobell's forces alone. Jaunde, which, after the fall of Duala, the Germans made for a while their administrative centre, is between the upper waters of the Sanaga and Njong rivers, its outlet to the sea being the port of Kribi over 130 miles away, to which it was linked by a good road. It is just on the outside of the forest zone, in a rich agricultural area, well watered and thickly populated. Here the Germans appear to have treated the natives better than in the coast belt, and their fighting forces were largely recruited from the district. None the less the incoming allies were welcomed when they came. It was connected with Edea by a so-called road, which was in fact no more than a forest track, and the unfinished midland railway bore in its direction by a somewhat circuitous route. From Edea it was by road 100 to 110 miles distant, farther than Leicester is from London, lying a little to the north of east. From Eseka the railhead, 50 miles beyond Edea, it lay some 60 miles away to the north-east. The road and the railway ran more or less parallel to each other with an intervening space of from 20 to 30 miles, and due north of Eseka, on the road, was Wum Biagas, on the Jaunde side of the Mbila river, a strong position for defence, roughly half-way between Edea and Jaunde. Dobell's plan was that a British force should move along the road as far as Wum Biagas, and a French force along the railway as far

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as Eseka, where the line ended, and that, when these two points had been secured, the forces should combine at Wum Biagas and follow up the road to Jaunde. The first step was to establish an advanced base in the Jaunde direction, on the line of the Kele river—the Kele being a tributary of the Njong—from Ngwe on the road, 11 miles from Edea, to So Dibanga, near where the railway crossed the river. Early in April a British force of 600 men, principally 2nd Nigerians, was brought up from Duala to Edea. They moved forward under Colonel Haywood's command and simultaneously the French moved forward also; the Germans strongly defended the Kele river line, but, with some loss, it was carried on the 14th of April. There was now a fortnight's halt before a further move was made, but no news came through of Aymerich's columns. Naval raids and demonstrations were made at Kribi and other points on the coast to induce apprehension in the enemy's mind of a direct advance on Jaunde from the sea, and a complete blockade of the Cameroons was formally declared as from midnight on the 23rd of April. On the 1st of May the two forces started again. On the 3rd Haywood, having driven in the German outposts in his path, came up against the strong defences at Wum Biagas and, on the 4th, after many hours of continuous hard fighting with serious losses, carried the position. On the 11th Commandant Mechet, an excellent officer, who led the French advance, after a stiff fight at Sende, reached Eseka, whence the main body of his troops marched north to Wum Biagas. At this date came intelligence that the French columns in the Eastern Cameroons were making slower progress than had been anticipated, and no hope was left of immediate co-operation from that side. To wait was, at the place and time of year, to court disaster, and Dobell decided to press the advance with all speed. Colonel Mayer came up from Edea to take command of the combined forces, and there came too a gun crew and a 12-pounder gun from H.M.S. *Astraea*, which ship had lately relieved the *Challenger*. On the 25th of May Mayer moved on from Wum Biagas with 1,300 men and 5 guns, French troops forming slightly more than half of the total number. His difficulties were immense. He was still in the forest zone and the one and only road was flanked by bush on both sides. It was now the rainy season, and though the weather was not wholly unfavourable, the

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rivers were filling, every crossing was becoming more difficult, each position harder to force or turn. Not closely pressed from other quarters the Germans could concentrate in his front and cut his lengthening communications. 'From the first', says an official report, 'the enemy opposed every yard of the way, fighting being practically continuous.' The troops, already too few, were falling sick and dysentery broke out among them. Supplies depended upon an insufficient number of native carriers, easily stampeded. Only 12 miles had been covered out of 50 and more by the 5th of June, when Mayer reported that a further advance must await co-operation from the east. On the 7th it was ascertained that nothing more had been heard from the Eastern columns and it was decided to retreat. The loss of a convoy hastened the retirement. Wum Biagas and Eseka were both given up and it was now a matter of heavy rearguard fighting. Dobell had some reliable troops in reserve and a last reinforcement was rushed up from Duala. Marching at the rate of 40 miles a day, the new-comers struck in in time to relieve the pressure of a critical attack on the 17th of June, and eventually by the 28th of the month the force was securely re-established on the Kele river line, having lost 25 per cent. of its strength. The enterprise had failed in the main object but had not been unfruitful. Proof was forthcoming that the Germans had withdrawn troops from north and east to counter the threat to Jaunde and the work of the British and French columns on north and east had been lightened in proportion. Moreover, without the experience thus gained of the lie of the land and the essentials for success, it may be questioned whether the latter advance over the same ground would have gone through so methodically and well. What had happened had been a premature and therefore unsuccessful attempt at a combined movement. The co-operation failed and the main force had to fall back. Meanwhile, too late for this particular effort but none the less ensuring the future, a substantial advance had been and was being made from south-east and north.

Reference has been made to the three tongues of land which, as the result of the Franco-German deal of 1911, protruded from the greatly enlarged German Cameroons. Menacing in the extreme to French interests, galling in the extreme to French sentiment, they were in the same proportion, under

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the conditions which the war called forth, inviting to attack and impossible for the Germans to defend. The strip which ran due west to the sea, south of Spanish Muni, slightly widened out towards the coast, but even on the coast was only some 20 miles in width, and Libreville, the capital of the French Gaboon, lies but a few miles from the border. On this section of German coast the port was Cocobeach or Ukoko. At the beginning of the war two armed German steamers were active in these waters, and at the request of the Governor of the Gaboon the French gunboat *Surprise* was sent down from Dakar to curb their activities.

She reached Libreville on the 19th of September 1914 and, taking on board a detachment of French native infantry, proceeded to Corisco Bay. Two enemy vessels were sunk—whether they were the original aggressors does not appear—and at daylight on the 21st Cocobeach was attacked. It was strongly defended and there was a whole day of heavy fighting with many French casualties and much damage to the *Surprise*, but in the evening, the troops, who had been landed under cover of the ship's guns, and who fought conspicuously well, stormed the defences and occupied Cocobeach. With the seaboard in their hands the French, as the war went on, cleared all the southern side of Muni, and at a later stage a French force, under Commandant Le Meillour, advanced north along the eastern side, rooting out small German posts in this area. Of the other two German promontories into French territory, one ran for many miles nearly due south, following the Sanga river down to its confluence with the Congo, and at the confluence was the German post of Bonga; the other, running east and south-east, followed the Lobaye river to the Ubangi, and here the farthest German position was Singa on the Ubangi. Directly the war began, on the 6th and 8th of August respectively, the French took Bonga and Singa, and from these two points Aymerich set in motion two small columns to win back the ceded territory, which included the whole eastern and southern sides of the Cameroons, and eventually strike at the heart. Widely separated at the start, as the Sanga column moved north, and the Lobaye column west and north-west, the two forces drew nearer together. They advanced at first with characteristic French rapidity, led in either case by capable officers, Lieut.-Col. Hutin being in charge of the Sanga

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column, Lieut.-Col. Morisson of the Lobaye force. Helped by the use of a navigable river, Hutin speedily cleared the southern promontory, relieved Wesso in French territory in the angle formed by the promontory with the main Cameroons, and continued his advance far up the Sanga until by the end of the first week in October he had reached and occupied Nola on that river, over 300 miles from his starting-point and due west of the Lobaye promontory or peninsula. Here he was in a position to come into touch with Morisson's force advancing from the east. Then came a set-back. He had gone fast and far with forces too weak to secure his long line of communication. At the angle already referred to, in which Wesso stands, the Dscha river joins the Sanga from the north-west. Some distance up this river was the German post of Molundu and, starting from it as a base, a German force swooped down on to the Sanga and cut Hutin's line at Nzimu, a short way north of the confluence. For the moment Hutin's position was critical, but Aymerich was equal to the emergency. With the help of a Belgian contingent, and very especially of an armed Belgian steamer, the *Luxemburg*—for the opposite shore of the Congo to Bonga was Belgian territory—after somewhat prolonged fighting he retook Nzimu on the 29th of October and cleared the line again. It was, however, imperative for Hutin to secure his western flank against any future mishap of a similar kind, the more so as his own further advance, after he had gained touch with Morisson, was to be to the west and not to the north. Accordingly, the last two months of 1914 were spent in clearing out the Germans on this side, Molundu being taken on the 21st of December.

Meanwhile Morisson with his Lobaye force made good progress. Moving a little north of west, he drove the Germans from Mbaiki, a post west of Singa, cleared his promontory, and crossed from the Lobaye to the Upper Sanga, where he could join hands with Hutin. He struck it north of Nola and from Carnot on the river he followed a road leading south of west to Baturi, thence west to Bertua, his objective being the important enemy centre of Dume, which lay south of Bertua. Then he too was checked and was compelled to fall back from Bertua and concentrate at Baturi, while the Germans in turn concentrated at Moopa, 25 miles to the south of Baturi. Dume, at which he was aiming, lies almost due north of Lomie,

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which was Hutin's objective. Dume is 140 miles NNE. of Jaunde, Lomie is 150 miles SSE. of the same place, and when the plans were made for the first advance on Jaunde, it was hoped that these two columns would move simultaneously from Dume and Lomie respectively. It has been seen that the hope was not fulfilled. Hutin did not enter Lomie until the 26th of June 1915, by which date Mayer's hard-pressed force was just ending its retreat and consolidating on the line of the Kele river. Morisson was still later in taking Dume. He made a new start in May 1915; early in June he attacked the Germans at Moopa but failed to dislodge them; later in the month a mountain-gun was brought up and on the 23rd he took Moopa; a month later, on the 22nd of July, he reoccupied Bertua; and on the 25th he marched into Dume. By this date the Jaunde expedition was ancient history, the rainy season was at its height, and there was nothing doing on the main front. On the other hand, looking to the future, the two French columns had made good their advanced bases and were given breathing space to prepare for a further and final advance in due time.

For some long time after the initial reverses in August and September 1914 on the Nigerian frontier, Nigeria was on the defensive. Two battalions of Nigerian infantry and the major part of a Nigerian battery were fighting under Dobell, and the remaining troops, together with the police, were hard put to it to keep the border districts in comparative security. As it was, here and there the Germans struck over the line, especially in the central border province of Muri, south of Yola and the Benue river. One such raid took place on the 17th of September, the objective being a police post at Takum in that province, almost due west of Ngaundere. There was on this occasion the better part of a whole day's fighting between 57 police with two British officers and a stronger German-led force with a machine gun, the assailants being eventually beaten off. At the beginning of 1915 the following was the position in the northern sphere of operations. The Maidugari column, after its failure to take Mora, was planted in German territory due south of Mora in order to block communication between that place and Garua. This column was joined in the middle of October 1914 by the French force from Fort Lamy under Lieut.-Col. Brisset, which, as already told, had taken

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BRIGADIER-GENERAL CUNLIFFE

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Kusseri. Brisset tried his hand at taking Mora, but without success. He then moved on south, drove the Germans out of Marua in December and came into touch with the Nigerian troops who were watching Garua. This latter force was based on Yola, Yola on the Nigerian side and Garua on the Cameroons side being the respective head-quarters and bases of the opposing forces. After the Yola column had broken down in its initial advance on Garua every effort was made to strengthen the defences of Yola against a possible German counter-attack, the charge of the garrison being placed in the capable hands of Lieut.-Col. Webb-Bowen. The Germans in turn made good use of their time in fortifying Garua, as was evident when the siege began. Meanwhile Brisset took up a position on the eastern side of Garua. Farther south, after the Takum affair, a small force was organized to safeguard the Muri frontier, having its base at Ibi on the Benue. Finally, farther south again, where there had been the most serious set-back, at the beginning of the New Year there was an advance to record on the part of the Cross river column. After the Nsanakang disaster this small column was reorganized and reinforced and about Christmas time moved over the border under the command of Lieut.-Col. Mair. The object was to join up with Colonel Gorges's column in the first advance on Dschang, but the retirement of that column, after taking Dschang, to Nkongsamba and Bare, necessitated a corresponding retreat of Mair's force, which had reached Tinto, for a short distance to Ossidinge. At this place, which was well in advance of the scene of the former mishap, he took up a position, facing an enemy force, and waited for future developments.

After the early days of September all these Nigerian troops had been under the command of Lieut.-Col. Cunliffe, who was directly responsible to Sir Frederick Lugard as Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria, but hitherto Brisset and the French contingent had acted independently, though in close co-operation. Cunliffe was at this date 53 years of age, he had seen active service in South Africa and on the Indian Frontier, and he was well seasoned in experience of Nigeria and the West African Frontier Force. He exercised very exceptional influence with both the officers and the rank and file, by whom he was beloved. To reorganize after reverses, to provide for the safety of Nigeria, and to prepare for a future

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offensive was his task till the end of the year. Then came his visit to Duala towards the end of January to confer with General Dobell with a view to a forward movement. From Duala he went back to Lagos on the 5th of February, bringing with him Lieut.-Col. Wright, V.C., who had won his Victoria Cross in Nigeria, to act as Chief of his Staff. He conferred with and received all possible support from Sir Frederick Lugard: it was arranged, with the consent of the French authorities, that he should control all the allied forces in the northern Cameroons; and on the 15th of February he started up country again. His chance had come and the sequel will show how well he took occasion by the hand.

The fighting on the main front in the southern Cameroons had so far been all in the forest region. Only at the head of the Northern Railway and on the flying march to Dschang had more open country been reached. The difficulties had been those of bush and swamp, of sickness and ambush. The dry and wet seasons in the south were clearly marked. Widely different were the conditions farther north. Communication was difficult enough, and the obstacles were many; but outside the forest zone movement was less impeded, the rains were not so continuous, the troops were in better health. The geography of the Cameroons must be borne in mind. The western side, it will be remembered, is much more mountainous than the east and, generally speaking, from the north as from the south, the ground rises to the central plateau. From a kind of amphibious fighting in the south we pass to a campaign in which mountain strongholds figure largely. Such was Mora, perched up in a mountain group in the far north-west. Such was the fort overlooking Banyo on the main plateau, or again the fort at Mbo on the west of the road from Bare to Dschang, and taken in the advance on Dschang. The stories of attack and defence almost recall the records of medieval warfare; the fastnesses were hard to take, for the assailants were ill supplied with guns or not supplied at all, and the Germans had called into play all their cleverness and military foresight in adding to the natural strength of the positions and accumulating stores of food and water.

It was not, however, on mountain-tops that the northern campaign opened, but on the banks of the Benue river. North of the main plateau the two central points on either side

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were Yola and Garua. Yola was Cunliffe's base, Garua was his objective, and his problem was not to drive the Germans out of Garua but to isolate and capture the garrison—as the garrison at Mora had been isolated, though not captured—and to prevent the force from retreating south to stiffen the resistance on the main front. Garua was over 150 miles to the south of Mora, rather less to the north of Ngaundere. It stood on the north bank of the Benue. On the southern bank of the river, which here flows in a winding course from east to west, nearly seventy miles from and almost due west of Garua, was Yola. The position of Garua, guarded by the river on its southern side, and with three hills as outposts on the opposite side, in a semicircle from north-west to north-east, was naturally strong, and both military skill and native labour had for months past been abundantly employed upon its defences. There were outlying posts, a network of trenches, bomb-proof shelters, barbed wire and thornbush entanglements, camouflaged pits to catch the enemy. Ample provision had been made for sanitation and water-supply. All was as though the scene was the heart of Europe not of Africa. There was an adequate garrison, an enterprising and resolute commander, Hauptmann von Crailsheim, and there were guns which outranged the weak artillery of the allied forces. Knowing this, Cunliffe, when at Duala, secured the loan of one of the *Challenger's* 12-pounder guns, which left Duala in charge of Lieut. L. H. K. Hamilton, R.N., on the 2nd of February, was brought up the Niger and Benue rivers, then in low water, by the Nigerian Marine, and at length reached Yola on the 12th of March, a truly notable feat, demanding unflinching effort and determination. A still heavier French naval gun was meanwhile being sent to Colonel Brisset from Dakar. The Yola column by this date had moved forward and was planted near Garua, on the opposite side of the river, south and south-east of the town, while Brisset's force was still watching the place on the eastern side and on the northern bank of the river. Cunliffe arrived at Yola on the 15th of March, took counsel with Webb-Bowen and Brisset's staff officer, Captain Ferrandi, and matured his plans.

To rush Garua was beyond the bounds of possibility. It was a case of a regular and prolonged siege, and the besiegers were as yet too weak in numbers for the task. Accordingly

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Cunliffe brought up to Yola three companies from the Cross river column and one from the Ibi force. This transfer involved corresponding risk to the frontier and the lines of communication, and as a matter of fact the telegraph line between Yola and Lagos was cut for a fortnight in the middle of April. With these reinforcements the General had at his disposal a British force of eight companies of native infantry, one of native mounted infantry, three guns and nine machine guns, a French native force of three companies of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, two guns and two mitrailleuses. He went up to the front on the 18th of April and began to block the outlet for retreat from Garua on its southern side. But the German commander was not disposed to look on passively and be hemmed in.

Some little distance south of a direct line drawn from Yola to Garua, almost equidistant from the two places, 30 miles south of east from Yola, 40 miles south of west from Garua, is the small native town of Gurin. It is on the Nigerian side of the frontier, here formed by the Faro river, a feeder of the Benue, and is over against the rather larger native centre of Turua. Less than a mile out of the native town a small mud fort had been improvised and was held by a handful of Nigerian soldiers and police as a *point d'appui* on the lines of communication between Yola and Garua. On the night of the 21st/22nd April, von Crailsheim broke out of Garua to the southward with not far short of 300 men and many miles to the south was joined by some 50 more from Ngaundere. The object was to transfer to the garrison at Ngaundere some of the ammunition which abounded in Garua. This part of the programme having been carried out, von Crailsheim circled round and marched on Gurin ; and at dawn on the 24th attacked the fort. As far as can be ascertained the attacking force consisted of 13 Europeans, 220 native infantry, 100 mounted infantry, and 4 Maxims. The defenders were three Europeans, of whom one was a civilian, and 41 native soldiers and police. The attack was from the south and east, it lasted for seven hours, till after noonday, and at one point the Maxim fire was within 400 yards of the fort. The British officer in command, Lieut. Pawle, was killed, the British non-commissioned officer was badly wounded, and the civilian, Mr. Fitzpatrick, took command. Finally, the Germans had a surfeit of killed and wounded and

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drew off. They held and looted the native town till dusk, then left before a relief force appeared on the scene. Preparations were made to intercept their retreat to Garua, but to no avail. By what is described in General Cunliffe's dispatch as 'a wonderful march of 28 hours without a halt', von Crailsheim evaded his enemies and found his way safely back again. It was an incident well worth recording from either side. It illustrated German courage and enterprise on the one hand; on the other, British tenacity in the face of greatly superior numbers.

The exit from Garua for its defenders was towards the south, but the best chance of taking the place was on the opposite side, from the north. Accordingly, while maintaining the southern blockade, Cunliffe gradually concentrated the bulk of the British force to the north of east. The concentration went forward unknown to the enemy until the 26th of May, when it came under the fire of the German guns. Two days later the heavy French 95 mm. gun came on the scene, brought up from Yola by the never-failing Nigerian Marine, and now at length superiority in gun-power rested with the Allies. Sapping went forward and entrenching under cover of night, until the advance was within 1,000 yards of the fort on the easternmost of the three hills already mentioned, which was the key of the position. Then there were signs that the garrison had had enough. On the night of the 9/10th June two attempts were made to break out to the south: the first was beaten back by infantry fire; on the second occasion a few of the native soldiers made their escape, but many more were drowned in the river or forced to return. At 3.30 on the afternoon of the 10th the white flag was hoisted, unconditional surrender within two hours was demanded, and at 6 o'clock the surrender took place. The captures included 37 Europeans, von Crailsheim among them, and 212 native troops, 5 guns, 10 Maxims, and a quantity of ammunition and stores. For the time and place it was a success of the first magnitude, and both directly and indirectly had a great effect. It was followed up at once. While Colonel Brisset took charge of Garua, Colonel Webb-Bowen was sent on south at full speed to take Ngaundere, another small column being dispatched from Yola to Kontscha, parallel to the line of Webb-Bowen's march and safeguarding his right flank. Ngaundere was the next point at which the

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Germans were likely to make a stand, and it was emphatically the starting-point from the north for an advance into the southern Cameroons. It was a meeting-place of roads; it stood high up upon the northern edge of the main plateau and from the north it could only be taken up a steep incline. But it was taken. On the 28th of June, in the midst of a tropical storm, Webb-Bowen's advance guard, under Captain Fowle, rushed the German outposts, who were holding the precipitous approaches, and carried the place. When night came on the evicted garrison returned to counter-attack, but were beaten off, and the key of the plateau was finally lost and won. On the previous day the parallel column had entered Kontscha, and the mounted troops were following up the Germans as they retreated on Banyo.

In order to follow the story correctly it is necessary to keep the dates in mind. The 28th of June, on which day Ngaundere was taken, was the date which has been given as marking the end of the retreat of the Jaunde expedition; Hutin had, two days before, marched into Lomie, and Morisson was just beginning the last stage of his advance on Dume. In other words, advance on the north and east exactly coincided with ebb tide on the main front. Colonel Brisset now came up with reinforcements from Garua, took over the command at Ngaundere, and began to feel his way south-west towards Tibati, south-east towards Kunde, but the news that fighting in the south had come to a standstill made it necessary to hold up for a while the advance from the north, and Cunliffe decided to concentrate on a line from Ngaundere westward to Kontscha and Gashaka. The map will show that Kontscha, occupied from Yola, lies behind Ngaundere to the north-west, that Gashaka is south-west of Kontscha, due west of Ngaundere, and that a line drawn west from Ngaundere through Gashaka strikes the Benue in the neighbourhood of Ibi. Troops from the Ibi column occupied Gashaka in the middle of August; Tingere, a point between Ngaundere and Gashaka, was occupied from Ngaundere late in July.

Cunliffe, now holding the rank of Brigadier-General, understood that in the south fighting would not begin again till November. In the north operations were not hindered by rains to the same extent, and in the far north from Mora to Garua inclusively the annual rainfall is smaller than elsewhere in the

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Cameroons. While his southern advance, therefore, was marking time, he determined to make another attempt to take Mora and set free the troops which all the while were investing it. On the 27th of August he began to reconnoitre the position. He tells us in his dispatch that Mora Mountain has a circumference at the base of some thirty miles, and rises to 1,700 feet, steep on all sides. He laid out plans to attack from a hill, which had already been occupied, nearly on a level with the northern end of the main mountain top, but separated from it by a deep valley 600 yards across. It was a case of clambering up from boulder to boulder in the face of fire directed from safe cover behind rocks. Three separate attacks were made: the third gained a footing on the summit: a redoubt then barred the way: a detachment of Nigerians tried to storm it with the bayonet: they were held up within 60 yards: for 48 hours the men hung on without food or water: supplies could not reach them and they were compelled to retire. The place could not be taken without more ammunition for the guns and more time; but no more time could be spared. In the middle of September the General learnt that the opening of the southern campaign had been put forward from November to the beginning of October, and, still leaving an investing force behind him to block the Mora garrison, he reached Yola again on the 26th of September.

A final decision as to military operations in the south had been taken, on the 25th and 26th of August, when General Aymerich and M. Merlin, the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, conferred at Duala with General Dobell. Before they met, Dobell had fully matured his plan for the final advance on Jaunde and provisionally fixed the date for putting it into force. Cunliffe was unavoidably absent from the conference, but in the scheme which was adopted and which was one of a general converging movement from all sides, his forces were of high account. The Germans were to be herded in on Jaunde from north, east, and west; and, if possible, their remaining outlet to the south, in which direction lay the only possible refuge, the Spanish Quadrilateral, was to be blocked. From Jaunde the direct route to Spanish Muni ran west of south through Ebolowa, but the main road to the coast ran south-west to Kribi in Cameroon territory. Some long distance down the Kribi road a track branched off to Ebolowa,

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and farther on again along the main road, from Lolodorf, 38 miles north-west of Ebolowa, there was another track. Yet a third way started from Jaunde in a south-easterly direction to Widemenge. Ebolowa itself was never reached and held by the Allies until the end, and from first to last it was a thorn in their side. It was the main depot for the supplies which, throughout the war, reached the Germans from Spanish territory, and eventually it was the gateway of their escape. It has been seen that, after the German tongue of land south of Spanish Muni had been cleared by the French, the latter moved north along the eastern, the inland, side of Muni. Meanwhile Campo, on the coast immediately north of Muni, and at the mouth of the Campo river, was continuously occupied from the end of 1914, and some progress was made inland, the main post being at Dipikar, on a little island in the Campo river, a short way up from the coast. In August 1915 a comparatively strong body of Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Indian troops,[1] under the command of Colonel Rose, scoured the district; towards the end of October a small French column took up the work but made little way; and in January 1916 a force, composed mainly of French troops, tried to block the German retreat across the Spanish border. But there was never sufficient strength to join hands and to establish a continuous and effective land blockade on the north and east of the Spanish Quadrilateral, and the result was that, while the war lasted, constant convoys of supplies reached the fighting Germans, and, when it ended, the Germans made good their escape into neutral territory.

The cutting of the Jaunde-Kribi road was to be effected by the right column, the French column, of the main advance on Jaunde, which, after reoccupying Eseka, was not immediately to wheel, as before, in the Jaunde direction, but to continue its eastward movement until it was astride of the Kribi road. On this main advance the French and British

[1] These Indian troops belonged to the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army mentioned below on page 103. This battalion at the beginning of the war was stationed at Singapore and a large proportion of the men mutinied. A reference to the mutiny will be given in vol. v.

In consideration for the men of the regiment who had remained loyal, the battalion was re-organized and sent to the Cameroons; being the only case on record of a unit of the Indian Army serving in West Africa. At the end of the Cameroons campaign it was sent on to East Africa. Subsequently, however, to the war the battalion was disbanded.

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columns were again to move along railway and road respectively, parallel to each other, but with somewhat looser co-operation than on the previous occasion and with independent lines of supply. On the east, Aymerich's troops, which, as has been seen, had occupied Lomie and Dume, were to concentrate for the march on Jaunde on the more northerly line, leaving a detachment under Hutin to advance nearly due west from Lomie on Ebolowa. Starting in three columns from the bases of Bertua and Dume, and moving south-west on parallel lines, they were to make for the upper waters of the Sanaga and combine again at the Nachtigal Rapids on that river. At this point, or before, they would come into touch with the left or eastern column of Cunliffe's force, which was also a French column under Brisset's command. Cunliffe's troops, in fact, were designed to supply, and did supply, the links between the converging forces. Starting southward on parallel lines, as his columns went forward, they opened out and closed in fanlike fashion, and meanwhile on the Nigerian frontier detachments came in eastward to combine with or guard the flank of their comrades marching south. With the occupation of Gashaka from Ibi, Ibi instead of Yola became the base of supplies. When the general movement began, a company moved over the border from Takum in the Ibi area and occupied Kentu, and farther south Dobell's and Cunliffe's forces joined hands when the Cross river column coming east from Ossidinge met troops coming up from the railhead of the northern line.

The story of the many different but simultaneous movements ought to be told, if it could be told, as one, for the whole interest of this last stage of the war in the Cameroons, and the secret of the success, lies in the extraordinary accuracy with which the movements were timed and executed, pointing at once to a skilfully drawn ground-plan and to unusual efficiency in the men who commanded the various columns. As the main column, advancing steadily and surely, drove a wide wedge into the heart of the enemy's country, the German detachments on all sides were compelled to fall back or risk being isolated and cut off. Thus the onward movement of the driving columns was facilitated, and they in turn kept up a ceaseless pressure on the outer ring. Though the various units were expanded as the campaign went on, the smallness of the numbers as compared with the great spaces in which they

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operated and the distances traversed, must be borne in mind. Sir Charles Dobell tells us in his dispatch that, whereas when the war began the force under his immediate command only numbered 4,300, towards the end of November 1915 the number had risen to 9,700. General Cunliffe states that the French and British troops, whom he controlled, numbered between 3,000 and 4,000 men. But each position that was taken meant a position to be held, and even if all the men had been available for the fighting line, the separate columns must still have been in each case very small detachments. As it was, the two parallel columns which advanced on Jaunde and practically finished the war numbered together no more than 2,800 rifles with 8 guns. Aymerich's three columns were in all only 1,000 men with 4 guns, and so with Cunliffe's small force, subdivided into numerically insignificant units. It is true that the number of fighting men on the German side, when the last phase of the campaign opened, was disproportionate even to these small numbers. Apart from the Mora garrison, it was estimated that centred at Jaunde there were 1,500 to 2,000 native with 300 white soldiers, and elsewhere in the territory scattered in small groups, no more than 1,000 natives and 150 Europeans. But the conditions were such that a dozen trained natives, under a resolute German, might cut a communication, ambush a convoy, wreck a plan. Cunliffe's line of communication, for instance, before the end, ran to some 400 miles. In other words, the base of his supplies was as far off as Edinburgh is from London, and the supplies were brought up not by North-Western or North-Eastern express trains, but along bush tracks and on the heads of men. That this long line was kept intact must be largely attributed to the pressure on the enemy by the southern columns advancing on Jaunde.

On the main front there was leeway to be made up and lost ground to be regained. It was necessary for the forces, which had ended their retreat on the Kele river line, to move forward again and reoccupy what had been advanced bases, Wum Biagas on the road, Eseka at the head of the railway. Dobell had turned to good account the close season enforced by the rains. White officers were sent to England for a short spell of change and rest. The salving and refitting of German ships made it possible to provide sufficient transport for Gold Coast

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and Nigerian soldiers, and they were given furlough to revisit their homes. Reinforcements kept coming in, among them an Indian battalion, the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army. From the first in this campaign the staffs had, to a great extent, to be organized on the spot and the departments and services to be formed out of the personnel immediately to hand. Now the administrative services were strengthened and additional officers were secured to supervise the Public Works, the railways, the Post Office. A 4·5 in. howitzer was sent out from England, an armoured car, and a Ford van company, together with signalling and mechanical transport units. As the Jaunde track was progressively hardened into a road, and provided with culverts and bridges, the motor lorries became invaluable for transport purposes, relieving and supplementing the native carriers. Adequate provision, however, had been made for human transport, and the governors of the British West African Colonies from Sierra Leone inclusively had undertaken to supply and, by regular drafts, to keep supplied, all the necessary carriers. The rains were not yet over and the rivers were not yet low, but the dry season was coming on apace. Sickness was still present, but not so rife as before. Above all, there was past experience to guide. On the 22nd of September, a few days short of a year since the capture of Duala, the move began, and at first history repeated itself. The British column was composed mainly of Nigerians and the Gold Coast contingent; Haywood led the advance, and by the 7th of October the troops were in front of the Wum Biagas position. Since the Germans had recovered it, they had added to its strength. The approaches had been cleared of timber, to give no cover to assailants, and behind the Mbila stream, of no great breadth but running deep and strong, was a long line of defences resting on swamp at either end. There was fighting throughout the 8th, but on the 9th the enemy's right flank was cleverly turned by Colonel Rose and his Gold Coast men, a combined assault was made, and the front was carried with not very heavy loss. Thus on the road the first objective was made good, and flanking parties were thrown out to relieve the pressure on the French, who were encountering stubborn opposition as they followed up the railway track. Difficulty and delay were caused by the intervening Kele river, whose winding upward course between road and railway accompanied

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and thwarted the advance on Jaunde, the river being still in flood; but eventually, on the 25th of October, the French took Sende and, on the 30th, Eseka, securing at the railhead some much-needed rolling-stock which had been left behind on the previous retreat. Time was now taken to consolidate what had been won, to construct or repair rail, road, and bridges, and to bring up supplies. The road was made available for the motors, and, where wheeled traffic was impossible, over 7,000 carriers were busily at work. It was the 23rd of November before all was ready for the final move, and meanwhile Cunliffe had made a big leap forward and scored a signal success.

We have seen that he did not return to Yola from the siege of Mora till the 26th of September, by which date the main advance on Jaunde had already begun, and his new starting-point was far south of Yola, his previous southern advance having stopped short on the Ngaundere-Kontscha-Gashaka line. This line was in fact a triangle, whose apex was on the north, at Kontscha, and its base the line from Ngaundere on the east to Gashaka on the west, with Tingere half-way between them. Ngaundere was some 90 miles south-east of Kontscha, Gashaka 70 miles south-west. Farther south than the base of this triangle, the line from Ngaundere to Gashaka, lay the base of another, a more acute triangle, still having its apex at Kontscha, the base being a line from Tibati to Banyo. Tibati, on the head-waters of the Sanaga, lay over 100 miles south by east of Kontscha, Banyo about 90 miles south by west. Tibati was over 70 miles due south-west of Ngaundere, Banyo was barely 50 miles due south-east of Gashaka. The left column, the easternmost column, which started from Ngaundere, was Brisset's French column. It was directed on Tibati. Next inside and supporting it was Webb-Bowen's column, starting from Tingere. Cunliffe himself was farthest back at Kontscha, and with his advance Major Mann, who commanded the Ibi column, now at Gashaka, was ordered to co-operate, the objective of these last two columns being Banyo. Simultaneously the Takum company was to march in to Kentu, protecting the flank of the advance from Gashaka to Banyo; and far away to the south, but not so far as to have no bearing upon the move on Banyo, Major Crookenden, commanding the Cross river column at Ossidinge, was to march upwards of 60 miles north of east on Bamenda, which place was some 120 miles south-

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

CAMEROONS: DISTANT VIEW OF BANYO

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west of Banyo. Finally, this last movement was to be supported from Bare by a second occupation of Dschang, which last place was under 40 miles south of Bamenda. The distances were long, the country, though not forest clad, was mountainous, intersected with rivers and ravines, covered with long grass, the columns were not unopposed. Yet the whole movement went like clockwork and the time-table was kept. On the 3rd of November Brisset marched into Tibati, and Webb-Bowen's men came in at the same time. Leaving Kontscha on the 14th of October, Cunliffe's advance guard was in Banyo on the 24th of October, forestalled by one hour by Mann's column from Gashaka. Two days earlier, on the 22nd, Crookenden fought his way into Bamenda, while on the 6th of November a mixed Indian and West African force, under Lieut.-Col. Cotton, who commanded the 5th Light Infantry, occupied Dschang.

Close to and overlooking the native town of Banyo, the Germans held a mountain stronghold, designed to be, under such conditions as had now arisen, a refuge and rallying-point for evicted garrisons from farther south. It was like Mora on a smaller scale. The mountain was an isolated height, rising 1,200 feet above the surrounding country. The distance to the top very roughly approximated to that of the Worcestershire Beacon from the foot of the Malvern Hills. Its steep sides were studded with rocky boulders. Almost incredible pains had been spent upon making it impregnable, and it was a marvel of German thoroughness combined with German command of unlimited native labour. Three hundred sangars, General Cunliffe tells us, linked the rocks into tiers of continuous loopholed defences, while on the summit were houses built on European pattern, cement reservoirs for the water-supply, immense stores of grain, foodstuffs, live stock, material of all kinds. As in the German dug-outs on the Western Front, so here in the heart of tropical Africa, no element of necessity or of comfort had been omitted, and the enemy counted upon holding their well-stored fortress to the end. It was a standing menace which could not be safely left behind, and Cunliffe set to work to take it. By the 2nd of November he had a cordon of mounted men encircling the base, infantry in position to attack, three guns to support them on the north, north-west, and south respectively. Daybreak on the 4th was fixed for the attack; on that morning there was a thick mist on the hill.

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which screened the climbers but at the same time precluded concerted movement and artillery support. Under cover of the fog one of the five attacking companies gained the top, but was driven down again, the commander being killed, Captain Bowyer-Smith, a very gallant officer, to whom was due the taking of Gashaka in the previous August. Through that day the other companies held their ground, but no more, half-way up the hill. Night came on and the defenders pelted them with dynamite bombs—so up to date were the German resources—novel and at first disconcerting to the native troops. They were not dislodged, however, and through the night and through the next day, the 5th, they toiled up steadily, taking line after line of defences. Cunliffe's three guns ran short of ammunition, but in the afternoon a small fresh supply was rushed up and, helped by the artillery fire, when night fell on this Guy Fawkes day, the troops were within 100 yards of the top. The attack on Mora had failed because supplies could not be carried up to the line of fire, but in this case, though with much difficulty and danger, the carriers reached the fighting men. Not long after sundown there was a violent thunder-storm. It was under cover of a storm that Ngaundere had been carried, and now a similar result was produced, but in a different way. The storm of rain was followed by a new and plentiful storm of bombs, but when day broke on the 6th, the white flag was seen flying on the summit of the hill. The bombs were a kind of grand finale, for already, taking advantage of the storm, the garrison had been creeping downhill in small parties, most of them to be eventually caught by the watchers below. They left behind them a scene of litter and wastage. Rifles and gramophones, stores and stuffs of every kind, strewn broadcast and half destroyed, marked on this hill-top, as in France and Flanders, the exit of the Germans. This was a very important success. Like the taking of Garua, it was a clean-cut knock-out for the enemy. It is true that Mora was still untaken, but Mora was in a far corner of the territory. Banyo Hill was a crucial central point. Here attack might have been defied, and was expected to be defied, for weeks or months. Its capture told the natives that the Germans were being rooted out: news travels fast and far among native races, and the fame of it must have spread through the land.

Thus all Cunliffe's first objectives had been gained by the

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end of the first week in November. Between two and three weeks later, on the morning of the 24th of November, the main advance on Jaunde was resumed. Gorges led out from Wum Biagas the two Nigerian battalions and the Gold Coast battalion, some 1,500 rifles in all, reinforced a little later by the Gambia Company of the West African Frontier Force and by a new unit, a company of the 2nd Battalion of the West India Regiment which had relieved the 1st Battalion at Sierra Leone three months previously. The march was not made as before, in a single column along the road, but in three parallel columns, the main force on the road being flanked on either side by columns making use of native paths or cutting their own way through the bush. Cockburn led the 1st Nigerians on the right flank. Rose and the Gold Coast battalion operated on the left. In the previous May and June the first 12 miles out from Wum Biagas had taken as many days to cover, and then the advance had been brought to a standstill. On this second attempt the opposition was still persistent and there were some seven days of nearly continuous fighting before, Rose having turned the enemy's right at the Puge river and Cockburn having crossed the Kele, Ngung was occupied on the 30th of the month. Here there was a halt and a strong post was formed and set in order before, on the 7th of December, the troops moved on again, the 2nd Nigerians now relieving the sister battalion on the right flank. Still the enemy concentrated in front, every crossing was defended and every turn of the road. Between four and five miles out from Ngung the advance was held up at a small river until a Gold Coast detachment, led by Captain Butler, V.C., made their way round the German right and, two miles behind their fighting line, took the village which was for the moment their base, capturing a machine gun with ammunition and, what was of much importance, the papers of the enemy commander. Eventually, on the 17th of December, Dschang Mangas was taken and occupied. This place was more than half-way between Wum Biagas and Jaunde, about 32 miles from Wum Biagas, 24 miles from Jaunde. It stood on the fringe of the Jaunde district, and the worst was now over, for, though the forest zone had not yet been wholly left behind, the country was beginning to open up and a cultivated area was at hand. Here there was a five days' rest, a supply depot was formed,

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and ample supplies were brought up in contemplation of further prolonged fighting. The French meantime, under Colonel Mayer, had been steadily moving east from Eseka, in very difficult country and heavily opposed. Their losses had been greater than the British casualties, and it was not until the 21st of December, four days later than the occupation of Dschang Mangas, that they reached Mangeles, still short of their final objective, the Jaunde-Kribi road. At Mangeles they had to call a halt, being short both of supplies and of carriers.

About this date native reports began to come through of Aymerich's columns, which were now concentrating on the Sanaga. The ring was closing in and the question of the moment was whether to wait until the circle was nearer completion or to strike at once at Jaunde from the nearest point and with the most available force. Mayer in any case could not move on from Mangeles for some days, and, holding that delay was politically inexpedient, to the native mind unintelligible, maybe also—for generals are human—not sorry that the British column should be first in the race, Dobell ordered Gorges to go forward along the road. On the 22nd he moved on. The Gold Coast men now took both flanks and the centre column was proportionately strengthened. The enemy resistance was still strong, but slowly giving way, and on the 30th the British force was wholly clear of the bush, in open country and within six miles of Jaunde. They were still confronted by a very heavy line of defences, but this last obstacle was carried without great difficulty, and before noon on New Year's Day 1916 the staunch little army marched into Jaunde. The total casualties since leaving Wum Biagas among the fighting men amounted to about 250, including 18 Europeans. In the course of the next few days the other converging forces came up. General Aymerich's troops, which on the 1st were on the Sanaga about 70 miles away to the north-east, reached Jaunde by the 8th; they were closely followed by Brisset's column of Cunliffe's command, and on the heels of Brisset came Webb-Bowen's detachment of the same force, so accurate had been the timing of the whole movement. In the early days of January too, Mayer, relieved from pressure on his front by the occupation of Jaunde, moved on from Mangeles and planted himself, according to plan, upon the Kribi road.

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
Sketch Map of the country between
EDEA and JAUNDE
English Miles
0 5 10 15 20
Roads
Railways
N
R. Sanaga
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Wum Biagas
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Dschang Mangas
Jaunde
Sende
So Dibanga
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Eseka
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Mangeles
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There were two main factors in the success of the second advance on Jaunde, as compared with the previous attempt. The first was the provision of motor transport, made possible by the repair, or rather the construction, of the Edea-Jaunde road, and the supply of Ford lorries from England. Want of success in May and June had been largely due to the breakdown of the carriers. The second was the employment of flanking columns to protect the advance of the main column along the road. In May and June, possibly from paucity of numbers, the advance was made in a single column, which was constantly attacked from the bush on either side of the road. In the later effort the case was reversed, and now the Germans were bewildered by constant threats to their flanks, and in consequence abandoned strong positions which would otherwise have been held.

When Banyo Hill had been taken, Cunliffe sent on his mounted troops and, after a few days' breathing space, set all his columns in motion again on their southward course. Brisset from Tibati was directed on Joko, a place of some importance, between 60 and 70 miles distant from Tibati to the west of south. He occupied it on the 1st of December. This was the easternmost point of Cunliffe's moving line, and it lay rather over 100 miles due east of Fumban, which was at much the same distance south-west of Banyo, Bamenda being 50 miles away from Fumban, north of west, Dschang rather farther to the south-west. Fumban was the capital of the native state of Bamun, one of the walled cities with huge circumference which are to be found in Central West Africa. The outer wall with mound and ditch encircled many miles of country. There was an inner ring of similar defence works, mound and ditch, gateway and guardhouse, round the native town itself, and yet again an inmost kernel, the dwelling-place of the Sultan. Fumban was one of the very few remaining native centres which the Germans still held and from which they were now due to be evicted. On the extreme east or left of Cunliffe's line Brisset at Joko was within measurable distance of what may be called Aymerich's sphere of influence; the French column was drawing near to the other French forces. On the extreme west Dobell's and Cunliffe's forces now joined hands to take Fumban. Colonel Cotton from Dschang and Crookenden from Bamenda, the latter being strengthened by the addition to his force of the detach-

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ment from Kentu, were ordered, moving north-east and south-east respectively, to combine at Bagam, 60 miles due west of Fumban, and march on the city. At the same time, in order to support them and make the movement doubly sure, Cunliffe sent down a small column from Banyo direct on Fumban. The junction was duly made at Bagam. On the 24th of November the small combined force moved on. Some delay was caused at the crossing of the Nun river, disputed by the enemy, but on the 2nd of December, the day after Brisset marched into Joko, Fumban was occupied, both the Bagam and the Banyo columns entering on the same day—another illustration of the precision with which the movements were timed. On the 4th the centre of Cunliffe's force reached Ngambe, lying between Fumban and Joko, 45 miles east of Fumban. It was on the north bank of the Kim river, and the retreating enemy was entrenched on the southern side, having broken the bridge and destroyed any boats that might have been used. Cunliffe, with his reserves, came up on the 11th, boats were procured, the position was turned, and again the line was moved on to the south and south-east. New objectives, Linte and Ditam, were reached on the 18th, and a further southward advance was registered by the 29th of December. Then a halt was ordered, in the hope of ascertaining what progress had been made by Aymerich's and Dobell's forces. It was presumed that the enemy was concentrated at Jaunde, and if all the columns could close in simultaneously there would be a dramatic ending to the campaign. On the 4th of January Brisset was ordered to secure the Sanaga crossing at the Nachtigal Rapids, about 40 miles north of Jaunde, and, as in the earlier stages of the southern sweep, Webb-Bowen was told to support him. The Sanaga crossing was the point towards which Aymerich's forces had been directed, and Cunliffe, through Brisset, now came into communication with Aymerich before any news reached him from Dobell. It was not until the 8th of January, by which date Brisset was on the Sanaga and Aymerich in Jaunde, that Cunliffe learnt that Jaunde had been occupied for a week past. He then held up his advance in order to avoid congestion at Jaunde, and moved his own head-quarters back to Fumban; but his orders were too late to reach Webb-Bowen, whose column followed Brisset into Jaunde, as Brisset followed Aymerich. Brisset and his

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men now came under Aymerich's command and Webb-Bowen's detachment was sent back by Dobell to Duala and thence by sea to Nigeria.

Dobell had not waited for the convergence of these troops to follow up the Germans. The story of the retreat and pursuit from Jaunde is not easy to trace, but it can hardly be doubted that this last stage in the campaign should be regarded not so much as a successful clearance as a failure to prevent escape. Apparently it was not at first certain that the Germans were at the end of their tether, that they might not dissolve into small parties for the purpose of continuing spasmodic bush warfare. In another quarter, in the Jabassi area, Dobell had ordered the country to be scoured, and after the occupation of Jaunde it must be supposed that the main object of the Allied commanders was to prevent Zimmermann and his followers from breaking back and carrying on guerrilla warfare on the lines which von Lettow-Vorbeck followed with so much success in East Africa. Still a rounding up and surrender would have made a better ending than the not very seriously molested exit of a large force across the Spanish frontier after a retreat from Jaunde of some 115 miles. After the occupation of Jaunde, Dobell's policy was to keep in touch with the retreating Germans, but not to push the pursuit too hurriedly until he was assured that the blocking troops on the frontier were in position and that all exits had been closed. A French force, composed largely of recruits, had been sent to Campo, assisted by British carriers, no French carriers being available, and with the lines of communication held by British troops. It had been contemplated that this force was to march due east along the northern frontier of Muni and join hands with the other French forces from south and east, but, as already told, the blocking process was not completed. The Germans retreated on Ebolowa, which lay from 60 to 70 miles due south of Jaunde, the upper waters of the Njong river having to be crossed on the way. They seem to have gone by two routes, through Widemenge, about 25 miles south-east of Jaunde, and, before Mayer's force came up, down the Jaunde-Kribi road. During the first week of January British and French forces followed on, occupying Widemenge, and Haywood, who led the British contingent, caught the Germans up so far as to recover a number of prisoners who were being carried off by their captors,

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in itself a sign that the enemy were not in headlong flight. His column and two French columns converged on Ebolowa, which the French entered on the 19th of January. It was now quite clear that the Germans were making for refuge in Muni. Haywood followed them up for some further distance strongly and well, then was diverted towards Kribi to clear the Kribi district in concert with a British force sent to Lolodorf. Kribi being but a short distance by sea from Campo, he was here in a position to be transferred to Campo should the Campo column need reinforcement. The French under Morisson continued the pursuit, acting in conjuction with other French forces, the column from Campo, and Le Meillour's force from the south, and by the middle of February all the Germans were driven over the border. About the same date, on the 18th of February, Hauptman von Raben, the gallant and stubborn commander of the Mora garrison, having held out unbeaten to the last, was offered and accepted honourable terms of surrender, such as he deserved, and the conquest of the Cameroons was complete.

When safe in Spanish territory, ex-Governor Ebermaier sent a telegram to his Government, which was duly let through, breaking to them that he had been obliged to abandon the Cameroons for want of ammunition—a statement which may not have been far from the truth, and an amicable arrangement was made with the Spanish Governor of Fernando Po to facilitate the removal of the interned Europeans, 840 in number, from Muni. On the 4th of March an agreement was arrived at in London between the French and British Governments which demarcated the respective spheres of occupation in the Cameroons pending a final settlement at the end of the war. All the eastern and central regions of the Protectorate, nine-tenths of the whole and including Duala and the Cameroon estuary, fell to the French. On the western side, adjoining Nigeria and coming under the control of the Government of Nigeria, was the British sphere of over 31,000 square miles. Starting north from the Bimbia Creek, east of Tiko, up that creek to the Mungo, and passing on north, the dividing line gave into British keeping, in the Southern Cameroons, some 18,700 square miles, with a population of over half a million. There were four divisions, Victoria, Ossidinge, Dschang, and Bamenda. The rich Cameroon mountain area, with Buea and the planta-

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tions, thus remained under British control, and Victoria once more made good its name. North of latitude 7° the British sphere included six districts on the borders of the Muri and Yola provinces, the districts of Nassarao, Laro, Kontscha, Dodeo, Gashaka, and Kaka. They had formed part of the Emirate of Yola, and the first four, and after an interval the other two also, were administered from the Yola province. This area amounted to nearly 10,000 square miles. In farthest north, in the Mora region, the small district of Dikwa, about 3,000 square miles in size, which had been an integral part of the Bornu Emirate, until severed by the Anglo-German boundary line, was again attached to the province of Bornu. During the month of March the necessary steps were taken to carry out the agreement. General Aymerich came to Duala to take over from Sir Charles Dobell. At midnight on 31st March/1st April the transfer took effect, and on the 3rd of April Dobell left for England, having done notable service to the Empire.

What should be the verdict on the campaign ? It could not be better expressed than in the terms used by Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, and always happy in his choice of words. When Parliament met on the 15th of February 1916, three days before the capitulation of Mora, he referred to ' the very successful and well-organized campaign in the Cameroons . . . one of the most satisfactory and complete episodes so far in the history of the war '. On the German side it was fought, as a whole, stubbornly, at times and at certain points with determination. The Germans made a far better fight in the Cameroons than in Togoland, where they made no real fight at all ; and their resistance was stronger than in South-West Africa. But in South-West Africa they were opposed by white troops who thoroughly knew and understood the conditions of the land and the kind of warfare required ; the resources of the Union of South Africa were ample and close at hand ; the scene of fighting, torrid and waterless, was yet a white man's zone ; and it was in the main open country, which lent itself to enveloping tactics by means of mounted troops and mechanical transport. The Cameroons campaign should rather be set side by side with the campaign in East Africa, where local conditions, the conditions of the Central African tropics, were near akin, and a comparison of the two campaigns compels a conclusion

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highly favourable to the French and British leaders in the Cameroons, unfavourable to the Germans. In the Cameroons the defenders had in Muni the great advantage of a neutral neighbour, and, if this is taken into account, together with the factors of climate and size of territory in proportion to the number of troops at the disposal of the Allies, the postponement of the final eviction from the Cameroons for a year and a half was only a moderate achievement on the part of the Germans. It cannot be doubted that, had von Lettow-Vorbeck been in Zimmermann's place, with Spanish Muni to hand, the evil day would have been longer postponed.

On the part of the Allies, in the course of the campaign, there were and must have been mistakes and mishaps. The first reverses on the Nigerian border should never have happened. The failure to take Mora was disappointing, as was the final escape of the whole body of retreating Germans. The first attack on Jabassi broke down completely. The cutting of Hutin's line of communications threatened the life of his force. The first advance on Jaunde was a hazardous venture. In these respects the story is very familiar, the old story of trying to do too much with too few men and guns, and learning by experience. On the other hand, there were some quite excellent pieces of work. Nothing could be better than the way in which the British Navy forced the passage of the Cameroon river and ensured the taking of Duala. The converging movements which cleared the Cameroon mountain district and which took Edea, the French defence of Edea, the advance up the northern railway, the methodical second advance on Jaunde, the equally methodical siege and reduction of Garua, all were soundly planned and well executed. There was a touch of brilliancy in the rush which carried Ngaundere and in the storming of Banyo Hill, and the whole southern sweep of Cunliffe's force was masterly.

But the outstanding feature of the Cameroons campaign is that it was in a peculiar degree an object-lesson in co-operation, co-operation of sailors and soldiers, of different nationalities, of one column with another. In this respect it is, perhaps, unmatched. It is not to be supposed that ordinary human weaknesses can have been wholly eliminated, that there can have been no friction or jealousy in a medley of services and peoples in the heart of the tropics, but whatever divergences

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there may have been, they were duly subordinated to the main issue. Wherever a boat could float, there were the men on water covering and supporting the men on land. On land, again, naval guns and gun parties were everywhere in evidence, up at the siege of Garua or on the Jaunde road. Mayer and his Senegalese served with Dobell, Brisset with Cunliffe, Belgians with Aymerich. Columns starting very many miles apart, when launched upon the same enemy objective, reached the goal on the same day. It was an altogether admirable illustration of combined effort. In particular, Franco-British comradeship, not always conspicuous in West Africa, was cemented in the campaign and survived the campaign. Here is an extract from a report from the Bornu Province of Northern Nigeria, written at the end of June 1918:

'Not the least pleasing or the least natural consequence of the war has been the strengthening of friendly relations between the French and British in these regions. Throughout the Cameroons campaign French and British troops fought side by side at Mora, and on more than one occasion French columns and convoys passed through the Province on their way to the seat of the war. But more, perhaps, than all this, the disappearance of the Germans from the Cameroons has led to the utilization by the French of the direct road from Fort Lamy to Kano via Maidugari for officers and others proceeding on and returning from leave in Europe. As a result, intercourse between French and British officials is now abundant and cordial.'

Co-operation would not have been possible without two main factors, men in the highest command whose personalities made for harmony in action, and column leaders who worked efficiently on the co-operative lines prescribed. Of General Aymerich and the officers under his immediate command there is not material to hand to form an estimate, beyond the fact that effective co-ordination in and from the east was carried through over very long distances. Sir Charles Dobell clearly proved himself to be an able and tactful commander, who was not afraid of taking risks, faced and surmounted obstacles, planned wisely and well, and, no doubt at the price of much strain upon health and strength, worked out a complicated enterprise to a successful ending. How well he was supported by the British Navy is in evidence throughout the story, and he has placed on record in high terms his sense of the services of

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Capitaine de Vaisseau Carré, who, in the last half of the campaign, was senior naval officer in the waters of the Cameroons. Of the men who served under him in the fighting line on shore, Colonel Mayer, who commanded the French contingent through the whole campaign, would seem to have been at once a tried soldier of exceptional merit and a most loyal colleague, while among the leaders of British columns or battalions the names of Cockburn, Haywood, Rose, became almost household words. In the north, had General Cunliffe taken Mora, he would have run a career of unbroken success. As it was, he more than justified his selection to control all the allied fighting forces in the northern area and earned, as he achieved, a high reputation. The account of his extending and converging columns, of march, siege, and assault, always accurate and well-timed, compel the conclusion that the staff work must have been unusually good and that Colonel Wright must have been a talented officer, while among the column leaders Colonel Brisset did all that he was asked to do and did it well, and Colonel Webb-Bowen was consistently to the fore.

We have seen that the British forces in the campaign included an Indian battalion, a detachment from the West India Regiment, and some small special units sent out from England. With these exceptions and excepting also parties of sailors and marines, the Cameroons were conquered, so far as rank and file were concerned, by British and French West Africa. The Generals' dispatches, as well as unofficial accounts, pay the highest tribute to the work of the West African soldiers, from the Senegal to the Niger. There is the same note of reciprocal confidence and affection between white officers and native troops which so often recurs in the annals of the Indian Army. Varying in type and race, when well handled and well led, as, with rare exceptions, was conspicuously the case in the Cameroons campaign, the fighting men of West Africa stand high for staunch courage and cheerful endurance. Sir Charles Dobell's testimony to the West African Frontier Force runs: 'To them no day appears to be too long, no task too difficult,' and General Cunliffe, writing of the Nigeria Regiment, which was his special concern, tells how scanty rations, long 'barefoot marches', and arduous fighting in no way affected the discipline of the men, their devotion to their officers, or their personal courage. What the barefoot marches meant

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may be judged from the fact that at the end of the campaign about 40 per cent. of the Nigerians who had served in it were lame.

It was a campaign against sickness on the one hand, against broken roads and bridges, or no roads and bridges at all, on the other, more than against ordered forces in accessible fields. Hence the supreme importance in the Cameroons of the medical engineering and transport services, to the excellence of which the dispatches refer. Sir Charles Dobell writes in strong and grateful terms of the services controlled by the Royal Engineers under Colonel Pery and Major Giles, D.S.O., of the Medical and Nursing Service headed by Lieut.-Col. Statham, C.M.G., of the Royal Army Medical Corps, of the Supply and Transport under Captain Wallbach and Lieut. Migeod, to whose names may be added those of Messrs. Stobart and Hodgson. The transport services included the native carriers, who far exceeded in numbers the fighting men, and the monotony of whose long marches, under heavy loads, was only broken by occasional calls to bring up food, water, and munitions under fire to the line of battle. From all West Africa they were sent, but of necessity, from its nearness and the size of its area, Nigeria was the main source of supply. The Northern provinces provided not far short of 25,000 carriers for the campaign. In the Southern provinces there was more reluctance to leave home; in some parts the people were averse to carrying loads and labour was in demand for the construction of the Port Harcourt-Udi railway. The carriers, therefore, who were sent across the border from Southern Nigeria hardly numbered 3,000, but inside the border very many thousands were forthcoming. It was estimated, for instance, that in the Ogoja Province alone, in the first five months of the war, over 12,000 carriers were employed on short-term work in connexion with the operations of the Cross river column. This was one main form of non-combatant aid rendered by Nigeria, but all the administrative services in the campaign were to a large extent manned by Nigerians. A railway contingent was formed on the outbreak of war and was sent to the Cameroons. Medical men, Public Works officers, members of the Postal and Telegraph Departments, served over the border. There was a Prisoners of War Bureau under Nigerian management, and it has been seen that the Nigerian Marine worked the Duala dockyard under the direc-

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tion of the senior naval officer, that the Nigerian Government eventually took over the plantations in the Cameroon mountain district, and that, when the campaign ended, the British sphere of occupation in the conquered territory was administered from Nigeria. These varied duties, it must be remembered, devolved upon a Civil Service which at the same time supplied a large proportion of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the fighting forces, for Sir Frederick Lugard was ever mindful of the necessity in a campaign against German-led troops for maintaining at full strength or more the supply of British officers and non-commissioned officers, and the reservoir for them was the Civil Service of Nigeria or unofficial volunteers.

In quality of fighting men Nigeria supplied soldiers who were second to none, and in numbers the Nigerian contingents were not far short of one-half of the total British forces employed. The strength of the Nigeria Regiment at the beginning of the campaign was a nominal 5,000. At the end it was 7,000. Special inducements were offered to discharged soldiers to re-enlist, and it was estimated that fully 70 per cent. of the discharged men were accepted for service in the first few months of the war. Five thousand were continuously on active service, either in or outside Nigeria, and those who were actually fighting in the Cameroons, according to the Governor-General's reports, averaged nearly 4,000 native rank and file, with 350 British officers. The total casualties in the fighting ranks were round about 1,000. The complement of the 18 little Nigerian vessels amounted to 40 British and 250 natives. Up to the end of 1917 the cost of the campaign to Nigeria, including £60,000 loss of revenue, more especially in respect of marine services, was given by Sir Frederick Lugard as just short of a million sterling.[1] A summary of the total effort of Nigeria in the great war will be given later in this section, but, if our survey is confined to the Cameroons campaign alone, it may well be claimed for Nigeria that, on the British side, she was the predominant partner in the enterprise.

This does not mean, in any sense, belittling of the effort of

[1] The Imperial Government paid the expenses of the Expeditionary Force in the Southern Cameroons, with the exception of the ordinary peace-time pay and allowances of the various colonial contingents up to peace strength and of any officials lent either for civil or military purposes. All such peace-time charges were paid by the respective colonies. The whole cost of the campaign in the Northern Cameroons, including General Cunliffe's force, was paid by Nigeria.

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the other British West African Colonies and Protectorates. One and all gave of their best and to their utmost. But, of necessity, the nearest British province to the war, the immediate neighbour of the Cameroons, which was at the same time immeasurably the greatest of the British West African dependencies in area, population, and resources, was by far the largest contributor—of necessity, but equally with the others of set patriotic purpose and abounding goodwill.

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CHAPTER III

NIGERIA, 1914–18

By the Editor

APART from fighting services, the record of Nigeria during the years of war is very remarkable. Though the south and north had been declared to be one as from the 1st of January 1914, an immense amount of work was still to come in order to co-ordinate and, as far as possible, unify laws, administration, public works, and finance. Upon this work the war supervened, but none the less it was untiringly carried forward. To some extent it was helped by the war, inasmuch as common danger made for community of feeling. It would have been otherwise had not British methods taken root and inspired confidence, for, in normal times, in this great territory, much of which had as yet hardly emerged from barbarism, no year had so far passed without some small rising or disturbance in one corner or another, and with the war came German intrigue to promote unrest. Early steps, however, were taken to deal with mischief of this kind, every resident of German nationality being deported in October 1914.

War legislation, over and above ordinances concerned with the Nigerian forces, or with finance, was of the familiar kind. It has been seen that the legislation of 1914 included an Aliens Restriction Ordinance and a Defence of Nigeria Ordinance. The latter was amended in 1915 and again in 1918, and an Immigration Restriction Ordinance was passed in 1917. Then there were various Trading with the Enemy Ordinances, laws concerned with the disposal of enemy property and the public custodian of such property, a Foreign Prisoners' Detention Ordinance, and a Customs Ordinance giving power to restrict exportation. Meanwhile, wholly apart from the demands made by the war upon the time of the legal advisers of the Government, the work of unifying laws and regulations made steady progress, involving a very large annual output of legislation.

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The first meeting of the Nigerian Council fell in war-time, on the last day of 1914. Designed, in Sir Frederick Lugard's words, 'to afford an opportunity for the expression of public opinion drawn from a wider circle than that of Lagos,' the Council was of very special usefulness during the war. Meeting at the end of each year, for one or more, but not more than three, days, and meeting before a public audience, it enabled the Governor-General to review the main features and events of the past year, to explain present policy and plans for the future, while European and native representatives, from south and north, were invited to speak their minds. At a critical time it was of much advantage that these occasions were provided for interchange of views and the furtherance of good understanding.

Prior to amalgamation, the revenue of Southern Nigeria had been overflowing for years past. The budget of Northern Nigeria, on the other hand, could not be balanced without an Imperial subsidy. It was arranged that this subsidy, reduced to £100,000 per annum, should be continued for five years from the 1st of April 1913, and then cease. Accordingly, it lasted through most of the war-time, ending on the 31st of March 1918. In spite of the scanty rainfall in the north and the consequent failure of crops for export, the trade of Nigeria in the first half of 1914 was steadily expanding. Then came inevitable dislocation caused by the war. German shipping disappeared and the German market was closed, prices of the staple exports fell, and both trade and revenue returns showed a decrease on 1913. Yet, when the year ended, the accumulated balances from former years still amounted to £1¼ millions. In the year 1915 there was a normal rainfall and a good season for crops. In the middle of the year trade revived, but it fell back again, and the trade statistics of the year showed a further and marked decrease in value, although there was a great rise both in the amount and in the value of one of the most promising articles of export, cocoa, as well as a slightly larger output of tin ore. The decreases were mainly under the heads of palm kernels, the greatest source of wealth in Southern Nigeria, and of ground-nuts, and hides and skins, products of the north. It may be said in general terms that fall in exports was mainly due to lack of shipping, which operated until it had become recognized that palm produce and ground-nuts were essential

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to the prosecution of the war. A fairly adequate amount of shipping space was then allotted to Nigeria and a control price was fixed. All through this year the Cameroons campaign was a disturbing factor, cost of living rose very greatly with the increased prices of imported goods, war expenses began to swell the expenditure side of the public account, and among liabilities due to the war the pensions vote grew, partly in consequence of the sinking of ships by the enemy. The loss of the *Falaba* in March 1915 was the first in a long list of similar disasters, which cost Nigeria the lives of valuable officers and weighted the Nigerian Treasury with pensions and gratuities for their wives and children. The Roll of Honour, published in a Special Nigeria Gazette in February 1919, of British officers and non-commissioned officers of the Nigeria Regiment, and British officials of the Nigerian Civil Service, who lost their lives from causes arising out of the war, showed that, out of a total of 195 who died, 100 were 'drowned by enemy action', including two women. The Nigerian Government made a special contribution to the Sailors' Fund in recognition of the debt which it owed, as a Government, to the courage of the merchant seamen. In spite of the war, the public works, which were actually in hand, were pressed on, including the Lagos harbour works and, very especially, the Eastern Railway. It was of vital importance to carry this line up to the coalfield, for, in the later years of the war, coal in any appreciable quantity could not be procured from outside, and had not access been given to the Udi coal supplies, traffic on the Lagos-Kano trunk line must have come to a standstill, resulting in financial and administrative paralysis and in complete inability to send Nigerian troops to East Africa. Hence surplus balances were expended on this work, and although at the end of the year they had, in consequence, fallen from £1¼ million to £524,000, the confidence felt in the future of Nigeria, together with Nigerian loyalty to the Empire, was illustrated in very practical fashion by a resolution unanimously passed by the Nigerian Council on the 29th of December, to the effect that Nigeria should take over from the Imperial Government £6 millions of the war debt, which meant in fact £13¼ millions spread over 36 years.

The year 1916, which began with the end of the Cameroons campaign and ended with the dispatch of the Nigerian brigade

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to East Africa, registered the beginning of returning prosperity. It was a year of somewhat heavy rains, and there were fairly good crops except of cotton, which suffered severely in October and November. Still there was a record export of cotton, and an immensely increased export of ground-nuts, of which France took one-third; and hides and skins, sent largely to America, palm kernels, and tin ore all showed an increase. The effect of the war was seen in the decrease of imported foodstuffs, and so far as such supplies were still imported they were brought from the United States, instead of the United Kingdom. It was seen too in the great increase of exports to France or French possessions and to the United States, the value in the former case being double that of 1915, in the case of the United States between two and three times as great. The total value of both imports and exports was appreciably higher than in 1915. The revenue returns were also slightly better than in the previous year, but the expenditure was also higher, and at the end of the year the surplus balance of £542,000 had disappeared and been replaced by a deficit of £124,000. But this was due to the fact that the cost of constructing the Eastern Railway had been paid for out of the accumulated balances, to the amount in all of £1¾ millions. On the 1st of September the line was formally declared to be open for 151 miles up to the Udi coalfields, and the result of wisely carrying on the work up to this point, in spite of depleting the Treasury at a most difficult time, was soon apparent in the growth of railway receipts and the increased output of coal. To meet the extra cost of working the Nigerian railways in war-time, owing to higher prices of coal and materials, goods traffic rates were, with some exceptions, subjected in March 1916 to a surtax of 10 per cent., which was further increased in August 1917 to 30 per cent., while an agreement made in April by the Government with the Elder Dempster Line, and the appointment of a representative committee to distribute the space allowed on the vessels for railway-borne produce, greatly helped both the profits of the railways and the export trade generally. As much courage was shown in continuing works of development during the war, so Sir Frederick Lugard was conspicuously brave in holding fast to the policy of killing the importation of trade spirits by import

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duties steadily and progressively raised to a prohibitive rate. The so-called trade spirits were of continental origin and had been chiefly imported in German vessels. Imported spirits, all told, had supplied round about one-third of the revenue before the war. When peace came the import and the revenue from it had both of them almost wholly disappeared, and most stringent liquor laws had been passed in 1917. Yet revenue was sorely needed, and October 1916 saw the imposition of substantial export duties upon cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels, similar duties being imposed in 1918 upon hides, skins, and ground-nuts. These duties, together with a surtax of 25 per cent. on imports (with a few exceptions), also imposed in 1916, and the surtax on railway freights already mentioned, constituted the very moderate total of war taxation. For the rest 1916, apart from the war, was a difficult year. Provision had to be made for the administration of the British sphere in the Cameroons. There was a riot in Lagos in connexion with the imposition of a water-rate, a disturbance in Yorubaland, and an outbreak among the cannibal tribes in the Benue region, in which the British district officer and 58 unarmed natives, who accompanied him, were massacred. But the loyalty of the northern Emirates remained firm and unmoved, in spite of the news which came in December of the Tuareg rising against the French. As the year went out the capital of the northern provinces was being transferred from Zungeru to Kaduna, intended to be eventually the main centre of the Nigerian Government, when at a later date it should have become the point at which the Eastern joined the Main Trunk Railway.

On the Gold Coast war-time prosperity, which had culminated in a record year in 1916, began to abate in 1917, and turned to acute depression in 1918. The reverse was the case in Nigeria, one main reason for the difference being that, while cocoa had almost entirely supplanted the palm industry on the Gold Coast, palm kernels and palm oil still headed the staples in Nigeria, and the longer the war went on the greater was the demand for oil products. In 1917 the value of both imports and exports was markedly greater; for exports, in spite of the growing shortage of ships, it was a record year. Palm kernels and palm oil, ground-nuts, tin ore, hides and skins, cocoa, all showed

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large increases in value. The export trade to the United States was worth between four and five times what it had been in 1915. Indeed, one of the main features of the effect of the war upon British West Africa was the immense development of trade with America. Yet the year, a very wet year, was not favourable for agriculture, and, in particular, the cotton crop was a complete failure. The revenue exceeded the receipts for 1916 by between £500,000 and £600,000; the expenditure side of the account was lightened by the fact that for the time being the whole cost of the Nigerian brigade in the East African campaign was being paid by the Imperial Government, and, when the year ended, the deficit in 1916 had been converted into a surplus of £148,000. It was a year of prosperity and—speaking generally—of internal peace, wholly unbroken in the loyal north.

The year 1918 bettered both the promise and the results of 1917. The value in money of the total trade in this last year of the war by far exceeded that of any previous year, and, in spite of scarcity and uncertainty of ships and abnormal cost of freights, a record quantity of oil products was exported, the United Kingdom taking what, before the war, had gone to Germany. The revenue for the year was larger than in pre-war times: it reached for the first time £4 millions and exceeded the estimate by some £650,000. On the 31st of December 1918 there were surplus assets to the amount of £700,000. No doubt there were arrears of outlay to be made good with the return of peace, but there was the patent fact that Nigeria ended the war with a trade and revenue greater than before the war. Abundance of such raw products as were in special demand during the war enriched its export trade, and at the same time the straitened conditions which the war produced made it necessary to practise self-dependence, to develop known resources and find out new, to rely more on home-grown foodstuffs, Nigerian coal, Nigerian timber, Nigerian lime for cement. The war proved to demonstration the immense possibilities of the territory if they had ever been doubted, and encouraged industries as well as products. 'The Nigeria of the near future will, I hope, be the premier Crown Colony, not merely in size, in population, in wealth, and in revenue, but also in an organization, not stereotyped but progressive, in which year by year

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the people themselves will take an increasing share.' These were words used in Sir Frederick Lugard's last address to the Nigerian Council, written at the end of October 1918, and read to the Council at the end of the year, after he had left the land to which he had given perhaps the best and most fruitful work of his strenuous life. The Armistice was celebrated by a public holiday on the 13th of November and another public holiday was kept on the 27th of December, which was constituted 'Our Day' on behalf of the Red Cross Funds.

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CHAPTER IV

NIGERIAN CONTRIBUTIONS AND GENERAL SUMMARY

By the Editor

Reference has been made to the consistently firm loyalty of the Moslem states of Northern Nigeria. Here the administration was carried on through the native rulers, advised by British Residents. A certain proportion of the revenue derived from taxation was assigned to the native administrations, with some 49 separate treasuries. Year by year the surplus funds steadily accumulated, and year by year during the war contributions were offered from them, voluntarily, towards the cost of the war. At the outset, in 1914, the sum of £38,000 was contributed, and by the end of 1916 over £98,000 had been given. A further contribution of over £51,000 was offered in 1917, but, by direction of the Secretary of State, was not accepted, lest the expenses of the war should unduly deplete funds raised from and intended for the native population. In 1918, a further contribution of about the same amount—over £51,000—was offered and accepted, but was subsequently refunded to the native treasuries. From the same source came gifts to the Red Cross Funds of £4,000 in 1917 and £5,000 in 1918; but it is interesting to note that the Sultan of Sokoto would not consent to a contribution from his treasury to the Red Cross, on the ground that such subscriptions ought to come out of private pockets, and, acting on this principle, he subscribed most generously himself. This high-minded and open-handed ruler, who died in 1915, was among the earliest of private subscribers to war charities. Shortly after the beginning of the war he gave £1,000 to the Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund. Money was very willingly given in West Africa for aeroplanes. In the earlier part of the war subscriptions from Southern Nigeria provided three aeroplanes, one of which, bearing the name Nigeria, specially distinguished itself. In 1917 the native administration of Benin, also in

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Southern Nigeria, the first to be formed in the south on the northern model, gave £1,000 for the same purpose. Among war charities there were various funds for the benefit of the Nigerian soldiers and their dependants of which the principal was the Nigerian Comforts Fund (£10,000), more especially connected with the campaign in East Africa. Over £8,500 were subscribed to the Prince of Wales's Fund, and much the same amount to King George's Fund for Sailors, including £1,500 from the Nigerian Government. It was the only charity to which the Nigerian Government, as such, contributed. Among other beneficiaries were the British Women's Hospital (Star and Garter) Medical Fund, Princess Mary's Fund, and the Lord Roberts Memorial Workshops. But by far the largest contributions were sent to the Red Cross, and by far the larger proportion of the Red Cross subscriptions were given in 1917 and 1918, after a special appeal had come out and 'Our Day' had been instituted. The total remittance to the Red Cross, on behalf of 1917, eventually exceeded £48,000, and Sir Frederick Lugard received wârm acknowledgement of the munificent help given by Nigeria. Out of a total of £149,000 given by private subscribers to War Funds and charities £101,000 were given to the Red Cross, in addition to the £9,000 which was subscribed by the native administrations in the Northern provinces. A small sum was also given to the French Red Cross.

The cost of the war to Nigeria to the 31st of December 1918 may be expressed as follows:

	£
1. Cameroons Campaign and defence of Nigeria (unprovided expenditure)	355,000 [1]
2. Men and material lent:	
West Africa	579,000
East Africa	110,000
War Office, Admiralty, &c. (provided expenditure)	16,000
3. Provision for pensions	101,000
4. Contributions towards cost of East African Campaign and West African Service Brigade	134,000
5. Loss of revenue from vessels, &c., lent to Cameroons Campaign	60,000
	1,355,000

In addition, Nigeria lost about £140,000 owing to enemy action at sea (loss of stores, compensation to officers for loss

[1] This total includes the £98,000 contributed by the Native Administrations in the Northern provinces, as mentioned above.

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of kit, compensation to dependants of officers who lost their lives, &c.).

The Government of Nigeria offered to undertake liability in respect of £6,000,000 of the Imperial War Debt, and the cost of providing the interest (and necessary sinking fund to extinguish the debt) was estimated at £13,250,000 spread over 36 years. About a year after the war, however, it was decided by the Nigerian Government and the Secretary of State that both Nigeria and the Empire as a whole would gain more by expending this money on the development of Nigeria. Consequently this contribution was not made.

Similarly, as has been told, advantage was not taken of offers by the native administrations in the Northern provinces to contribute to the Imperial Government from their revenues for 1917 and 1918 towards the cost of the war.

Such was the effort of Nigeria in terms of money. Turning to the fighting effort, it is not possible to give an estimate of the total number of men who served in the Cameroons, but it has been seen that, taking the campaign as a whole, Nigeria maintained on an average a force of 4,000 men in the field, supplemented by thousands of carriers, by camels, pack oxen, and donkeys from the Northern provinces, and by food supplies from the whole territory. To East Africa were sent in all some 6,500 fighting-men, of whom 285 were Europeans, supplemented again by a number of carriers. Then there were the two small flying columns which co-operated with the French in the Agadez area. In the actual fighting it may be claimed for Nigeria that she was by far the largest contributor on the British side to the conquest of the Cameroons, and that her brigade was a very important factor in the later stages and under the climatic conditions of the East African campaign.

The total native man-power effort of Nigeria in the war, including both the numbers as they stood at the beginning of the war and the numbers recruited during its course, has been estimated roundly at 17,000 combatant native ranks, 1,800 gun carriers, 35,000 transport carriers, 350 motor transport drivers, 800 inland water transport men, including 67 ratings of the Nigerian Marine, who were sent to Mesopotamia,[1] and under 500 railwaymen, postmen, policemen, and artisans.

[1] As to the numbers of West Africans who actually landed in Mesopotamia, see above, p. 18, note.

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These are figures for natives alone. Turning to Europeans, no record of the effort of Nigeria in the war and during the years of war would be accurate without emphasizing the strenuous and most willing work of the civil staff. In order to facilitate volunteering for active service and other war work it is not too much to say that each civil officer in Nigeria, or in the occupied territory of the Cameroons, did two men's work: the usual rest and change of climate was foregone and British civilians, very especially political officers and doctors, carried out abnormally heavy duties for abnormally prolonged times. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that Nigeria took the whole responsibility of administering the occupied area in the Cameroons, finding the men and the money, and that the raw products of Nigeria, especially the oil products, were a very great asset to Great Britain in the later years of the war.

So much for the active co-operation of Nigeria in the war outside her own borders. But, while the object of the present book is primarily to record to what extent, and in what ways, all parts of the Empire, great or small, shared in the war, it is also desired to point out to what extent and in what ways each part was affected by the war. The special interest which attaches to Nigeria in this latter regard is that here was the largest by far of the British dependencies in West Africa, still in the making, still taking form and shape, still being habituated to a new order and containing numberless elements and possibilities of unrest. The record therefore might well have been one of strained effort to hold ground already won, to maintain a position not yet consolidated, or at best, a record of passive waiting on events by uncertain native millions and of anxious expectancy by the armed forces of the dominant Power already on the spot, strengthened by any reinforcements that could possibly be spared from other quarters. In any case the record would have been confidently expected to be one of progress entirely suspended and of leeway to be made up after the war. The facts were otherwise, and otherwise in a very striking manner. The story, taken as a whole, is one not of difficult repression, nor of passive acquiescence, but of active and effective partnership. It is one not of enforced stagnation but of marked advance. There was of course leeway to be made up in various directions, when the war

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ended. How could it be otherwise, with an infested sea, restricted shipping, and men, money, material diverted to the war. But the longer the war continued the more Nigeria went forward, the twofold reason being, on the one hand, public confidence and security, on the other, great quantities and varied kinds of natural resources. The confidence was strongest and public peace most assured where the communities were best organized, either under direct British administration, or under native régime, and in the latter case, where the régime was a Moslem rule. The unfaltering attitude of the northern Sultans could not be accounted for by anything short of real attachment to the Empire. Combined with security and confidence were conditions under which much of what Nigeria was already producing was in abnormal demand in other countries, while what Nigeria was accustomed to import, to a very large extent, either could not be imported at all, or was imported from other lands than had sent the imports before the war. Thus the war in every way encouraged production, to meet demands from overseas and to supply the necessities at home; existing resources were further developed, new industries came into being, new avenues of trade were opened. If Nigeria suffered heavy losses through the war, she also gained, directly or indirectly, in proportion alike to her losses and to her admirable service to the Empire.

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CHAPTER V

RECRUITING IN NIGERIA AND OPERATIONS NEAR THE FRONTIER

Mainly supplied from Nigeria

THOUGH the Northern and Southern Nigeria units of the West African Frontier Force had been combined under a single command from the 1st of January 1914, when the two territories were combined, it was not until the Nigerian Brigade was on the eve of embarking for East Africa that a comprehensive law was passed finally completing the fusion. Then, in October 1916, 'an ordinance constituting the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force' amalgamated 'the Forces hitherto known as the Northern and Southern Regiments of the West African Frontier Force'. A minimum strength was fixed by the law, consisting of a commandant and head-quarters staff, two batteries of artillery, one battalion of mounted infantry, four battalions of infantry, and authority was given to add, when necessary, to the numbers of the batteries and battalions. This ordinance was supplemented by another, passed in June 1917, which constituted a reserve for the regiment. We have seen that the regiment, which at the beginning of the war was (nominally) 5,000 strong, at the end of the Cameroons campaign numbered 7,000. The new campaign in East Africa made a greater strength necessary. Not only were large reinforcements constantly required for East Africa, but Nigeria, whose garrison in normal times stood at 5,000, could not in abnormal times, when German agents were active, infecting the native population with poisonous rumours to the effect that the British were leaving the country, be committed to the charge of the police alone. Moreover, as will be told, detachments of the regiment were required for active service in French territory beyond the border.

Training for the Nigeria Regiment, while the campaign in the Cameroons was running its course, had proved a difficulty, and in order to train recruits on the spot and pass them on at

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once into the fighting-line, Sir Charles Dobell established a training centre at Duala. This came to an end when the campaign ended and Duala was handed over to the French. With the decision to send an expeditionary force to East Africa the difficulty became accentuated. At the date when the brigade left, over and above the minimum force which was considered necessary to keep order in Nigeria, there were about 1,000 recruits in training. It was clear that, while untrained men might be sent to Duala to be made ready for battle, they could not be sent so far afield as East Africa, and it was equally clear that the work of recruiting and training could not be undertaken by the small remaining garrison, which of necessity was kept in a state of the utmost mobility and constantly placed in evidence, as far as possible, in all parts of the great expanse of Nigerian territory. An appeal was accordingly made to the War Office to send out a nucleus of officers with previous experience of West Africa, its peoples and languages, to form a separate organization for recruiting and training work. The request was complied with, and as similar difficulties were being experienced elsewhere in West Africa, notably on the Gold Coast, Lieut.-Col. Haywood, D.S.O., who had served with so much distinction in the Cameroons, was appointed Assistant Director of Recruiting in West Africa and visited Nigeria on the 2nd of January 1917. Before his arrival every effort had been made on the spot to recruit and train the largest possible number of men from such native peoples as were considered to have the making of good soldiers; and subsequently, in addition to training centres at Zungeru, Lokoja, and Ibadan, Okigwi was selected as a training centre by way of experiment. It was south of the line below which no good fighting material had so far been found, and it was hoped to tap certain native races and tribes hitherto considered unsuitable for regular service. But after a trial of nearly nine months the experiment proved a complete failure, and at the end of September the training staff was transferred to Ibadan. During 1917 nearly 6,500 recruits passed through the training centres, and more than half were sent overseas during the year. A school of instruction was also established at Zungeru for European civilians, official and unofficial, who had had no previous military experience, and who were now trained as officers and non-commissioned officers to accompany the overseas drafts;

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and there was also a class for native non-commissioned officers. The net result was that 5,000 men were kept constantly in the field, together with a sufficient force to maintain order in Nigeria, and that in the last stages of the war the Nigeria Regiment counted approximately 10,000 men under arms.

The brigade had not long left for East Africa before a call came to those who had remained behind to give further proof of comradeship with the French and to take active service outside Nigeria. In the French Territoire du Niger, due north of Nigeria, the Tuareg tribesmen were in revolt and, in company with Senussi Sheikhs from northern Africa, invested, in December 1916, the important French post at Agadez, in the desert, 300 miles north of the Nigerian frontier. An aggressive leader, of the name of Kaossen, commanded the insurgents and their allies and among them were men carrying weapons of Italian workmanship, proving that they had come from as far afield as Tripolitan territory. They were heartened by full-blooded reports that Germans and Turks had taken Kano, but the lie was given to these rumours in effective fashion, when two small mobile columns from the Nigeria Regiment, having their bases at Katsena and Sokoto respectively, moved in January into French territory and operated till the end of May in concert with the French forces, which were holding or moving to relieve Agadez. French reinforcements, at the same time, were brought up through Nigerian territory and given all possible facilities, so that no doubt could be left in native minds as to France and Great Britain having made common cause or as to their ability to uphold it. The two British columns numbered in all 37 British officers and non-commissioned officers and 425 native rank and file, in addition to medical staff and gun and maxim carriers. Reserves were kept in readiness at various centres, and in order to make good the gaps in the garrison thus caused, four companies of the West African Regiment were sent down from Sierra Leone. They were hardly required. Although the rising was ostensibly a Moslem movement, the Sultan of Sokoto and others of the northern Emirs were eager to raise native levies to fight for the Allies, and so sure was Sir Frederick Lugard of their loyalty that for a time he was able to denude Kano of all troops and entrust its safe keeping to the civil police. The columns had little or no actual fighting and were not

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strong enough to move far into the interior, but they relieved the pressure on the French and their presence in the field had a moral effect beyond their actual numbers. The French relieved Agadez on the 3rd of March, quelled the whole rebellion by August, and in graceful terms amply acknowledged the opportune help which had been forthcoming to them from Nigeria.

The campaign in the Cameroons and East Africa had proved the merit of the West African Frontier Force, very especially of the Gold Coast and Nigerian contingents, and in the course of 1918—the Nigerians having come back from East Africa in March of that year—it was decided to embody two West African brigades for foreign service, as distinct from the garrison troops of the force. One was to be raised in Nigeria, the other on the Gold Coast, and a notice to that effect appeared on the 1st of June. 'The 1st (Nigerian) West African Frontier Force Service Brigade,' as it was officially styled, comprised four infantry battalions, a pioneer company, and Stokes gun and machine-gun detachments. An outbreak of influenza caused delay, meanwhile the concluding phases of the war sped on with bewildering rapidity, and the Nigerians lost their chance of further foreign service. In a farewell order on the 16th of December, General Cunliffe stated that the brigade had been destined for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to serve under Allenby in Palestine.

It must always be borne in mind that throughout the war, from first to last, however great was the emergency, the Nigerian ranks were filled wholly by voluntary recruits. No compulsion was used; to the very end it was a matter of free will.

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CHAPTER VI

THE NIGERIAN BRIGADE IN EAST AFRICA [1]

Mainly by Mr. E. S. Stobart

As the fighting in the Cameroons neared the end, the Imperial Government began to look for reinforcements for East Africa from the western side of the continent. The earliest response came from the Gold Coast, and the fine Gold Coast battalion embarked for East Africa early in July 1916, only three months after it had returned from the Cameroons. A somewhat longer interval was needed to repatriate the Nigerians, in many cases to far distant homes, to rest the men and reorganize the regiment, but, upon Brig.-Gen. Cunliffe's return from leave in England in August 1916, volunteers were called for to serve in East Africa. The call was promptly answered, especially in the Northern provinces, and an expeditionary force was organized, a small Nigerian brigade, consisting entirely of voluntary combatants. It comprised four special service infantry battalions and a battery of artillery, recruited and brought up to strength from the training centres in Nigeria. They took first reinforcements with them and numbered 195 British officers and non-commissioned officers, and 3,253 native ranks, together with some 800 machine-gun carriers. The British officers were largely drawn from the civil staff of Nigeria. The commanders of the infantry battalions were Lieut.-Cols. Feneran, West, Archer, and Sargent, and Lieutenant Wise, R.A., commanded the battery. The whole force was under the command of General Cunliffe, now C.M.G. and C.B. in recognition of his services in the Cameroons. His senior staff officer was Lieut.-Col. Mann, D.S.O. The first of the four transports, sent by the Admiralty, reached Lagos on the 8th of November; the first left on the 15th, and the last on the 27th of that month. The ships rounded the Cape, called

[1] This summary has been condensed from a most interesting and valuable account of the Nigerians in East Africa, supplied for the purposes of this book by Mr. E. S. Stobart.

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for two days at Durban, and on the 10th of December the leading transport entered the harbour of Dar es Salaam.

The war had now run half its course. The reverses which marked the first stages of the East African campaign had been retrieved. The Germans had been ousted from all the country north of the trunk railway from Dar es Salaam to Lake Tanganyika, and from the railway itself, and they were being pressed south on to the line of the Rufiji river. The whole coast-line was in British hands. General Smuts, who had arrived at Mombasa to take over the chief command on the 19th of February 1916, the day after the capitulation of Mora ended the Cameroons campaign, was drawing near to the close of his term, for he left for England on the 20th of January 1917, and the white troops in East Africa were being, as far as possible, replaced by coloured African soldiers, among them the Nigerian Brigade. The main front was on the southern edge of the monsoon region, the north-eastern area of the territory, in which, in the interval between the lesser rainy season in November and the main rainy season beginning in March, the months December to February inclusive are normally the hottest and driest months of the year; but in 1916 December, in which the rainy season begins farther south, brought heavy rains here also. After long preparation, a new advance was imminent, for which the services of the Nigerians were urgently required, and accordingly they were sent up country immediately on arrival, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battalions being entrained before they had time to retrieve their kits from the holds of the ships, the 3rd Battalion, the battery, and the head-quarters staff following after an interval of three days.

The brigade left the train at Mikese, a station on the main railway, some 110 miles inland from Dar es Salaam. Seventy to eighty miles south of this point, only to be reached by a road congested with men and transport, and cut up by heavy guns and motors, the head-quarters were, on the 22nd of December, fixed at Dunthumi, facing the enemy on the line of the Mgeta river, which flows, deep and sluggish, through lowland swamps at the foot of the Uluguru hills. The Nigerians were to concentrate at Tulo, 12 to 13 miles short of Dunthumi, and here the three leading battalions arrived on Christmas Eve, the 3rd Battalion and the battery being still behind.

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General Smuts had planned an enveloping movement on a wide scale, to be carried out while the enemy was held in his position by a frontal attack, not hardly pressed. The operations had been delayed by rains, and the delay enabled the Nigerians to come up in time to take part in them. The frontal movement was in General Cunliffe's charge and entrusted to the 1st and 4th Nigerians, while the 2nd Battalion was attached to a separate column which, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Lyall of the Indian Army, was to make a detour to the east and threaten the right flank of the German retreat. In the last days of the year the 4th Battalion took over the advanced trenches, separated from the enemy, who held both banks of the Mgeta, by two to three miles of swamp and bush. On New Year's Day, 1917, heavy artillery opened fire behind the trenches and the Germans were pushed across the river, three companies of the 4th Battalion following them across. A further advance was made on the next day. Meanwhile, the 2nd Nigerians in the flanking column came in for some sharp fighting and a party under Captain Gardner captured a German howitzer. By the end of the first four days of January the whole line of the Mgeta had been cleared, and the 1st and 4th Battalions, with the battery which had come up on the 30th of December, were withdrawn to Dunthumi, where the 3rd Battalion had now arrived, the 2nd Nigerians still remaining with the detached column. In these initial operations the Nigerian casualties numbered 71.

While the fighting on the Mgeta river was taking place, Beves's South African Brigade, in accordance with General Smuts's plan, worked far round the left flank of the German line and by hard marching seized, on the 3rd of January, a crossing of the Rufiji river, a short distance below its confluence with the Ruaha, some 70 miles south of Dunthumi. It was the end of the dry season, the river was low, about 300 yards in breadth, the troops were taken across on Berthon boats at Kipenio, a few miles south of Mkalinzo, and were entrenched on the southern bank. On the 10th of January the 1st and 3rd Nigerians and the battery, leaving the 4th Battalion in reserve at Dunthumi, marched for the crossing and, after suffering much from heat and want of water, joined Beves on the evening of the 15th. Farther down the river, 8 to 9 miles north-east of Mkalinzo, the enemy forces, which had

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retreated from the Mgeta, had crossed by a bridge to the southern bank of the Rufiji at Kibambawe, having been closely followed up by General Sheppard's East African Brigade, in which Colonel Lyall's detachment, including the 2nd Nigerians, became incorporated. The crossing was commanded by the Germans and some considerable time elapsed before more than a small fraction of Sheppard's men could be passed over to the southern bank. On the evening of the 17th, the Nigerians who had joined Beves moved on south from Mkalinzo on the heels of the retreating Germans. On the morning of the next day the 1st Nigerians had some fighting before a position taken up by the enemy on the farther bank of a small stream, near Mkindu, was outflanked and occupied. At Mkindu, on the 19th, the 2nd Nigerians came up from Sheppard's force, bringing with them the Cape Corps and the Kashmiri battery. On the night of the 19th, Colonel Feneran took the 1st Nigerians and a section of the Nigerian battery by a wide detour through the bush behind the enemy's position at Kipongo, some distance south of Mkindu, and, when daylight came, he was well in their rear, to the south of Kipongo and close to the road along which was the line of retreat. Meanwhile, at dawn on the 20th, Colonel Morris, who commanded the Cape Corps, was ordered by General Cunliffe to make a frontal attack along the road to Kipongo, with that corps, the Kashmiri battery, and the 2nd Nigerians. His attack made little progress until Feneran, relinquishing his attempt to block the line of retreat, threatened the left flank of the Germans, with the result that in the course of the afternoon the position was taken with comparatively little loss. The 1st Nigerians were then left to hold Kipongo and the rest of the force returned to Mkindu. On the 22nd the 4th Nigerians, who had been left behind at Dunthumi, came up and now, for the first time since landing, the whole brigade was concentrated as a single unit.

Ousted from Kipongo, the Germans fell back to a position at Ngwembe, about 10 miles farther south along the main road to Maba. On the 24th Colonel Archer started to attack them, with the 3rd Nigerian Battalion, one company of the 4th, and a section of the battery. About 7 miles out from Kipongo they were found in strength, and two companies of the 3rd Nigerians under Major Gardner were detached to turn

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their right flank. An initial success was followed by a strong counter-attack. The flanking force was in turn outflanked. Fighting in the thick bush, they lost touch with the main body and suffered heavily. The commanding officer was wounded, the two company commanders were killed, and three machine guns were lost. Meanwhile the main column was attacked on both flanks and compelled to draw back, the carriers were stampeded, and a very critical position was only retrieved by the timely arrival of two companies of the 4th Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. Sargent, sent up in support, who attacked with the bayonet and enabled Archer's force to be withdrawn. Over 100 casualties were the result of this engagement, including 10 British officers, of whom five were killed. Want of supplies precluded a further advance, and the rainy season having set in put an effectual stop to fighting in this district.

For south of the Rufiji, where the brigade was operating, the rains had now begun. It was, in General Hoskins's words, the wettest season known in East Africa for many years and 'the valley of the Rufiji, and its various tributaries, became a vast lake'. Motors were useless, animals died, human carriers, to wade through the water, were scarce, rations ran short, malaria was rife. The brigade, as a whole, remained stationary at Mkindu and Kipongo till the end of the first week in February, when two companies of the 3rd Nigerians relieved malaria-stricken South Africans at the Rufiji crossing. The Nigerian Brigade at this time also suffered badly from sickness and want of sufficient food, the hospital returns showing no less than 28 officers and 500 men unfit for duty. Later in February the 2nd Nigerians, now commanded by Lieut.-Col. Uniacke, and a section of the battery, co-operated with the Kibambawe force lower down the river in some indecisive operations; and, in the middle of March, the brigade took over the patrol of 50 miles of the southern bank, as being better able to stand the climate than South African and Indian troops. In the middle and latter part of April, as the question of supplies became still more serious, the battery and the 4th Nigerians were withdrawn altogether to the Central Railway at Morogoro, and the 1st Nigerians followed shortly afterwards, both battalions having suffered severely from sickness and short rations. At the beginning of June the brigade head-quarters were also moved to Morogoro, while the 2nd and 3rd Nigerians

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remained on the Rufiji, under the command of Colonel Uniacke. Before this date the whole south bank of the river had been cleared of the enemy.

In the latter part of May the 4th Nigerians were moved up the railway to the neighbourhood of Tabora, and, combining with a Belgian battalion, started on the 28th, under the command of Colonel Sargent, to hunt a strong enemy force, which had broken back to the north. After pursuit for some 200 miles, on the 7th of June, the column had a sharp fight with the German rearguard, and relieved a small post which had been hard beset, but the main body was not overtaken and in the middle of July the battalion returned to Morogoro.

Reinforcements had by this time come in from Nigeria, the Gambia Company had arrived and been attached to the brigade, and Nigeria and Sierra Leone had sent a large number of carriers. The reinforcements were badly needed. Marching, fighting, and above all sickness, had taken heavy toll of the brigade, especially of the two battalions which remained in the Rufiji area throughout the time of heavy rains. With the advent of the dry season and the incoming of the drafts from overseas, the brigade approximately regained its original strength. In July the troops on the Rufiji made a further southern advance and had some appreciable fighting. At the end of the month the 2nd Nigerians were ordered to Morogoro, and only the 3rd Nigerians were left, under Lieut.-Col. Badham, to keep the line of the river. With this exception the whole brigade, having concentrated at Morogoro, was placed under orders to return to Dar es Salaam to be embarked for Kilwa lower down the coast. They reached Kilwa at the end of the first week of September, and on the 17th of September joined the head-quarters of the Kilwa force at Msindyi, 80 miles inland from Kilwa. The brigade was comprised of Head-quarters, Battery, 1st, 2nd, and 4th Nigerians, Gambia Company, pioneer section, Stokes gun section, signal section, field ambulance, supply and ammunition column.

The advance began on the next day. The country, in which for the past six weeks there had been hard fighting, was dry, sandy, and thinly populated, with patches of almost impassable scrub. The Germans had swept it clear of food supplies, water was scarce, the enemy force in front was commanded by von Lettow-Vorbeck himself and represented the main strength

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which still remained to be broken. To the Nigerian Brigade was assigned the task of outflanking the Germans on their left, and on the 19th an advance of 20 miles was registered to a point where there was a sufficient water-supply. On the 21st a further advance was made, converging in a south-easterly direction upon the main route by which the enemy was now known to be retreating. Early in the morning of the 22nd the leading portion of the column, which consisted of Head-quarters, 1st and 2nd Nigerians, and signal section, under General Cunliffe's personal command, reached a native village, Beho Chini, on the road or track which led from Mawerenye on the north-east to Nahungu on the south-west. A German picket was driven out, entrenchments were at once begun, and patrols, sent out on the east and to the south-west, ascertained that the Germans had not yet slipped past. Unfortunately the field telegraph line had been cut on the previous night and the column was out of touch with the main force which was pressing the Germans back upon them. Moreover, the 4th Nigerians, the Gambia Company, and the battery with the supply and ammunition columns, who had been left behind for want of carriers, had not yet come up. In order to ascertain the numbers of the enemy coming down from the north-east on the road from Mawerenye, a strong reconnaissance, consisting of two companies of the 1st Nigerians, was sent out in this direction. Almost immediately they became heavily engaged and nearly at the same time an attack was made upon the main force not yet securely dug in. The two companies were surrounded but fought their way back with heavy casualties, the perimeter in the village was assailed at first from north and east, and, as the day wore on, from all sides. Just before sundown, the German machine guns being now within 100 yards range, a desperate effort was made to break the ring but was repulsed by a counter-attack with the bayonet, made by a company of the 2nd Nigerians. There was then a lull, the trenches were deepened, the wounded brought under cover, and night came on. In the darkness attacks began again, but they had lost their sting, and at midnight died away. When morning came it was found that the German force, estimated at 1,000 rifles, with 100 to 150 Europeans, and 20 to 25 machine guns, had passed on in small parties to Nahungu, leaving on the ground a large number of dead and

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some stores and ammunition. The Nigerian casualties, exclusive of carriers, numbered about 140, including 4 British killed. A memorable stand had been made, which called forth a special message of commendation from the Commander-in-Chief.

It was not possible at once to follow up the German retreat. Ammunition had run short, there were wounded to be cared for, and the fighting-men needed a day's rest. The 23rd passed without incident. On the morning of the 24th touch was regained with the main force and the wounded were sent to Mawerenye, now occupied by the Gold Coast Regiment A move forward was then again made, and in the evening the rest of the brigade came up. The objective was now Nahungu on the Mbemkuru river, and the Nigerians, reinforced by a battalion of the King's African Rifles and a company of the 127th Baluchis, formed one of a series of parallel columns directed on that point. There was some resistance, but on the 28th the whole of the Kilwa force was concentrated at Nahungu, the Kilwa area had been cleared, and the enemy driven south of the Mbemkuru. The scene of fighting now became the district whose outlet to the sea was the port of Lindi.

Columns had already been operating from Lindi as a base, and with them at this date were the 3rd Nigerians, who had been left on the Rufiji, when the rest of the brigade was moved round to Kilwa. The battalion had been at length, on the 3rd of September, moved out of the Rufiji lowlands to Morogoro. There they were refitted and reinforced by a draft from Nigeria. They left almost immediately for Dar es Salaam, were embarked for Lindi, landed there on the 20th of September, were sent up country the next day, and on the 28th went into action. On the 30th they were very heavily engaged on the right of the line, holding their ground against repeated attacks ; they had 66 casualties and of 22 officers who landed at Lindi there were now only 9 remaining. The Lindi force was separated from the troops on the Mbemkuru by some 80 miles of almost waterless country, denuded of human beings and of food supplies, a hilly region where motor transport was impracticable. The Nigerian Brigade, now commanded by Lieut.-Col. Mann, owing to the illness of General Cunliffe, was again detailed to make a flanking movement and, traversing

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this wilderness, to strike the left of the enemy, while the Lindi columns pressed him from the east, and the remainder of the Kilwa force held the line of the Mbemkuru, to prevent any break back to the north. The brigade comprised head-quarters, battery, the three infantry battalions, and the Gambia Company, the Stokes mortar section, pioneer, wireless and signal sections, field ambulance, supply and ammunition column. Eight days' rations had to be carried, donkeys supplemented human carriers and, while facilitating the transport, added to the demand for water. Guided by an officer who knew the country, Major Pretorius, the long unwieldy column started on the 4th of October. From the first, want of water made itself felt, and want of roads. The only road was a native bush track, the march was for the most part in single file, and miles separated the head of the column from the rearguard. The heat was intense and, as men fell out day by day in growing numbers, the long line became longer and more vulnerable. Ordered by aeroplane on the 9th to gain with all possible speed the rear of the enemy forces at Mahiwa on the main Lindi–Masasi road, by ceaseless marching the column reached the Nyengedi river on the 12th. The donkeys had by this time been dispensed with and sent to the coast with such stores and ammunition as could no longer be carried. The orders were to press on at all cost, the baggage and over 350 sick were sent back, and on the 13th the column struck straight across the left flank of the enemy to gain his food store and rallying centre at Mahiwa. The three battalions now hardly numbered 1,000 rifles. The main German force was estimated approximately at 2,000 Askari, with between 300 and 400 Europeans and several guns, and in addition von Lettow himself was in the neighbourhood with a striking force of some 600 picked men.

Marching night and day, uphill and down, in the hottest weather, after crossing the Nyangao river, at nightfall on the 14th the main body reached the mission station at Namupa, where a party of German European convalescents was captured, together with a small store of food. The supply and ammunition column was far behind, but the brigade was timed to reach Mahiwa at dawn and in the darkness they moved on again. A wrong track was taken, causing delay; when the mistake had been rectified, at midnight there was a short rest for the tired unfed men and then the advance was

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resumed. In accordance with a wireless order, the 1st Nigerians, less one company left to act as escort to the ammunition column now arrived at Namupa, and the Gambia Company, with two out of the four guns of the battery, were detailed to move on Nyangao and block a road to the east of Mahiwa by which the Germans might retreat. Only the 2nd and 4th Battalions, with head-quarters, the other two guns, and the Stokes mortar section were left to attack and occupy Mahiwa. They went forward in early morning, were opposed from the first, more strongly as the day wore on. At 4 in the afternoon, when within 1½ miles of Mahiwa, a sharp effort was made to push through and a company of the 4th Nigerians was detached to make an outflanking movement simultaneously with the main attack. The company was heavily counter-attacked, suffered over 50 casualties before it could be withdrawn, and the whole force had to dig in for the night in the face of the enemy. During the night news came that the 1st Nigerians had also been held up and they were ordered back to Namupa to bring up the supplies and ammunition to the main body. Morning came on the 16th, the supplies had not arrived, the field telephone connecting with Namupa had been cut, and the two battalions were surrounded, commanded by German guns and machine guns. All day long they beat off attacks, and meanwhile the 1st Nigerians and the Gambia Company, who were coming up from Namupa with the ammunition and supplies, were intercepted, very severely handled and obliged to return to Namupa. Day dawned on the 17th and the position before Mahiwa was very serious. The Nigerians were completely isolated. Since the 14th the men had had no food but what they carried with them, the only available water was covered by German machine guns, ammunition was running out, retreat, if possible at all, meant leaving the wounded behind. But now heavy firing was heard from the east, from the direction of the Lindi column; it grew in intensity through the day and, when night came on again, a patrol from the beleaguered force made their way through the enemy circle and came into touch with the 1st Nigerians, who had at length reached Nyangao from Namupa. It was decided to retreat on Nyangao at all costs. On the morning of the 18th the retreat began, and now the long severed 3rd Nigerians, detached from the Lindi column to join hands with their

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comrades, appeared on the scene, and, with much fighting, the withdrawal was successfully effected.

It turned out that on the 17th the 3rd Nigerians had been ordered to Namupa to bring up the 1st Nigerians with the supplies and wounded to Nyangao. Having accomplished this task by nightfall on the 17th, the battalion struck for Mahiwa, bivouacked on the road during the night of the 17th, and moving forward in the morning fought all day in covering the withdrawal of the 2nd and 4th Battalions. The total casualties in the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Battalions during these critical days, the most critical for the brigade in the whole campaign, amounted to 149 killed, 14 of whom were British officers and non-commissioned officers, and 418 wounded, 567 casualties in all.

On the 19th of October, General Cunliffe, now returned to duty, took command of the whole Lindi force, Colonel Mann remaining in charge of the Nigerian Brigade. There were some days of rest and preparation and a new draft was incorporated in the much depleted brigade. Then, on the 6th of November, the Nigerians, less the 1st Battalion temporarily attached to another column, moved off from Nyangao to outflank the Mahiwa position from the north, while the rest of the Lindi forces attacked from the east and south-east. Making their way slowly through the bush, towards the end of the day the brigade struck the main road and came into touch with the troops on their left. Under the united pressure the enemy were now retiring from Mahiwa, the retreat was closely followed up on the 7th, and on the 8th the leading Nigerian battalion, the 3rd, with the 4th in support, pressing the Germans down the main road, encountered them in strength and a heavy fight ensued. All the reserves were called up to meet a counter-attack and it was not until support from the neighbouring column was given in the form of a company of the 1st Nigerians and, on the flank of the enemy, the Cape Corps, that the Germans at length gave way and evacuated Mahiwa. In this fighting the Nigerian killed and wounded amounted to 130, principally among the 3rd Nigerians.

The Germans fell back and, threatened by a column from the Kilwa force which had come round in their rear, retreated on to the Makonde plateau, a last resting-place in their own territory before the Ruvuma river was reached. At Ndanda,

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at the foot of the plateau, the Kilwa columns and the Lindi forces joined hands. The plateau rises into a flat waterless stretch of bush, some 25 miles in breadth, descending on the southern side into the valley of the Ruvuma. In the foot-hills on the western side is Chiwata, a large German hospital centre, where British prisoners were known to be interned. On this point, on the 14th of November, the 1st and 4th Nigerians, with a section of the battery, led the brigade, skirting the plateau, and early on the 15th Chiwata was occupied, a number of prisoners were taken, and 67 British prisoners were recovered. The pursuit went forward without intermission, on the 18th the German camp at Luchemi was entered, large captures were made, more British officers were retrieved, including two captured at the Ngwembe fight, and the Germans were now in full flight for Portuguese territory on the other side of the Ruvuma. But they had taken toll of their pursuers. In the six weeks ended the 11th of November, the Nigerian Brigade, out of an effective strength of 170 Europeans and 2,246 rank and file, had suffered in casualties 75 Europeans and 800 rank and file. On the 20th of November the brigade was concentrated at Mwiti, on the 26th it reached Bangala, where Colonel Tafel's force, trying to join von Lettow, had been forced to surrender. Early in December, in abnormal heat, short of rations and water, and with sickness rife among officers and men, the brigade head-quarters were established on the Ruvuma over against Ngomano, and until the rains came and the river was in flood, Nigerians patrolled the neighbouring districts of Portuguese East Africa. At the end of the year they were withdrawn to the northern side, in the middle of January 1918 they were ordered for home, leaving the carriers to remain behind. In the middle of February they embarked at Lindi, and in March they were welcomed back at Lagos.

In all 285 British officers and non-commissioned officers served with the brigade in East Africa, of whom 37 were killed or died of wounds or sickness, 6,216 native rank and file, of whom 589 were killed or died, and much the same number of carriers; 166 honours of various kinds were awarded to members of the brigade for service in the campaign, and to the ' marked resource and ability ' of General Cunliffe, Sir J. L. Van Deventer bore testimony in his dispatch of the 21st of January, 1918.

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PART II

EAST AFRICA

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SECTION I

THE WAR IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA

By Major K. N. Colvile, M.A.

THE war in East Africa possesses several features of special interest.

In the first place, alone of all the so-called 'side-shows' it lasted from the beginning to the Armistice. Secondly, it was peculiarly an Imperial war, for though Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders took no part in it, the continent of Africa was represented by troops of all arms from the Union, by Rhodesians, Nigerians, the Gold Coast Regiment and the Gambia Company, as well as by the King's African Rifles and the local European forces; India was represented by many units from almost all her fighting races and even by European volunteers; America by the West India Regiment and the British West Indies Regiment; and the Mother Country by a Regular and a New Army battalion and by artillery. Thirdly, it was waged by mobile forces in a large country and has special attractions for the student of strategy.

It must be followed on the map to be understood at all, and the geography of the country and its climate must be continually borne in mind.

The Germans began to gain a foothold in East Africa in 1884, the memorable year in which they also planted themselves in South-West Africa, in the Cameroons, and in Togoland. The first Anglo-German Agreement relative to East Africa was signed in the autumn of 1886. The respective spheres of the two Powers in East Africa were definitely settled by the famous Heligoland Agreement of July 1, 1890, and supplementary Protocols and Agreements, running on to 1910, gradually delimited the frontiers. In 1910 the boundary line between German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, north of Lake Tanganyika, was settled. The southern boundary of the Protectorate, in the main the Ruvuma river, had already been determined by Agreements with Portugal of December 1886

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and September 1894. When the war began, German East Africa abutted on no less than four British Protectorates, British East Africa, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, while off the German coast, immediately north of Dar es Salaam, the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were in British keeping. At the outset of the war the Belgians were the only other European enemy on the German borders, but at a later date, when the Portuguese also had joined the Allies, German East Africa had enemies on all sides.

It was the largest oversea possession of Germany, and by far the most important. Its area was 384,000 square miles, not far short of twice the size of Germany, larger than British East Africa and Uganda combined. It had a native population of nearer eight than seven millions, 3½ millions of whom were to be found in the far north-west, in the populous states of Urundi and Ruanda. The white population was estimated by Professor Moritz Bonn, in January 1914, at 4,866, including over 900 women and over 700 children. Another estimate gave a total of 5,336, of whom 4,107 were Germans. Among the non-German Europeans was a small number of South African Dutchmen. The Protectorate had a coast-line of 470 miles, not deficient in harbours. Perhaps the best natural harbour is Kilwa Kisiwani, 15 miles south of the modern Kilwa, but the most developed port at the time of the war was Dar es Salaam, which was constituted the capital. On its inland side the Protectorate included the northern half of the eastern side of Lake Nyasa, together with the north end of the lake, the whole eastern side of Lake Tanganyika, with the exception of a tiny corner in the extreme south, and all sides of the southern half of Lake Victoria. Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyasa are, in the order given, the three largest lakes in Africa. All of them came within the scope of the German Protectorate. It was the centremost European dependency in Africa, extraordinarily well placed for overmastering Central Africa and especially the Belgian Congo. This the Germans fully appreciated, and early in 1914 they had completed a main trunk central railway from the sea at Dar es Salaam for 787 miles to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. The line followed roughly the old trade route, which ran from Ujiji on the lake to Bagamoyo on the coast, over against Zanzibar. Kigoma is just north of Ujiji and Dar es Salaam is slightly to the south of Bagamoyo. Both

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the trade route and the railway ran through Tabora, which, with 40,000 inhabitants, was in 1914 the most populous town in the Protectorate,[1] Dar es Salaam coming next with 25,000. There was a high power wireless station at Tabora and stations at three other points, including Dar es Salaam. The only other railway in the Protectorate, with the exception of purely local light lines, was the Northern Railway, running north-west from the port of Tanga for 220 miles through the Usambara highlands to Moshi, which was reached in 1912, at the foot of Kilimanjaro. Here it was close to the frontier of British East Africa, and in the course of the war it was linked up to the Voi-Taveta branch of the Uganda railway.

Within the northern boundary of German East Africa was the highest African mountain, Kilimanjaro, rising to over 19,000 feet. It is a land of considerable rivers, though the rivers are not of much value for navigation. The largest river basin is that of the Rufiji, with its feeder the Ruaha, comprising about a quarter of the whole territory. Its delta breaks the coast-line between Dar es Salaam and Kilwa. North of Dar es Salaam the chief river is the Pangani. The face of the country is endlessly diversified. The main division is between the lowlands of the coast and of the Rufiji basin and the East African plateau, the lowlands widening out into the interior from north to south. But throughout the territory are more or less isolated plateaux and mountain groups, and well-watered areas alternate with desert steppes and regions of almost waterless bush. The climate varies in the same way and the rainfall. For the tropics the rains are not excessive, droughts are common, and the rainy seasons in the different regions are not uniform. There are some comparatively healthy areas on the mountain slopes, but, taken as a whole, the land is unhealthy for both man and beast. Malaria, sleeping sickness carried by the tsetse fly, and fevers prevail. There are abundant natural resources of all kinds, plantation products, notably rubber and sisal hemp, cattle raising, and minerals, including gold and mica. Up to the date of the war the chief plantation areas were the Pare-Usambara mountain region in the north-east, along the central railway, and in the Lindi district in the south.

The Protectorate was not self-supporting, though trade

[1] A later estimate gives Tabora a smaller population, 25,000.

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was being steadily developed. Its strategic position constituted its chief value to the Germans, who contemplated an east and west dominion in Central Africa, cutting the British line from south to north. For the rest the German outlook was that of a plantation colony. 'East Africa', said Professor Bonn, 'is going to be a mixed colony like Natal and Rhodesia.' This involved, under the methods which were adopted by the Germans, forced labour and taxation heavy enough to compel the natives to work in order to pay the taxes. The native soldiers alone were attached to them and followed von Lettow-Vorbeck with singular fidelity. At the outset of the war the German armed forces in the East Africa Protectorate were given in round numbers as 250 Germans and 2,500 natives. But there were about 3,000 Germans of military age in the territory, the opening of the railway had brought a number of visitors to Dar es Salaam, when the *Königsberg* was run ashore her men and guns were available for fighting, and in addition to raw recruits there was a police force of 2,200 men trained to arms and some 3,000 time-expired soldiers were still living in the country. A German account makes the highest total of the forces on the German side during the war 3,300 whites and 15,000 natives, who had fallen when the Armistice came to 155 and 1,100. Other estimates have placed the numbers of the native ranks, at flood tide, as high as from 20,000 to 30,000, and the exceptionally strong personality of the German leader, together with initial successes, may well have enlisted for a time these additional thousands,[1] but the figures may be meant to include gun-carriers and partially trained porters. Extent of area, climate, internal lines of communication, habitual readiness for war and trained resourcefulness were on the German side, and their general von Lettow-Vorbeck, who had come out to the colony in January 1914,[2] was, for the place and time, a man in capacity and resolution of the very first rank.

On the other hand the British military forces were at their lowest ebb. A battalion of the King's African Rifles had

[1] Von Lettow-Vorbeck writes of 'a very efficient population of eight millions suitable for military service' (*My Reminiscences of East Africa*, English Translation, p. 19).

[2] Von Lettow-Vorbeck had had experience of bush warfare in the Herero and Hottentot rebellion in South-West Africa in 1904–6. He also admits to having specially studied Boer methods, and he had two Boers on his staff.

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recently been disbanded, to the joy of the German recruiting sergeants, and the bulk of the remainder was occupied on the Somali border. Further, British East Africa possesses a particularly vulnerable nerve in the Uganda railway, which runs roughly parallel with the frontier and in part of its length only 50 to 100 miles from it. Against these disadvantages Britain had one all important advantage—control of the sea.

The war in East Africa falls into three phases, more or less sharply distinguished. The first saw the British generally on the defensive and only taking the offensive as part of their defensive strategy. This lasted till the arrival of General Smuts in the beginning of 1916. The second saw General Smuts's brilliant campaign in 1916 and, during 1917, under Generals Hoskins and Van Deventer, the final sweeping of the Germans from their own territory. The third phase was concerned with the rather desultory pursuit of von Lettow-Vorbeck, principally on Portuguese soil. But there is a cross-division to be noted, due to the existence of two other 'fronts', that of the forces based on Nyasaland and Rhodesia, commanded in the most important phase by General Northey, and the Belgian front on the side of the Congo and Tabora.[1]

The early operations consisted in German raids, spasmodic, and not very boldly conceived. In the north they aimed at cutting the Uganda railway but never succeeded in doing much damage. Small British forces, greatly outnumbered, made a gallant resistance, notably at Tsavo on the 4th of September, 1914. Taveta, a post right on the border, and commanding the entrance to German territory, but very weakly held, the enemy did succeed in occupying. They also made attempts to hold Karungu on Lake Victoria and to attack the railway terminus on the Lake, at Kisumu; but at Kisii, on the way to Kisumu, they were beaten off on the 12th of September by a force of the K.A.R. 240 strong, and shortly afterwards they abandoned Karungu.

At the end of September they attempted a more ambitious undertaking, nothing less than an attack by land and sea on the British port of Mombasa, but Admiral King Hall, who had already on August 14 bombarded Dar es Salaam and caused

[1] In the fighting on the Nyasaland and Rhodesia side, see Part III (Central Africa), especially under Nyasaland. For the fighting on the Belgian front, see especially under Uganda in Part II.

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the destruction of its wireless station, prevented the German cruiser *Königsberg*, on which depended the naval part of the proceedings, from coming out of the creeks in which she was lurking, and the land force was repulsed after getting as far as Gazi.

Reinforcements had, as early as the beginning of September, arrived from India, the 29th Punjabis. It was a detachment of these troops that held Tsavo, and a considerable expeditionary force, comprising both British and Indian troops and artillery, sailed from Bombay in October, accompanied by two small warships. It was decided to take this force straight to the German port and railway terminus of Tanga and disembark it on hostile territory. Tanga is an open town, and the British scrupulously observing the conventions summoned it to surrender, allowing time for compliance. The Germans wisely employed the time in reinforcing the garrison, von Lettow himself bringing 11 companies from Moshi, and in strengthening the defences. In the early morning of November 4 the British advanced from the shore, from which the town is nearly two miles distant, through dense bush. No attempt was made to bring the guns up. They were left on board and fired all day from the decks of the swinging transports at an enemy whose position had not been in any way reconnoitred. They suffered no casualties, but there is no reason for supposing that they inflicted any. For 2½ hours the infantry, consisting of the 101st Grenadiers, the 2nd Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the Kashmir Rifles, struggled through the bush. It was hard for the several units to maintain contact and for the men to see their officers, a matter of the first importance where native troops are concerned. They were further harassed by wild bees, disturbed by their advance. When finally they reached the town they were met by heavy fire from loopholed and barricaded houses and from machine guns inseparable from German troops in all parts of the world. The right wing nevertheless did effect a lodgement in the outskirts of the town, but they were not supported on the left and could make no further headway. After dark they withdrew to a position a short distance from the town, and the next day they re-embarked for Mombasa, unmolested by the enemy, to whom they left some hundreds of rifles, a quantity of small-arm ammunition, 16 machine guns, and a heightened self-confidence and morale.

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Attacks on the northern frontier had been planned to synchronize with the expected occupation of Tanga. In the Kilimanjaro district two columns crossed the frontier, one on each side of the mountain, and the Punjabis attacked a German position successfully; but the failure at Tanga made further operations useless.

Nyasaland, in the far south, contained at the outbreak of war only a handful of white men and but few native soldiers. The Germans, whose resources were considerably greater, raided over the border and sought continually to incite a native rebellion. What reservists or police could be collected were concentrated at Fort Johnston at the southern end of Lake Nyasa, and thence, after the steamer *Gwendolen* had attacked the German port of Sphinxhaven and disabled her German rival *Von Weissmann*, the little force was carried up the lake, concentrated at Karonga, and from there dispatched to drive off the raiders. At the same time the Germans themselves had assembled in force and marched on Karonga. The small guard that had been left behind made a stout resistance, and the Germans, not realizing how weak was the opposition, did not press the attack with much resolution. Meanwhile the little field force heard the firing in their rear and turned back to the sound of the guns. They took the Germans utterly by surprise and routed them with a loss of a large proportion of their effectives, Europeans and natives, and almost the whole of their machine guns and ammunition. The losses on the British side were far smaller, but any losses were serious to so weak a force. Activities on this front were therefore practically suspended.

On the main front December saw the Germans who had worked up the coast north of Tanga driven back, with the aid of the Navy, and only at Taveta did they retain any permanent hold beyond their own borders. January 1915, however, was marked by another small German success. On the 12th a strong force with artillery and machine guns was concentrated against Jasin, the British frontier port on the sea coast. The British garrison, composed of Indian and African troops, fired away its ammunition and then had perforce to surrender. On the other hand, on the 10th of January, troops from Mombasa occupied the German island of Mafia, some 150 miles south of Zanzibar, and about the same time another force occupied the German

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port Shirati on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. There was a good deal of activity on this lake in the early part of 1915, culminating in a fight between the *Winifred*, one of the newly armed British lake steamers, and the only armed German boat, the *Mwanza*, which on the 6th of March was driven ashore and put out of action. A few days later a German raiding party of some 300 men was caught once more near Karungu by a force of mounted infantry and King's African Rifles and driven over the frontier with heavy loss. In May the Navy obtained complete control of Lake Nyasa, where a small naval expedition under Lieut.-Commander Dennistoun, together with a detachment of K.A.R. under Captain Collins and some guns, successfully attacked Sphinxhaven for the second time and finally disabled the *Von Weissmann*.

On the 28th of February 1915 a blockade of the coast had been proclaimed, but unfortunately one ship, the *Adjutant*, had contrived to get to Dar es Salaam just previously, and a second, the *Rubens* from Hamburg, was in the following April run into Manza Bay, where she was actually set on fire by H.M.S. *Hyacinth* and abandoned. The Germans, however, who had gone ashore returned and succeeded in salving her cargo. Only one other ship got through, the *Maria*, which reached Sudi Bay in March 1916, but unfortunately all these ships brought most valuable cargoes of arms and ammunition,[1] and the large resources of the colony were very skilfully used by the Germans, who provided themselves with leather, rubber, spirit, medicines, and even ammunition from local workshops.

Mid-March to mid-June is—roughly speaking—the rainy season and occasional skirmishes between patrols were the only military encounters, but in June General Tighe, who had assumed command at the end of April, undertook an operation of some magnitude. A force was sent from Kisumu across Lake Victoria to the western shore. It then advanced by land upon Bukoba, a town on the lake shore, 25 to 30 miles within the German frontier. The force consisted of detachments of the K.A.R., the Loyal North Lancs., and the 25th R.F. (Legion of Frontiersmen) with mountain artillery, and was commanded by Brig.-General J. A. Stewart. On the 22nd of June it defeated

[1] The *Rubens* brought enough Mauser rifles to re-arm the entire German forces (hitherto armed with the old Jäger (1871) rifle), some machine guns, and a large quantity of small-arm and artillery ammunition.

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the enemy about 400 strong, captured the town and the enemy's artillery, and destroyed the wireless tower.

About the same time there was some brisk fighting on the Rhodesian border, the Germans taking the offensive in this instance and attacking a force of Northern Rhodesia Police and Belgians under Major O'Sullevan, at Saisi near Abercorn. The Germans were driven off but a month later they returned, in considerably greater strength, under General Wahle. He had with him a force estimated at some 1,800 Askaris and Arabs and 500 Europeans. Against them Major O'Sullevan had only 450 native troops and 19 Europeans. They had very little food and had to fetch water under cover of night from a neighbouring river. The attack began on the 26th of July. On July 31 the Germans summoned the little garrison to surrender and all terms being refused renewed the attack, but they were repulsed with the loss of nearly a tenth of their Europeans killed and a larger number of Askaris. For three days they continued to fire into the British position and then, on the 3rd of August, withdrew.

Except for the usual raids and skirmishes along the borders there was no other military operation of note during 1915, but in July the Navy performed a feat of some moment, the destruction of the German cruiser *Königsberg*, the only remaining German warship in the Indian Ocean. This vessel had been driven up the Rufiji river by the *Chatham* in the previous autumn and here she was hidden from view by thick jungle and protected by batteries erected on the river banks. It was therefore necessary to attack her with heavy howitzers after aerial observation. For this purpose two monitors, *Severn* and *Mersey*, were brought out from England, and on July 4 these two vessels opened fire from the river mouth with two aeroplanes to ' spot ' for them. They fired for 6 hours and set the *Königsberg* on fire, but one of the aeroplanes was put out of action. On July 11 the bombardment was renewed and the *Königsberg* was at last blown up. Her guns,[1] however, and her crew survived, and in 1917 a large portion of her crew, taking to the water again, eventually succeeded in getting home by way of Arabia and Turkey. In the spring of 1915 the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment, a regiment raised for the Imperial

[1] Ten 4·1 in., some 8·8 cm. and many lighter guns and machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition.

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Government, came by sea to East Africa and rendered splendid service throughout the campaign.

In the autumn of this year General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, the commander of one of the two original British Army Corps in France, was appointed to the command in East Africa, which was thus acknowledged as requiring the most serious military attention, but he fell sick at Cape Town on his way out and never took up the appointment. Eventually General Smuts, who had commanded the southern portion of the Union forces in German South-West Africa and was at the moment Minister of Defence in the Union, was appointed in his stead, and with his appointment begins the second phase of the campaign.

The offensive now definitely passed to the British side. The Germans have sometimes been criticized for not making better use of the early period when they had superiority in numbers and in organization. But a serious German offensive had never been practicable. German resources in men and material were fairly large but always and most obviously limited. To attempt an expensive campaign must in the end have proved fatal, for von Lettow and his advisers could foresee no way of replacing casualties or expended ammunition. Great Britain, however much territory she might lose for a time, had, whenever she could spare them, the means of bringing fresh supplies of men and stores to the country; Germany, so long as the Grand Fleet was in being, had not.

Yet trusting in the eventual victory of their war machine in Europe the Germans had every confidence in their ability, if they husbanded their strength, to hold out in Africa. To the British soldier in Africa, on the other hand, the painful present was all absorbing, and the achievements of that sorely tried force deserve to be remembered.

'For eighteen months', wrote one of the earliest historians of the campaign, 'they had borne the heat and burden of the climate, without a chance of leave, without adequate supplies, with little to cheer them in their past record, and with no hope of an offensive in the future. One white officer, often in the early twenties, with a handful of natives was left to patrol a long length of line in the face of vigilant and aggressive enemies. In that wide and solitary land there was none of the stimulus which comes from a consciousness of support at call and neighbours near. The time was soon to come when the little army was caught up in a great movement, and swept the

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enemy's domain from all points of the compass. But let us recognize the desperate strain on mind and body of the far-flung lines of defence which during 1915 sat in dreary and perilous vigil on the northern borders.'

'At the commencement of 1916', records General Smuts in his first dispatch, 'the German forces in German East Africa were estimated at some 16,000 men of whom 2,000 were white, with 60 guns and 80 machine guns.' This estimate, as the subsequent captures proved, was below the truth, but even so it was a larger force than General Tighe, who till the arrival of General Smuts was at this time in command, could dispose of, even though troops from South Africa were now arriving.

Of the section of the front that really mattered at this stage of the campaign, Kilimanjaro may be regarded as the centre. To the north-west of Kilimanjaro the British were based mainly on Longido, which General Stewart occupied on January 15th 1916, with the 1st Division. To the south-east, they were based on the railway line which had been constructed from Voi to Maktau, with Taveta as its final objective. Taveta, then in German hands, was in fact the key to the whole front. It filled the pass that leads into German East Africa, and was not only strongly garrisoned itself but was protected by advanced positions at Salaita, Serengeti, and Mbuyuni.

On January 22nd the 2nd Division, under General Malleson, occupied Mbuyuni almost unopposed and, two days later, Serengeti, the railway being advanced correspondingly. Then on February 12th, more South African troops having arrived, an attack was made upon Salaita, but, though 6 battalions of infantry and 18 guns and howitzers were employed, the enemy was too strongly entrenched and the attacking force was compelled to withdraw to Serengeti. The 1st Division, which was to have struck in along the western side of Kilimanjaro, was never brought into use.

Such was the position when General Smuts reached Mombasa on the 19th of February, 1916. With characteristic energy and thoroughness he proceeded at once to make a personal reconnaissance of the whole field of operations in both the Taveta and the Longido sectors before proceeding to Nairobi. On arrival at Nairobi on February 23rd he at once cabled to London his confidence in his ability to occupy the Kilimanjaro area before the rains. Two days later sanction was received

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and he went to work without delay. In general he followed the plan already laid by General Tighe, but, in order to avoid repetition of the frontal attack on Salaita, he decided that a way must be found round the northern flank of this position through Chala, where there was ample water; and, since a detour had to be made in no longer time than the direct advance would take, he brought back the South African Mounted Brigade, then attached to the 1st Division, to use for this purpose. Also, in order to divert attention from this northerly movement, reconnaissances were made towards the Ngulu Gap, the first break in the hills behind Taveta and some 20 miles away. No serious attack could however be made here, particularly by mounted troops, for lack of water. Mbuyuni and Serengeti were only supplied by a 2½-inch pipe laid from the Lumi river in the Bura hills. Thus it was of the first importance accurately to synchronize the movements of the different forces in this sector, who were moreover operating in thick, pathless bush; and most careful reconnaissances were carried out. At the same time General Stewart with the 1st Division, comprising both mounted and dismounted troops, was ordered to strike south down the western side of Kilimanjaro across 35 miles of waterless country, to the Engare Nanjuki river and thence, turning south-east, to cut into the enemy's line of retreat at about Kahe where the railway from Moshi crossed the Pangani river.

The exact composition of these three forces was as follows: divisions and brigades, it should be noted, being throughout this campaign of variable strength:

1st East African Division (to advance from Longido), Major-Gen. J. M. Stewart.
2nd East African Brigade.
25th R.F.; 29th Punjabis; 129th Baluchis; 3rd Kashmiris.
Divisional Troops:
1 Sq. 17th Cavalry (Indian Army); East African Mounted Rifles; M.I. Coy. K A.R.
1st and 3rd South African Field Artillery; 27th Mountain Battery (Indian).
7th Bty. (a locally organized unit, with 15-prs.). No. 1 Ammunition Column.
E.A. Maxim Gun Coy.; Loyal North Lancs. Machine-Gun Coy.
Mounted Section East African Pioneers; Faridkot Sappers and Miners; Signal Company; No. 2 section East African Pioneers.
1st K.A.R.

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1st and 2nd S.A. Mounted Bde. Field Ambulances; 1st Indian Bearer Coy.; 2 sections 120th Indian Field Ambulance; one section 140th Indian Field Ambulance, Divisional Train, Supply Column, Mobile Veterinary Section.

2nd East African Division, Major-Gen. M. J. Tighe.

1st East African Brigade.

2nd Rhodesian Rifles; 130th Baluchis; 3rd K.A.R.; Kashmir Rifles.

2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade.

5, 6, 7, and 8 Batns. S.A. Infantry.

3rd S.A. Infantry Brigade.

9, 10, 11, and 12 Batns. S.A. Infantry.

Divisional Troops:

2nd East African M.I. Coy.

28th Mountain Battery (Indian); No. 8 Bty. (Calcutta volunteer).

No. 6 Bty. (locally organized, armed with 12 prs.); No. 11 Bty. R.G.A. (5″ hows.).

No. 2 Ammunition Column.

2nd East African Signal Coy.; No. 1 section East African Pioneer Coy.

61st Pioneers.

No. 10 Armoured Car Battery.

Two sections British Field Ambulance; two sections 139th Indian F.A.; two sections 140th Indian Field Ambulance; one section East African Field Ambulance; Nos. 2 and 4 South African Field Ambulance.

2nd Indian Bearer Coy.

Divisional Train and Mobile Veterinary Section.

The 1st Mounted Brigade, under Brig.-Gen. Van Deventer, which formed the third force, was directly under the Commander-in-Chief. It included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd South African Horse, the South African Scout Corps; the 2nd, 4th, and 5th S.A. Field Batteries.

The whole striking force was, it will be noticed, composed of very varied elements, making the co-ordination of their movements a most delicate task.

The 1st Division left Longido on March 5th after dark; the Mounted Brigade, together with the 3rd S.A. Infantry Brigade from the 2nd Division, started for Chala after dark on the 7th; the 2nd Division was to advance from Serengeti at dawn on the 8th. The reserves marched off on the night of 7th/8th in the track of Van Deventer's force, but halted at the Lumi river, whence they were available to reinforce either Van Deventer or Tighe. By the evening of the 8th

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Stewart had reached the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru ; Tighe was entrenched in front of Salaita ; Van Deventer was in full strength at Chala ; and the reserves were astride the Lumi. On the 9th (in the afternoon) Tighe, after bombardment, attacked the Salaita position and found it abandoned. Meanwhile, Van Deventer had sent troops across the Taveta–Moshi road and also to the bridge over the Lumi, east of Taveta. It was doubtless this threat to their communications that persuaded the German retreat from the strong Salaita trenches, albeit Van Deventer's detachments withdrew to Chala again at nightfall. On the 10th troops of the 2nd Division occupied Taveta, which one of Van Deventer's regiments had already entered.

The enemy was now in force on the hills at Latema, some five miles west of Taveta ; another body was vainly watching the Ngulu Gap ; another was presumed to be covering Moshi. Latema was the next stage in the British advance, and its capture involved considerably heavier fighting. The 2nd Division attacked the German position between Latema and Reata on the 11th, and the infantry, the K.A.R., the 130th Baluchis, and the Rhodesians, with mounted troops on either flank and supported by all the available guns, advanced across 1,000 yards of open ground towards the bush in which the enemy lay. They reached the bush but could not penetrate far into it and had to dig in. In the afternoon more guns came up and the 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade, from Chala, and a further advance was made, first the 5th S.A.I. and then the 7th being thrown in. It was now dark, but Tighe, who had succeeded Malleson in control of operations, determined to press the attack and attempt to capture the upper slopes of the ridge before the enemy had time to entrench or be reinforced. The two South African regiments were accordingly sent in with the bayonet, the exact whereabouts of the Rhodesians and K.A.R., some of whom had, as a matter of fact, reached the crest, being unknown. The 7th pressed forward in the centre, then divided into two halves and moved to either flank and there dug in. Meanwhile, the 5th followed behind and endeavoured to hold the hollow or *nek* in the centre, but found the position untenable owing to machine-gun and rifle fire from a prepared position. General Smuts, on hearing from General Tighe of the failure in the centre, ordered

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the whole force to be withdrawn before daybreak, preferring to wait till the turning movement of his mounted troops planned for the following day should take effect. But while the withdrawal was being carried out word was received of the success of the flanking parties of the 7th S.A.I., and it was further reported that the enemy was retiring. General Smuts thereupon ordered the 8th S.A.I. and some guns to advance, and the whole *nek* was occupied with total losses of less than 300. The door to the German Colony was now opened. It remained to keep it open and to bring the whole striking force inside. Bridges had to be rebuilt, tracks improved, and the outlying bodies of troops brought together.

On March 14th the advanced guard of General Stewart's command joined forces with that of the Mounted Brigade at New Moshi, which, together with Old Moshi, was now in our hands. New Moshi was a station on the Northern Railway about six miles south-east of Moshi. From this point our line stretched back eastward, the enemy still holding the Ruvu or Pangani [1] river and the hills immediately to the north of it from Kingaranga westward. The northern bank of the Ruvu had therefore to be cleared before a further advance could be attempted, and on the 18th a successful attack was made on the hill positions of Unterer Himo, Euphorbien, and Kifumbu. On the following day Rasthaus and Masai Kraal were attacked, but though the 1st Division made good progress, reaching nearly half-way beyond Masai Kraal to Kahe Kwa and the river, the 12th S.A.I. found the bush round Rasthaus almost impenetrable and under its cover the enemy subjected their western flank to heavy rifle and machine fire.

Next day General Smuts transferred the 2nd S.A.I. Brigade, which with the 3rd had been concerned in the attack on Rasthaus, to the 1st Division, and at the same time Van Deventer was ordered to make a night march across the railway, then south across the river and so to take the enemy directly in the rear. On the same night (March 20th/21st) the Germans made a determined attack on the camp of the 1st Division, which was now back at Masai Kraal, but were driven off,

[1] General Smuts in his dispatch speaks of 'the Ruwu or Pangani'. The Ruwu or Ruvu was the Upper Pangani, but there was another Ruvu identical with the Kingani river and running into the sea from the south-west near Bagamoyo. This latter is the river mentioned later on pp. 179 and 181.

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and at dawn next morning Van Deventer's Mounted Brigade with two batteries appeared in the neighbourhood of Kahe Hill. Before they could attack it, however, the river, deep, swift, and 20 yards wide, had to be crossed, there was no bridge except on the map, and the engineer officers declared it to be impossible to construct either a bridge or a raft in time. The 1st S.A. Horse were therefore ordered to swim the river, and, doing so they stormed the hill, which was held by only a single company, on foot.

Von Lettow himself was on the Ruvu at the time and desperate counter-attacks on this all-important position were made. But the South Africans, supported by their artillery from across the river, held it, and Van Deventer meanwhile was advancing along the other bank of the river, occupying Kahe station 18 miles lower down the line than New Moshi and threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Unfortunately, communication with the 1st Division, which was now again advancing, was not established, and this force found that the denseness of the bush, combined with the enemy's machine guns, made progress exceedingly slow and in places impossible. They could not reach the river that night and under cover of the darkness the Germans crossed it and got away to the south by way of Kisangire. Thus a movement which at one time promised to net the whole of the enemy's main force just failed to achieve complete success ; but the whole area north of the Ruvu was now in British hands, comprising a wide habitable and fertile district, the main pass into the enemy's territory and 20 miles of the Moshi–Tanga railway. The enemy had had in action near Kahe one of the *Königsberg's* 4-inch guns, which he was forced to blow up.

It was now possible to establish permanent lines of communication, the extension of our own railway to link up with the German line being of prime importance, particularly in view of the coming rains, when other forms of transport would become impracticable. At the same time a reorganization of the forces was effected, three divisions being formed, two, the 2nd and 3rd, of South Africans, each containing a mounted and an infantry brigade, commanded by General Van Deventer and General Brits respectively, and one composed of the units from other countries, under General Hoskins. The rains were imminent, but General Smuts did not intend to suspend the

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(*a*) Railway bridge over the Ruvu river, Tanga district

(*b*) Derelict German railway carriage in the same river

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campaign on that account. His own summary of his plans is as follows:

'Merely to follow the enemy in his very mobile retreat might prove an endless game, with the additional danger that the enemy forces might split up into guerrilla bands doubling back in all directions and rendering effective occupation of the country impossible. In view of the size of the country it was therefore necessary to invade it from various points with columns strong enough to deal with any combination that could be brought against them, and for these columns as they advanced to clear the country also laterally. General Northey was operating eastwards and northwards from Lake Nyasa; a Belgian column was launched eastwards from Lake Kivu (to the north of Lake Tanganyika); in April another Belgian column and a British column were set in motion in a southerly direction from the Uganda border west of Lake Victoria Nyanza; a mounted brigade under Van Deventer was launched southwards from Arusha to Kondoa Irangi, which was the most important strategic point on the interior plateau of the enemy territory, and, finally, towards the end of May, three columns advanced south-eastward from the Moshi area against the Pare Mountains and towards the Usambara Mountains.'

On April 3rd Van Deventer's mounted troops set out from Arusha, which lies 40 to 50 miles west of Moshi, to attack the enemy's position on Lol Kisale Hill. They surrounded it, and at dawn on the 5th the enemy, some 430 strong with two machine guns, surrendered. Then for the first time since leaving Arusha, nearly 48 hours before, men and horses were able to get water, of which the only springs in the district lay within the captured lines. Here it was discovered that von Lettow was about to reinforce his garrison at Kondoa Irangi, which is over 140 miles south-west of Arusha and considerably more than half-way from that point to the Central Railway, and it was at once resolved to forestall him by a rapid attack. Van Deventer's mounted troops therefore set out again on the 8th at 6 p.m. and reached Tarangire at 1 p.m. on the 9th. Here they spent a day and a half; at 9 a.m. on the 11th they started again and encamped that night about 10 miles short of Ufiome, where they arrived at 3 p.m. next day. Rain began to fall and made progress difficult. On the 13th the force moved on and after a fourteen hours' march reached Galai at 7 p.m. On the 16th they again advanced, and on the 17th were in touch with the enemy four miles north of Kondoa

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Mkalamo. Meanwhile Hannyngton had occupied Mombo and later Wilhelmstal or Lushoto, the government's hill station 21 miles by road from the railway at Mombo. He then advanced to Korogwe on the railway, which was entered on the 15th, and the two forces presently joined hands at the important [illegible] Handeni, which is south of the railway but was connected with it by a trolley line from Mombo. Handeni was [illegible] Stevenson's brigade, supported by a flanking movement [illegible] Reves's brigade, on the 19th. The [illegible] at very long distances from their sea [illegible] Dar-es-Salaam, were now Handeni and Kondoa [illegible] at equal distances from the next [illegible] railway. But General Smuts, [illegible] away from the Usambara [illegible] and from here, [illegible] the enemy, who were [illegible] a flying column under [illegible] Commander-in-Chief's [illegible] during the night across the [illegible] The attack was successful, [illegible] impossible [illegible]

[illegible] troops, to [illegible] plans with [illegible] established on [illegible] Nguru [illegible] this time [illegible] Pangani the [illegible] men withered [illegible] August, but [illegible] that the [illegible] Deventer [illegible] him, and by [illegible] succeeded, [illegible] wide front [illegible] main body [illegible] with the [illegible] moved to [illegible] centre [illegible] west of [illegible] distant [illegible] Kondi,

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Kilimatinde was occupied on July 30th by Colonel Kirkpatrick. The Singida column under Colonel Taylor reached its objective on August 2nd and then proceeded, all but a small garrison, to Kilimatinde. Meanwhile Van Deventer, on arriving at Aneti on July 19th, had divided his column into two, the mounted troops under Brig.-Gen. Botha, and later Brig.-Gen. Nussey, moving by way of Tisakwamade and Nyangalo, to Kikombo on the railway, which they reached on July 30th, the remainder, under General Berrangé, direct to Dodoma also on the railway. Dodoma, some 70 miles from Kilimatinde in the direction of Dar es Salaam, was reached on the 29th. The whole of Van Deventer's main body was then concentrated at Nyangalo, and his advance continued eastward upon Mpwapwa. At the same time Colonel Kirkpatrick, leaving Colonel Taylor at Kilimatinde, marched by way of Dodoma to rejoin his chief.

By this time steps had been taken to secure the territory which General Smuts had passed over in his left rear. Tanga was taken by a combined naval and military force under Colonel Price on July 7th, the troops this time being landed at Kwali Bay, eight miles to the north. Thereupon General Hannyngton was ordered to move from Handeni down the Pangani road with forces drawn from the lines of communication troops covering his left flank. Several parties of the enemy were thus captured or dispersed, but as they had now definitely adopted guerrilla tactics in this area and could not all be hunted down, the bulk of Hannyngton's force was brought back to Lukigura. On July 23rd the Navy occupied Pangani and a week later Sa'dani, opposite Zanzibar, and landed a detachment of the West India Regiment in order to co-operate with the 40th Pathans from Hannyngton's column, which was moving south and, having driven the enemy out of Manga, was advancing towards the Wami river. Between them they cleared the lower reaches of the Wami, crossed it, and advanced again upon Bagamoyo, half-way between Sa'dani and Dar es Salaam.

All this while the Belgians and the British Lake Force had not been idle.[1] After the capture on the 9th of June of the island of Ukerewe immediately to the north of the German port of Mwanza, which with its important high-power wireless station was at the extreme south of the lake, on the 14th of July

[1] See below, pp. 231–2.

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Irangi. On the following day Van Deventer reconnoitred the position and endeavoured to bring his field guns into action, but the ground was found to be terribly soft and observation almost impossible owing to the mist and rain. Nevertheless, the mounted men made progress, and by noon the town was in our hands, the enemy's force, which was not a large one, retiring to the south. This was a very fine feat, not by reason of the enemy's opposition, but owing to the extraordinary hardships of the march—16 days in all, in incessant rain for the last week, and with no provisions for man or beast beyond what nature afforded. There was not a single casualty among the mounted troops, whereas the enemy lost 50 killed and wounded and 34 prisoners, besides much ammunition and 800 head of cattle. The force, however, could not move again till its horses, of which 140 died, had been replaced, and meanwhile it had to continue to forage for itself.

On the 1st of May Van Deventer's Infantry Brigade and the 4th S.A. Horse joined him, but he still had with him barely 3,000 rifles, and von Lettow, recognizing as clearly as his rival the importance of Kondoa Irangi, transferred troops from the Usambara railway, where he had expected attack, to the Central Railway. By the 7th of May he had concentrated 4,000 fresh troops, together with two naval guns, under his own immediate command, against Van Deventer, and on the 9th he launched four determined assaults, but they failed and the attack was never seriously renewed. Before the end of the month Van Deventer had been strongly reinforced.

The rains had made active operations impossible in the Pangani area, and the only other important fighting during this time was the advance of the Belgians, with whom we were closely co-operating, being indeed responsible for their supplies from Bukakata on Lake Victoria, southwards against Kigali, the head-quarters of the province of Ruanda. These operations were under the control of the Belgian General Tombeur, working in concert with the British Lake forces, which were at first under Colonel Adye and later under Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe. A force under Colonel Molitor occupied Kigali on May 6th, and General Tombeur then attacked also eastwards from Lake Kivu.[1]

Towards the end of May, General Smuts resumed his advance

[1] See below, pp. 231–2.

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south from the Pangani, with the object of clearing the Pare and Usambara mountains as far as Handeni and then turning south towards the enemy's chief nerve, the Central Railway, at which Van Deventer from Kondoa would also strike. The first objective was Lembeni on the Northern Railway, 23 miles farther down the line than Kahe but higher in altitude, and for the capture of this very defensible position General Smuts characteristically relied on a flanking movement on the left, both by way of the Ngulu Gap (where the Germans had expected the attack that actually fell on Moshi and Chala) and down the Pangani. This advance was undertaken by the 1st and 3rd Divisions (of which, however, two battalions had been lent to Van Deventer). A small column of K.A.R. with two mountain-guns under Lieut.-Col. Fitzgerald was to move from Mbuyuni to the Ngulu Gap ; a brigade of Indian infantry with two field batteries under Brig.-Gen. Hannyngton was to follow the railway line ; on the right was the main advance along the Pangani. The first of these three bodies started from Mbuyuni on May 21st, the other two concentrated at Kahe station and started on the 22nd and the 23rd respectively. Lembeni, threatened on either flank, was evacuated, and occupied by General Hannyngton on the 24th and Same on the 25th. Here Colonel Fitzgerald's force joined Hannyngton, and meanwhile the main body had advanced abreast of them down the river. The troops still pressed forward, the Commander-in-Chief alarmed his staff by scouting in person, some slight resistance was met and overcome at Mikochine, and on the 31st the main body was at Bwiko station, 68 miles from Lembeni, a railway centre of some importance but utterly wrecked by the retreating enemy. Meanwhile, General Hannyngton had moved along the northern side of the Pare mountains, and followed the Mkomazi river through the mountains to Mkomazi station, the next station below Bwiko.

At Bwiko there was a halt to bring up supplies, but there could be no waiting for the reconstruction of the railway. A road was made by the artillery for 22 miles back to Makanya and General Smuts prepared to continue his advance down the river, neglecting for the moment those of the enemy who still lurked in the Usambara mountains, which continue the line of the Pare range. On June 8th the whole force had crossed the Pangani, and by the 10th, after some brisk fighting, was in

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Mkalamo. Meanwhile Hannyngton had occupied Mombo and later Wilhelmstal or Lushoto, the government's hill station 21 miles by road from the railway at Mombo. He then advanced to Korogwe on the railway, which was entered on the 15th, and the two forces presently joined hands at the important centre of Handeni, which is south of the railway but was connected with it by a trolley line from Mombo. Handeni was entered by Sheppard's brigade, supported by a flanking movement to the south-west by Beves's brigade, on the 19th. The two advanced bases, at sadly long distances from their sea base, which was still Mombasa, were now Handeni and Kondoa Irangi, which are roughly at equal distances from the next British objective, the Central Railway. But General Smuts, now having turned almost due south away from the Usambara railway, pressed on still farther to Kangata, and from here, on the 24th, delivered an attack on the enemy, who were entrenched behind the Lukigura river, a flying column under General Hoskins having, after the Commander-in-Chief's usual manner, been sent round during the night across the river to take the enemy in the rear. The attack was successful, but the dense bush made complete encirclement impossible and the bulk of the enemy's force got away.

It was now an imperative necessity to rest the troops, to improve the lines of communication, and to concert plans with Van Deventer. A large camp was accordingly established on the Msiha river, 8 miles farther south and close to the Nguru mountains. The amount of sickness in the force at this time was terrible. Throughout the march down the Pangani the very air seemed to throb with fever and the men withered away like parched flowers. This halt lasted till August, but there was much activity elsewhere. On the very day that the passage of the Lukigura river was carried, Van Deventer found the enemy melting away from in front of him, and by nightfall had occupied the whole of his line. He then proceeded, on General Smuts's orders, to advance on a very wide front towards the Central Railway, the objective of his main body being Mpwapwa, whence it might later co-operate with the force from Msiha camp, while smaller columns moved to Singida on the right, towards Tabora, and in the centre towards Kilimatinde, which is 80 miles or more south-west of Kondoa Irangi and actually on the railway 360 miles distant from Dar es Salaam. After a brush with the enemy at Mpondi,

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Kilimatinde was occupied on July 30th by Colonel Kirkpatrick. The Singida column under Colonel Taylor reached its objective on August 2nd and then proceeded, all but a small garrison, to Kilimatinde. Meanwhile Van Deventer, on arriving at Aneti on July 19th, had divided his column into two, the mounted troops under Brig.-Gen. Botha, and later Brig.-Gen. Nussey, moving by way of Tisakwamade and Nyangalo, to Kikombo on the railway, which they reached on July 30th, the remainder, under General Berrangé, direct to Dodoma also on the railway. Dodoma, some 70 miles from Kilimatinde in the direction of Dar es Salaam, was reached on the 29th. The whole of Van Deventer's main body was then concentrated at Nyangalo, and his advance continued eastward upon Mpwapwa. At the same time Colonel Kirkpatrick, leaving Colonel Taylor at Kilimatinde, marched by way of Dodoma to rejoin his chief.

By this time steps had been taken to secure the territory which General Smuts had passed over in his left rear. Tanga was taken by a combined naval and military force under Colonel Price on July 7th, the troops this time being landed at Kwali Bay, eight miles to the north. Thereupon General Hannyngton was ordered to move from Handeni down the Pangani road with forces drawn from the lines of communication troops covering his left flank. Several parties of the enemy were thus captured or dispersed, but as they had now definitely adopted guerrilla tactics in this area and could not all be hunted down, the bulk of Hannyngton's force was brought back to Lukigura. On July 23rd the Navy occupied Pangani and a week later Sa'dani, opposite Zanzibar, and landed a detachment of the West India Regiment in order to cooperate with the 40th Pathans from Hannyngton's column, which was moving south and, having driven the enemy out of Manga, was advancing towards the Wami river. Between them they cleared the lower reaches of the Wami, crossed it, and advanced again upon Bagamoyo, half-way between Sa'dani and Dar es Salaam.

All this while the Belgians and the British Lake Force had not been idle.[1] After the capture on the 9th of June of the island of Ukerewe immediately to the north of the German port of Mwanza, which with its important high-power wireless station was at the extreme south of the lake, on the 14th of July

[1] See below, pp. 231–2.

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Stewart had reached the southern slopes of Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru ; Tighe was entrenched in front of Salaita ; Van Deventer was in full strength at Chala ; and the reserves were astride the Lumi. On the 9th (in the afternoon) Tighe, after bombardment, attacked the Salaita position and found it abandoned. Meanwhile, Van Deventer had sent troops across the Taveta–Moshi road and also to the bridge over the Lumi, east of Taveta. It was doubtless this threat to their communications that persuaded the German retreat from the strong Salaita trenches, albeit Van Deventer's detachments withdrew to Chala again at nightfall. On the 10th troops of the 2nd Division occupied Taveta, which one of Van Deventer's regiments had already entered.

The enemy was now in force on the hills at Latema, some five miles west of Taveta ; another body was vainly watching the Ngulu Gap ; another was presumed to be covering Moshi. Latema was the next stage in the British advance, and its capture involved considerably heavier fighting. The 2nd Division attacked the German position between Latema and Reata on the 11th, and the infantry, the K.A.R., the 130th Baluchis, and the Rhodesians, with mounted troops on either flank and supported by all the available guns, advanced across 1,000 yards of open ground towards the bush in which the enemy lay. They reached the bush but could not penetrate far into it and had to dig in. In the afternoon more guns came up and the 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade, from Chala, and a further advance was made, first the 5th S.A.I. and then the 7th being thrown in. It was now dark, but Tighe, who had succeeded Malleson in control of operations, determined to press the attack and attempt to capture the upper slopes of the ridge before the enemy had time to entrench or be reinforced. The two South African regiments were accordingly sent in with the bayonet, the exact whereabouts of the Rhodesians and K.A.R., some of whom had, as a matter of fact, reached the crest, being unknown. The 7th pressed forward in the centre, then divided into two halves and moved to either flank and there dug in. Meanwhile, the 5th followed behind and endeavoured to hold the hollow or *nek* in the centre, but found the position untenable owing to machine-gun and rifle fire from a prepared position. General Smuts, on hearing from General Tighe of the failure in the centre, ordered

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the whole force to be withdrawn before daybreak, preferring to wait till the turning movement of his mounted troops planned for the following day should take effect. But while the withdrawal was being carried out word was received of the success of the flanking parties of the 7th S.A.I., and it was further reported that the enemy was retiring. General Smuts thereupon ordered the 8th S.A.I. and some guns to advance, and the whole *nek* was occupied with total losses of less than 300. The door to the German Colony was now opened. It remained to keep it open and to bring the whole striking force inside. Bridges had to be rebuilt, tracks improved, and the outlying bodies of troops brought together.

On March 14th the advanced guard of General Stewart's command joined forces with that of the Mounted Brigade at New Moshi, which, together with Old Moshi, was now in our hands. New Moshi was a station on the Northern Railway about six miles south-east of Moshi. From this point our line stretched back eastward, the enemy still holding the Ruvu or Pangani [1] river and the hills immediately to the north of it from Kingaranga westward. The northern bank of the Ruvu had therefore to be cleared before a further advance could be attempted, and on the 18th a successful attack was made on the hill positions of Unterer Himo, Euphorbien, and Kifumbu. On the following day Rasthaus and Masai Kraal were attacked, but though the 1st Division made good progress, reaching nearly half-way beyond Masai Kraal to Kahe Kwa and the river, the 12th S.A.I. found the bush round Rasthaus almost impenetrable and under its cover the enemy subjected their western flank to heavy rifle and machine fire.

Next day General Smuts transferred the 2nd S.A.I. Brigade, which with the 3rd had been concerned in the attack on Rasthaus, to the 1st Division, and at the same time Van Deventer was ordered to make a night march across the railway, then south across the river and so to take the enemy directly in the rear. On the same night (March 20th/21st) the Germans made a determined attack on the camp of the 1st Division, which was now back at Masai Kraal, but were driven off,

[1] General Smuts in his dispatch speaks of 'the Ruwu or Pangani'. The Ruwu or Ruvu was the Upper Pangani, but there was another Ruvu identical with the Kingani river and running into the sea from the south-west near Bagamoyo. This latter is the river mentioned later on pp. 179 and 181.

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and at dawn next morning Van Deventer's Mounted Brigade with two batteries appeared in the neighbourhood of Kahe Hill. Before they could attack it, however, the river, deep, swift, and 20 yards wide, had to be crossed, there was no bridge except on the map, and the engineer officers declared it to be impossible to construct either a bridge or a raft in time. The 1st S.A. Horse were therefore ordered to swim the river, and, doing so they stormed the hill, which was held by only a single company, on foot.

Von Lettow himself was on the Ruvu at the time and desperate counter-attacks on this all-important position were made. But the South Africans, supported by their artillery from across the river, held it, and Van Deventer meanwhile was advancing along the other bank of the river, occupying Kahe station 18 miles lower down the line than New Moshi and threatening the enemy's line of retreat. Unfortunately, communication with the 1st Division, which was now again advancing, was not established, and this force found that the denseness of the bush, combined with the enemy's machine guns, made progress exceedingly slow and in places impossible. They could not reach the river that night and under cover of the darkness the Germans crossed it and got away to the south by way of Kisangire. Thus a movement which at one time promised to net the whole of the enemy's main force just failed to achieve complete success ; but the whole area north of the Ruvu was now in British hands, comprising a wide habitable and fertile district, the main pass into the enemy's territory and 20 miles of the Moshi–Tanga railway. The enemy had had in action near Kahe one of the *Königsberg's* 4-inch guns, which he was forced to blow up.

It was now possible to establish permanent lines of communication, the extension of our own railway to link up with the German line being of prime importance, particularly in view of the coming rains, when other forms of transport would become impracticable. At the same time a reorganization of the forces was effected, three divisions being formed, two, the 2nd and 3rd, of South Africans, each containing a mounted and an infantry brigade, commanded by General Van Deventer and General Brits respectively, and one composed of the units from other countries, under General Hoskins. The rains were imminent, but General Smuts did not intend to suspend the

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(*a*) Railway bridge over the Ruvu river, Tanga district

(*b*) Derelict German railway carriage in the same river

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campaign on that account. His own summary of his plans is as follows:

'Merely to follow the enemy in his very mobile retreat might prove an endless game, with the additional danger that the enemy forces might split up into guerrilla bands doubling back in all directions and rendering effective occupation of the country impossible. In view of the size of the country it was therefore necessary to invade it from various points with columns strong enough to deal with any combination that could be brought against them, and for these columns as they advanced to clear the country also laterally. General Northey was operating eastwards and northwards from Lake Nyasa; a Belgian column was launched eastwards from Lake Kivu (to the north of Lake Tanganyika); in April another Belgian column and a British column were set in motion in a southerly direction from the Uganda border west of Lake Victoria Nyanza; a mounted brigade under Van Deventer was launched southwards from Arusha to Kondoa Irangi, which was the most important strategic point on the interior plateau of the enemy territory, and, finally, towards the end of May, three columns advanced south-eastward from the Moshi area against the Pare Mountains and towards the Usambara Mountains.'

On April 3rd Van Deventer's mounted troops set out from Arusha, which lies 40 to 50 miles west of Moshi, to attack the enemy's position on Lol Kisale Hill. They surrounded it, and at dawn on the 5th the enemy, some 430 strong with two machine guns, surrendered. Then for the first time since leaving Arusha, nearly 48 hours before, men and horses were able to get water, of which the only springs in the district lay within the captured lines. Here it was discovered that von Lettow was about to reinforce his garrison at Kondoa Irangi, which is over 140 miles south-west of Arusha and considerably more than half-way from that point to the Central Railway, and it was at once resolved to forestall him by a rapid attack. Van Deventer's mounted troops therefore set out again on the 8th at 6 p.m. and reached Tarangire at 1 p.m. on the 9th. Here they spent a day and a half; at 9 a.m. on the 11th they started again and encamped that night about 10 miles short of Ufiome, where they arrived at 3 p.m. next day. Rain began to fall and made progress difficult. On the 13th the force moved on and after a fourteen hours' march reached Galai at 7 p.m. On the 16th they again advanced, and on the 17th were in touch with the enemy four miles north of Kondoa

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Irangi. On the following day Van Deventer reconnoitred the position and endeavoured to bring his field guns into action, but the ground was found to be terribly soft and observation almost impossible owing to the mist and rain. Nevertheless, the mounted men made progress, and by noon the town was in our hands, the enemy's force, which was not a large one, retiring to the south. This was a very fine feat, not by reason of the enemy's opposition, but owing to the extraordinary hardships of the march—16 days in all, in incessant rain for the last week, and with no provisions for man or beast beyond what nature afforded. There was not a single casualty among the mounted troops, whereas the enemy lost 50 killed and wounded and 34 prisoners, besides much ammunition and 800 head of cattle. The force, however, could not move again till its horses, of which 140 died, had been replaced, and meanwhile it had to continue to forage for itself.

On the 1st of May Van Deventer's Infantry Brigade and the 4th S.A. Horse joined him, but he still had with him barely 3,000 rifles, and von Lettow, recognizing as clearly as his rival the importance of Kondoa Irangi, transferred troops from the Usambara railway, where he had expected attack, to the Central Railway. By the 7th of May he had concentrated 4,000 fresh troops, together with two naval guns, under his own immediate command, against Van Deventer, and on the 9th he launched four determined assaults, but they failed and the attack was never seriously renewed. Before the end of the month Van Deventer had been strongly reinforced.

The rains had made active operations impossible in the Pangani area, and the only other important fighting during this time was the advance of the Belgians, with whom we were closely co-operating, being indeed responsible for their supplies from Bukakata on Lake Victoria, southwards against Kigali, the head-quarters of the province of Ruanda. These operations were under the control of the Belgian General Tombeur, working in concert with the British Lake forces, which were at first under Colonel Adye and later under Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe. A force under Colonel Molitor occupied Kigali on May 6th, and General Tombeur then attacked also eastwards from Lake Kivu.[1]

Towards the end of May, General Smuts resumed his advance

[1] See below, pp. 231–2.

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south from the Pangani, with the object of clearing the Pare and Usambara mountains as far as Handeni and then turning south towards the enemy's chief nerve, the Central Railway, at which Van Deventer from Kondoa would also strike. The first objective was Lembeni on the Northern Railway, 23 miles farther down the line than Kahe but higher in altitude, and for the capture of this very defensible position General Smuts characteristically relied on a flanking movement on the left, both by way of the Ngulu Gap (where the Germans had expected the attack that actually fell on Moshi and Chala) and down the Pangani. This advance was undertaken by the 1st and 3rd Divisions (of which, however, two battalions had been lent to Van Deventer). A small column of K.A.R. with two mountain-guns under Lieut.-Col. Fitzgerald was to move from Mbuyuni to the Ngulu Gap; a brigade of Indian infantry with two field batteries under Brig.-Gen. Hannyngton was to follow the railway line; on the right was the main advance along the Pangani. The first of these three bodies started from Mbuyuni on May 21st, the other two concentrated at Kahe station and started on the 22nd and the 23rd respectively. Lembeni, threatened on either flank, was evacuated, and occupied by General Hannyngton on the 24th and Same on the 25th. Here Colonel Fitzgerald's force joined Hannyngton, and meanwhile the main body had advanced abreast of them down the river. The troops still pressed forward, the Commander-in-Chief alarmed his staff by scouting in person, some slight resistance was met and overcome at Mikochine, and on the 31st the main body was at Bwiko station, 68 miles from Lembeni, a railway centre of some importance but utterly wrecked by the retreating enemy. Meanwhile, General Hannyngton had moved along the northern side of the Pare mountains, and followed the Mkomazi river through the mountains to Mkomazi station, the next station below Bwiko.

At Bwiko there was a halt to bring up supplies, but there could be no waiting for the reconstruction of the railway. A road was made by the artillery for 22 miles back to Makanya and General Smuts prepared to continue his advance down the river, neglecting for the moment those of the enemy who still lurked in the Usambara mountains, which continue the line of the Pare range. On June 8th the whole force had crossed the Pangani, and by the 10th, after some brisk fighting, was in

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Mkalamo. Meanwhile Hannyngton had occupied Mombo and later Wilhelmstal or Lushoto, the government's hill station 21 miles by road from the railway at Mombo. He then advanced to Korogwe on the railway, which was entered on the 15th, and the two forces presently joined hands at the important centre of Handeni, which is south of the railway but was connected with it by a trolley line from Mombo. Handeni was entered by Sheppard's brigade, supported by a flanking movement to the south-west by Beves's brigade, on the 19th. The two advanced bases, at sadly long distances from their sea base, which was still Mombasa, were now Handeni and Kondoa Irangi, which are roughly at equal distances from the next British objective, the Central Railway. But General Smuts, now having turned almost due south away from the Usambara railway, pressed on still farther to Kangata, and from here, on the 24th, delivered an attack on the enemy, who were entrenched behind the Lukigura river, a flying column under General Hoskins having, after the Commander-in-Chief's usual manner, been sent round during the night across the river to take the enemy in the rear. The attack was successful, but the dense bush made complete encirclement impossible and the bulk of the enemy's force got away.

It was now an imperative necessity to rest the troops, to improve the lines of communication, and to concert plans with Van Deventer. A large camp was accordingly established on the Msiha river, 8 miles farther south and close to the Nguru mountains. The amount of sickness in the force at this time was terrible. Throughout the march down the Pangani the very air seemed to throb with fever and the men withered away like parched flowers. This halt lasted till August, but there was much activity elsewhere. On the very day that the passage of the Lukigura river was carried, Van Deventer found the enemy melting away from in front of him, and by nightfall had occupied the whole of his line. He then proceeded, on General Smuts's orders, to advance on a very wide front towards the Central Railway, the objective of his main body being Mpwapwa, whence it might later co-operate with the force from Msiha camp, while smaller columns moved to Singida on the right, towards Tabora, and in the centre towards Kilimatinde, which is 80 miles or more south-west of Kondoa Irangi and actually on the railway 360 miles distant from Dar es Salaam. After a brush with the enemy at Mpondi,

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By this time steps had been taken to secure the territory which General Smuts had passed over in his left rear. Tanga was taken by a combined naval and military force under Colonel Price on July 7th, the troops this time being landed at Kwali Bay, eight miles to the north. Thereupon General Hannyngton was ordered to move from Handeni down the Pangani road with forces drawn from the lines of communication troops covering his left flank. Several parties of the enemy were thus captured or dispersed, but as they had now definitely adopted guerrilla tactics in this area and could not all be hunted down, the bulk of Hannyngton's force was brought back to Lukigura. On July 23rd the Navy occupied Pangani and a week later Sa'dani, opposite Zanzibar, and landed a detachment of the West India Regiment in order to cooperate with the 40th Pathans from Hannyngton's column, which was moving south and, having driven the enemy out of Manga, was advancing towards the Wami river. Between them they cleared the lower reaches of the Wami, crossed it, and advanced again upon Bagamoyo, half-way between Sa'dani and Dar es Salaam.

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[1] See below, pp. 231–2.

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we occupied that port, capturing some ships, and a 4·1-inch naval gun, and completing control of the lake. The Belgians were still advancing from the north of Lake Kivu, and by July 24th were at Mariahilf (now Ushirombo), 50 miles south of Lake Victoria, whence they moved on St. Michael. Other columns came down the German side of Lake Tanganyika and about the same time occupied Ujiji on the lake and Ruchugi 50 miles east of it. The German naval command of Lake Tanganyika had been terminated by Commander Spicer Simson's motor-boats early in 1916. Tabora, the chief town of all the western part of German East Africa, was thus threatened from the north and from the west, and its communications with Dar es Salaam were at that very moment being cut by Van Deventer at Kilimatinde and Dodoma.

The Nyasaland–Rhodesia border had also become lately a field of important operations. Here the command was in the hands of General Northey, who had come out from England at the beginning of 1916 and, after the most careful organization of transport and commissariat, had begun an offensive at the end of May. The greatest obstacle to be faced on this front was not so much the enemy's armed opposition as the lengthening chain of communications. General Northey's dispatch states the nature and extent of this obstacle in precise terms:

'It must be remembered that up to our own frontier all supplies had to be brought either through Rhodesia, some 600 miles from the nearest railway, by native bearers, or from Chinde up the Zambezi through Nyasaland and up the lake, a distance of 700 miles, with constant transfers from a sea-going ship to a stern-wheeler, railway, motor, carriers, and lake steamer. In addition to the troops of the columns, many thousands of carriers had to be fed, and it must be borne in mind that each carrier eats the equivalent in weight of his own load in three weeks.'

The result of his early operations may be set forth in a further quotation from this same dispatch:

'On 25th May we attacked the enemy all along the frontier, and by the end of July had cleared him out of the whole of the New Langenburg and Bismarckburg districts, occupying about 20,000 square miles of their rich and fertile country, and captured many prisoners and much war material. During August and September we made a complete wheel to the eastward, pivoting on the north end of Lake Nyasa and

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SIR EDWARD NORTHEY

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driving our enemy, who had now been reinforced from the north eastwards from the districts of Iringa, Ubena, and Songea, the occupation of Iringa being synchronized with the arrival of General Van Deventer at Kilosa.'

This, however, was not till August 22nd, and it is necessary to turn once more to the doings of General Smuts's main body. The principal force opposing him, about 3,000 rifles, was now located in the Nguru mountains, and covered Morogoro, 50 miles or so to the south, a former capital of the colony and still a place of much importance, which was the next British strategic objective. First of all, therefore, the Nguru mountains had to be cleared. These mountains are divided into two unequal portions by the valley of the Mjonga, and the enemy's main position was on the much smaller, eastern portion, which terminates to the south in Mount Kanga. Opposite Kanga, on the western side of the valley, though on the eastern bank of the river, is the village of Matomondo. Ten miles farther south, on the western bank of the river, is Mhonda, and south again of Mhonda lies Turiani.

General Smuts as usual depended on turning movements and, after gathering information as to the practicability of the various tracks, he set his troops in motion on August 5th in the following manner. General Sheppard's brigade was to make a holding attack on the main enemy position at Ruhunga, on the eastern slopes of Mount Kanga, and to pass his main body down to the Russungo river to the south of the mountain. General Hannyngton's brigade was to advance down the Mjonga valley, that is along the western side of Mount Kanga. General Brits's division was to move away to the right flank up the Lukigura valley and through Kimbe, then across the Kiseru and through the cleft in the Nguru mountains into the Mjonga valley at Mhonda, well in the rear of the enemy.

Brits's division started on August 5th, and Enslin reached Mhonda with the 2nd Mounted Brigade on the 8th. From here he sent back word that the roads through the mountains, contrary to the information received, were impracticable for wheeled traffic. Meanwhile Hannyngton, starting on the 6th, had reached Matomondo and there met with strong opposition. Therefore the Commander-in-Chief diverted Brits's infantry, under Beves, which was following painfully in the track of the

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mounted brigade, and moved it round the north side of the mountains to reinforce Hannyngton. The transport was at the same time sent back to Lukigura and thence along the main eastern road in the wake of Sheppard, who had moved on the 7th and was advancing through thick bush towards the Kanga position. Enslin meanwhile had passed through the Mhonda Gap and established himself across the enemy's line of retreat, but one of his regiments lost its way and eventually arrived at Matomondo, and he found himself too weak to stem the retiring flood of the enemy. However, he secured his hold of Mhonda Mission station a little way up the cleft, and his presence induced the enemy to abandon all his mountain defences and retire south while he could. Had Brits's infantry brigade been able to reinforce the mounted troops the enemy would have been entirely trapped.

After two days' stubborn fighting (August 10th and 11th) Matomondo was carried, and on August 11th Sheppard, at his second attempt to find a way through the bush, reached the Russungo to find the enemy fled. On the next day Sheppard's, Hannyngton's and Enslin's brigades joined hands at Turiani, and head-quarters were established there. Sheppard came on the 13th to Kipera on the Wami, and Enslin's mounted brigade was advanced to Ngulu Kwa Boga on the Mkindu river, and thence to Mwomero, the 17th Cavalry and the 130th Baluchis of Sheppard's command following in support. Simultaneously, the 2nd E.A. Brigade and the S.A.I. moved by the direct road upon Kwedihombo, and after a brush with the enemy's rear-guard occupied it on the 15th. On the following day Hannyngton's brigade arrived at Mwomero. The enemy, it had been learned, was retiring in force down the Morogoro road towards Dakawa, a town of some importance on the Wami, but a small body from Mwomero was going farther west to the Mkundi along the Kilosa road. General Hannyngton was instructed to follow up this latter force, while the main body advanced upon Dakawa, Sheppard from Kipera along the south bank of the Wami, Enslin towards the other bank from Kwedihombo. The enemy, on the south bank, at first held both in check, for the river is wide and deep, but after a day's delay and the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief in person, the mounted brigade got across farther up stream, and the Germans retired precipitately, having lost heavily, mainly from artillery fire. This

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was on the 18th. A bridge had now to be constructed and the road from Turiani onwards improved sufficiently to allow the heavier guns to be brought up, for at Morogoro it was expected that the enemy's naval guns would be in action. For these reasons even the mounted troops, for whom General Smuts always found such abundant use, were given a few days' halt.

Meanwhile, Van Deventer had also been moving, and it was in part the success of his operations that had brought the enemy back so rapidly from the Nguru mountains to Morogoro. His objective was Kilosa and his march thither was even more arduous than his former swoop upon Kondoa Irangi. His division, which had been advancing from Kondoa Irangi towards Mpwapwa, was concentrated at Nyangalo on August 9th, and at once moved out against the enemy, who were at Chunyo. Thither they marched over a waterless area, attacked at once, on the 11th, and after a night's fighting found that the enemy had evacuated his position. They pursued him towards Mpwapwa, and fought and beat him again before nightfall on the 12th. Three days later another fight took place forty miles farther on, the enemy here having not only machine guns and field artillery but heavy guns as well. The infantry had marched 20 miles that day before coming into action, but they attacked so stubbornly that during the night the Germans began to evacuate Kidete by train, and next day, the attack being resumed with the usual encircling movements by the mounted troops, they abandoned their very strong position. During the week following, from August 15th to the 22nd, Van Deventer pressed the enemy back step by step along the railway, fighting almost continuously for the whole of the 25 miles. Particularly stubborn was the fighting at Msagara on the 19th and on the 21st in front of Kilosa itself; the railway runs the whole way through a defile affording one defensive position after another. Along the railway Kilosa is over 100 miles south-east of Dodoma and 50 miles west of Morogoro. Since leaving Kondoa Irangi on July 24th, a bare month, Van Deventer's troops, such of them as had taken the shortest route, had covered at least 220 miles; others had done far more. The lack of transport and of roads had left rations always short, sometimes non-existent, and the horses and mules, besides enduring the consequent hardships, were

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a prey from Mpwapwa onwards to the abhorred 'fly'. They had had practically no grain since April.

It was now learned that a large body of the enemy who was being reinforced by troops from the Nyasaland front was at Uleia, 20 miles south of Kilosa, and after only three days' rest General Smuts on August 26th ordered Van Deventer to advance once more upon Kidodi and Kidatu. Once again therefore he called on his weary troops and most gallantly they responded. The enemy was driven out of Uleia the same day, and out of Kidodi on September 10th after more hard fighting. 'From Uleia to Kidodi', wrote Van Deventer, 'the country consists of high mountain ridges running across the road for several miles. These had all been entrenched by the enemy some time ago, so that in the various actions his troops could fall back from one entrenched position to the next, a mile or so in rear. The operations thus called for an extraordinary amount of mountain climbing and constant fighting.'

Before this date, on August 24th, Van Deventer had detached the 1st Mounted Brigade, all but one regiment, to co-operate with General Enslin's 2nd Mounted Brigade, which had been the first portion of the main body to resume operations after the very brief halt at Dakawa. Enslin, on August 21st, was sent across country to Mkata, on the Central Railway, some 20 miles west of Morogoro, in order to bar the enemy's retreat in that direction. On the 23rd the main body started on a two days' march through waterless country to the valley of the Ngerengere, thus approaching Morogoro from the east. The Ngerengere was struck at Msungulu on the night of the 24th, and on the 26th the advance was continued upstream to Mohale and to Morogoro, which General Smuts entered on the following day, making the town his head-quarters. At the same time Hannyngton's brigade was sent south-eastwards from Msungulu to Mikese, also on the railway. The distance of Morogoro from Dar es Salaam along the line is 129 miles, and of Mikese about 110. On the 28th Sheppard's brigade, which had been working on the road between Msungulu and Morogoro, moved across the railway, due south from Mohale, to the Kiroka Pass, on the eastern side of the Uluguru mountains, and Hannyngton's brigade to the river just east of it. The roads in these parts were very bad and had to be made anew with

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great labour, commissariat was almost impossible to contrive, and the country was terribly waterless. But the troops were buoyed up by the prospect of forcing upon the enemy a general surrender.

Meanwhile, General Enslin's troops had arrived, on August 24th, at Mlali, on the opposite side of the Uluguru mountains, where it was reinforced by the greater portion of Van Deventer's Mounted Brigades under General Nussey. They occupied Kisagale Hill, where they captured an enemy ammunition dump, and from this and other of the low hills commanded the road from Morogoro. They were just in time to intercept a considerable force of the enemy trying to effect its retreat, and after two days' fighting the Germans destroyed two naval guns which they could not remove and took to the hills in the direction of Mgeta, 10 miles south-east. Enslin dismounted his men and went into the mountains after them, moving, however, more directly to the south in the hopes of cutting off their retreat, while General Nussey occupied Mgeta. General Smuts in person, as well as General Brits, to whose division General Enslin's brigades belonged, now arrived at Mlali and sent Nussey's brigade along the Mgeta river in the track of the enemy, while Brits with Enslin's and Beves's brigades (less two regiments at the time lent to the 2nd Division) moved round the west of the mountains by way of Mahalaka to Kisaki on their extreme southern edge. The enemy had apparently intended making a serious defence of these mountains, for General Nussey in his pursuit came upon large quantities of heavy gun ammunition, but the movements of General Enslin were too quick for him. Hardly any opposition was met with all the way to Kisaki, and General Brits was in front of that place by September 5th, though without either artillery or wheeled transport, which could not cross the Msongosi river and had to return to Morogoro and take the eastern road.

Nevertheless, he resolved on attacking Kisaki on September 7th and sent Beves along the Mgeta to attack from the north and Enslin, with the mounted troops, round the right flank to attack from the south and the south-west. But the town, in which von Lettow himself now was, was strongly held on a wide circumference, and Beves found the bush too thick to allow of his making his weight felt, the bulk of the defending

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force being on the right bank of the river, opposite Enslin. Enslin had therefore to retire, and General Brits then ordered General Beves, who had dug in in front of Kisaki, to do the same. The whole division established itself on the edge of Little Whigu Hill, about four miles to the north-west.

All this while General Nussey, with no other transport than carriers, had been working his way through the mountains, and on the very next morning, September 8th, debouched upon Kisaki. Thus the two forces had, as a matter of fact, concentrated upon the field of battle in approved fashion, but unfortunately the two Generals were unaware of one another's movements, and General Smuts, who had intended directing the combined operations himself, had been held up by an accident to his car and lack of a horse. As it was, General Nussey was at once attacked and compelled on that same day to fight an ineffective action, which served no very useful purpose except to attract the attention of his colleague. But General Brits, owing to the bush, could not join in the fighting, and it was not till evening that his scouts reached General Nussey with orders to come to his own camp, which he did, but not before the enemy, who greatly outnumbered his troops, had withdrawn. This was practically the first check the British had suffered since General Smuts had assumed command, and he comments on the recovery of enemy morale that ensued. Next day, September 9th, General Smuts, on receiving news of what had occurred, ordered General Brits to march round to the south of Kisaki ; but this was judged impossible and General Brits instead proposed moving across the north side. In accordance with this plan General Enslin proceeded to the east of Kisaki and occupied Dakawa (the second of the name to fall in our path), on the Tulo road, on the 15th. Here he was only nine miles away from Hannyngton, and the advance of General Hoskins's division down the east side of the mountains must now be followed.

General Smuts had hoped to compel von Lettow to make a stand at Morogoro, but his troops had not retreated only by way of Mlali, where he had been confronted by General Enslin, and southwards from Kiroka, whence General Hannyngton pursued him, but also directly across the mountains, from Morogoro itself to Kisaki, by a track unknown to the British commander. Thus while the force in Kisaki proved stronger

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than had been anticipated, the opposition to General Hoskins's advance was formidable because of the great difficulties of the terrain rather than of the enemy's numbers. On the 28th of August the enemy made a stand on the Makamo river, where they held a ridge and had to be driven out by a turning movement on the part of the 3rd King's African Rifles. On the following day the line of the Manga and Ruvu rivers was reached, and by September 2nd the whole division was astride it. The engineering problem here was a serious one. Not only was the bridge destroyed, but so also was the gallery carrying the road round the face of the perpendicular rock which constitutes the river's southern bank. This had been partly supported on piles, partly blasted out of the rock. The men, however, rose to the occasion. General Sheppard, who was a Royal Engineer, took charge of the work, and by the 5th, with the labour of such skilled men as were available and of most of his own brigade as well, he had reconstructed the missing 200 yards of roadway, so as to be passable by artillery. Thereafter it was used constantly without mishap by the whole motor transport of the force.

The infantry had already pushed on, and on September 4th Magali Ridge was occupied. On the following day the Gold Coast Regiment, which had reached East Africa by the end of July, and the 2nd King's African Rifles were in touch with the enemy on the southern slopes of Kikarunga and at the same time the 29th Punjabis advanced to Tununguo on the east of the main advance. On the 6th some of the British guns were brought up and the enemy was driven out. On the 9th the 2nd King's African Rifles came upon the enemy's 22nd Field Company not far from Wakami and inflicted heavy losses. Tulo was occupied without opposition that same day. On the 10th the enemy was found to be occupying an entrenched position in front of Mikese, on the Dunthumi, and the whole of General Hannyngton's brigade presently came into action. Von Lettow, with strong reinforcements, had just come over from Kisaki. The Kitoho hill, about a mile to the north of the road, was seized and Hannyngton sought to make a holding frontal attack along the road with the 3rd Kashmiris and turn the enemy's left or northern flank with the 57th Rifles and the 3rd King's African Rifles. Later, the 5th South Africans joined in on the south of the road, and on the next day, as

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the fight was still in progress, two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment reinforced the troops on Kitoho, who were being heavily counter-attacked. The enemy was strongly posted and had heavier guns than any that could be opposed to them. The 12th found things very much as they had been. General Hoskins sent the 29th Punjabis up to reinforce the 2nd Brigade, which was beginning to tire, and little by little progress was made on the left which endangered the enemy's position. During the afternoon of the 12th the enemy began to withdraw and under our pressure he lost heavily in doing so. By evening we were in possession of the Dunthumi and its very welcome water-supply, while the enemy retired to the Mgeta. The fighting on the Dunthumi had lasted three days, but General Smuts, who was at Kisaki at the time, makes no mention of it in his dispatch. It is hard to avoid the impression that the Commander-in-Chief would have contrived to give the flank attack a wider sweep, but a country of alternating swamp and high grass, combined with intense heat and difficulty of finding water, made extended movements difficult and, in face of an enemy who knew the lie of the land, dangerous.

On the 15th, while Hoskins was still on the Dunthumi, Enslin having that day come to Dakawa, the Germans abandoned Kisaki and here too fell back upon the Mgeta, where they had all the worst of the climate, leaving General Smuts in full occupation of the Uluguru mountains. Here the General established himself and reorganized his forces preparatory to a fresh advance, while with raids by land and air and artillery fire he continued to harass the enemy beyond the Mgeta.

In all the other localities, valuable progress had been made. General Northey had occupied Lupembe on August 19th with one column, Iringa on August 29th with a second, and both columns then advanced from north-west and south-west on Mahenge. A third column had occupied Songea, 80 miles east of Lake Nyasa. In the lake district the three forces—Colonel Molitor's from St. Michael, Sir Charles Crewe's from Mwanza, Colonel Olsen's from Ujiji and Ruchugi, together with a fourth from Karema, lower down Lake Tanganyika than Ujiji—had continued their converging movements upon Tabora. The rear guards opposed to both Colonel Molitor and Colonel Olsen fought stubbornly, and heavy fighting took place on September 12th and 13th at Itanga, to the north,

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and the Lulangaru Hills, to the west of Tabora; but the Germans were already beginning to evacuate the town, and on September 19th the Belgians entered it. General Crewe occupied Igalula, on the railway 30 miles east of Tabora, a few days later. The Germans retired in two columns, one due south, towards Itunda, the other westward by the railway; but very little of the line was now left to them, and this body too had to turn south. Both were next heard of in October on the Great Ruaha river, north-west of Iringa. The enemy losses at Tabora were heavy, as many as 50 whites being killed and 120 taken. Several guns, including two 4·1-inch, were abandoned and a quantity of stores and ammunition was destroyed. Tabora itself was not only the most populous town in German East Africa, but was the centre of the best recruiting district for Askaris. Portugal, by this time, had entered the war and Portuguese troops had crossed the Ruvuma river, which is her frontier, at several points. Finally, a most important move had been made on the coast. From Bagamoyo, which had been occupied by the Navy on August 15th, a force drawn from the lines of communication troops, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Edwards, had advanced in two columns upon Dar es Salaam. One of these columns moved down the Ruvu, found the Central Railway bridge destroyed, and defeated an enemy force near Ruvu station. It then turned east towards Dar es Salaam, which the other column, moving down the coast and co-operating with the fleet, had occupied, without opposition, on September 4th. The garrison, after destroying all the guns, docks, and works of any military value, had retired south. Dar es Salaam obviously promised to be of the greatest possible value to our forces as a base, but it was first necessary to reconstruct the railway and provide rolling-stock. The retreating Germans had thoroughly wrecked the line and destroyed sixty bridges, one of which, the Ruvu bridge, was a quarter of a mile long. Meanwhile the two Kilwas, Mikindani, Sudi Bay, and Lindi were successively occupied by the Navy and garrisons established. Thus the whole coast-line was now in our effective occupation, save for the delta of the Rufiji, and October found the Germans disposed along the Rufiji river and about 30 miles north of it, and about the Ruaha and Ulanga (or Kilombero), its tributaries. They occupied barely a tenth part of their former holding in this, their last remaining

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African colony, and of that only the Mahenge plateau was habitable by Europeans. Seven months' campaigning had deprived them of all the rest.

But campaigning as carried out by General Smuts, at top-most speed, is exhausting work, and the strategical situation, together with the physical needs of his army, made a considerable pause advisable. The climate had told heavily on the health of the men; the long marches, the lack of water and of certain kinds of food, and above all the devastating tsetse fly, on that of the animals. Twelve thousand men were sent back to South Africa as unfit for further service in East Africa, and it was determined to use henceforward as few white troops as possible; nevertheless, the 2nd Battalion of the Loyal North Lancashires, who had been sent to the Cape before General Smuts's arrival, leaving only their invaluable machine gun company behind, now returned at full strength once more. In December the Nigerian Brigade, of four infantry battalions and a four-gun mountain battery, under Brig.-Gen. Cunliffe, arrived. This was a most valuable reinforcement, for it numbered on its arrival 125 officers, 70 British N.C.O.'s, over 3,000 native rank and file, and 812 machine gun and battery gun carriers. Most of the troops had had previous service in the Cameroons, where the campaign had ended in February 1916; the brigade was composed of fine fighting material, was not troubled by the climate to the same extent as white troops, and had reserves in its West African depots to replace casualties. Also, additional battalions of the King's African Rifles had been formed and some recruits had been obtained from the enemy's deserters.

The 3rd Division (General Brits's) was now disbanded. Its Mounted Brigade, the 2nd, was nearly horseless, and its personnel had also sadly diminished. The 1st Mounted Brigade, in Van Deventer's command, was strengthened and the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade was transferred to Army Reserve, the 5th S.A.I. being sent to General Northey and its place taken by the Cape Corps, a strong coloured battalion.[1] The Lake Detachment from the lines of communication was also broken up, Sir Charles Crewe being invalided to South Africa.

Much reorganization and reconstruction was required in

[1] For the Cape Corps see below, pp. 497–501.

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connexion with the transport arrangements. It was not until January 1917 that trains could run from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, a distance of nearly 300 miles, though it was contrived that motor tractors and trailers, carrying a 15-ton load, should be run on railway trolley wheels as early as the beginning of the previous October. General Van Deventer's engineers had already applied this method on the part of the line between Dodoma and Kilosa, rather over 100 miles, and by November it was in use all the way to Tabora, 526 miles from Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam could thus be utilized to relieve Mombasa, and it was further arranged to establish a base farther south at Kilwa, whence, when a move was made again from the north, a newly formed brigade, under General Hannyngton, could operate in the enemy's rear. General Northey's base was now to be Lupembe, involving a further extension of his long line of porterage from Nyasaland (thus limiting the size of his forces), and General Van Deventer's base was Iringa.

But before the whole plan could be put into operation there was a good deal of local activity on the southern fronts. General Northey's troops were scattered over a wide area north of the Ruhuje river, from Lupembe to Iringa, when in the middle of October the enemy force from Tabora under Wintgens, from 1,000 to 2,000 strong, approached Iringa and cut it off from the south. Colonel Rodger, commanding at Iringa, was thereupon placed under General Van Deventer, and, being relieved in his garrison by the 7th South African Infantry and the South African Cyclists, was ordered south to attack the enemy. Simultaneously General Northey sent a battery, with an escort under Colonel Baxendale, to reinforce Colonel Rodger. Baxendale on his way left two guns and 50 men, under Captain Clarke of the South African Mounted Rifles, to hold Igominyi, took the battery to Iringa, and was returning to Igominyi when he was ambushed near that place on the 23rd of October and was killed with 33 of his men. The enemy then attacked Igominyi in considerable force and, after several days' resistance and the loss of Captain Clarke, the place was taken on the morning of the 29th, though about half of the little garrison made their escape. On that same evening Colonel Rodger's column, with a portion of the force that had relieved him at Iringa, reached Mahansi near

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by. Next day he too was attacked, but after two days' fighting the enemy retired, having lost heavily. The column then returned to Iringa. During the remainder of the year there were many fights, on a small scale but often very bitterly contested, in the whole of this area. The most important were one on October 30th on the Ruhuje, where a strong force under Colonel Hawthorn took 6 whites and 76 Askaris prisoners, together with a 6-cm. gun, 3 machine guns, and many stores; another when General Wahle, while attacking a post garrisoned by about a hundred men at Malangali, was on November 12th surprised by Colonel Murray with 400 rifles and severely handled; and a third when Colonel Murray with 450 rifles and 18 machine guns surrounded an enemy force at Ilembule and captured 8 officers, 48 other whites, and 250 Askaris, with a 4·1-inch howitzer and 3 machine guns.

General Smuts, after a visit to the new Kilwa base, had modified his original plan. Instead of using on that front only General Hannyngton's brigade, he now transferred to it the whole of the 1st Division under General Hoskins, at the same time exchanging for the 1st East African Brigade, under General Sheppard, the 3rd, under General Hannyngton, which was already at Kilwa. General Sheppard's troops remained on the Mgeta under the Commander-in-Chief's immediate control.

The detailed composition of the forces at this date was as follows:

1st East African Division (General Hoskins).
- 2nd East African Brigade (General O'Grady).
  - 57th Rifles; Gold Coast Regiment; 1st/3rd and 2nd/3rd King's African Rifles.
- 3rd East African Brigade (General Hannyngton).
  - 2nd Batt. Loyal North Lancs.; 129th Baluchis; 40th Pathans.
  - 1st/2nd and 2nd/2nd King's African Rifles.
- Divisional Troops: 5th, 8th, and 14th Batteries (Naval 12-pr.); 10th Armoured Car Battery; King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry Company; 61st Pioneers (one wing); one section East African Pioneer Company.

2nd East African Division (General Van Deventer).
- 1st South African Mounted Brigade (General Nussey): 1st, 4th, 7th, and 9th South African Horse.
- 3rd South African Infantry Brigade (General Berrangé): 7th, 8th, and 10th South African Infantry; 17th Infantry Indian Army.
- 1st/4th King's African Rifles.

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Divisional Troops: 5th South African Horse (dismounted): 28th Mountain Battery; 1st, 2nd, and 4th South African Field and 12th Howitzer Batteries; No. 4 Armoured Car Battery; East African and Indian Volunteer Machine Gun Companies, South African Motor Cyclist Corps, and other detachments.

Army Troops under the Commander-in-Chief.

1st East African Infantry Brigade (General Sheppard): 25th Royal Fusiliers; 2nd Rhodesians; 29th Punjabis; 130th Baluchis; 2nd and 3rd Kashmiris; Nos. 6, 7, and 13 Batteries.

No. 1 Armoured Car Battery; 1 double Company 61st Pioneers; and other detachments.

2nd South African Infantry Brigade (General Beves): 5th and 6th South African Infantry; Cape Corps; African Scout Battalion; 3rd South African Field Battery; No. 3 Armoured Car Battery; and other detachments.

Nigerian Brigade (General Cunliffe): 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Nigeria Regiments; Nigerian Battery Pioneer section, &c.

The formations in this last class were continually being varied. There were, in addition, a number of units, mainly Indian, employed on the lines of communication and also General Northey's force.

In the area of the main operations the enemy had not waited to be attacked, but had, in addition to the activities of the Tabora refugees, made two offensive moves. From Kilwa General Hannyngton had sent forward several detachments, notably one to Kibata, and this the enemy attacked twice. The first attack, on November 7th, by a force not more than 400 strong, was easily driven off. The second attack, which began on December 6th, was made by a far stronger force, provided with several guns. The enemy occupied the hills that command the place from the north, east, and west, and pushed the attack strongly, the British having at first only one section of mountain guns to oppose to a 4·1-inch gun and a howitzer, as well as several small pieces. But General Hoskins pushed up reinforcements as quickly as bad roads and heavy rain permitted, and after repulsing a night attack on the 9th and 15th, the British assumed the offensive, and on the 15th and 16th the Gold Coast Regiment and the 129th Baluchis drove the enemy off the nearer hills. Though for some time they remained in the neighbourhood and indulged

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in occasional long range practice they did not again threaten danger.

Meanwhile, British detachments from Dar es Salaam had pushed south towards the Rufiji to Msanga and Kongo, and on December 16th the enemy counter-attacked, but after an initial success were driven off. These detachments, which belonged to the lines of communication, were to co-operate in the coming operations by advancing to the Rufiji, at the mouth of which another detachment was to be landed.

But the most important incident at this time was the expulsion of the Portuguese from several of the posts which they had established on the Ruvuma. Not only was a way of escape thereby opened to the threatened enemy, but he provided himself with a very useful quantity of arms and ammunition, and even machine guns, at our Allies' expense.

The next, and it was then hoped the last, phase in the campaign was timed to begin on New Year's Day 1917, and the plan comprised an advance from north, east, and west. On the Mgeta the enemy had been located in a strong position opposite Kisaki and Dakawa and also at Kiderengwa, farther east. General Beves's brigade was to move through Kisaki and away to the west to Kirengwe, thence south-east to the point of junction of the Rufiji and the Ruaha, which he was to cross with collapsible boats. At the same time General Sheppard was to attack the enemy opposite Dakawa on his left flank more eastward upon the Kiderengwa position. One of his battalions, the 130th Baluchis, under Colonel Dyke, was to press on in advance to Wiransi, on the road to the Rufiji. Further, General Cunliffe was to advance from Mikese on the railway and concentrate at Tulo for a frontal attack, but not to press an attack till it was seen how the other movements progressed. Finally, Colonel Lyall, with one battalion of General Cunliffe's Nigerians and the 2nd Kashmiris from General Sheppard's brigade, was to advance from Tulo through Kiruru, still farther east, to Chimbe, directly in the rear of the Kiderengwa position. He was timed to arrive there on the morning of the general advance.

General Sheppard occupied the position opposite Dakawa with but slight opposition, and then, hearing that the 130th Baluchis were being attacked north of Wiransi by the retreating enemy, pressed on to relieve them, but found on his

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arrival that after hard fighting they had driven the enemy off to the east. He then occupied Wiransi. By this time the Nigerian Brigade had reached the north bank of the Mgeta, driving the enemy's advanced posts before them. Then, hearing that Colonel Lyall had reached Chimbe, they crossed by a bridge. The enemy, retiring towards Beho-Beho and the Rufiji, found Colonel Lyall's force across their road and attacked but could not dislodge him. By the evening of this day, January 1st, General Beves, who had been steadily advancing, was about 10 miles south of Kirengwe. Next day the enemy from in front of Colonel Lyall was found to have taken to the bush and made for Beho-Beho, and General Cunliffe on that morning occupied Kiderengwa.

General Sheppard was now ordered to move south-west from Wiransi towards Fuga Mountain and thence march south to the Chogowali with the object of outflanking the enemy, who were in position south of Beho-Beho. During the afternoon Colonel Lyall's column got into touch with Colonel Dyke's north of Beho-Beho, where action was joined with the enemy. On the next day, the 3rd, these two small columns, now united under Colonel Dyke, from the north, and General Sheppard from the south-west, attacked the Beho-Beho position, and it was here that the famous hunter, F. C. Selous, now at 65 a captain in the 25th Royal Fusiliers, was killed. The enemy again took to the bush and slipped away. All this while General Beves's brigade, which had left Dunthumi on December 30th, had been marching towards the Rufiji. They covered 70 miles and, though they encountered no opposition from the Germans, they were heavily laden and the achievement was a fine one. The advanced guard reached the river at Kipenio, a short distance south or south-west of Mkalinzo and higher up the river, on the night of the 2nd/3rd and at once got their Berthon boats into the water and crossed over. Next day they seized a German post at Mkalinzo, on the road from Mahenge to Kibambawe and between Kipenio and Kibambawe on the river, and gained much useful information there from captured documents and prisoners and over the telephone. It was now learned that the Germans had been ordered to retire eastward along the Rufiji, but that the movements of Colonel Lyall's column in that direction had disconcerted this plan. It was also learnt that, while a westward flanking movement

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such as that actually executed by General Beves had been expected, Colonel Dyke's Baluchi battalion had attracted all the attention, so that the wider movement had gone unobserved.

On the 5th General Sheppard occupied Kibambawe, on the north bank of the Rufiji. The bridge at this point had been destroyed by the enemy in their retreat and they had taken up a strong position on the south bank. During the succeeding night Sheppard contrived under cover of darkness to push across a gradually increasing number of troops who established themselves on a sand-bank across the main stream, but were cut off from the mainland by a swamp and a narrow back-water of the river. It was not until the 17th that Sheppard's brigade finally got possession of the south bank of the river, the enemy having fallen back some six miles south to a strong position at Mkindu. This retirement was undoubtedly due to fear of having their line of retreat south to Maba cut off, either by General Beves's brigade or by the advance of the Nigerian Brigade under General Cunliffe. Beves, advancing down the river, had cleared the Germans out of Mkalinzo and held it, but on the 8th General Smuts came himself to Kipenio and ordered the detachment at Mkalinzo back to the bridgehead. The Nigerian Brigade (less one battalion with Colonel Lyall's force), after the action on the Mgeta river, had been ordered back to Dunthumi, but on the 10th received fresh orders to march to Kipenio following Beves's route. They arrived at Kipenio on the 15th and their whole force had crossed over by the 16th. On the 17th they moved out from Kipenio and on the following day drove back the enemy and captured their position at Mkindu, a strong position on a low table-topped hill about half a mile square, with a 50 ft. escarpment north, east, and west and a gentle slope to the south. The Germans retreated for some four miles to the south to Kipongo.

On the 19th the Nigerians were reinforced by the Cape Corps Battalion under Colonel Morris from General Beves's brigade, and on the 20th two battalions of the Nigerians and the Cape Corps, the whole force being under the command of Colonel Morris, drove the enemy out of Kipongo and he retired to a position about seven miles farther south at Ngwembe. The Nigerian Brigade now held Mkindu and Kipongo—the Cape Corps being ordered back to rejoin General Beves's brigade,

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which had moved from Kipenio and taken up a position at Mpangas on the Rufiji a mile or two lower down than Kipenio. By this time the rainy season had set in—rather earlier than usual. The lines of communication to rail-head at Mikese had lengthened out to 160 miles, with the Rufiji as a final obstacle to cross. For the last 70 miles the country, composed of black cotton soil, was fast becoming a swamp. There was an end to all mechanical transport, dearth of carriers began to imperil the rationing of the troops, and the situation rapidly became worse as time went on—no local supplies of any sort being available. A further advance therefore became impossible. It was, however, considered feasible to make one more attack upon the enemy holding Ngwembe, before the rains prohibited all active operations. This was to be more of the nature of a reconnaissance in force than an attack leading to a further advance. Intelligence reports, never very trustworthy, were to the effect that the position at Ngwembe was only weakly held. A force of Nigerians consisting of the 3rd Battalion and two mountain guns—with one company from the 4th Battalion as escort for carriers—under Lieut.-Col. Archer, O.C. 3rd Battalion, left Kipongo on January 24th to carry out this operation. The enemy, who had been reinforced the night before, were stronger than had been anticipated, and the Nigerians, after being roughly handled, were obliged to fall back on Kipongo. This was the last engagement of any importance in this area. General Sheppard's brigade was broken up and the troops sent north. General Beves's South African Brigade, with the exception of the Cape Corps, returned to South Africa, and the Nigerian Brigade was left to hold the line of the Rufiji.

In other quarters operations had been successful. South of Dar es Salaam, Mkamba and Kibesa had been occupied by the 10th January and Kisegese on the 17th. In the Kilwa area the enemy had retired and General Hannyngton occupied Ngarambi. General Northey's troops, moving out of Lupembe towards the end of December, had defeated the enemy near Mfrika, and by the middle of January had crossed the Ruhuje at Malawi's in pursuit of the enemy, whose main force on this front was retiring upon Ifinga. Mohoro was occupied on the 16th and the 4·1-inch gun used by the enemy against Kibata captured. Still farther south the 5th South African Infantry under Colonel Byron, operating from Songea, had advanced

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due north, also towards Ifinga, and dispersed hostile detachments on December 20th at Nyamabengo, where they captured stores and cattle, and at Gumbiro on January 6th.

Van Deventer at Iringa, which he took over from Northey in December, had found himself handicapped by the difficulty of getting up supplies for so large a force as he had intended to use. He had accordingly retained only three battalions of dismounted and a squadron of mounted troops, sending the rest of his division back to the railway. On December 25th this force, acting in three columns, attacked the enemy's position north of Lukegeta, where they held a gently sloping ridge, with a single knoll half-way up it. Up this slope the central column, led by the 17th Infantry, advanced under heavy fire and by nightfall were at the knoll. Here they dug in and waited throughout that night and the following day for the flanking attacks to develop. But the country through which the march lay was so difficult that the movements were hopelessly delayed; a section of the 28th Mountain Battery, for example, which was with the left-hand column, lost seventeen mules on the march, nine of them falling down precipices. The result was that before the two columns could come into action the enemy had once more made off through the bush, unsuccessfully attacked Makungwas, where the right-hand column had left a detachment of the 7th South African Horse (which had no horses), and, being pursued by the main body, made off again. It was realized after this failure that, particularly in the unsettled southern country, a tactical encircling of the enemy was impossible, and also that white soldiers were not suited for use in this area, principally because of the weight of food they require. Accordingly, the white troops were ordered back to Dodoma on the railway, and the cordon was maintained by Indian and African units.

At this point in the campaign General Smuts was called away to represent South Africa at the Imperial Conference in London, and he sailed from Dar es Salaam on the 20th January 1917, leaving his work unfinished. But his plans were well laid out, and, though longer time was taken in carrying them out than had been anticipated, there is no reason to suppose that this was due to any shortcoming on the part of his successors, but simply to the practical impossibility, to which the General has himself testified, and which he had himself recently

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experienced, of surrounding in such a country as East Africa an enemy prepared to abandon any position and dispense with all bases and all transport.

His plan at this time was to use the Rufiji as a line of supply and for the Nigerian Brigade to advance to Lakuliro, joining hands there with General Hannyngton's column from Kilwa. These two forces would then move by different routes upon Liwale. At the same time Lindi, in the far south, was being made available as a new sea base whence a considerable force was to operate and endeavour, with General Northey's force from Songea, to cut off the Germans on the south. It was thus hoped to round up and capture the whole of the enemy's remaining forces, as well as to occupy his entire territory. This, however, was not to be.

The command now devolved upon General Hoskins and there was no check in the operations. On the same day that the Nigerians had a set-back at Ngwembe, on General Northey's front at Likuyu a considerable German force surrendered, but before the end of January the roads and bridges were so damaged by the rains as temporarily to bring all operations based on the Kibambawe line or on the Dodoma–Iringa line to a standstill. This was one of the wettest seasons ever known, and it was unfortunate that our troops were now in a low unhealthy area, with great difficulties in rationing them, though the Rufiji was becoming a useful line of communication. It was estimated about this time that the enemy's fighting strength in East Africa amounted to 1,100 Europeans and 7,300 native troops. It was, of necessity, far more concentrated than in the earlier days of the campaign. The principal concentration was in the Lindi area, to oppose the new forces assembling under General O'Grady. Other bodies faced General Sheppard and General Cunliffe south of the Rufiji and General Hannyngton in the Kilwa area. On the south-western front there was more dispersion. General Northey's troops advanced during February, while little was in progress elsewhere, upon Kibinda with one column, Kitande with another, and Ifinga with a third, all three meeting with opposition. Many small actions were fought, but it was never found possible to round up the enemy.

In March there were some desultory outpost engagements and April was again a month of heavy rain with none but

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outpost actions, but the whole trend of events was to make the Rufiji area untenable by the Germans, who were gradually withdrawing south, so that their forces now fell into three main groups, on the Mahenge plateau under Tafel, under von Lettow himself east of the Luwegu river, and a remarkable nomadic force under Wintgens in the region west of the upper Ruaha.

It was this last force which, in the spring and summer of 1917, occasioned the most excitement, though its numbers were never large enough to make it more than a source of extreme annoyance. In February it had several brushes with General Northey's columns, notably near Tundala, but a concentration near this point forced Wintgens to make off to the north, pursued by Colonel Murray. Later, a detachment was sent to Tabora to head him off, and a mixed body of Nigerian and Belgian troops was dispatched along the Central Railway to join in the chase. In March Wintgens was followed up near St. Moritz and again near Kitunga, not far from Sikonge. Here he stayed, living on the country in most ruthless fashion, till the middle of May, making no attempt apparently to take part in the main operations of his compatriots in the south. It is supposed that his Askaris, who came from the Tabora and Mwanza districts, refused to go south. Colonel Murray reached Kitunga on May 19th, only to find that his quarry had fled three days earlier in the direction of Tabora, but at this point Wintgens himself fell sick and surrendered to the Belgians, handing over the command to Captain Naumann.

Naumann was an even more skilful vagrant than Wintgens had been. He contrived to elude the 4th Nigerians and crossed the Central Railway, eventually appearing at Singida, which is due west of Kondoa Irangi, and occupying the fort there. He then attacked Mkalama, where there is also a fort. He besieged the small garrison (6 Europeans and 10 Askaris) for three days, June 5th–7th, and on June 7th he fought an inconclusive action with an advanced guard of the Nigerians who had been toiling in his track for a fortnight past. Next day the main body arrived, but Naumann had made off in the night. Again he went north, but was headed off from Mwanza on Lake Victoria and moved east to Ikoma. At this point the Belgians took up the pursuit and came up with him at Ikoma, but were very roughly handled, and Naumann turned

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south. The 1st Nigerians now joined in, but could not bring their elusive quarry to a stand. Naumann was at one time said to be moving towards Magadi Lake; at another to be threatening Handeni; then he was heard of near Moshi. Finally, being now pursued by the Cape Corps, who succeeded in capturing half his force, and by the 10th South African Horse, he was run down west of the Usambara railway and surrendered with 14 Europeans and 150 Askaris at the end of September. His men had marched, between February and October, some 2,000 miles, moving by devious routes from the Nyasaland to the British East African border.

The operations in the main theatre were not greatly affected by these exploits of Wintgens and Naumann; for it was not so much troops as the means of maintaining them in the desired localities that the British Commander-in-Chief lacked, and the forces used in pursuit of these nomads were not greatly missed. Threatened from the coast and from the Rufiji front, the enemy had drawn back to the Matandu valley and established his civil capital at Liwale, which lies nearly as far south as Lindi. Here he had a wireless station which was in touch, by way of Damascus, with Germany.

At the end of May, General Hoskins handed over the command to General Van Deventer, and almost immediately afterwards, the rains being over, operations began again. The strategic plan now was to squeeze the enemy gradually south, applying the strongest pressure from farther and farther down the coast. Already the forces on the Rufiji were become subsidiary to those based on Kilwa, and presently Lindi was reinforced at the expense of the more northern port. The first move was made from the coast, but early in July two battalions of General Cunliffe's brigade, which was still in the north, marched to Nyangandu, attacked the enemy successfully at Mswega, and on the 21st occupied Kitope. This was the limit of the advance from this side; the line was here held only while pressure was applied farther south.

General von Lettow-Vorbeck had fallen back before the advance of General Hannyngton from Kilwa, fighting only rearguard actions till he reached Narungombe, some 30 miles south of Kilwa. Here, on July 19th, he stood and gave battle. The losses on both sides were heavy, but during the night the Germans had to continue their retreat to the valley of the

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Mbemkuru. Nahungu on this river was now one of von Lettow's principal bases, he made every preparation to hold it and there was a lull in the fighting while General Van Deventer disposed his forces anew. It was not until September that the Kilwa force, now reinforced by the bulk of the Nigerian and Indian troops, advanced upon Luale and, after considerable fighting here and at Beho Chini, drove the enemy upon Nahungu. The action was in effect two actions, General Cunliffe's Nigerians at Beho Chini were attacked by the enemy while General Hannyngton's columns were driving him south from Luale. By breaking into small parties and abandoning much ammunition the Germans escaped envelopment, but their losses were very heavy.

On September 27th Nahungu itself was attacked by three columns moving down three converging roads, and the enemy, after retiring stubbornly upon their prepared position and counter-attacking strongly but unsuccessfully late in the evening on Nahungu Hill, abandoned it during the night. The British losses were not at all heavy, and it is clear that the battle of Beho Chini had, for the time at least, seriously shaken the enemy's morale. The whole of the Kilwa force was now concentrated at Nahungu, and it was time for the chief pressure to be applied on the Lindi front, where an advance had already begun. Accordingly, the bulk of the troops were ordered thither, leaving only a reserve of 1,000 men at Nahungu. The Nigerians were sent southwards from Nahungu, General Hannyngton's column by a more westerly route, through Nangano.

In the other field of operations, Mahenge, complete success had only just been missed. The Belgians, from Tabora, had now arrived on this front, coming down the Central Railway to Dodoma and Kilosa, whence two columns moved south and joined hands at Fakar's on the Kilombero. Then, while General Northey's troops advanced from Lupembe, capturing Mpepo, after a short resistance, on the way, the combined Belgian force fought its way through the hills and came upon Colonel Tafel west of Mahenge. The Germans were beaten, but once again not enveloped, and when on October 9th the Belgians entered Mahenge their enemy escaped eastward to Mgangita. General Northey's columns were at the same time advancing from the south, one upon Mahenge, another upon

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Mgangita, a third upon Liwale by way of Likuyu. General Van Deventer, seeing that Colonel Tafel's only course now was to attempt to march south-east and rejoin von Lettow-Vorbeck, further brought a Belgian column to the Kilwa area and dispatched it to Liwale from the north. Tafel, who was fencing with General Northey's troops throughout October, attempted early in November to execute this 200-mile march, and by November 15th was near Liwale, now deserted by his compatriots. Here he encountered a fourth column of General Northey's, which, under Colonel Shorthose, had marched from the southern end of Lake Nyasa through Portuguese territory; but this adventurous force was too weak to stop him, and he broke through and made for Newala, near the Portuguese border, where he expected to find von Lettow.

Meanwhile operations had been in progress against that commander, who, driven from the Mbemkuru, was next to be attacked on the Lukuledi, 80 miles south, by the Lindi force, together with General Cunliffe's brigade (at the moment commanded by Colonel Mann) from Nahungu. General O'Grady had advanced from Mingoyo, 14 miles inland from Lindi, towards the end of August and by a series of attacks had successfully captured Nrunga, Mtua, and the Nengedi and Nyengedi crossings. Thus when Nahungu fell the enemy was back on a line from Nyangao to Masasi, and the Nigerians were directed to make for Mahiwa, the key to his position, and believed to be lightly held, while General Beves fought his way through Nyangao. General Van Deventer hoped thus to cut his opponents' line of retreat. The 80-mile march, through very hilly country and with very scanty rations, proved most trying. Colonel Mann's column started on October 4th and, urged on by continual messages from head-quarters, reached Namupa Mission on the 14th, after crossing the Nyangao river. Mann was ordered to send one of his battalions to hold the road in rear of Nyangao and with the other two to attack Mahiwa next day. But Mahiwa was not weakly held, and von Lettow-Vorbeck himself, with a mobile column of 600 picked troops, was in the neighbourhood. This was reported to Colonel Mann and passed on by him to General Beves, but apparently discredited by the intelligence officers at head-quarters.

On October 15th there began the last important battle of

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the campaign, great, alike, in point of the numbers engaged and in the fierceness with which it was fought. While the main Nigerian column was attacking Mahiwa and a subsidiary one was occupying the Nyangao road, two of General Beves's four columns, under General O'Grady and Colonel Tytler, were attacking Mtama Nyangao, 10 miles east of Mahiwa, and two Masasi, from the north. None of the attacks progressed very rapidly, and at Mahiwa so far was Colonel Mann from carrying the enemy's position that he soon found himself surrounded and subjected to heavy shelling. On the 16th his Nyangao battalion endeavoured to rejoin him with supplies, but lost heavily and failed to get through. On the same day General O'Grady's column, which was here joined by the 3rd Battalion Nigerian Regiment, had got into Nyangao and tried to reach Mahiwa, but he too failed. On the 17th the 3rd Nigerians went out to Namupa Mission and relieved the 1st Battalion, which, with its brigade transport, had been obliged to entrench itself there. On the 18th General O'Grady came into touch with Colonel Mann and their joint commands were withdrawn. The casualties in these four days' fighting were very heavy, the British having, according to one writer who was present, 2,700 casualties out of 4,900 infantry engaged, while the Germans suffered with equal severity. Though Mahiwa had not been captured, the blow to the Germans, who had no reserves, was irreparable.

General Beves ordered the Nigerians to attack again at dawn next day, but this they were in no position to do and the order was subsequently cancelled. On that day, October 19th, General Cunliffe, who had just rejoined his brigade, superseded General Beves. No further attack was made during October, but on November 6th the advance was resumed, a column from General Hannyngton's command and a mounted force being used to threaten the enemy's rear. In the face of this threat Mahiwa itself was abandoned, after comparatively brief resistance, in favour of a position beyond Mkwera, whither General O'Grady and Colonel Mann followed the enemy. They were ejected from the Mkwera position on the 8th and on the 9th from another at Hatia, where a 4·1-inch gun, 10 machine guns, many rifles, and much ammunition were found. On the 8th, too, General Hannyngton occupied Lukuledi, to the south-east.

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The enemy was now back on his last vantage ground, the Makonde Plateau, but he had no longer the strength for a regular action. On November 15th Chiwata was attacked by three columns, O'Grady's, Mann's, and Hannyngton's, and, fighting only a rear-guard action, von Lettow evacuated it, leaving to the British 33 European and 4 native prisoners of war in hospital, together with the medical staff, 96 Europeans, and 510 Askaris of his own force. The advance was continued the next day, the enemy retiring steadily without attempting a serious stand. Beyond a slight brush in the Luchemi valley on the 17th, there was no more fighting with this force. On the following day 259 Europeans and 700 natives surrendered, and with them were 32 Allied officer prisoners. Von Lettow, with some 300 Europeans and 1,200 natives, had made off to the south. A few days later Newala was occupied by General Hannyngton's troops, and here a further 160 Europeans and 75 Askaris surrendered.

Colonel Tafel, who had been headed south by General Northey and the Belgians, was now the only foe left in German territory. He had arrived at Newala only to find von Lettow fled and the British hot on his tracks. After a skirmish with a patrol of the 25th Cavalry and a detachment of the 129th Baluchis, he drew off to the south and began to cross the Ruvuma into Portuguese territory, but at the last moment either his heart failed him or he grew disgusted with the game. Possibly he, like Wintgens, was a little jealous of von Lettow. Whatever his motive, he turned back and surrendered to the inferior force he had just successfully fought. Thirty Europeans, 180 Askaris, and 640 carriers surrendered on the 26th of November; Tafel himself, with 62 Europeans and 1,000 Askaris, on the 28th. The two Indian detachments together numbered little more than 100 men. Only Captain Otto, with 5 other Europeans and 20 Askaris, refused to go with Tafel, but made off, on the night of the 26th, to join von Lettow, wherever he might be.

This was the extinction of German sovereignty in East Africa, and, in consequence, in the African continent. Early in December the whole province was declared an Allied Protectorate and was later styled the Tanganyika Territory. It still remained to round up General von Lettow-Vorbeck and the 1,500 men who had accompanied him across the Ruvuma.

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He had crossed at Ngomano, near the river's confluence with the Lujenda, almost under the noses of a Portuguese force of some 900 men under Major Pinto. The Portuguese were established in an open camp and had made no defensive preparations. To the German Commander-in-Chief and his seasoned troops such a force was a mere supply depot. The Portuguese fought bravely but unskilfully, and eventually surrendered to the number of 700, Major Pinto and 8 other Europeans being among the killed. The Germans captured 6 machine guns, hundreds of rifles, much ammunition, a week's rations for the whole force, clothing, which they removed from their prisoners, and a supply of porters. Henceforward they used British rifles and ammunition, as supplied to the Portuguese army.

The nearest British force at the time was at Gongonuchi, 55 miles away by road, and von Lettow had therefore a good start, into an unmapped country, without railways or even roads. On December 12th, after a stiff fight with a Portuguese force in the Ukula hills, he occupied Nanguari fort, where was a very large quantity of stores and ammunition. His troops were then split into two columns, one marching east and occupying Medo Boma and Mesa, the other moving south to Mwembe. Meanwhile, British mounted troops had been in hot pursuit and had come in touch with the German rear-guard under Hauptmann Klinkhardt, but though Klinkhardt himself, who was sick, surrendered, the remainder got away.

Operations against von Lettow were now taken in hand from more convenient bases, Porto Amelia on the one side and Nyasaland on the other; but the greater part of the white troops were at this point withdrawn altogether from the country. General von Lettow-Vorbeck, driving his porters, by methods 'often brutal but always effective', in Van Deventer's phrase, eluded pursuit to the end. In May 1918 there was a sharp fight at Maketi, near Kireka Mountain, east of the Lujenda, and there was also fighting near Nanungo. He thence moved south, with the loss of all Governor Schnee's baggage together with much ammunition and paper money. He reached the Malema and later captured a Portuguese depot on the Lugella, obtaining food and clothing, and an Allied post at Kokosani, with a quantity of ammunition. Then he turned north again, living on Portuguese supplies; surprised a small British

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detachment at Nyamirue, where he captured a trench mortar; was hard pressed at Regone, and thence marched directly north to the Ruvuma, which was recrossed on September 28th, and presently the world was surprised to hear of him once more as approaching Tabora. He then turned south again; and when, under the terms of the Armistice arranged in Europe, he agreed to give himself up with 155 Europeans and 1,166 native soldiers, he was south of Kasama, in Northern Rhodesia.[1] But the full story of his wanderings belongs rather to the pages of personal adventure than of world history. The surrender was carried out at Abercorn on the 25th of November 1918, von Lettow-Vorbeck and his officers being allowed to retain their swords. This brief tale of the campaign may well be concluded with General Van Deventer's last tribute to his troops:

'To the troops that achieved and maintained the conquest of German East Africa, unstinted praise is due. Not only were they opposed to an enemy composed of first-class fighting material and specially trained to the peculiar conditions of African bush warfare, but they had also to contend with Nature in some of her most difficult aspects. The vastness of the theatre of operations, the difficulties of supply, and the deadliness of many parts of the country to all but the indigenous African, greatly enhanced the hardships inseparable from any form of campaigning in the tropics. The distances covered by the troops, especially in the latter stages of the campaign, would have been remarkable even in a temperate climate. The theatre of war was perhaps the most difficult in which any large body of troops has fought, and as a test of sheer human endurance the operations in East Africa must rank high among the campaigns of the world.'

[1] For the last phase of his adventures see below, pp. 297–306.

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SECTION II

ZANZIBAR

Mainly supplied by the Government of Zanzibar

THE islands of Zanzibar and Pemba lie over against the northernmost section of the coast-line of what was German East Africa, between Dar es Salaam and the frontier of what was the British East Africa Protectorate. Zanzibar is within 23 miles of the mainland north of Dar es Salaam, and Pemba is about 30 miles north-east of Zanzibar. Zanzibar has an area of 640 square miles, somewhat smaller than Mauritius, Pemba of 380 square miles, the two together being of much the same size as the county of Northamptonshire. At the last census before the war, they had a population of nearly 200,000, and the town of Zanzibar was a town of over 35,000 people, made up of Swahili, Indian, and Arab elements. The great industry was and is the cultivation of cloves, especially in the island of Pemba, and next to cloves, coco-nuts. Much of the trade before the war was in the hands of German firms, and Hamburg was a good market for Zanzibar.

Before Germany gained a political footing in East Africa, in the eighties of the last century, the Arab sultanate of Zanzibar, with its mainland possessions, had been in special relations with the Government of India ; and as an outcome of the ' scramble for Africa ', the two islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were in 1890 formally declared to be a British Protectorate. Under the Zanzibar Order in Council of January 1914, the charge of the Protectorate was in April of that year finally transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. A High Commissioner was appointed, and under him a British Resident, and a Protectorate Council, presided over by the Sultan, was constituted, including both official and unofficial members, but not possessing legislative powers, the laws being enacted in the form of Decrees of His Highness the Sultan. The High Commissioner was the Governor of the East Africa Protectorate, now the Kenya Colony, at the beginning of the war Sir H.

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Conway Belfield, K.C.M.G., and at the end Major-Gen. Sir Edward Northey, now G.C.M.G., C.B. The British Resident was Major Francis Pearce, C.M.G., whose previous service had been mainly in Nyasaland. In 1916 the German island of Mafia was taken over by the Zanzibar administration.

The war effort of the Protectorate—very notable in proportion to its area and resources—is set out in the following account forwarded by the Acting British Resident in April 1919. The effect of the war upon the internal condition of Zanzibar may be summed up in very few words. An inevitable dislocation of trade, caused by the outbreak of war and the immediate proximity of an enemy country, coincided in 1914 with a small crop of the staple product, cloves, and resulted in temporary depression. There was a good clove harvest in 1915, the seaboard was secured and conditions improved. From that date onward, in proportion as German East Africa was wrested from the Germans and the prices for what Zanzibar could supply to the Allies increased, Zanzibar prospered, and in the two last years of the war the figures of revenue and of trade exceeded in money value all previous years. Contributions were made to Imperial war expenses, as shown below, and surpluses were invested in war loans. As an island dependency of an island Power, as the centre formed by nature for the ingoing and outcoming trade of Central East Africa, in war as in peace, Zanzibar possessed singular advantages, which were turned to good account for public no less than private benefit.

Following on the declaration of war with Germany, a decree associating Zanzibar with the Protecting Power was issued on the 5th of August 1914 by His Highness the Sultan. Subsequent decrees declaring war with Austria were issued on the 13th of August 1914, with the Ottoman Empire on the 5th of November 1914, and with Bulgaria on the 18th of October 1915.

At the outbreak of the war the garrison of Zanzibar consisted of one company of the 3rd King's African Rifles, 100 strong. Steps were at once taken to supplement this force by the enrolment of all able-bodied Europeans in the 'Town Guard', formed under a proclamation by the Resident, which, in addition to specific duties in the general scheme of defence, mounted guards at certain points, furnished patrols and carried

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out other duties too numerous to be undertaken by the small garrison of regular troops. Important places in the island were put in a state of defence, and in the total absence of artillery during the early days of hostilities, every precaution was taken to provide against the emergency of a raid by a landing party. After the sinking of the *Pegasus* by the *Königsberg*, on September 20th, further measures for the defence of the Protectorate as well as a more efficient system of look-outs were rendered possible by the presence of the Naval Detachment, then quartered in the island, under the command of Commander J. Ingles, R.N., captain of the *Pegasus*. In November, the defence force of the island was still further strengthened by the arrival of a detachment of the Gwalior Infantry.

Early in 1915 it was decided, on the recommendation of the late Major G. C. Denton (Indian Army), who was then Officer Commanding the troops, to abolish the original Town Guard, and in its stead to form the Zanzibar Volunteer Defence Force. The object of the change was to enlarge the usefulness of the old unit by providing a course of training for every European of military age. To this highly capable officer the efficiency of the Force was mainly due. At a later date the strength of the Force was increased by the inclusion of a company of the civil native police. The officers and N.C.O.s were found from the European members of the Force. With the mounting of big guns at different points of the island a further call was made on the members of the Force to furnish crews. Instructors were lent by the Navy, and during the latter part of the war the energies of the Force were directed almost exclusively to this important branch of the defence. Captain J. H. Sinclair, C.M.G., was in command of the Zanzibar Volunteer Defence Force, and it was due to his untiring energy and enthusiasm, together with that of Mr. Withycombe, that the efficiency of the Force was maintained.

On receipt of the King's call to the Colours, practically every able-bodied member of the small British community volunteered for service, but it was not possible, in view of the necessity for carrying on the work of the Government and the maintenance of supplies, to allow very many to proceed on active service outside the Protectorate. Government officials (among whom was Captain Stirling, who died on active service in German East Africa) and members of business firms held

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commissions in combatant units, while roughly an equal number served as officers in the Military Labour Corps. In the latter work special recognition must be given to the part played by the members of the Universities Mission, who from the outbreak of hostilities made a ready response to every call. The Bishop of Zanzibar personally recruited and commanded a corps of officers. In considering the part played by Zanzibar in the war, the very large amount of work carried out on behalf of the Navy and Army must not be forgotten. Zanzibar was utilized as a base and coaling station by the Navy during the whole period of the operations in German East Africa, and the Government workshops under the control of Mr. Withycombe, M.B.E., which were subsequently reinforced by Naval labour, were busily and continuously employed on repairs to the numerous craft engaged, many of which were fitted with bullet-proof shields. Field mountings were also constructed for the *Pegasus* guns. The Public Works Department, under Mr. R. G. Crawley, M.B.E., was also kept hard at work in the construction of defences, gun emplacements, and aerodromes for the Royal Naval Air Service, and in furnishing materials for which there was continuous demand by the military authorities on the mainland. The two steamers belonging to the Zanzibar Government, together with their crews, were placed at the disposal of the naval authorities and utilized as patrol vessels and for the transportation of troops, porters, and stores. Lieutenant-Commander Clark, R.N. (retired), one of the A.D.C.s in the employ of the Government, was for some time in command of one of these vessels. Zanzibar Government steam launches and motor-boats were also utilized by the Navy.

The medical service was, on the outbreak of war, immediately organized by the Principal Medical Officer, Dr. H. Curwen, and the Medical Officer of Health, Major (now Colonel) D. Skelton, D.S.O., to meet emergencies, and it did excellent work in tending the wounded on the occasion of the sinking of H.M.S. *Pegasus* by the *Königsberg*, on the 20th of September 1914. Both the European and native hospitals were kept constantly full during the whole period of the war. The services of the nursing staff were recognized by the grant of the Order of the Red Cross to the Matron, Mrs. Zurcher, and to Miss Brewerton, the nursing sister in charge. A medical unit 200 strong

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was trained by Colonel Skelton, and was present at Tanga. The Zanzibar stretcher-bearers continued to serve with distinction throughout the campaign.

Extra services rendered necessary by the war were, in spite of depleted numbers, almost exclusively provided for from the personnel of the Government. Prize Court, Cable and Postal Censorship, Office of Supply, Liquidation of German firms, and other works incident to a state of war were undertaken by civil servants. In December 1917 military censors were appointed for the cable censorship, and from that date also assisted in the postal work.

A convalescent home for officers was maintained by the Zanzibar Government, under the control of a committee of ladies presided over by Mrs. Sinclair, M.B.E. Over 400 officers passed through this home.

The number of natives recruited for combatant units during the war was approximately 900, but the demand for carrier labour made a constant claim on the manhood of the Protectorate. Special calls were met in November 1914, when 2,000 carriers were sent to Tanga under the command of Captain R. G. Crawley, M.B.E.; in August 1916, when 600 were sent to the mainland under the command of the Bishop of Zanzibar; and in December 1916, when a further corps over 600 strong was recruited and did excellent work under most trying conditions under the command of Captain Rivers-Smith. Small drafts were also sent from time to time to make good casualties. The total number of men used for this form of active service was 4,295, a total which would undoubtedly have been larger had not the vital needs of the Navy necessitated a careful conservation of native labour for the port. Native interpreters and clerks, for whom there was a continual demand, were enlisted for work on the mainland, and these, together with the increased number of 'Seedie Boys' employed in the Navy, added to the total of Zanzibaris engaged on active service outside the Protectorate.

From the outbreak of war Zanzibar's ready response to the claims of the sick and wounded, and the results which attended her efforts, were far in excess of the most sanguine expectations. The Zanzibar War Relief Fund was founded in the early days of the war, and with Major F. B. Pearce, C.M.G., the British Resident, as President, and a strong Committee, representative

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THE BISHOP OF ZANZIBAR'S CARRIER CORPS

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with the Europeans in the needle-work and bandage-rolling ; a large amount of skilled work was done without payment by Indian carpenters and tailors ; contracts were taken up for large quantities at prices which left no margin of profit ; the apprentices of the Government Industrial Schools made splints and tailored articles in their spare time, and generally, from each section of the community in turn came a ready response when the necessity for action was made clear. A large quantity of comforts was accumulated by these means, from which it was possible to meet the frequent appeals for mattresses, deck-chairs, pillows, pyjamas, slippers, and other comforts for hospitals and hospital ships. A special feature of this branch of war work was the collection and distribution of fruit to the hospitals. Many thousands of oranges and baskets of other kinds of fruit indigenous to the island were purchased by the Society. The packing and the distribution along the coast were undertaken by the Navy, by the courtesy of the N.O.C. Zanzibar.

The first direct contribution made by the Zanzibar Protectorate towards the cost of the war was in 1915, the contribution on that occasion being allocated for the purchase of four aeroplanes which bore the name 'Zanzibar'. Further contributions of £20,000 were made in 1916, 1917, and 1918, bringing the total up to £70,000.

The attitude of the non-European population, from His Highness the Sultan, whose influence in favour of the Allies was not confined to Zanzibar, but who wrote letters to the leading Arabs on the mainland of Africa enlisting their support, was admirable throughout. Many of the Arabs and Indians volunteered for service, and several of the former were utilized as intelligence agents.

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SECTION III

THE EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE, NOW THE KENYA COLONY AND PROTECTORATE

Mainly supplied by the Colonial Government

THE East Africa Protectorate, now, with the exception of the coast-line, no longer a Protectorate but a Colony—the Kenya Colony—is credited with an area of rather under 250,000 square miles. On the west it links on to Uganda. On the north it is bounded by Abyssinia. On the north-east and east it has for its neighbour Italian Somaliland, and on the south, when the war came, it was conterminous with an enemy country, German East Africa.

Its population, composed of the most diverse races, has usually been estimated at under three millions, and is so given below, but the latest guess appears to be that, if all the nomad tribes are taken into account, the total might possibly be placed as high as four millions. In 1914 the Europeans numbered round about 3,500, and were increasing in numbers, attracted by the high and healthy uplands, with an altitude of from 5,000 to 8,000 feet above sea-level, on which the capital and chief European centre, Nairobi, stands. Well over 200 miles to the north-west of Nairobi, the Uasin Gishu district of the Naivasha province was a scene of South African settlement, an appreciable number of Dutch and British Afrikanders having come in subsequently to the South African war. The chief township in this district was Eldoret. There was a growing number of Asiatics in the territory, Indian traders and others. The 1911 census returned them as rather under 12,000, but by 1914 the number was considerably larger.

The Uganda Railway was in every sense the line of life to British East Africa. With a length of nearly 600 miles, it

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of all communities in the Protectorate, continued active from that date. No effort was spared and all means were employed to raise money for the Red Cross and other charitable objects connected with the war. A subscription fund was immediately opened, to which not only the well-to-do of all communities contributed generously, but the natives in large numbers gave according to their ability. It might reasonably have been anticipated that the first enthusiasm would have cooled, but each succeeding year recorded an increased subscription list and undiminished loyalty to the cause of helping the sick and wounded. Further, considerable sums were raised each year by a carnival, for which valuable gifts in kind were invariably forthcoming. The success which attended these occasions was due not only to the hard work of the organizing committee, but also to the generous support of all classes. Special performances were arranged by the proprietors of places of public entertainment; concerts were held and various other activities were organized. These resulted in raising additional and valuable contributions by private endeavour.

Amounts raised by the Zanzibar War Relief Fund and forwarded each year to the British Red Cross Society were as follows:

	£
1914	2,000
1915	2,000
1916	1,900
1917	6,400
1918	7,000
Total	19,300

Quite early, however, it was realized that Zanzibar had other and equally urgent calls nearer home, and it was due to the initiative of the Right Reverend Bishop Weston, O.B.E., that the Zanzibar War Society came into existence. This had for its object the organization of local resources, with the view of providing comforts for the troops engaged in the German East Africa Campaign. The original committee consisted of the Bishop, Mr. J. H. Sinclair, C.M.G., His Honour Sir William Murison (hon. treasurer), and Captain Rivers-Smith (hon. secretary). Energetic measures were immediately taken to give effect to the suggestions which led to the formation of the Society. Contributions both in money and in kind were made and working parties organized. Indian ladies took their part

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climbed the mountains and joined Lake Victoria to the ocean at Mombasa, where was a singularly fine harbour at Kilindini on the south-western side of the island on which Mombasa stands. The war found the Protectorate still in the early stages of development, but, judged by the revenue returns, it was rapidly growing in prosperity, the revenue for the financial year ended the 31st March 1914 being easily a record. Stock-raising and sheep-farming were the chief industry on the high plateau. On the lowlands the usual tropical products were in evidence. Hides and skins and grain were the principal exports, with fibre and rubber on the increase. The United Kingdom and British possessions took the greater share of the exports, and Germany headed the list of foreign nations which traded with British East Africa.

The incoming of a number of British settlers led to the grant to the Protectorate of a constitution similar to that of a Crown Colony. There was a Governor, an Executive Council, and a nominated Legislative Council. The Governor in 1914 was Sir H. Conway Belfield, K.C.M.G., and when he retired, in 1917, the Chief Secretary to the Government, Mr. (now Sir) C. C. Bowring, C.M.G., acted as governor from April in that year to the end of the war. The new Governor, Major-Gen. Sir E. Northey, K.C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C., was appointed in July 1918, but did not take up his duties until January 1919.

The story of the actual fighting in East Africa at the beginning of the war is told elsewhere, but it may be noted that the part of the southern boundary which was at once most vital and most vulnerable was the easternmost section between the Kilimanjaro region and the sea. Here the Uganda Railway ran nearest to German territory and was therefore most exposed to attack, while attack was facilitated by the Northern German Railway, which placed the Germans in a position to strike at and secure the main pass between the two Protectorates in the hill region, from Moshi on the German side to Taveta on the British. In the course of the war, and because of the war, a line was constructed from Voi, a station on the main Uganda Railway, 103 miles from Mombasa, to Taveta, and thence linked on to the German Railway at Moshi. To safeguard the railway and the whole of East Africa, in the north of which there was much tribal unrest, there were, when

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the 4th of August 1914 came, but scanty forces. There was one battalion, the 3rd Battalion, of the King's African Rifles, and a police force which numbered in all under 1,600, of whom rather over 50 were Europeans and rather under 70 were Asiatics. Provision had been made for constituting a volunteer reserve by an Ordinance of 1910 and a 'Legion of Frontiersmen' by an Ordinance of 1911; a volunteer Uganda Railway unit was in existence, but it was not until war had actually broken out that volunteer forces became appreciable. Martial law was then at once declared: defence forces were immediately formed at Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kisumu on Lake Victoria, a King's African Rifles Reserve Forces Ordinance was passed, as also an East Africa Volunteer Reserve Amending Ordinance, and two European volunteer units were formed, the East African Mounted Rifles and—a less successful attempt—the East African Regiment. The following account of the steps taken to meet the emergency and of the effort made by East Africa in personal service and in gifts has been supplied by the Government of the Kenya Colony.[1]

The outbreak of war necessitated immediate steps to defend British East Africa against offensive operations by the enemy. The Protectorate troops available for the defence of the principal centres and of the Uganda Railway were not enough to do more than keep guard over some of the most vital points, but the prompt reply which was made to the call for volunteers greatly reduced the gravity of the situation. The Government of India subsequently supplemented the local defence force by the dispatch of troops, while sufficient numbers were also sent from England and the Colonies to allay anxiety as to the result of offensive action against the Protectorate. In spite of these reinforcements the southern border was frequently violated by the enemy at points between the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria. Native tribes under British protection were raided and harassed, but, owing perhaps to the topographical conditions which existed between the colonized areas and the southern border, it was never necessary to abandon the farms and concentrate the European population at the centres.

[1] The account, for reasons of space, has been somewhat condensed by the Editor.

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The initial excitement was followed by a period of inactivity; men who had gone to the front and were serving in comparative idleness began to think about their private interests, while others, who had not joined the local forces but were willing and anxious to serve, had no one from whom they could obtain information as to how best they could be employed. On the 7th of September 1915 a mass meeting was held in Nairobi, at which a resolution, supported by persons from all parts of the Protectorate, was passed unanimously to place at the Governor's disposal the entire resources of the country, and following upon this resolution, inasmuch as a comprehensive system of registration was an essential preliminary to any form of organization, an Ordinance was introduced on September 13th entitled the Registration of Persons Ordinance, 1915, which made provision for the registration of adult persons within the Protectorate.

In order to give effect to this Ordinance and to provide for the proper organization of the community, it was necessary to secure the active co-operation of the military, civil, and administrative authorities. The Governor therefore appointed a War Council, under the presidency of the Chief Secretary, composed of a number of military and civil members and of a representative from each of the settled areas of the Protectorate. The duties of the War Council were to make recommendations as to the areas and races to which the Ordinance should be applied from time to time and as to the rules to be made; to scrutinize the register which would be compiled under the Ordinance, recommending how best to organize the community on a war footing; and to advise the Governor as to what further legislation might become desirable for the purpose of introducing a policy of compulsory service, having due regard to the requirements of the civil administration and the bare necessities of civil industry. In each district to which the Ordinance was applied, a committee drawn from among the male European residents was formed under the presidency of the District Commissioner for the purpose of advising the War Council on matters and circumstances arising in their respective districts; to examine the local registers compiled under the Ordinance; to report on the manner in which the respective districts could best be organized on a war footing; and to make such arrangements as might be possible

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locally to deal with the cases of those who were willing to join the forces immediately without waiting for any complete scheme of organization.

In December 1915 an Ordinance was passed providing for compulsory military and other service. Previous calls for men had been loyally met, and the District Committees had been operating with marked success, but it was considered advisable to provide against emergencies which might still arise necessitating a further call for men. An important provision was included in the Ordinance in order to safeguard the interests of men at the front, to the effect that no one who had undertaken to perform work or supervision on behalf of any one serving in the military forces would himself be permitted to enlist or leave his employment without the consent of the District Committee or of his employer. The War Council and District Committees were placed on a legally constituted footing under the provisions of this Ordinance, but the powers and duties originally entrusted to them were not diminished or curtailed.

On the 21st of March 1917 the Compulsory Service Ordinance was applied and the Governor called upon the War Council to provide 300 men required by the G.O.C. The information collected under the Registration of Persons Ordinance 1915 greatly facilitated the task entrusted to the War Council and District Committees. Each case was considered on its merits, both from the personal point of view and from that of the employer, due regard being paid to the civil industries of the Protectorate. The result was completely satisfactory, and there was the additional advantage that every individual of military age had his case closely inquired into so that he had the satisfaction of knowing that, if he was not called upon to join the forces, he was medically unfit or considered indispensable for carrying on the civil life of the Protectorate.

In February 1919 the War Council and the District Committees were dissolved. They had proved to be most valuable. Advisory committees of this kind were a novel experiment, the success of their efforts showed the good effects of co-operation for the common good amongst the various members of the community, and the principle of District Committees was maintained as a permanent part of the administrative machinery of the Colony.

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The outbreak of hostilities found the East Africa Protectorate without any forces except the King's African Rifles, the East African Police, and the Railway Volunteers. Without any of the usual military organization, e.g. an Ordnance Department, as large an army as possible had to be found without delay: as soon as they were armed and equipped, men were sent to guard the vulnerable points; and the necessity of sending men, with the greatest speed, to defend the borders of the Protectorate led to a not unnatural neglect of records of enlistment, discharges, and transfers.[1] Such particulars, therefore, as have been obtained are meagre and probably inaccurate. Still more difficult is it to give an accurate statistical record of the services subsequently performed by residents of the Protectorate. Owing to the small European population, the amateur army recruited locally had to be reinforced from outside, and within some two months the Indian Expeditionary Force landed and assumed control of arrangements for the defence of the Protectorate. Volunteer organizations were, in consequence, almost completely recast; many who had come forward in spite of age or other disability to do what they could in the country's hour of distress were released and returned home; far more were transferred to non-combatant services such as transport and supply. Reorganized at the end of 1914, the Protectorate forces were again totally recast when the arrival of the South African troops at the beginning of 1916 enabled the British to take the offensive. The original purely East African forces such as the East African Mounted Rifles, the East African Regiment, and the East African Transport Corps, were absorbed into the new army, many members taking commissions in the K.A.R., which were then rapidly growing, and a large number being transferred into the three branches of the transport, viz. the carriers, motor, and animal transport.

The inevitable results of these changes were different sets of imperfect records with conflicting figures. But the statistics derived from returns made by district officers and government departments in 1919 are undoubtedly the most trustworthy, and from them is taken the following analysis of the European population in the Protectorate from the 4th of August 1914 to the 1st of December 1918.

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	Non-officials.	*Officials.*	*Total.*
Number of adult male Europeans, including Aliens and Missionaries	2,321	824	3,145
Discharge after service in the field	732	416	1,148
Serving in East Africa on December 1st, 1918	473	69	542
Serving in other theatres on December 1st, 1918	116	23	139
Killed and Died	134	24	158
Total who served	1,455	532	1,987
Percentage of those who served to adult male population	62·7	64·6	63·2
Percentage of dead to population	5·8	•2·9	5·0
Percentage of dead to those who served	9·2	4·5	7·9

The above figures include 95 officers and 38 other ranks, East Africans serving in the K.A.R. and 12 East Africans who served in the Arab Rifles, four of whom were killed. They do not include those men who joined the defence forces, inaugurated at each main centre on the outbreak of war for the purpose of local defence, nor do they include members of the various services, such as the Uganda Railway and Post Office, who were placed on a war footing. Division of those who were recruited into combatants and non-combatants is impracticable, for transfers from one to the other, e.g. from the East African Mounted Rifles to the East African Transport Corps and then to the King's African Rifles, were frequent.

The distinctions won by residents in East Africa during the war years included 1 K.B.E., 1 C.B., 4 C.M.G.'s, 10 C.B.E.'s, and 2 Hon. C.B.E.'s, 25 D.S.O.'s (2 with bar), 74 M.C.'s (2 with bar), and a large number of minor honours, in addition to distinctions in the Red Cross and in foreign orders, and mentions in dispatches.

Three native combatant forces were raised or increased during the war, viz. the King's African Rifles, the Arab Rifles, and the Police Battalion. Before the war, one battalion of the 3rd K.A.R. only was recruited from the Protectorate. During the war the 3rd and 4th K.A.R. raised three battalions each, while the 5th and 7th K.A.R. each raised part of one battalion. The total number of East Africa Protectorate natives serving in these regiments finally amounted to 8,486. A statement is attached giving the strength of the K.A.R. at six-monthly intervals during the war and the dates on which the battalions were raised, but it is not possible to show in this statement the share taken by the Protectorate natives as

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the units were latterly drawn from all Protectorates indiscriminately. The Arab Rifles were recruited entirely on the coast. The Police Battalion and Special Service Police were drawn from the existing ranks of the civil police.

The following table shows the casualties among native combatant forces recruited in the East Africa Protectorate:

Unit.	*Recruited.*	*Killed, missing, and died of wounds.*	*Died of disease.*
3rd K.A.R.	4,916	262	287
4th ,,	2,291	85	222
5th ,,	637	2	19
7th ,,	642	0	50
Arab Rifles	425	28	15
Police Battalion	385	5	6
Police Service Battalion	347	10	0
Total	9,643	392	599

The difficulties encountered in forming an estimate of the European man-power effort are met with to an even greater extent in estimating the native recruitments of carriers and other services. The carrier system was reorganized more than once and a collation of the records has been found impossible. The figures given here may include an undiscoverable number of re-enlistments which occurred in forming the Maxim gun porters, stretcher-bearers, and carrier police, but they may be taken as approximately correct:

Early period of the war	7,500 Carriers
After formation of Carrier Corps	162,598
Maxim Gun Porters	9,237
Stretcher Bearers	7,500
Carrier Police	1,500
Casuals	13,096
Total	201,431

The native population in East Africa is estimated at about two millions and three-quarters.

Casualties present a still more intricate problem. Statistics of casualties among stretcher-bearers, carrier police, and casuals are not known, but they may be averaged from those of Maxim gun porters, which are given. It is not possible to ascertain how many of those shown as deserted and missing died. The Director of Military Labour believes that of the 11,142 carriers who had deserted up to the 30th of September 1916, the majority entered civil employ. From the 30th of

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September 1916 to the end of the war 16,794 are shown as deserted and missing; of the total 27,936, it may be assumed that 14,000 died.

The known dead amount to . . .	26,193
The estimate of dead deserters . .	14,000
Total . .	40,193

In addition, a large but entirely inestimable number died on the way to or after reaching their homes.

The following table shows the recruitments and deaths at the principal recruiting centres:

Station.	*Recruited.*	*Known dead.*	*Deserted and missing.*
Nairobi . . .	67,843	9,280	14,403
Mombasa . .	13,532	1,310	7,056
Kisumu . . .	76,335	12,624	3,688
Voi	4,868	97	548
Total .	162,578	23,311	25,695

The history of recruitment both for Europeans and natives shows a remarkable resemblance in one respect. In the earliest stages of the war large numbers joined the forces, for which recruitment proceeded steadily during the next two and a half years. In 1917, when the application of the Compulsory Service Ordinance brought out every European who could possibly be spared, a great and final effort was made to increase the Carrier Corps. Between March 1st and July 31st no less than 67,799 carriers went to the front. It should not be forgotten that, simultaneously with the campaign in German East Africa, expeditions had to be undertaken against the Giriama, the Turkana (twice), the Kisii, the Aulihan, and the Masai. Each of these expeditions meant a further effort on the part of the natives in the carriage of food and equipment to the various bases.

The Women's War Work League of British East Africa came into being during the autumn of 1915. Its object was to train and provide women, where possible, to take the place of men, thus leaving the latter free to serve, and to organize the resources of the country so that help might be given to the hospitals by providing any extra food or necessaries required. With this object the Protectorate was divided into branches, each centre having a branch secretary, treasurer, and committee, but all working in conjunction with the head-quarters

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of the League at Nairobi. The branches were as follows: Nairobi—divided into four sections—Eldoret, Kyambu, Kericho, Kisumu, Kabete, Limoru, Lumbwa, Mombasa, Nakuru, Fort Ternan, and Ruiru. Each branch secretary enrolled her respective members, and the total number of members amounted to 630, each member paying a subscription of one rupee.

A Labour Bureau was formed and many members were found posts through the central office of the League for War Work, some as voluntary, others as salaried workers, but all, when circumstances permitted, taking voluntary work. Classes were formed for the purpose of training women in shorthand, typewriting, first aid, sick nursing, and cookery. A local branch of the Red Cross Society was formed and weekly nursing lectures comprising a two months' course of training were given by one of the doctors without any fee being charged. Cooking was also taught without any charge other than a small fee to cover the working expenses. In the shorthand and typewriting classes a small fee was charged by the League and the sum accruing from this source was handed over to the Women's Field Force Fund to help with the purchase of materials for their work. Before long women were able to relieve men in the following professions: shorthand typists, book-keepers, clerks, dispensers. Nearly 100 women were found employment, several working in the Post Office, also at the Ordnance Department. Women also went as cooks to the various hospitals.

Sub-committees were formed for the following purposes: arrangements were made for the mending of clothes for all patients in hospitals to be undertaken by a committee of ladies, materials for mending being provided by donations. Large quantities of books, magazines, and papers were collected by all the branches and were distributed by the central bureau to all hospitals in East Africa. Many thousands of eggs were sent from the up-country branches, and were received and re-packed by members of the League at the Base Depot. These were distributed equally among the hospitals as 'extras', and were sent whenever possible to those hospitals near the firing line, where great difficulty was experienced in procuring supplies of fresh food. Gifts of cakes, vegetables, fruit, jam, butter, cheese, and fowls were sent in most generous quantities to the

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central office for redistribution to the hospitals. These came not only through the branch secretaries, but also from private sources.

A most successful canteen was opened at Mombasa, Kilindini Wharf, where the troops arriving and departing by boat were supplied with coffee, lemonade, bread and butter, &c., free. This was supported by gifts and subscriptions from the Mombasa members of the League. The Mombasa members also arranged outings for convalescent soldiers from 4.30 to 6 in the afternoons. Another canteen was opened at Nairobi Station to provide soldiers going or coming by the trains with tea and bread and butter free. This was also supported by private subscriptions. Two members of the League were always in charge at the canteen, and a stock of tobacco, cigarettes, chocolates, and biscuits was kept which the men might buy at cost price. All hospital trains were met and the patients provided with tea and bread and butter while waiting for the ambulances to convey them to the hospitals. In many instances members of the League offered to give accommodation to convalescent officers and men, and a large number of convalescents were provided with a thorough holiday and change of air before returning to the front. In April 1916 the League gave a dinner to 460 Rhodesians. Sunday 'At Homes' and concerts were provided for the troops stationed in Nairobi by the League working in conjunction with the Y.M.C.A. The branch centres entertained all troops who might happen to be temporarily stationed among them. The League also supplied cakes at cost price to the canteens started by the Y.M.C.A. in conjunction with the League at Voi, Maktau, and Kajiado Railway Stations, and it undertook to provide Christmas dinners for all men in hospitals both in 1915 and in 1916. In 1915 the Christmas Dinner Fund amounted to Rs. 2,057, in 1916 to Rs. 2,879. The response on both occasions was so generous that large quantities of provisions were purchased and, in addition, numerous gifts were sent in from various sources.

Immediately on the outbreak of war a meeting of the women of Nairobi was called with the idea of forming a Women's Voluntary Aid Society. The first meeting took place on the 6th of August 1914. A class of instruction in nursing was organized by the Matron of the Nairobi Hospital; this was largely attended, and many who went through the course were

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subsequently able to take an active part in the nursing of sick and wounded. Many women resident in or near Nairobi offered their houses as convalescent homes or hospitals, but these were never utilized for military patients and the activities of the Society were thereby greatly curtailed. During the Christmas season of 1914 the Society provided many gifts to the troops. Over 2,000 field dressings were made up from materials supplied by the Medical Department for delivery to East African volunteer forces, while parcels of clothing and literature were frequently sent to the hospitals at Kajiado and Voi. Arrangements having been made for the distribution of gifts for troops through the Committee of Supplies, further action by the Women's Voluntary Aid Society was rendered unnecessary, and when in 1915 the Women's Field Force Fund was started by Lady Belfield the Society was absorbed in this latter organization.

The Women's Field Force Fund was inaugurated by Lady Belfield on the 28th of June 1915 with the object of supplying garments and other comforts for the sick and wounded. The fund had a branch at Mombasa. No appeal for subscriptions was made to the community in East Africa, but a grant of £50 from the East Africa War Relief Fund and the provision of money in payment of orders through the Military Authorities enabled the committee to purchase materials, and with this assistance, supplemented by many generous donations, the work was maintained. The scheme of work was as follows: Garments were cut out at the central depot, Nairobi, and dispatched to those ladies of the country who organized work parties. These ladies were responsible for the work sent to them and for its safe return when completed; the garments were then dispatched direct to the hospitals and convalescent homes. Pillow making was undertaken with the help of the Boy Scouts. More than 7,000 articles, including pyjamas, dressing gowns, helpless suits, and bandages were made by the Society, and in addition gramophones, cigarettes, &c., were dispatched to hospitals. In August 1915 the British Red Cross Society was asked for assistance. A most generous response was made to this appeal, and a consignment of 214 cases of gifts arrived in Nairobi in January 1916 for distribution among the various hospitals. In addition to this contribution from the Red Cross Society many gifts were received from the Kensington War Relief Fund, the Aden Patriotic League,

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The South African World, and the Zanzibar War Society. In 1916 a representative of the Red Cross Society arrived in the Protectorate and urgent need for the Women's Field Force Fund came to an end, but the Society continued in existence for the supply of hospital comforts until the end of the war.

A fund called the East Africa War Relief Fund was inaugurated in September 1914, subscriptions were readily forthcoming and the fund increased rapidly, standing at the figures quoted on the dates shown:

1914	Rs.
September 30	4,638
October 31	8,889
November 30	12,369
December 31	15,060

The fund was raised primarily for the relief of disabled volunteers and the dependants of those killed on active service. It was not intended to be applied to regular troops nor to the K.A.R. In July 1915 the committee defined the scope of the fund as being 'for the relief of necessitous cases amongst Protectorate troops and their dependants arising from the war'. In August 1915 the committee decided that donations made to the fund by Africans or specially earmarked for the relief of Africans should be handed over to the East Africa War Relief Fund for Africans, and that relief of distress amongst natives would be best achieved by that fund. In November 1915 further appeals were made for subscriptions on the basis of one day's pay a month, and the E.A.W.R.F. and the One Day's Pay Fund were amalgamated under the title of the 'Government House War Relief Fund'. These funds were administered as one, but the moneys received were accounted for separately. The following schedule shows the annual revenue and expenditure of the two funds:

	Revenue.		Expenditure.	
	General Fund.	*One Day's Pay.*	*General Fund.*	*One Day's Pay.*
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Sept.–Dec. 1914	15,060.70	—	6.49	—
1915 . .	44,183.61	854.05	3,366.89	—
			11,324.64 transferred to Fund for Africans	
1916 . .	16,823.18	21,995.49	747.05	1,414.71
1917 . .	1,893.50	476.00	456.50	757.70
1918 . .	611.00	—	1,549.50	675.00
1919 . .	2,943.95	2,073.24	1,863.52	7,684.78
Jan.–Sept. 1920	233.75	170.84	1,928.53	2,586.62

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Some 54 cases were dealt with, relief being afforded in 32 cases and refused in 21, one case being withdrawn. A variety of applications for relief were made, of which the following will give some indication of the wide scope of the fund's application: Widows of soldiers killed on active service were assisted out of the country, and received grants of money in addition to their pensions. Disabled soldiers received small supplementary disability grants, or lump sums to assist them to make new starts in life. Discharged soldiers who had fallen on evil times were assisted to return to their homes in other countries, provided with outfits of clothing for the voyage, and given train fares to the coast to enable them to catch their steamers, &c.

On the 15th of October 1920 the financial state of the combined funds was as follows:

	Government House Fund.	*One Day's Pay Fund.*
	Rs.	Rs.
Current account . . .	10,725.07	6,115.65
Fixed Deposit . . .	15,735.94	15,705.00
	26,461.01	21,820.65

	Rs.
Totals	26,461.01
	21,820.65
Loan outstanding . . .	390.00
Grand Total	48,671.66

In December 1919 the question of winding up the fund was discussed by the committee, who decided that the date of closure should be left indefinite, and it was subsequently resolved that the fund should be kept in operation for some years in order that no cases deserving of relief should be allowed to pass unassisted.

In April 1915 Mr. John Ainsworth, C.M.G., suggested the possibility of raising funds by means of voluntary contributions from African natives for the purpose of providing hospital comforts for native troops, sailors, police, stretcher-bearers, and carriers while employed on active service in East Africa. An organizing committee was formed and local committees were appointed in each province. Subscriptions were obtained by means of collecting cards (Appendix 2) distributed through

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native areas. The fund was closed in 1918, the following amounts having been contributed:

	Rs.	Rs.
Natives in the Nyanza Province	45,261.19	
,, ,, Naivasha ,,	8,207.76	
,, ,, Ukamba ,,	16,790.13	
,, ,, Kenya ,,	4,442.50	
,, ,, Seyidie ,,	2,944.00	
,, ,, Tanaland ,,	788.75	
,, ,, Jubaland ,,	2,143.00	
		80,577.33
Sundry subscribers, including Europeans and natives	5,582.87	
Kisumu Chamber of Commerce	500.00	
		6,082.87
Total Subscriptions		86,660.20
Bank interest received on money placed on deposit with the National Bank of India, Ltd., up to 21st January 1919		5,444.60
Total		92,104.80

	Rs.
Expended on comforts to native hospitals, sundry gratuities, and grants to wounded and sick natives	46,248.62
Expenses	518.68
	46,767.30
Balance on deposit with Bank on 19th April 1919	45,337.50
Total	92,104.80

On the 26th of February 1919 the organizing committee resolved that

'there can be no more appropriate manner of recognizing the manifold and valuable services of the natives of East Africa in the late war than by handing over the remaining balances of the fund, amounting to not less than £3,000 sterling, to the Council of the Alliance of Missionary Societies in British East Africa, to be used by them in building and equipping a native medical training school open to all natives of East Africa, and that the said Council be asked immediately to consider their acceptance of this money subject only to the following two conditions: (*a*) That that part or wing of the school which shall be constructed out of the money provided by the fund shall be commenced within twelve calendar months from the date of acceptance of this offer by the said Council and shall be completed within a further period of eighteen months. (*b*) That a stone, the size and inscription on which shall be decided by the committee of this fund, shall be provided and built into the structure in a prominent position.'

In 1915 £1,059 were subscribed to the Belgian Red Cross Society. In 1916 an appeal on behalf of the Red Cross Society,

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native areas. The fund was closed in 1918, the following amounts having been contributed:

	Rs.	Rs.
Natives in the Nyanza Province	45,261.19	
,, ,, Naivasha ,,	8,207.76	
,, ,, Ukamba ,,	16,790.13	
,, ,, Kenya ,,	4,442.50	
,, ,, Seyidie ,,	2,944.00	
,, ,, Tanaland ,,	788.75	
,, ,, Jubaland ,,	2,143.00	
		80,577.33
Sundry subscribers, including Europeans and natives	5,582.87	
Kisumu Chamber of Commerce	500.00	
		6,082.87
Total Subscriptions		86,660.20
Bank interest received on money placed on deposit with the National Bank of India, Ltd., up to 21st January 1919		5,444.60
Total		92,104.80

	Rs.
Expended on comforts to native hospitals, sundry gratuities, and grants to wounded and sick natives	46,248.62
Expenses	518.68
	46,767.30
Balance on deposit with Bank on 19th April 1919	45,337.50
Total	92,104.80

On the 26th of February 1919 the organizing committee resolved that

'there can be no more appropriate manner of recognizing the manifold and valuable services of the natives of East Africa in the late war than by handing over the remaining balances of the fund, amounting to not less than £3,000 sterling, to the Council of the Alliance of Missionary Societies in British East Africa, to be used by them in building and equipping a native medical training school open to all natives of East Africa, and that the said Council be asked immediately to consider their acceptance of this money subject only to the following two [illegible]tions: (*a*) That that part or wing of the school [illegible] be constructed out of the money provided by [illegible] be commenced within twelve calendar months [illegible] of acceptance of this offer by the said Council [illegible] within a further period of eighteen [illegible]ne, the size and [illegible] on which [illegible] committee of the fund shall be pro- [illegible] structure [illegible] position.

[illegible] Belgian Red Cross [illegible] subscribe [illegible] Red Cross Society.

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with particular reference to 'Our Day', met with a response totalling £7,282. In addition to individual subscriptions, dances, fêtes, concerts, and games were held at the various centres in aid of the fund; these brought in £2,824 or about 40 per cent. of the total. In 1917 the subscriptions amounted to £10,988, of which some 66 per cent. represented individual subscriptions, while in 1918 the amount collected was about £15,500. An appeal was made on behalf of the Lord Roberts' Memorial Workshops during 1918 and resulted in a contribution of about £1,450. A sum of £598 was collected on behalf of the Prisoners of War Fund during the last three months of 1918, mainly as a result of Church and School Offertories and through the activities of the committee of the Star and Garter Fund, who, after completing subscriptions for an East African Ward, placed their balance to this fund.

A number of individual contributions in money or kind were made by natives, in addition to their general subscriptions to the War Relief Fund for Africans. Shortly after the commencement of hostilities the chiefs and headmen in the Kisumu District made a spontaneous contribution of 500 sheep and goats for the use of Indian troops. This gift was followed by a similar one of 3,143 sheep and goats from the chief and headmen of the North Kavirondo District. The Masai cheerfully supplied large numbers of bullocks and sheep for the troops, while presents from others, amounting in all to 210 bullocks and 280 sheep, are recorded. In May 1915 the Wakamba of Mumoni in the Kisii District presented Rs. 10,643 to the Government House War Relief Fund; this was subsequently transferred to the credit of the Fund for Africans. A present of ivory was received from a headman of the Samburu tribe in August 1915. During 1914 and 1915 various presents were received from the Kikuyu in the Kenya Province totalling 347 head of cattle. In May 1918 the Galla tribe in Tanaland contributed £200 towards war expenses. In making this contribution they explained that they were only a small tribe and had lately suffered considerable loss through rinderpest in their cattle.

The outbreak of the war caused a falling off of trade in British East Africa, and decline of revenue, with the result that the returns for the financial year ended the 31st of March 1915 showed a large excess on the expenditure side, with

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a corresponding depletion of balances. The calendar year 1915 was a year of marking time, while preparations were being made for a general advance, and until the Protectorate was once for all cleared of the enemy and made secure against the possibility of further raids there could be no general return of prosperity. Still, trade began to revive, helped by the demand for meat and other supplies for the growing armies, and, by the exercise of strict economy, the expenditure was kept within the revenue for the fiscal year which ended on the 31st of March 1916. The next year, 1916–17, showed a large excess of revenue over expenditure, there was a great increase in Customs receipts, and a large increase in the value of exports, hides and skins heading the list. There was also an extension of agriculture. The war, with its large demands for what East Africa could supply, brought grist to the mill, in spite of drawbacks, such as shortage of oxen for ploughing in consequence of the numbers required for military transport. The year 1917–18 was also a good year, though not so good as its predecessor, and the year 1918–19 showed large increases both of revenue and of expenditure, and a considerable expansion of trade. General prosperity was maintained in the last years of the war in spite of bad seasons. Drought was prevalent, with consequent famine among the natives in some districts, which necessitated famine relief Ordinances in 1918, and the year 1918–19, especially, was exceptionally unhealthy for both man and beast. Influenza was general, and the returning native carriers brought sickness with them to their various homes. The Legislature was kept busy during the war, and war measures of the standard kind were plentiful. The Compulsory Service Ordinance of 1915, which has already been noticed, was amended in 1917 and twice in 1918. The Volunteer Reserve Amendment Ordinance, passed at the beginning of the war, was followed by a Volunteer Ordinance in 1915, which, *inter alia*, included as volunteer corps under its provisions the East Africa Medical Service and the East Africa Veterinary Corps. Native followers recruitment Ordinances, for the purposes of transport and labour with the armies, were passed in 1915 and 1918, and another Ordinance of 1918 safeguarded the distribution of the pay and personal property of the military labour corps. It has been seen above that there were native troubles during the war years, as prior to the war. In

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view of the great size of the Protectorate, disturbances were inevitable from time to time in one direction or another. But, taken as a whole, the native population was loyal and helpful, and showed no sign whatever of leanings to the enemy side, even where, as in the case of a Masai reserve, they were near the German frontier. The white settlers, for their part, rose well to the occasion, and the war record of British East Africa was a credit to the Empire.[1]

[1] This concluding paragraph has been written by the Editor.

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APPENDIX I

Statement showing strength of British Officers, British N.C.O.'s, and native rank and file of the King's African Rifles at different periods from the outbreak of the war, and casualties therein.

STRENGTH

Dates.	*British Officers.*	*British N.C.O.'s.*	*Native rank and file.*	*Authorized Establishment.*								
				1st Regt.	*2nd Regt.*	*3rd Regt.*	*4th Regt.*	*5th Regt.*	*6th Regt.*	*7th Regt.*	*M.I.*	*Signal Coy.*
5th Aug. 1914	62	2	2,319	1st Batt.	—	1st Batt.	1st Batt.	—	—	—	M.I.	
1st Jan. 1915	100	2	3,327									
1st July 1915	129	2	3,885									
1st Jan. 1916	133	2	4,203									
1st June 1916	—	—	—	—	—	—	2nd Batt.	1st Batt.				
1st July 1916	248	10	8,159	—	1st Batt. 2nd Batt.							
30th Nov. 1916	—	—	—	—	—	2nd Batt.						
1st Jan. 1917	380	50	15,304									
10th Jan.–1st June 1917	—	—	—	2nd Batt. 3rd Batt.	3rd Batt.	3rd Batt.	3rd Batt. 4th Batt.	—	1st Batt.	1st Batt.		
1st July 1917	535	118	23,325									
1st Aug.–1st Nov. 1917	—	—	—	4th Batt.	—	—	5th Batt.	—	2nd Batt.	—	—	Signal Coy.
1st Jan. 1918	951	776	27,269									
11th Jan.–1st April 1918	—	—	—	—	4th Batt.	4th Batt.	6th Batt.					
1st July 1918	1,193	1,497	30,658									
1st Jan. 1919	1,297	1,916	29,137									

CASUALTIES

	British Officers.	*British N.C.O.'s.*	*Native rank and file.*
Killed	66	47	1,198
Wounded	194	59	3,558
Died of disease	34	30	3,039
Total	294	136	7,795
Percentage of maximum strength	22·6 (approx.)	7·0 (approx.)	25·5 (approx.)

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APPENDIX II

No. 30191

EAST AFRICA WAR RELIEF FUND (FOR AFRICANS)

OFFICIAL COLLECTING CARD

(The Space below to be left for Name of Collecting Committee responsible for this Card.)

INSTRUCTIONS

Each Square must bear a pin prick for each 25 cents subscribed.

AMRI

Killa Mraba sharti itiwe sindano kwa killa sumoni ilio Patikana.



AMOUNT COLLECTED ON THIS CARD. Rs.....

OBJECTS OF THE FUND.

1. For providing extra Medical Comforts for African Troops, Police, Carriers, Stretcher Bearers, Sailors, &c., while they are actually in Hospital.
2. For the purpose of aiding them during their period of convalescence.
3. In case of necessity for supplementing the Bonus granted by Government as a Wound Pension.

FEDHA YA MCHANGO WA VITA KWA WATU WA AFRIKA YA MASHARIKI

KUSUDI YA FEDHA HII.

1. Kwa kuweza Kupatikana Matumizi zaidi ya dawa kwa askari weusi, wapagazi. wachukuzi wa vitandi vya majuruhu baharia na wengine wanapokuwamo katika Aspitali.
2. Kwa kusudi la kuwasaidia kadri ya siku wanapopata hajambo.
3. Kwa kusudia la kuweza kuwapatisha fedha ya bakshishi ilioruhusiwa na serkali kuwa Fedha ya Majuruhu.

NOTE.—This card must be returned to the Provincial Committee for forwarding to the organizing Committee.

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SECTION IV

UGANDA

By the Editor

THE British Protectorate of Uganda in 1914 was rather smaller in area than the British Isles. In the census year 1911 it was credited with a population of less than three millions. The Europeans were but a handful, and there were some 4,000 Indian traders and other Asiatics. The native Africans included a large proportion of Christians, between 400,000 and 500,000, for Uganda has been a notable scene of missionary enterprise. The principal native state, giving its name to the whole Protectorate, was and is Uganda or Buganda, the young Kabaka or king of which came of age and entered upon his duties on the 8th of August 1914, four days after the war began. The British Governor of the Protectorate in 1914 was Sir Frederick Jackson, K.C.M.G., C.B., who had had long experience of British East Africa and Uganda. He was on leave of absence when war was declared, and for the first three months the chief Secretary to the Government, Mr. H. R. Wallis, C.M.G., C.B.E., was acting for him. Mr. Wallis again acted as Governor from April 1917 to February 1918. Upon Sir Frederick's retirement at the end of 1917, he was succeeded by Sir Robert Coryndon, K.C.M.G., whose previous service had been in South Africa. There was no Legislative Council for the Protectorate, and, subject to the terms of the treaties with the native states, the Governor, under the Uganda Order in Council of 1902, was empowered to legislate by ordinance.

Uganda is an equatorial province. Entebbe, the seat of administration, is on the equator. The Protectorate is one of the comparatively few units of the Empire which are far removed from the sea. Its main outlet was at Mombasa, with which it was connected by the so-called Uganda Railway, running for the whole 584 miles of its length through East Africa or Kenya, not Uganda, from Mombasa to Kisumu or Port Florence on the Kavirondo Gulf of Lake Victoria.

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From Kisumu steamers plied to the Uganda ports on the lake, including Entebbe. Some 20 miles to east of north from Entebbe is Kampala, the native capital of Uganda proper and the commercial centre of the Protectorate, connected with the lake at Port Bell by a metre gauge railway, 7 to 8 miles in length, which was opened for public traffic on the 1st of June 1915. Farther east another light railway, 62 miles long, ran from Jinja, where the Nile leaves the lake by the Ripon Falls, to the navigable head-waters of the Nile and Lake Kioga. The Protectorate is essentially a scene of inland waters, of lakes and rivers. Great Britain shared Lake Victoria with the Germans, taking the northern half. Of this northern half, the whole of the eastern coast was in the East Africa Protectorate. Elsewhere it was within the Uganda Protectorate, and west of the lake Uganda was on the south conterminous with German East Africa. On the west its neighbour was the Belgian Congo; on the north-west and north, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which, in the extreme north-east, severed it from a corner of Abyssinia. On the east it joined up with the British East Africa Protectorate. In May 1910, Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain had come to agreement as to their respective boundaries west of Lake Victoria, and the Anglo-Belgian line, as the territories stood before the war, was finally delimited in 1915.

The war found Uganda still in infancy as a British Protectorate, though making steady progress. It was in receipt of a small annual grant from the Imperial Exchequer. Two loans of £170,000 and £125,000 respectively had been made by the Home Government for improvement of communications, and, under the East Africa Protectorates (Loans) Act, passed in this year, 1914, a further advance of £329,000 was to be made for the same purpose. Cotton, grown by natives, was the principal export; and there were European-owned plantations for coffee, rubber, and cocoa; but only a small part of the territory had been to any appreciable extent opened up and developed, and in that part sleeping sickness had been a few years previously a terrible scourge to the native population.

[1]In August 1914 the northern frontier of the Protectorate

[1] What follows has been taken mainly from material collected for the 2nd edition of the Uganda handbook, by kind permission of the author, Mr. H. R. Wallis, C.M.G., C.B.E.

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was much disturbed. In the far north-east, in the region of Lake Rudolf, the Turkana tribes were in open hostility, and a joint expedition against them had been concerted by the administrations of British East Africa and Uganda. The regular forces of Uganda consisted of the 4th—the Uganda battalion of the King's African Rifles, seven companies in all. Two companies had been sent to East Africa for the coming expedition. Two were concentrated for the same purpose in the Rudolf province. One was on its way to that province. The remaining two, one at Entebbe, the other at the depot station at Bombo, north of Kampala, were not yet mobilized. The news of war reached Entebbe on the 5th of August, and Lieut.-Col. Ward, commanding the battalion, ordered these last two companies to be sent to East Africa to guard at Kisumu the terminus of the all-important Uganda Railway, and himself left for Nairobi to take charge of the armed forces in both Protectorates. Thus in the earliest stages of the war there were no regular troops left in Uganda to hold the 180 miles of southern frontier west of Lake Victoria, where Uganda marches with German East Africa, and where German forces were reported to be concentrating in considerable strength. The position, as far as the north and north-east were concerned, was relieved by help promptly sent from the Sudan. Sudanese troops garrisoned the northern border. Thus, secure on this side, the Uganda Government was set free to take what steps could, in the absence of regular soldiers, be taken to safeguard the south. The material available for defence purposes comprised the Uganda Volunteer Reserve, made up of Europeans and British Indians, the civil police, time-expired soldiers belonging to the King's African Rifles Reserve, and such native levies as might be forthcoming at the bidding of their chiefs. Proclamations were issued, placing the volunteer and military reserves and the police on a war footing, a Supplies Board was constituted, the principal native kings and chiefs were taken into confidence and responded most heartily, and, on the 8th of August, martial law was proclaimed. Until the 17th of August, when a regular officer, Major Hickson, of the 4th K.A.R., arrived at Entebbe to take command of the forces, the acting Commissioner of Police, Captain Lawrence, was in charge of defence measures, and proved well equal to the emergency. Practically all the able-bodied Europeans in the

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Protectorate and many British Indians went into training in the Volunteer Reserve. Police were concentrated at Kampala, at Masaka, about 80 miles south-west of Kampala, and farther south-west again, in the direction of the German border, at Mbarara, the chief centre of the Ankole district in the Western Province. They were to form the nuclei of Defence Forces at these three points. The old military reservists were formed into two companies to garrison Entebbe. The actual southern frontier was patrolled by police, supported by native levies, 3,000 Baganda spearmen having been mobilized by their chiefs, with some 15,000 in reserve. On the frontier the main natural feature was the Kagera river, which, in its lower course flowing north-east from German territory, had its outlet into Lake Victoria on the Uganda side of the line.

Before noting more in detail the war effort of Uganda, the general course of the war, so far as the Protectorate was concerned, may be given in outline. Fortunately the threatened initial German invasion over the southern border did not materialize, and time was given to improve the chances of successful defence. The police on the frontier were organized as the Uganda Police Service Battalion; from the native Uganda levies were formed the Baganda Rifles; medical, transport, intelligence services, and so forth were given form and shape, the organization of the various units throughout the first year of the war being in the main carried out by the untiring efforts of the Uganda civil staff, and before the end of the year a company of the 4th K.A.R., an Indian battalion, the 13th Rajputs, and a section of a mountain battery had been sent up. There was then an appreciable force to guard the frontier, under the command of one or other of the available senior military officers, Colonel Adye being eventually appointed to the command in December 1915. From November 1914, when the Germans drove out the garrison of a small fort on the southern side of the Kagera river, there were outpost actions from time to time on the line of that river, but, with one exception, until the general advance began, there was no serious fighting on the Uganda side of the lake; the British forces were on the defensive and the Germans made no substantial attack. The exception occurred in June 1915. A strong force, including a detachment of Loyal North Lancashires,

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

UGANDA: FIRST POLICE CONTINGENT

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under the command of Brig.-Gen. Stewart, and acting in co-operation with a force from the Kagera line, was taken across the lake from Kisumu, landed near the advanced German base of Bukoba on the western shore, and, at daybreak on the 22nd of the month, attacked and after stiff fighting carried the place, the Lancashires forcing an entry from the western or inland side. It was not intended to hold Bukoba, but on the 23rd guns, ammunition, and stores were carried off or destroyed and the wireless station was wrecked, the position on the Uganda frontier being thereby greatly eased.

On the eastern side of the lake, within the East Africa Protectorate, as early as the 12th of September 1914, Uganda police as well as companies and reservists of the 4th K.A.R. were heavily but successfully engaged at Kisii against a German force directed at the railway terminus at Kisumu. In Uganda territory the most difficult area was the extreme south-west, the Kigezi district. Here was the Batusi tribe, whose homeland, as in similar cases in West Africa, had been cut in two by the boundary line, and who, under the instigation of their paramount chief, the Sultan of Ruanda in German territory, rose against the Uganda Government. For a time it was necessary to evacuate the district, but, with help forthcoming from the Belgian Congo, the position was restored, the Belgians garrisoning the British posts in the district for the time being.

Early in 1916 preparations had been made for a vigorous offensive at all points against German East Africa, and General Smuts arrived at Dar es Salaam to take over the command. The forces on either side of Lake Victoria had been organized as the Lake detachment under Lieut.-Col. D. R. Adye. In February 1916 they included, among other units, three companies of the 4th K.A.R. and also a newly-formed Baganda company of that battalion. A little later the remaining four companies were sent back from the main front, and by the beginning of June the whole battalion was available for an advance in the lake area. A lake flotilla had been constituted and was superior in strength to the Germans on the water, the British *Winifred* having already in the early months of the war proved too much for the German *Mwanza*, and having in March 1915 driven her ashore. In the first week of February a conference was held with Major-Gen. Tombeur, commanding

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the forces of the Belgian Congo, at which it was arranged that the Belgians should make a southerly advance through Uganda territory down the western side of the Protectorate, and strike at Kigali, the capital of the German province of Ruanda. A base for supplying this force was to be formed by the Uganda administration at Bukakata, on the west side of Lake Victoria, north of east from Mbarara, through which the supplies would be forwarded. The necessary carriers and ox wagons for transport were to be provided by Uganda, and the Belgians were to be released from garrisoning the posts in the Kigezi district. The arrangements were duly carried out; in the last week of April the Belgians moved forward, and occupied Kigali on the 6th of May. Simultaneously the Lake forces took the offensive, the German advanced posts on the Kagera line were driven in, and on the eastern side of the lake, under the direction of Colonel Adye, and with the help of the Lake flotilla under Commander Thornley, R.N., a section of the 4th K.A.R. on the 9th of June occupied the German island of Ukerewe, while on the 30th of that month the troops on the western side of the lake took possession of the German port of Bukoba. By this date, Brig.-Gen. Sir Charles Crewe, who had come from South Africa on General Smuts's staff and had been sent up by the General to be his liaison officer with General Tombeur and to speed co-operative movement, had in the middle of June taken over the command of the Lake detachment. Acting in concert with the Belgians who, advancing from Kigali, reached Nyamirembe at the south-western corner of the lake, he planned an attack upon Mwanza, a fortified German port and town with a high-power wireless station at the southern end of the lake. It lay due south of Ukerewe island, only a few hours away, and the main concentration for the attack was on Ukerewe, though some troops were also embarked at Nyamirembe. Two columns were landed, on the 11th and 12th of July, north and north-east of Mwanza, and on the 14th it was occupied. The Germans fled by land and water; steamers, boats, and stores were captured, and the whole lake area was finally cleared of the enemy. With Mwanza for its new base, the Lake detachment moved on south, *pari passu* with the Belgians, and, while the Belgians marched into Tabora on the 19th of September, Sir Charles Crewe's force, about a week later, struck the railway at Igalula

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a little farther east. The Lake detachment had now done its work. The regular units, which were included in it, were transferred to other divisions, and the Uganda Police Service Battalion, the Baganda Rifles, and the specially constituted Uganda Transport Corps were disbanded. Thenceforward the Uganda war effort was directed to keeping the 4th Battalion of the King's African Rifles supplied with men and to providing stretcher-bearers and carriers for the armies in the field in German East Africa.

As has been stated, the 4th King's African Rifles, the Uganda Battalion, consisted, when the war began, of seven companies, and they were employed in the earliest stages of the war either in the extreme north-east of the Protectorate or in British East Africa. They saw heavy fighting in East Africa, both on the main front, especially in the Voi area, and also on the eastern side of Lake Victoria. Three companies of the battalion, with 180 reservists and 90 Uganda police, took part in the fight at Kisii on the 12th of September 1914, and the commanding officer, Captain Thornycroft, was killed. In March 1915 four companies of the battalion were in the Voi district of East Africa, two were on the eastern side of Lake Victoria, one with reservists on the southern frontier of Uganda, and a new 8th company of Baganda recruits was in process of formation. The first four companies were employed on the main front until well into 1916, suffering heavily from sickness in addition to casualties in the field. In February 1916 the other four companies, including the new Baganda company, together with reservists, were west of Lake Victoria, holding the line of the Kagera river. The four companies from the main front were sent back up country in time to carry out in June the occupation of Ukerewe island, the other four companies on the western side of the lake occupied Bukoba at the end of the month, and all 8 companies were engaged in the taking of Mwanza. The battalion then participated in the southern advance and, on the disbandment of the Lake force, was transferred to other divisions. Meanwhile, a new battalion, the 2nd/4th K.A.R., was raised and went into the fighting line in January 1917. This was followed by a 3rd/4th K.A.R., formed at a training camp near Nairobi, which took the field in July 1917. A fourth battalion was raised at Entebbe, and later a fifth, a training battalion, to reinforce the fighting

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battalions, was organized at Bombo. All these battalions were almost entirely recruited from Uganda, which contributed to them in all nearly 7,000 men.

Among the armed native levies which, led by their own chiefs, were engaged at the beginning of the war in scouting and outpost work on the southern frontier, a certain number were gradually trained as regular soldiers and in 1915 were formed into a military corps for local defence with a complement of 555 of all ranks, and named the Baganda Rifles. They served with growing efficiency in the clearing of the lake area, and in the southward advance to the main German railway, and, when the Lake detachment was broken up, they were disbanded in November 1916.

The Uganda police, sent to patrol the southern border in the first weeks of the war, were subsequently formed into a police service battalion 516 strong. Like the Baganda Rifles, the battalion served throughout the defensive operations on the frontier and the subsequent offensive by which the Germans were evicted from the lake area. It was demobilized in January 1917, when the men returned to their civil duties. Two members of the battalion, one a sergeant, the other a private, received the Distinguished Service Medal.

Prior to the war 129 Europeans were enrolled in the Uganda Volunteer Reserve, all tested in the use of a rifle. Under an Ordinance passed on the 11th of August 1914, the members of the Reserve were two days later called out for active service within the Protectorate, put into training, and made subject to military law. Three European companies were formed, numbering in all 10 officers and 185 other ranks, and an Indian company with 3 officers and 75 other ranks. The Reserve did not take part in military operations as a single unit, a large proportion of the members being Government officials, who could not be spared from their normal duties ; but individuals were drafted from it for service in other units, and they were of special value, as knowing the country, trusted by the natives, and, in addition, in most cases, expert shots. Lieut.-Col. Riddick, Commissioner of Police, was commandant and, in his absence, Major Lawrence, Assistant Commissioner. These two officers, as well as Company-Commander Flint, were mentioned in dispatches, and Sergeant C. T. C. Doran was awarded the

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D.C.M. The time for which the Reserve was called out ended on the 26th of August 1916.

Before the war Uganda was well equipped with medical officers. In addition to the Government medical service, the Church Missionary Society had its hospitals and doctors, and the various tropical diseases prevalent in the Protectorate, especially sleeping sickness, had attracted specialists in medical research. Upon the outbreak of war, the 'Uganda Medical Service', as a military unit, was immediately formed from the civil medical establishment, six Government medical officers and four assistants, with their trained native staff, being called up for service in the field. The office of the Principal Medical Officer at Entebbe became automatically the administrative base, and the civil hospitals at Entebbe and Kampala the base hospitals; but very early in the war the Church Missionary Society's hospital at Kampala, the largest hospital in Uganda, was placed, with its staff, at the disposal of the Government and became the principal base hospital, dealing with 44,000 day cases in the year 1916. Steps were also taken to establish a military hospital at Masaka, south-west of Kampala, with a clearing station at Bukakata on the lake, and to train a company of native stretcher-bearers. This company, after a few weeks' training, was sent to the front and, with further training in the field, developed into the 'Uganda Native Medical Corps', supplying hospital dressers, orderlies, and ambulance personnel, a field ambulance of three sections being formed and equipped. In a short time the hospital at Masaka was moved south to Simba, with a clearing hospital on the lake at Sango Bay, and, for the benefit of the central and western sections of the frontier line, hospitals were planted at Mbarara and Kabale. From January 1915 the Uganda Medical Service ministered to the Belgian as well as the British troops on the southern border of Uganda, and by the end of 1915 the personnel of the unit numbered, with followers, over 1,000. This total included a Uganda bearer corps, 597 in number, and 150 members of the Uganda Native Medical Corps. With the occupation of Mwanza and the further southern advance, the hospitals at Simba and Mbarara were moved south to Mwanza, and still farther south an advance hospital was established at Shinyanga, half-way to Tabora. In the southern advance the medical staff was strengthened and

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a section of ambulance was sent up from East Africa. With the conclusion of hostilities in the lake area and the disbandment of the Lake detachment, the Uganda Field Ambulance, all but one section, the Uganda Bearer Corps, and the Uganda Native Medical Corps, were all demobilized, but as many of the Native Medical Corps as were willing to continue in the field were re-engaged for further service in the campaign. In March 1917 a new African Native Medical Corps was instituted, recruited mainly from the mission high schools of Uganda. As a result of the hearty co-operation of the missions and the great influence exercised by the Prime Minister of Uganda, Sir Apolo Kagwa, K.C.M.G., the response to the call for educated young natives was wonderfully well answered, and a strength of 1,000, with European personnel, was completed in a very short time. The commandant was Major Keane, R.A.M.C., who was on special service in Uganda when the war came, and who raised the original Stretcher Bearer Corps. He was awarded the D.S.O. Twenty-one medical officers of the Civil Medical Department of Uganda and one European assistant served in the Uganda Medical Service during the war, and eleven more were locally engaged or temporarily lent, five of whom came from the Church Missionary Society. Among warrant officers and non-commissioned officers were 3 British and 15 Indian members of the civil medical staff. At the end of 1916, 17 medical officers and various other members of the department were still on active service. Sir Robert Coryndon has placed on record that 90 per cent. of the African Native Medical Corps were natives of Uganda, and that ' the long and admirable service ' of the corps illustrates ' the remarkable capacity of the Baganda for skilled work '.[1]

The main contribution of the natives of the Uganda Protectorate to the Allied cause in Africa was in the matter of carriers and transport; and among the carriers there was much loss of life. It was due to the difficulty of providing them, when away from their homes, with their accustomed food. The large majority of the native population of the Protectorate are not grain eaters, but live on bananas, sweet potatoes, and various kinds of beans. Where these could not be supplied, and a flour diet was substituted, the mortality

[1] Lecture before the Royal Colonial Institute, see *United Empire*, June 1920, p. 296.

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UGANDA: AFRICAN NATIVE MEDICAL CORPS ON PARADE

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from intestinal diseases was very high. Further, the repatriated carriers brought with them on their return to their homes the seeds of various diseases, with the result that at the close of the war the Protectorate was the prey of epidemics. Early in the war, 6,000 military carriers were organized for transport in the operations on the southern frontier. For the first four months the majority were sent by the Buganda Government. Subsequently, that Government supplied 3,000, the western province 2,000, and the northern and eastern provinces 500 each. The western province also supplied many thousands of job porters for the Belgian Congo transport, and the eastern and northern provinces carriers for East Africa. In April 1915 a re-organization was carried out under the direction of Mr. E. L. Scott, Assistant District Commissioner, recalled for the purpose from service in East Africa. He was given temporary rank as Major and was subsequently awarded the Military Cross. A Uganda Transport Corps, carrier section, was constituted with a commandant, a European and clerical establishment, and a native personnel of 4,500, three-monthly reliefs being as far as possible arranged. This corps was disbanded on the 31st of December 1916, over 38,000 natives having been registered as carriers for the army, exclusive of medical, ox waggon, machine gun and other special service carriers, and exclusive also of job porters. Of this total, 1,267 died, chiefly from dysentery and pneumonia, while 434 were reported missing. At the very beginning of the war, Uganda native carriers were called for from East Africa, and in the middle of August 1914, 1,000 carriers, with native headmen, were sent in charge of Captain Place, District Commissioner, and of Mr. E. L. Scott, as second in command, the latter being later brought back to re-organize the Uganda Transport Corps. This first instalment was succeeded by others, and in all 3,576 men were supplied. They served principally in the coast region, and the death-roll among them was, for the reasons already given, so high that in the spring of 1915 they were withdrawn and replaced by local natives. The Congo Carrier Corps was formed for service with the Belgian forces in their southward advance. They were under British Government officers, of whom Captain E. G. Fenning was awarded the D.S.O., and two other officers the Military Cross. The native ranks were supplied by the Buganda Government and

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from Ankole. The organization and equipment of the corps was completed in March 1916; it served with the Belgians from April to October in that year, and it was disbanded in December. In all 8,429 natives were employed, of whom 789 died and 402 were reported missing. Seventeen native headmen received Belgian decorations. In March 1917 carriers were recruited for service in German East Africa, from the grain-eating tribes of the eastern province. 41,706 were called up, but only 5,763 were passed as medically fit for service, and many of these were repatriated or died.

The total numbers of Uganda carriers and transport workers from 1914–17 inclusive were as follows:

The Uganda Transport Corps—Carrier Section, including special details	40,051
East Africa Carrier Corps	3,576
Congo Carrier Corps	8,429
Belgian military telegraph construction	500
Uganda Pioneers	500
Job porters for Belgian advance (not organized) in round numbers	120,000
Carriers for service in German East Africa	5,763
Total	178,819

Judged by the yearly statistics (the financial year ending on the 31st of March) Uganda profited rather than lost by the war. In the year 1914–15 the export trade for the first time exceeded in value the import. There was an increased export of cotton, but prices fell in consequence of the war. In 1915–16 trade was still further affected by the war. The Uganda Railway was at times closed for all but military purposes; it was difficult to transport the cotton crop or to dispose of it when carried to the sea, but the war now had the effect of raising the price of exports and also of opening a new market for Uganda cotton in India. Under a standing arrangement with the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda was credited with 25 per cent. of the duties collected at the East African ports of entry, the war added to the volume of imports, the Uganda revenue for the year was a record, and for the first time no Imperial grant in aid was needed. It was the same in 1916–17; again there was a record revenue, and—as measured in money—a record trade: the season was not favourable for cotton growing, but, though there was a reduction in quantity, there was a rise in value. The year 1917–18 told

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a precisely similar story. A bad season for cotton growing was offset by the good quality of the cotton grown, the purchases for India increased, the number of local ginneries multiplied. The effect of the war, in short, upon Uganda, financially, was to produce, in money value, records in trade and revenue and to enable the Protectorate to dispense for the time being with grants from the Home Government. Meanwhile, in spite of the calls made upon the native population for help in the war, they prospered and multiplied, giving every sign of loyalty and content. The worth of mission work was much in evidence. Many missionaries went themselves on active service, while the high schools of the missions, as has been told, provided recruits to meet the wants of the armies in the field. It stands to the credit of British administration and of Christian missionaries working under that administration, and, equally, to the credit of the native kings and leaders, that this distant Protectorate, which might so easily have been a danger-point, was, on the contrary, at a most critical time, a scene of kindly relations and mutual confidence between the very small white minority and the coloured men among whom they lived and worked.

The following is a schedule of subscriptions from the Uganda Protectorate for purposes connected with the war, revised to the 31st of March 1919:

Uganda War Relief Fund.

	£	s.	d.
Subscriptions	1,851	10	5
Coffee subscribed	17,410 lb.		

British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England.

	£	s.	d.			
Our Day Appeal, 1915	1,127	18	2			
" " 1916	1,755	15	9			
" " 1917	2,171	3	0			
" " 1918	935	12	4			
Proceeds of Lady Coryndon's Fête held at Government House, Uganda, on 5th August 1918	2,383	0	0			
				8,373	9	3

Lord Kitchener's National Memorial Fund.

Subscriptions	198	1	5

Lord Roberts' Memorial Fund for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors.

Proceeds of Lady Coryndon's Fête held at Government House, Uganda, on 5th August 1918	1,197	0	0

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St. Dunstan's Home for Blinded Soldiers.

	£	s.	d.
Proceeds of Lady Coryndon's Fête held at Government House, Uganda, on 5th August 1918	1,197	0	0
Overseas Aircraft Flotilla.			
Subscriptions	76	18	8
Belgian Red Cross.			
Subscriptions	112	16	3
Belgian Relief Fund.			
Subscriptions	346	14	8
	£13,353	10	8

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PART III
CENTRAL AFRICA

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SECTION I

THE LAKE TANGANYIKA EXPEDITION

By the Editor [1]

NORTHERN RHODESIA encloses the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. The eastern shore of the lake, which is fully 400 miles long, the longest freshwater lake in the world, was, in August 1914, within German East Africa. The western shore was and is in the Belgian Congo. The railway from Dar es Salaam, the German capital and main port on the Indian Ocean, to Kigoma on the lake had been finally completed and opened at the beginning of 1914. Lower down the lake on the opposite—the Belgian—side, near the exit of the Lukuga river from the lake, was Kalembe, now Albertville, the terminus of a railway, about 170 miles long, which was not finally completed till March 1915, and whose other end was at Kabalo on the Lualaba—the Upper Congo. Even in March 1915 the line stopped short of the lake itself and so far no port had been constructed by the Belgians.

German East Africa included on its inland frontier sections of all the three great Central African lakes, Victoria, Tanganyika, and Nyasa. Of the three the centremost, Tanganyika, was most under German control, and was the one lake from which a German railway ran to the ocean. We have it from von Lettow that unimpeded transport on Tanganyika was vital for the rapid transport of German forces from one threatened point to another, and he tells us that, after the *Moëwe* had been blown up by the Germans themselves on the 9th of August at Dar es Salaam, her commander, officers and crew were transferred to Tanganyika and that a gunboat, the *Kingani*, was also brought up by rail. In any case in the middle of 1915 the Germans had three, if not four, armed vessels on the lake, whereas the English had none and the

[1] The Editor is greatly indebted to Commander Simson both for help in writing the account and for the illustrations.

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Belgians only one, the *Delcommune*, which in the first month of the war had been attacked and disabled by the German *Hedwig von Wiessmann*, commanded by one of the *Moëwe's* officers.

German control of the lake made itself felt by raids on British territory at the southern end. Troops were conveyed from Bismarckburg, the southernmost German post on the lake, who on the 17th of November 1914 destroyed the stores of the African Lakes Corporation at Kituta, 14 miles west of Abercorn, and on the 20th carried off a quantity of telegraph material from Kasakalawe, 28 miles west of the same place. On Victoria and Nyasa the English had the upper hand; it was otherwise on Tanganyika, and before a general offensive could be effectively taken from all sides against German East Africa, it was essential to overmaster the Germans on this central lake.

It was suggested by a South African hunter, Mr. Lee, that by a route which he knew, boats of sufficient size to achieve the end in view could be taken overland to the lake. In 1915 it was decided to make the attempt and the enterprise was entrusted to Lieut.-Commander G. Spicer Simson, R.N., now Commander Spicer Simson, D.S.O., qualified by much experience of Africa. The expeditionary force numbered 28 white men all told of whom the only officer of the Royal Navy was Commander Simson himself, and the flotilla taken out consisted of two motor launches of sufficient speed to outclass the German vessels. The tonnage of each of the boats was about 4¼ tons, they were 40 feet long, with 7 feet beam, and their speed was 15 knots. Owing to their small size it was only found possible to mount one 3-pounder gun in each, and even these small guns had to be provided with specially low mountings, which made it necessary for the gun-layer to adopt a kneeling position, when firing the gun. The boats had been in no way designed for the purpose. They were built for a foreign Government, but the case was urgent and in three weeks' time after the order was given, they were transformed at Messrs. Thornycroft's works to meet the case, provided with guns and, under the names of *Mimi* and *Toutou*, placed on board for the Cape. On the 12th of June 1915 boats and men left England and reached the Cape at the beginning of the following month.

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COMMANDER SPICER SIMSON

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(*a*)

(*b*)

(*c*)

TRANSPORT OF MOTOR BOATS TO LAKE TANGANYIKA

(*a*) Uphill; (*b*) Downhill; (*c*) Being Launched

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The route would lie, for the last part, through the Belgian Congo, the base on the lake would be in the Belgian sphere, and Belgian co-operation was necessary and was forthcoming. So was all assistance that could be given by the Commandant-General of the Rhodesian forces, now Sir A. H. M. Edwards, under whose general orders the expedition was placed. The start was made from Cape Town on the 19th of July and the boats were taken by rail, via Bulawayo and Livingstone, for over 2,300 miles to railhead north of Elisabethville in the Belgian Congo, the line not yet having been linked up to Bukama on the Lualaba river. From Fungurume, the point where the rail was left, to Sankisia, whence a 15-mile railway was open to Bukama, there were nearly 150 miles of bush, through which a way had to be found or made for the boats, and a range of mountains to be crossed over 6,000 feet above sea-level. The passage through the bush was divided into three 50-mile stages, a depot being formed at the end of each stage. The boats were carried in cradles, mounted on specially made wagons and drawn by traction-engines. The roads were forest tracks, the bridges had to be constructed, and so steep was the gradient at one point that two traction-engines did not avail to take up one boat at a time, a long train of oxen equally failed, and so did oxen and traction-engines combined. But the resourceful leader rose to the occasion, and the steep was surmounted by means of pulley-block haulage in which, with the help of trees, the oxen pulled downhill against the weight of the boat slowly mounting in the opposite direction. Early in September the top of the plateau was reached. Then came a sharp descent with awkward bends and imminent risk of losing the boats altogether. There followed on the flat want of water alike for the men and for the engines, but Sankisia was reached at last, the boats were railed into Bukama and floated on the Lualaba. Now came 400 miles of towing, steaming, grounding, with casks fastened to the bottoms of the boats to protect them on the sandbanks, and eventually at Kadjia of carriage on a flat-bottomed river-steamer. Kabalo was thus reached on the 22nd of October, and thence the railway carried men and boats to Tanganyika. Von Lettow tells us that the approach of the boats 'had been long under observation' by the Germans and, as Lord Buxton states in his dispatch, it is difficult to believe that they had no warning

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of the expedition. Probably, as he suggests, they did not take so mad a scheme, as it must have seemed, seriously; at any rate the final outcome was of the nature of a surprise. The boats were hidden on the shore of the lake, until Simson had compassed an extension of the railway for rather over five miles in a south-easterly direction to the lake and constructed a little breakwater running out into comparatively deep water and enabling the boats, by means of rails laid under water, to be launched too speedily for the Germans to intercept them. Launched they were, fitted with guns fore and aft, and stocked with ammunition. All was finished on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, 1915, was a day of rest. The next day, while Sunday service was being held, the German gunboat *Kingani*, a boat of 53 tons, passed by. The *Mimi* and the *Toutou* gave chase and after a ten minutes' fight the *Kingani* surrendered. Attacked from the stern, where she had no gun, and struck by a high explosive shell, she was brought in in a sinking condition, but patched up, mounted with a 12-pounder gun, and constituted a third British warship under the name of the *Fifi*, all the more valuable in that not long afterwards the *Toutou* was damaged in a storm and went to the bottom. She was raised a few days later but had sustained so much damage that she was not repaired in time to take part in the next action.

On the 9th of February 1916, the *Hedwig von Wiessmann*, three times as large as the *Kingani*, was attacked by the two British boats, and a running fight ensued for some three hours and thirty miles. The *Mimi*, faster than the converted *Kingani*, kept astern of the German vessel out of range of her aft gun, and compelled her to a zigzag course, enabling the slower *Fifi* to come within range with her heavy gun. High explosive shell settled the business and sank the German ship.

The *Graf von Götzen*, of 850 tons, far larger than the other two vessels, in spite of her size shunned the open lake. Her end was inglorious. After being bombed by a Belgian seaplane, she was filled with cement and sunk in Kigoma harbour by her own people. It would seem, though the accounts are not clear, that another small vessel was accounted for by the Belgians. So ended the German command of Lake Tanganyika.

When Commander Simson gave an account of the expedition to the Royal Colonial Institute in April 1918, Admiral Sir Henry

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Jackson, who presided at the meeting, questioned whether any enterprise of such miniature proportions had so important an influence on the operations of the enemy. Certainly it would be difficult to point to any better illustration of British resolution and resource. The effect on the natives, as Lord Buxton pointed out, was greatly to enhance British prestige and to convey an impression of the length of the British arm. It was



the smallest of small 'sideshows', but none was more adventurous, and it is difficult to conceive that any but Englishmen would have devised and carried it out so conspicuously well. Commander Simson well merited the promotion and the D.S.O. which rewarded him. Three other members of the 28 received the D.S.C., among them Lieutenant Arthur Dudley of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, who was in immediate charge of the transport, and 12 of the number were given the D.S.M. It was an episode as skilful in achievement as it was fruitful in result.

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

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SECTION II

THE CLEARING OF THE NYASALAND—NORTHERN RHODESIA FRONTIER

By the Editor [1]

An account of General Northey's campaigns is given in the next section in connexion with Nyasaland. But it may be well, as a prelude to the sections on Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, slightly to amplify the details of the first stage in the operations by which their common frontier was cleared.

On all the fronts the first eighteen months of the war in East Africa were, taken as a whole, a time of defence and preparation. Organized offence, invasion of German East Africa from all points came with the early months of 1916. General Smuts took supreme charge of all the operations and was Commander-in-Chief of all the British troops, white or coloured, employed in them. Under him unity of command on the Rhodesia–Nyasaland border was secured by the appointment of—as he then was—Brig.-Gen. Edward Northey. In 1915 he was 47 years of age. He had seen much active service on the North-West Frontier of India and in the South African War, and on the western front in the first year of the great war he had commanded the 1st King's Royal Rifles and subsequently a brigade, and had been twice wounded. He left England to take up his command early in December 1915, and reached the advanced Nyasaland base at Karonga in the middle of February 1916 at the same time that General Smuts reached the main front.

At the date of his arrival the troops on the Nyasaland–Rhodesia frontier, including non-effectives, numbered

European officers	77
European rank and file . . .	880
Native troops	750
Total . .	1,707

[1] The Editor wishes gratefully to acknowledge his indebtedness to Sir Edward Northey for being given access to his diaries.

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The white troops were principally the 1st and 2nd South African Rifles, the coloured were the 1st King's African Rifles. These numbers were raised before the campaign opened to about 2,500 effectives, 1,400 on the Nyasaland frontier, 1,100 on that of Northern Rhodesia. They were opposed by estimated enemy forces of from 1,500 to 1,800 at most, 600 on the Nyasaland side in the New Langenburg district, with possibly 300 more within call, and 600 to 900 over against the Rhodesian frontier. White men formed only about one-tenth of the German forces, but nearly 50 per cent. of the British. Early in April Northey established his head-quarters at Karonga, after having inspected the fortified stations on the frontier. These were four in number, from south-east to north-west, Karonga on Lake Nyasa, Fort Hill on the Stevenson Road between Karonga and Fife, Fife, and Abercorn with an outpost at Zombe, nine miles to the north of Abercorn. The distance from Karonga to Abercorn was in round numbers 200 miles. Having reorganized these positions so as to enable them to be held by smaller garrisons and having secured a track fit for motor traffic between Karonga and Fife, Northey timed for the 25th of May a general offensive most carefully planned and rehearsed with abundance of preliminary reconnaissance.

Karonga, Fort Hill, Fife, and Abercorn were respectively over against the German positions of Ipiana, Igamba, Luwiwa or Mwembe, and Namema. Four small columns were to advance simultaneously from the four British bases and to invest and take by siege, avoiding expensive frontal attacks, the four German posts. By this date, it will be remembered, the Germans had lost command of Lake Tanganyika as well as of Lake Nyasa. With the prospect of having to bridge the Songwe and cross another river, the Karonga column, led by Lieut.-Col. G. M. Hawthorn, who had been in command of the Nyasaland Field Force, started earlier than the 25th; in face of his advance the Germans evacuated Ipiana; he occupied it on the 23rd, and on the 24th Igamba was similarly evacuated and occupied by the Fort Hill column under Major Flindt. Following up the Germans in his front, Hawthorn found them entrenched at Mwasukulu, 12 miles south of New Langenburg.[1] He drove them out and occupied Mwasukulu on the 25th. Flindt meanwhile advancing from the south and south-west,

[1] Now Tukuyu.

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while Hawthorn advanced from the south-east, placed his force between the retreating garrison of Igamba and the Ipiana men in front of Hawthorn, so that these two enemy forces could not combine. The German positions at Luwiwa and Namema were stronger than Ipiana and Igamba and held by garrisons about three times as numerous. They were duly invested according to Northey's plan, Luwiwa by a column under Lieut.-Col. Rodger based on Fife, and Namema by a column based on Abercorn under Lieut.-Col. Murray, commanding on the Northern Rhodesia border. The Luwiwa garrison managed to break out at dawn on the 28th of May; the Namema garrison attempted to break out on the same night but failed, and eventually made their escape with heavy casualties on the night of 2nd/3rd June. Both garrisons had been contained long enough to prevent them from saving by concentration of forces New Langenburg, which Flindt entered on the 29th of May, finding all intact as the result of the rapid British advance. On the next day General Northey came up to New Langenburg and made it his head-quarters. On the 9th of June Bismarckburg[1] on Lake Tanganyika was occupied by Murray from Namema, and on the 13th of June Old Langenburg[2] at the head of Lake Nyasa was occupied. Thus the frontier was rapidly and most successfully cleared, and New Langenburg having become the British head-quarters, the base on Lake Nyasa to which supplies were brought by water was moved from Karonga 30 miles north to Mwaya on the same western side of the lake but in German territory and about 4 or 5 miles from the head of the lake. By the end of June motor-cars were running from Mwaya to New Langenburg and to points north and east of that place.

Northey's columns had unceasingly pressed the retreating Germans, and were rapidly advancing on Iringa, an important centre 270 miles by road from Mwaya and 120 miles from Kilosa on the main Central Railway. About the 23rd of June Hawthorn occupied Nyombe or Ubena at the cross roads on the way to Iringa, about 80 miles east of New Langenburg and 50 miles north-east of Old Langenburg. The Germans sent down troops to block the advance, among them men of the *Königsberg*, 100 Europeans in number. In all the German force was estimated at 200 to 300 Europeans and 700 to 800

[1] Now Kasanga. [2] Now Lumbira.

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Askari, who took up a position at Madibira mission, south-west of Iringa. On the 24th of July there was a hard fight, the stiffest fight of the campaign, at Malangali. The Germans were astride the road to Iringa and they had with them a 4·2 field howitzer which had been landed from a blockade runner. Rodger attacked from the west, Hawthorn from the east, and there was a small containing force on the south. The Germans were defeated and their big gun was taken as well as a Maxim; 32 enemy dead, 13 of whom were Europeans, were found on the field, while our own casualties were 17 killed and 63 wounded. On the next day the enemy position at Madibira was occupied. The advance on Iringa was being made at General Smuts's request, and it had had the desired effect of drawing off a proportion of the enemy from the main front, but Northey's right flank was now very much exposed to attack, and before continuing the advance it was necessary to safeguard the right. This was done when Hawthorn on the 18/19th August occupied Lupembe, about 50 miles due east of Nyombe; the advance was then resumed and on the 29th of August Iringa was occupied, 16 prisoners of war and 40 interned persons being released. By October Songea, due south of Iringa, was occupied also.

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SECTION III

NYASALAND AND GENERAL NORTHEY'S CAMPAIGN [1]

Mainly by Sir George Smith, K.C.M.G.

NYASALAND was called upon to play a not unimportant part throughout the war. Of an area approximating to 40,000 square miles, about one-third larger than Scotland, it is a strip lying to the west and south of Lake Nyasa well within the interior of Central Africa. Its greatest length north to south is 550 miles, its greatest width 110 miles, and it has an extensive border of some 1,300 miles. For boundaries it has what was German East Africa on the north and north-east for 250 miles, Portuguese East Africa on the east, south, and south-west for 700 miles, and on the west, Northern Rhodesia for 350 miles. The lake is an important waterway 350 miles in length.

Livingstone reached the south end of Lake Nyasa in 1859, but it was not until some years later that the country was opened up to missionary enterprise and the trade of the African Lakes Company. In 1883 Nyasaland came to some extent under consular control, and in 1889 it was proclaimed a British Protectorate. It was renamed the British Central Africa Protectorate in 1893, but on the grant of a new constitution in 1907 the old title of the Nyasaland Protectorate was revived. In 1904 the control of its affairs passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office and it has since, though still a Protectorate, been administered as a Crown Colony. Throughout the war the Governor was Sir George Smith, K.C.M.G., who had had long service in Cyprus and had subsequently been Colonial Secretary of Mauritius.

In 1914 the population comprised in round figures 800 Europeans, 300 Asiatics, principally Indians, and a million

[1] This section was in the main contributed with map and illustrations by Sir George Smith, K.C.M.G., Governor of Nyasaland during the war, to whom the Editor is very specially indebted.

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and a quarter natives. The chief settlement was Blantyre, in the Shiré Highlands, with some 300 European residents; the head-quarters of the Government were at Zomba. Cotton and tobacco headed the exports and were exported in larger quantities in 1917, in spite of the war, than in 1913. The trade of the Protectorate was almost entirely within the Empire.

When, on the morning of the 29th of July 1914, a warning telegram arrived from the Colonial Office, the military forces of Nyasaland nominally comprised 300 with the colours of the 1st King's African Rifles and 300 in the Reserve, but the actual numbers were considerably below these figures. There was also a Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve of under 200 whites; but this force had not, as yet, been trained as an effective fighting unit. German East Africa was approximately ten times the size of Nyasaland, it possessed a well organized and equipped military force of proportionate strength, and on the lake had an armed gunboat, the *Hermann von Weissmann*. The vessels of the Protectorate Government were the *Gwendolen*, 350 tons, with a 3-pounder Hotchkiss and a Nordenfeldt quick-firer, and the *Pioneer* of 40 tons with a Nordenfeldt. No time was lost in mobilizing the small force available, in calling up the K.A.R. reserve and men on leave with as many old soldiers in the police and elsewhere as could be induced to rejoin, and by the 8th of August a force of about 500 had been assembled at Fort Johnston at the south end of Lake Nyasa. In the meantime the Government vessels had been prepared for active service and all other steam vessels, the *Queen Victoria*, 177 tons, of the African Lakes Corporation, the *Chauncy Maples*, 320 tons, and the *Charles Janssen*, 25 tons, privately owned, had been recalled to that port.

War having been declared, it was essential in the first place to dispose of the German gunboat, and on the 8th of August the *Gwendolen* was dispatched to find and if possible capture or sink her. Information had been received that shortly before she had been hauled up for repairs at Sphinxhaven, the southernmost German port on Lake Nyasa, and the fear was not unwarranted that this might mean rearmament with heavier guns. The *Gwendolen* found her, however, at Sphinxhaven on the 13th refitting and with some plates out of her sides. The captain and chief engineer (Germans) with four Indian artificers were made prisoners, but as the repairs

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necessary to refloat the vessel would have taken some time she was disabled by the removal of her armament and the main parts of her engines. Nyasaland then had command of the lake and was gratified both by the success which had attended the first move and by the recognition it received in Viscount Harcourt's telegram: 'Well done, Nyasaland!' The *Gwendolen* returned to Fort Johnston, and on the 16th of August all available forces were dispatched to the north end of the lake for defence of the frontier on the Songwe river. On the 19th of August the enemy crossed the border and shots were exchanged with police patrols. A few days later the Nyasaland force reached Karonga, about 15 miles south of the Songwe, and a reconnaissance found the enemy in some strength in entrenched positions well within the Nyasaland border. Small outpost affairs ensued and the *Gwendolen* from the lake attacked positions within range of her guns. On the 5th of September Old Langenburg at the north-east corner of the lake was bombarded by her, stores were captured, including spare parts of the *Hermann von Weissmann*, and a large steel boat too heavy to remove was destroyed.

On the east side of Lake Nyasa, from a point about half-way down the lake, thence to the Indian Ocean, the southern boundary of German East Africa marched with Portuguese East Africa in a line almost due east following the course of the Ruvuma river. So long as Germany was disposed to respect the neutrality of Portugal, Portuguese territory offered a buffer to attack on Nyasaland from that side, but it was known that the Portuguese had no troops in the vicinity which could have successfully resisted the Germans. An intelligence service was established south of the Ruvuma, but no telegraphic communication existed and dependence had to be placed on native runners for the transmission of information over the 200 miles which intervened to Fort Johnston. On the 25th of August reports came in of the movement of German troops towards the Ruvuma, and subsequently two or three Portuguese posts were attacked, but orders appear to have been promptly dispatched to discontinue aggressive action. That this considerate treatment of the Portuguese would be maintained became increasingly doubtful as news arrived of the action of the Germans on the west against Portuguese Angolaland. Such was the position on the north and east sides of the Pro-

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tectorate at the end of August. It had been ascertained that His Majesty's Government would not be able to send reinforcements or additional guns and quick-firers of which the Protectorate stood greatly in need, and the policy had to be the maintenance of its defence without jeopardizing its small force.

The troops on the northern border, strengthened by some 50 whites from the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve, completed their organization and established their position at Karonga. It was then decided to take steps to expel the enemy from British territory, and on the afternoon of the 8th of September, Lieut.-Col. C. W. Barton, D.S.O., moved out of Karonga with about 400 rifles, 3 machine-guns, and 900 carriers, leaving a small garrison in Karonga of half a dozen whites and 50 native troops. Knowledge of the difficulties of the African bush with its long grass and scrub is needed fully to appreciate what befell on this night of the 8th of September when a considerable force of the enemy in two columns intent on attacking Karonga passed by Colonel Barton's column moving northwards. Reports had come to hand of an enemy detachment in the way of the British advance, and a small column had been thrown out to get into touch with it but returned at 9 p.m. that night. About 8 a.m. in the morning of the 9th of September the firing of an old 7-pounder muzzle-loading gun used in past expeditions against native chiefs warned Colonel Barton, then on the Lufira river some 8 miles north of Karonga, that the latter place was being attacked. A column with one machine gun under Captain Griffiths was immediately dispatched to its relief and the main body was formed up to return in its support. The force which attacked Karonga was estimated at from 300 to 400 rifles with 3 machine guns. The little garrison gallantly held on until Captain Griffiths came up about 11 a.m. when the Germans were dispersed, leaving behind two whites and 21 Askari killed. There were no British casualties except a few slight wounds. Too exhausted by its rapid march from the Lufira, Captain Griffiths's column was unable immediately to follow up the retreating enemy. About 11 a.m. a party of Germans were met by the returning main body and at 1 p.m. there was a warm engagement near the Kasoa stream. The position was as follows: Colonel Barton's force, hampered by its baggage train, was moving

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

Nyasaland: (*a*) Sir George Smith and Legislative Council



Nyasaland: (*b*) Defences of Karonga

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Nyasaland was one of the parts of the Empire in which grave internal trouble coincided with foreign war. On the night of the 23rd of January 1915, a body of natives, estimated at 200, armed principally with spears, attacked the houses occupied by Europeans on the Magomero estates situated about half-way between Zomba and Blantyre. Messrs. Livingstone, McCormick, and Ferguson were brutally murdered, Mr. Robertson wounded, and three ladies and five children were carried off. News of the attack was brought to Zomba in the early hours of Sunday, the 24th of January. A force of about 100 recruits from the King's African Rifles depot was dispatched at once on foot and several members of the Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve followed on motor cycles and cars. The telegraph line had been cut, and it was not until later in the day that news was received of a similar attack at Blantyre on the stores of the African Lakes Corporation for the purpose of obtaining arms and ammunition. Other information filtered in which made it apparent that the movement was widespread, and that attacks on Zomba and Mlanje had also been premeditated and might still be attempted. At all these stations it was decided to bring in the European women and children, many of them scattered on plantations at some distance, and laagers were formed on suitable premises. No time was lost in taking active measures against the rebels from Zomba, Blantyre, Mikalongwe, and Mlanje, and, assisted by friendly natives, the disaffected area was soon surrounded. On Tuesday, the 26th of January, the village of John Chelembwe, the organizer of the revolt, was taken with slight casualties among the King's African Rifles. Early that morning the Mission of the Marist Fathers at Nguludi was attacked by the rebels and burnt down, but excepting one Father left for dead the remainder with the Sisters effected their escape to Blantyre. Some stores were raided in different parts. The same day the ladies and children carried off from Magomero reached Chiradzulu, having suffered no harm except from exposure and want of food in their wanderings through the bush. News reached Zomba on the 26th of a similar rising in the Ncheu district. This was frustrated by warnings received from a friendly chief, and by assistance promptly rendered by another. Mr. Cardew, the Resident of the district, acted with energy and promptness and effected the capture of some of the ringleaders.

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When, on the 24th of January, information was to hand as to the extent of the movement, the Officer Commanding the troops at Karonga was requested to dispatch a force to assist in suppressing the rising. This he did promptly, and two companies of the K.A.R. reached Fort Johnston on the evening of the 27th. Thence a detachment was dispatched to Ncheu and the remainder, dragging a 7-pr. gun over a distance of 86 miles, rising from 1,600 to 3,000 feet, reached Zomba in 48 hours, a remarkable marching performance. The back of the rising had, in the meantime, been broken, but the trained troops under Captain Collins, K.A.R., were of the greatest assistance in rounding up scattered parties and in clearing the disaffected areas. John Chelembwe and some others with him, trying to escape into Portuguese East Africa, were intercepted by a party of police from Mlanje on the 3rd of February. The leader was shot resisting capture, and the others were wounded and taken prisoners. The movement was designed for the massacre of the whites in the Shiré Highlands, where they are principally congregated, and for the suppression of white rule, and there can be no doubt that it had been in course of preparation for some years by John Chelembwe and the members of the religious fraternity which he had established under the name of the African Baptist Church and Provident Industrial Mission. He was a man of about 50 years, a native of Nyasaland; he had spent some time in America, where he had been ordained a clergyman of the National Baptist Convention, and he started his mission in Nyasaland in 1900. It had long been under suspicion as seditious, and after the outbreak of war which synchronized with a native *Watch Tower* prediction that the end of the world, interpreted to mean the end of the white rule in Africa, would come in October 1914, it was more completely watched; but overt acts were not anticipated. While there is no actual evidence that Chelembwe received assistance from the Germans, a letter was captured clearly showing that he had been in correspondence with officials in German East Africa and that his plans had, at least, their sympathetic support.[1]

[1] *Translation from Kiswahili.*

To the Sultan John Chelembwe,

P.I. Mission at Chiradzulu near Blantyre.

I let you know that your man . . . arrived here with your letter, thank you.

I have sent your letter to the Chief Judge at Lindi and to the Governor at Dar es Salaam. We are all very pleased to receive your news. Also I have received an

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Apart from the unrest engendered by the Chelembwe rising, there were not wanting other evidences of mental disturbance in the native at the continuance of a state of affairs of which he had had no previous experience. To see white men at each others' throats was a novelty, the length of the operations and the preparations for a continuance of them on an even greater scale, together with the growing demands on him for a multitude of services, were enough to upset his equanimity. The Germans unquestionably sought to stir up trouble among the Moslems in Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa, and it must be accounted greatly to the credit of the Nyasaland Yaos that they continued to furnish large numbers for service in the King's African Rifles and otherwise, and were throughout the whole campaign most loyal. The Angonis in Mombera district, descendants of an offshoot of Zulus who trekked north in Chaka's time, showed signs of giving trouble. These people, granted certain privileges at a time when the authorities were busily engaged in suppressing slave raiding and their antagonism was not desired, had ever been disposed to regard themselves as of a superior race to their neighbours. On a demand by the Resident for men for carrier and other services, Chimtunga, the paramount chief, directed the other chiefs to refuse. Sent for by the Resident, he returned a defiant answer that the Resident might come and fetch him if he could. Half a company of Yaos of the K.A.R. with a maxim were immediately dispatched to the district, but hearing of their impending arrival Chimtunga came in. He was deported to another district, the subsidies granted to him and other of his chiefs were withdrawn, and there was no further trouble.

In May 1915 another expedition was made against Sphinxhaven, whence reports had been received that the *Hermann von Weissmann* had been repaired. This was successfully accomplished by the *Gwendolen* and *Chauncey Maples*, under the command of Lieut.-Commander G. Dennistoun, R.N., and a landing force under Captain Collins, K.A.R., the German

order from the Chief Judge of Lindi to write you thanking you for your letter. The news you tell me about the war is true. In Europe the Germans have conquered the English, many were killed, many wounded, many taken into German territory. In Europe on the sea the German Navy is the best. Every time English ships have been sunk. As to what concerns about German territory here in Africa this man of yours . . . will inform you, having heard all the news.

My compliments to all your people. Wasalaam,

—CHIEF JUDGE AT TUNDURU.

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vessel being completely disabled. Although resisted, the landing force suffered no casualties except one officer slightly wounded. This finally completed British control of the lake. Much later in the war, when the want of shipping for transport on Lake Nyasa was badly felt, attempts were begun to repair this German vessel, and make her again serviceable on the water. Eventually the efforts of Colonel Silburn and the soldiers under his command succeeded, and on the 18th of March 1918 the *Hermann von Weissmann* made a trial trip under her new name of *King George*.

General Northey's Campaign

In the latter part of 1915 steps were taken to send reinforcements from the Union of South Africa, and in the middle of February 1916 Brig.-Gen. Edward Northey arrived at Karonga to take command of the Nyasaland-Rhodesia forces for an advance into German East Africa in conjunction with a similar movement from the northern side under the direction of Lieut.-Gen. Smuts. After organizing his forces and supplies, General Northey began his advance on the 25th of May 1916, along the whole front from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Nyasa, a distance of 200 miles, by four columns based respectively on Abercorn, Fife, Fort Hill, and Karonga, and comprising in all about 1,000 white and 1,500 native troops. The attack was simultaneously delivered on four points strongly held by the enemy and was entirely successful on the whole line, the Germans being driven back on Bismarckburg, thence up the east side of Tanganyika, and on to New Langenburg, which was evacuated. By the middle of June, after engagements at Magoje, the Paroto Hills, Ulongwe, and Mwakete, at all of which severe losses were inflicted, the enemy was in full retreat towards Iringa, and Nyombe, an important junction of roads, was occupied. Then, reinforced from the north, the demoralized German forces were gathered together at Malangali, where, on the 24th of July, an action of some magnitude was fought, the enemy suffering casualties of about 150, and a 4·2 howitzer being captured. On the 29th of August Iringa was occupied and a large number of sick and wounded, women and children, were taken, and British prisoners released. General Northey's line was now extended south of Iringa, facing east against a somewhat broken enemy formation.

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At this stage an unwelcome diversion arose in the retirement of a considerable enemy force driven from Tabora on the Central Railway by the Belgians and a British column operating respectively from the north end of Tanganyika and from Mwanza at the south of Lake Victoria. In several columns, estimated at 1,000 rifles, under Wahle, Wintgens, and Langen, these troops sought, by breaking through General Northey's rear and flanks, to join up with the enemy main body then concentrating in the Mahenge area, where Lieut.-Cols. Hawthorn and Murray were holding them. General Northey's main line of communications, still based on Mwaya at the north-west end of Lake Nyasa, thence by New Langenburg and Buhora to Nyombe, a distance of 160 miles, was seriously threatened. The loss of two small detachments with two naval 12-pr. guns under Lieut.-Col. Baxendale and Capt. Clarke near Igominyi, Baxendale being ambushed and killed on the 23rd of October,[1] was compensated for by a heavy defeat of the enemy under Kraut, inflicted by Lieut.-Col. Hawthorn on the 30th October. The fight took place at Mkapira near the Ruhuje, 82 prisoners, a field gun, and three machine guns were taken, and 42 of the enemy were killed, the British casualties being only 21. At Malangali, Lieut.-Col. Marriott, with half a company of the Rhodesian Native Police, after sustaining a five days' siege, was brilliantly relieved on the 12th of November by Lieut.-Col. Murray's force, rushed up in motor-cars, and large captures of arms, ammunition, and stores were effected. A few days later, a detachment of 250 Awemba recruits of the 1st K.A.R., under Captains Wyatt and Slattery, after a magnificent resistance for six days against determined attacks by Wintgens' force on their position at Lupembe, in which the enemy lost heavily, was relieved on the 18th of November by Colonels Hawthorn and Murray; while at Ilembule, on the 26th of November, an enemy force under Colonel Hubener was surrounded and captured. The enemy's known losses during these few weeks were: killed, 23 Europeans and 126 Askari; captured, 75 Europeans and 420 Askari, one 10·5 cm. howitzer, one 6 cm. field gun, and seven machine guns, while the two naval guns lost at Igominyi were recaptured.

The enemy forces from Tabora had now been disposed of or had got through and joined the main body. In December the Iringa area was transferred to the northern command, and taken

[1] See above, p. 183.

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over by General Van Deventer's force; General Northey moved his head-quarters from New Langenburg to Nyombe, his troops were concentrated on a line from Lupembe to Songea, the old line of communication was abandoned and new lines were opened up from Old Langenburg via Tundala and Nyombe to Lupembe and from Wiedhaven[1] on Lake Nyasa to Songea. With the rainy season the difficulty of supplies grew greater; they could be brought only by carriers across the Livingstone range on the east of Lake Nyasa. The hope had been entertained, when the move into German East Africa first took place, that the Portuguese troops centred on Porto Amelia would have been able to support General Northey's right by an advance towards Songea and Mahenge, but beyond occupying Newala, from which they were driven by the Germans on the 7th of December, they were unable to afford any material support to the British forces.

The scheme of operations was now to drive the enemy out of the positions he held in the highlands between Lupembe and Songea eastwards into the Ruhuje and Luwegu river basins. By the end of January 1917 General Northey had advanced his front to Ifinga, Kitanda, and Likuyu, at which points three interesting hands were being played at one time. At Kitanda, Lieut.-Col. Tomlinson with the Rhodesian Native Regiment was surrounded by Wintgens, while at Ifinga, south-east of Lupembe, Kraut was held up by Murray, and Grawert was invested at Likuyu by Lieut.-Col. McCarthy with the North Rhodesian Police, sent by Colonel Byron, commanding at Songea. Grawert surrendered with 3 officers and 35 other Europeans and 202 Askari; Kraut escaped north, and, the enemy line being broken, Wintgens was compelled to withdraw from Kitanda. During this period excellent work was done by the K.A.R. in driving the enemy right wing across the Ruhuje towards Mahenge out of a very difficult country full of steep ravines and dense bush. The drive eastwards was here interrupted by Wintgens and Kraut doubling back in February to the north-west, which necessitated the withdrawal of considerable forces in pursuit. The front line, extending as it did for 120 miles, was too long to be held with any degree of completeness by the forces at General Northey's disposal. The German movement was no doubt dictated in the main by food considerations, but not improbably also by

[1] Now Manda.

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desire to relieve the pressure on von Lettow's main body. West of Gumbiro, the enemy force divided; Kraut with some 50 whites and 400 Askari and 14 machine guns proceeded south via Kigonsera, while Wintgens with another force of about the same dimensions moved on Milow and thence took a northerly course, cutting Northey's line of communication near Tundala. The pursuit of these columns was vigorously pressed, Wintgens being followed past Magoje, Utengule, and Lake Rukwa towards Tabora, where, in May, the chase was taken up by troops from the north sent in by the railway, while Kraut was driven to the Ruvuma. The pursuing columns were frequently engaged with the enemy, and captures of men, baggage, and ammunition were effected, but in such a chase the advantage lay with the enemy. He could live on and devastate the area passed through, while new lines of communication had to be opened up and supplies hurried forward in support of the pursuing columns. At the same time General Northey had to maintain his stand on the Lupembe–Songea line against an enemy now actively pressed in from the north and east. Kraut's force, considerably reduced and scattered, proceeded eastwards along the Ruvuma, but in April broke south and raided Portuguese territory down to the Nyasaland border, which was entered at Namweras. With this threat to Nyasaland, General Northey in May moved his head-quarters to Zomba, and, rapidly throwing in troops, was able to drive the enemy back over the Ruvuma. In July he organized his forces in three columns, the first at Lupembe, based on Nyombe and Old Langenburg, the second at Songea based on Wiedhaven, the third in Portuguese East Africa based on Fort Johnston. By the middle of August Colonel Shorthose had cleared the western portion of Portuguese East Africa and occupied Tunduru in German territory. The South African Engineers, commanded by Major Colin Clarke, had greatly facilitated operations by the construction of motor roads, among them a road across the Livingstone Mountains from Wiedhaven to Songea. In the meantime a vigorous offensive was pressed forward against the enemy under Otto, Lincke, and Aumann in the Mahenge-Liwale area, serious losses being inflicted at Mpepo, Mpondas, and on the Songea-Liwale road. On the 29th of October a strong detachment of the 1st/4th K.A.R. entered Liwale, to be relieved by the

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Belgians, who also, about the same time, occupied Mahenge, releasing part of the Nyasaland-Rhodesia force for more active measures against the enemy farther south. At this date Northey's columns were operating at the greatest distance from their base, 250 to 300 miles by road from Lake Nyasa, and some 30,000 native carriers were being used.

The operations in German East Africa now entered on their final stage. Pressed on the north and east as well as from the west, with a wedge driven in at Liwale, the enemy was divided into two bodies, one operating between Liwale and Mahenge, the other, under von Lettow's direct command, to the south between Liwale and Masasi, the whole materially reduced by constant engagements and by the abandonment from time to time of large numbers of sick and wounded which fell into our hands. In the latter part of November, the squeeze being severely pressed, a rapid move was made by the Northern Force under Otto, Aumann, and Tafel to join up with von Lettow for a general move south across the Ruvuma into Portuguese East Africa. In this withdrawal they lost heavily in engagements with our columns, and a considerable force under Tafel, who had orders to make for the Ruvuma west of Ngomano and join von Lettow, was headed off to the south-east, intercepted, and at the end of November captured by British troops operating from the east, the total surrender being 148 Germans, 1,398 Askari, and 3,000 carriers. On the 4th of December von Lettow crossed the Ruvuma after capturing the Portuguese post at Ngomano. There appears to be no question that he was then hard pressed and short of both ammunition and food, his whole force reduced to some 300 whites and 1,800 Askari. Had the Portuguese been able to hold him, the campaign might have been ended, pressed as he was by British columns close on his heels. On the contrary, he was replenished with stores and ammunition seized at Ngomano, and the operations took a new life. No strong force of Portuguese was available to resist him, and until British troops could be moved south and new lines of communication opened up from Nyasaland and the coast, he had a comparatively free hand in raiding the rich Lujenda valley and neighbouring areas. By the end of the year his troops were spread over some 300 square miles of central Portuguese East Africa, one Portuguese position after another being

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occupied, and the natives offering no resistance to the invaders.

While concentration on the Ruvuma was necessary to prevent a return into German East Africa, columns were pushed in by Mtengula, on the Portuguese shore of Lake Nyasa, and Fort Johnston. Among new units under Northey's command was the 2nd Battalion of the Cape Corps. Repeated patrol affairs with raiding parties took place, but extensive operations were rendered difficult by heavy rains and swollen, unbridged rivers. By the beginning of February 1918, however, the enemy had been dislodged from the area west of the Lujenda, and was then moving south-east towards the Lurio, which necessitated the opening up again of new lines of communication through Malokotera and Regone and from the Zambezi. A column under General Edwards was advancing inland west, from Porto Amelia. Important engagements were fought at Mahua and Kanene and in the neighbourhood of Nanungo, which von Lettow made his centre and which was roughly equidistant from Nyasaland and the sea. The enemy suffered severely, but he was able to effect his retreat southwards towards Quelimane on a line as far distant as possible from the bases, in Nyasaland and on the coast, of the columns engaged in his pursuit. His progress was not seriously opposed by the small Portuguese forces in his way, and he was able, at the various stations captured, to provide himself with ample supplies of food, clothing, and trade goods. At Nyamakura, 30 miles north of Quelimane, his course south was stopped by a combined force of British and Portuguese troops, and he then turned north-east, following the coast-line, at a distance of about 30 miles, through Ociva and Metil to Chalaua, where he was caught up by our troops and hemmed in. At the end of June the command of the Nyasaland-Rhodesia forces passed to Brig.-Gen. Hawthorn from Major-Gen. Northey, who proceeded on leave prior to taking up the appointment of Governor of British East Africa. It was then hoped that it would be possible to bring von Lettow to a final engagement at Chalaua, but again he was able to evade capture by a rapid move south and then west towards the Nyasaland frontier, and it was not until the latter days of August that he was brought to a stand near Nyamaroi. Here he turned north, suffering heavily in engagements at Regone, Lioma, and Muanhupa. In the

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latter days of September he re-crossed the Ruvuma into German East Africa, our troops closely following him. With little effective resistance from the small bodies available to intercept him, he moved rapidly northwards, passing west of Songea by Gumbiro, Nyombe, and Utengule. Pressed by our troops in close pursuit and by others moved up the lake, he turned west and south, entering North Rhodesia by Fife, where he was engaged, and at Kayambe. As is told in the following section, it was while on the Chambezi river, not far from Kasama, that news of the signing of the armistice reached him and he received orders to surrender, which he did.

The foregoing is a brief outline of the course of events attending the campaign against the Germans from the Nyasaland-Rhodesia side. The account would, however, be very incomplete if it did not notice the remarkable success which General Northey achieved under stupendous difficulties and with a very small fighting force. The area cleared by him and promptly brought under civil administration may be put at no less than 80,000 square miles, bounded by a line drawn from a point on Lake Tanganyika about half-way between Bismarckburg and Ujiji to Iringa, thence through Mahenge and Tunduru to the Ruvuma.

In considering the vicissitudes of the campaign, its long duration, and the apparent inability of our troops to contain the enemy and force him to a decisive engagement or surrender, full allowance must be made for the terrain and the local conditions attending military operations in the African bush, the lack of communications, and the facility with which large bodies of men may move in close proximity but in ignorance of each other's presence. Another consideration is the vast area covered by the operations and the long lines of front to be held with insufficient troops. At different times the forces under General Northey were operating between Tabora on the Central German Railway, to which Wintgens was pursued, and Quelimane, where von Lettow's southern course was turned, a distance as the crow flies of nearly 1,000 miles, his front line frequently extended over 200 miles, while lines of communication from bases in Nyasaland and on the lake had repeatedly to be opened up for a like distance. While, in the early stages of the campaign, with the enemy more or less

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concentrated, it was possible to bring him into action, later on it became an easy matter for a smaller and more mobile force of tried and hardened veterans to evade capture. Such a body, by living on the land, was able to move rapidly, leaving a devastated area to the pursuing force which had to depend on supplies brought up to it. Another factor not to be ignored (it has frequently been touched on in General Smuts's dispatches) was the difficulty of maintaining the health of white troops under the fierce sun of the tropics and in the pestiferous areas in which the operations were conducted.

A few remarks must be added on the difficulties attending the movement of troops to and from Nyasaland and in maintaining their supplies. Beira, in Portuguese East Africa, is the ocean port. Here during the war men and stores had to be transferred to smaller vessels capable of crossing the bar at Chinde, the only navigable mouth of the Zambezi, at a distance of 180 miles. Thence, transport on the river was effected in shallow-draught stern-wheel steamers towing barges for a distance of 120 miles, the journey occupying three to ten days according to the condition of the river, as, when the river was low, new channels had to be negotiated and sand-banks often cut away. At Chindio on the Zambezi was the terminus of the Central Africa and Shiré Highlands Railways, by which goods were carried to Limbe, a distance of 170 miles, whence for 120 miles a road suitable in dry weather for motor traffic was available to Fort Johnston at the south end of Lake Nyasa. Here the stores had to be rebulked to loads of 56 lb. for human carriage on the forward lines to the fighting columns. Accordingly, between Beira and Fort Johnston, a distance of about 600 miles, four different means of transport were employed with five separate handlings of the goods. At Fort Johnston, transhipment to the lake steamers took place for carriage to the bases of the forward lines of communication, which, as in the case of Mwaya, might be 350 miles distant. Each of these links in the chain had its limitations and a breakdown in any one immediately reacted on the usefulness of the others. Each had been prepared only to the point of sufficing for the ordinary needs of the Protectorate; in many cases the vessels and rolling-stock had been long in service, there were grave risks of breakdown by overstrain, and, except in the case of motor vehicles, it was impossible to augment

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the plant to meet the ever-increasing demand on it. In the opinion of all with local knowledge, it is a marvel that the various services were able to carry the numbers of men and quantities of stores they were called upon to transport, and that they did so and were maintained throughout in an efficient condition reflects the greatest credit upon all concerned in this important service, on which the success of General Northey's operations so materially depended.

We come now to that all-important matter the more immediate supply of the troops in the fighting line. The map (end of volume) shows in double lines the various communications for this purpose opened up from time to time as General Northey advanced. Where it was possible and time permitted, roads suitable for light motor traffic were constructed, and the following statement of routes and distances will be of interest and bear testimony to the efficient organization of the military engineering service under the command of Lieut.-Col. Colin Clarke.

	Miles.
1. Karonga to Fife (over the old Stevenson road)	150
2. Karonga to the Songwe	22
3. Mwaya to Nyombe via New Langenburg, Rungwe, and Buhora	163
4. Nyombe to Iringa	120
5. Nyombe to Lupembe	45
6. Nyombe to Tundala (for Old Langenburg)	45
7. Nyombe to Songea	150
8. Lituhi (near Wiedhaven) to Songea	88
9. Mbamba Bay to Johannesbruck	70
10. Songea to Mpurakasese	65
11. Nyamtumbo towards Tunduru	11
12. Fort Johnston to Namweras, Amaramba, Malokotera, and Lurio	134
13. Amaramba-Kanene road	22
14. Fort Anderson, Portuguese Mlanje, and Libuda	75
	1,160

In addition to road formation, all streams had to be substantially bridged to carry the motor vehicles and their loads.

Where motor roads could not be provided, transport had to be effected by human porterage in loads of approximately 56 lb., or 40 carriers to the ton, with a margin for casualties of from 5 to 10 per cent. according to the character of the country to be traversed. Some idea of the distances over which this kind of transport had to be used will be obtained by a reference to the map and the various points reached by General Northey's troops.[1] Fifteen miles a day on a continuous

[1] Speaking at a dinner in England after the war, on 21st November 1918, of

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journey is a good march for a loaded carrier, and it must be remembered that, when on heavy work, each carrier eats the equivalent in weight of his own load in about three weeks. It was in the matter of native carrier transport that Nyasaland made its most valuable contribution to the war.

No exact census of the native population had been made, but by careful investigation in connexion with the hut tax assessment, it was computed at about a million and a quarter. Excluding women (380,000), children of both sexes (670,000), and aged and infirm male adults (30,000) there remained, in round figures, 200,000 adult males physically fit for active labour. Of these, during the war, 19,000 were recruited for service in the King's African Rifles. The other demands on the native population in connexion with the war were for carriers with the front-line columns and on lines of communication, as labourers in making and repairing roads and in a multitude of auxiliary services, wood-cutting for the railway and steamers and in the carriage of locally grown foodstuffs from the place of production to the lake or other transport centre. In this last service some women and children were employed. The conditions of service varied with the different classes of labour. The term of engagement was longest with front-line carriers, often for twelve months; in the other classes the periods were shorter, generally six months, and in the transport of foodstuffs the conditions were the carriage of a given number of loads over specified distances. It is difficult to procure absolutely reliable data of the numbers employed in the several services, but the following figures go to show how great was the demand. There were recruited in Nyasaland:

	1916–17.	*1917–18.*
As front-line carriers with the troops .	11,933	31,876
For transport on lines of communication	45,866 }	34,740
For labour on roads, &c. . . .	14,528 }	
For wood-cutting and miscellaneous .	—	6,121
In carrying foodstuffs locally . .	—	50,588
	72,327	123,325

the difficulties of transport for his campaign, Sir Edward Northey gave the distances as 700 miles from Beira or Salisbury to the depots, and thence 200 or 300 miles by carriers, making a total distance of sometimes 1,000 miles from the base. A track had, he said, to be cut for the carriers through the Livingstone Mountains, 5,000 feet high at the southern end of Lake Nyasa, 10,000 feet high at the northern end of the lake.

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Taking another set of figures accessible, in the months January to May 1917 (inclusive), when, by reason of bad weather, motor traffic was interrupted, there were dispatched from Zomba to Fort Johnston 131,573 loads by human carriage. Repeated journeys were made by the same carrier.

Apart from what Nyasaland furnished, Rhodesia[1] provided large numbers for the transport from that country of food and material for the Rhodesians serving under General Northey and also front-line carriers for service with those forces. Further, as the columns advanced through enemy territory and Portuguese East Africa, they were able to draw on the natives of those countries. One important feature in the service was the fluctuation in demand from time to time, which threw a heavy strain on both the recruiting organization and the native population. The number of troops engaged changed constantly, as well as their fronts and the length of lines of communication. No definite requirement for any given period could be anticipated and demands had to be met as they arose. Take, for instance, any of the rapid moves of the enemy or the case of the breaking back of Wintgens and Kraut referred to above. The rapid movement of troops was as much as the lake vessels and other means of transport could provide for, there was no margin or time for evacuating carriers on the old lines of communication, and a fresh service had to be rapidly improvised in or about the area of the new advance. Setting aside military requirements, there were the ordinary and normal services of the Protectorate to be provided for, amongst which, in prime importance, is native agriculture for raising the foodstuffs on which the native population depends. It has been estimated that about 30,000 labourers are required for work on European estates for a period of about four months in the year, that some 20,000 are constantly engaged as carriers, and that a not smaller number seek employment out of the country on the mines and farms of Rhodesia and South Africa. To these must be added 2,000 permanently employed by Government, including police and prisoners, and there are in addition permanent employees of the railways, trading, and other concerns, casual labour other than agriculture, mission staffs, teachers, &c., and the numbers employed in domestic service. If the estimate of the physically fit adult male population above

[1] See below under Northern Rhodesia, pp. 290–6.

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given is to be depended on, it is apparent that the Protectorate was practically exhausted in meeting the military demands.

Great hardships were endured by the native carriers both in the front-line service and on the lines of communication. In ordinary circumstances, this form of labour is held in favour, but then the carrier is given his load and a period in which to complete the journey. He accordingly determines for himself the stages, his halting-places, and the duration of his rests. The conditions on active service were all different. In the front lines, the carrier had to be ready for work at any moment and not infrequently for long and difficult journeys with the added risk of being wounded or killed. On the lines of communication, there had to be precise organization and regular journeys at stated intervals. With all, there was unusual exposure to wind and rain, cold and heat, for at one time high mountain passes had to be crossed, at another time low-lying, fever-stricken swamps. The African native is very susceptible to pneumonic diseases and incapable of much physical resistance to them. Dysentery and malaria are common ailments. That there was considerable sickness and loss of life is not surprising in the circumstances. Statistics as to sickness are not available. The returns of deaths in the year 1917–18, when the work of both troops and front-line carriers was most strenuous, are between 40 and 50 per 1,000. This was a high rate, but not unduly so if regard is had to all the conditions of the service; nor does it compare unfavourably with that of African natives in the mines of South Africa, labour in which the Nyasaland boy voluntarily engages, or with the ordinary death-rate in many eastern countries with large native populations. In common parlance in Central Africa, *Tenga-tenga* is the name applied to the carrier service and the men engaged in it. As was frequently admitted by General Smuts and others concerned in the operations against German East Africa, it was the Tenga-tenga who won the campaign. No praise of what they did and what they endured can be too high. All was done in a cause in which they took little interest and which they understood less, but the Government they respected required the service from them and it was readily and loyally given at much personal risk to themselves and not a little inconvenience to their families. A great debt of gratitude is due also to the native chiefs for the assistance most

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

Nyasaland : (*c*) *Tenga Tenga* (carriers) waiting for loads at Zomba

Nyasaland : (*d*) Transports at Fort Johnston

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readily rendered by them at all times in meeting the recurring demands for more and more of their men. It speaks well for the native Nyasaland population generally that this great disturbance of their ordinary lives and pursuits, extending over so long a period, led to no serious resistance at any time.

Of the 800 Europeans in Nyasaland at the outbreak of war about 300 were women and children. The Nyasaland Volunteer Reserve, originally raised for the better protection, if required, of the European community against internal trouble, had become little more than a shooting club, although, at the beginning of 1914, measures were being taken or in contemplation for its better organization. On the 1st of August 1914 it comprised 181 members in seven sections, with stations principally in the Shiré Highlands. The outbreak of hostilities gave an immediate impetus to recruitment, and during the war upwards of 400 joined up, some of them being persons from outside the Protectorate. In 1918 its strength was 455; 158 volunteers saw service in the fighting line, and 180 were employed in various capacities on the lines of communication and at the bases in connexion with transport, supplies, &c. Fifty-one received commissions in the King's African Rifles and other branches of the Nyasaland Field Force. Twenty were killed in action or died on active service, while large numbers were wounded or invalided. The decorations granted to members of the Volunteer Force included 1 D.S.O., 10 Military Crosses, 5 Meritorious Service Medals, 1 Croix de Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, 3 Croix de Guerre, and 5 Italian Bronze Medals. The employment of the white population in connexion with the war was governed in large measure by local considerations. Such as had had any previous military training or experience were immediately attached to the fighting forces. Many were still required in their ordinary occupations in aid of services on which the military operations materially depended, e. g. staff of the vessels on the river and lake, the railways, and other transport. At the same time it was desired to cripple as little as possible the productive power of the Protectorate, especially in articles necessary for the prosecution of the war. It was not easy to keep an even balance between these requirements and the desire of Europeans to do their bit in active service, coupled with the constantly

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increasing demands of the military authorities for more white helpers.

A rough distribution of the male white population by occupations may be put as follows, based on returns furnished in 1916 :

Government officials	147
Missions	128
Planters	110
Trading concerns	107
Miscellaneous	62
Total	554

Of these, 52 were over the age of 45, a like number had already been on active service, and 200 were then serving with the forces or were otherwise engaged on duties connected with the military operations. With the large employment of natives as carriers and otherwise, it was in their recruitment, organization, and supervision that the whites with knowledge and experience of the natives and their language could best render assistance. This assistance was afforded in the fullest degree and was highly appreciated by the military command. The missions furnished their quota of men and, in many cases, sisters whose aid in ministering to the sick natives was of the greatest benefit. Many of the ladies who had had past nursing experience joined up for service in the hospitals.

As soon as General Northey's columns moved forward, provision was made for establishing a civil administration in the cleared areas. In July 1916 Mr. (afterwards Sir Hector) Duff, Chief Secretary to the Government of Nyasaland, was sent to New Langenburg with a staff of trained and experienced officers drawn from the Nyasaland and Rhodesian Administrations. He proceeded at once to settle the country between Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa, subsequently extending his government to Iringa and Songea; courts of justice were opened and promptly resorted to, district officers were soon in close touch and sympathy with the people, ordinary civil life was speedily resumed and material assistance in carriers, cattle, and foodstuffs was given to General Northey's force. It was a valuable tribute to British methods that normal conditions revived so rapidly after two years of devastating war.

No account of the participation of Nyasaland in the war would be complete without reference to the King's African Rifles, who played so important a part in the operations in all

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parts of German East Africa. When, in the 'eighties, Sir Harry Johnston was sent up for the settlement of the country, he had with him a mixed force of Sikhs and irregulars recruited from among the Zanzibaris and Mahuas and Somalis of the coast. In 1892 Sir Alfred Sharpe raised a small local force principally from among the Atongas. Later on, Yaos were recruited, and by 1896 a recognized military force had come into being with the title of the British Central Africa Rifles, to be styled in 1900 the British Central Africa Regiment, and in 1901 the King's African Rifles.[1]

On the outbreak of war, the K.A.R. in Nyasaland, as previously pointed out, was considerably below strength; but recruitment, pressed forward, was readily responded to, and during 1915 enough had joined to bring the 1st Battalion up to strength and to reform the 2nd Battalion, which had been disbanded in 1912, for service in British East Africa. Later, when it became apparent that white troops could not endure the strain and sickness of a protracted campaign in tropical Africa, steps were taken to increase the King's African Rifles, and by 1918 two regiments, the 1st and 2nd, of four battalions each, with their depots, had been formed in Nyasaland. Among these must be reckoned some Awembas and other North Rhodesian natives and some from German territory, but, in all, the Protectorate provided during the campaign some 19,000 recruits. The tribes principally drawn upon were the Yaos, the Angonis, and the Atongas, but many others contributed. Opinion differs as to the relative fighting values of the different tribes, and where all did so well it would be invidious to make distinctions. The Yaos, a Mohammedan tribe in the main, showed the greatest avidity for military service, but the fighting qualities were uniformly good, whatever the regiment

[1] For the King's African Rifles before the war see vol. i, pp. 261–3.

The following figures as to the force are given on pp. 382–3 of *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920* (The War Office, March 1922):

'(1) Strength of the force (viz. 3 battalions) on 5th August 1914:

British officers	62
British N.C.O.'s	2
Native rank and file	2,319

(2) Strength of the force (viz. 22 battalions) on 1st November 1918:

British officers	1,423
British N.C.O.'s	2,046
Native rank and file	31,955'

See also Appendix I to the Section on the East Africa Protectorate above, p. 225.

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or battalion and whenever or wherever employed. Without detracting in any way from the capacity of others of H.M.'s troops engaged in the war, whether from India or West Africa, the King's African Rifles maintained their splendid reputation of the past, and in the East African campaign added new laurels to their record.

At the beginning of the war it was not thought necessary to place the Protectorate under martial law. The enemy aliens were few, including some 30 German traders, and were all known. They were required to give their parole, which they readily did, their movements were restricted, and their actions and correspondence placed under close surveillance. It, however, soon became necessary to prosecute and fine some of them for trading with the enemy, and measures were then taken to intern all enemy aliens and to bring their estates under control preparatory to winding them up. At the end of the war practically all enemy estates had been realized, the proceeds were in the hands of the custodian, and all enemy aliens had been removed from the country. At the outbreak of war a session of the legislature was called, when more ample powers were taken for dealing with the censorship of postal matter, telegrams, the press and publications, with the registration and restriction of aliens, with trading with the enemy, and with the defence of the Protectorate. These measures followed closely the lines of legislation of the Empire dealing with the same matters, the last named in particular giving very wide authority to the Governor. The export, without his written permission, was prohibited of foodstuffs, gold, coin and bullion, and of a multitude of articles necessary for the prosecution of the war or which would be of use to the enemy. Subsequently, additional powers were taken for dealing with the publication, importation, circulation or possession of seditious or dangerous books, newspapers, or documents.

In the matter of propaganda, not much was possible with an illiterate native population, but among the Indians and at centres of native education selected publications were distributed. By frequent interviews with chiefs and their people the District Residents were able to keep the natives fully informed of the progress of events and the true issues which had given rise to the all-world conflict in which Nyasaland was taking its part. It has been previously pointed out what

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that part was for the native and how loyally and bravely he stood the test.

Excepting a small increase in the postal rates, estimated to produce about £1,500, no extra taxation was imposed in Nyasaland to meet war expenditure, nor was the Protectorate in a position to make any special grant of money to Imperial funds in aid of the war. The East Africa Protectorates, British East Africa, Uganda, and Nyasaland, were none of them separately, nor were they collectively, in a financial position to embark on such a military venture as the reduction of German East Africa; that had necessarily to be a matter of Imperial concern. The necessary advances to meet the cost of the campaign were made by the Imperial Exchequer on the understanding that adjustment of liability should be determined on its conclusion. The Protectorate, however, maintained its vote for military purposes at the pre-war figure; further, it paid the interest on certain advances for war expenditure, and the salaries of a large number of its officials lent for military duty continued to be charged to local funds. While unusual profits were undoubtedly made by a few trading firms from the increased spending capacity of the community arising out of the war, as well as by some planters from the high prices ruling for their products, incomes in Nyasaland had not previously been taxed, and there were reasons for hesitating before instituting the necessary machinery for reaching excess profits. All sections of the community had displayed a very patriotic sense of duty in offering personal assistance, and the principal sources of revenue had been well maintained. The revenue in each of the three years 1915–16, 1916–17, and 1917–18 was higher than the revenue in 1913–14. Customs, port, and harbour dues had increased from £23,448 in 1913–14 to £42,955 in 1916–17, and hut tax from £69,810 to £78,478 in the same period. An attempt to increase the last-named impost, contributed as it is entirely by the natives who were being drained for carrier and other services, would have been misunderstood and might have led to serious trouble. The other sources of revenue, except the land tax, already paid on extensive undeveloped areas, offered little scope for expansion. It was considered desirable, therefore, before embarking on new taxation which would involve additional outlay in its assessment and collection, to await the final settlement after the war.

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In the matter of war charities, the Protectorate, having regard to its population and means, must be held to have done well. The Nyasaland Relief Fund was started at the commencement of the campaign, partly in aid of the Prince of Wales's Fund, to which £1,170 were sent, but also in relief of Nyasalanders who had suffered by the war, to whom £1,095 were devoted. To the British Red Cross and the kindred Star and Garter Fund a sum of £8,187 was subscribed in the four years 1915–18, to the local Red Cross for whites and natives and for hospital comforts and Christmas gifts £1,893, while the Belgian and Serbian Red Cross and Relief Funds received £217. Other funds to which assistance was given included the British and Foreign Sailors' Society and the Seamen's Hospital, the Miss Cavell and Lord Roberts' Memorials, the Blue Cross and the Overseas Aeroplane Fund. In all, exclusive of gifts in kind, tobacco, &c., £13,671 were contributed. To many of these funds natives added their gifts in money and kind.

The foregoing pages briefly review Nyasaland's part in the war. Some observations may be offered in conclusion as to the effect of the war on its prospects. The earliest settlers pinned their faith on coffee, and the coffee-plant became the badge of the first Protectorate flag. Disease and adverse climatic conditions, however, told against the industry, and little is now grown except for local consumption. In or about 1902, experiments were made with cotton, chiefly of Egyptian varieties, and this crop is now fully established, a local culture from American stock, well known in Africa as the 'Nyasaland Upland', having replaced the Egyptian. In cotton-growing the native has shown marked ability and he will unquestionably become a large producer. The most important rival to cotton is tobacco. This is almost entirely a European cultivation, but of late years there has been some growth by natives, who sell their leaves to the planters. Nyasaland tea is almost exclusively drunk throughout the Protectorate, but the areas suitable for tea-growing are restricted. Fibre (sisal and Mauritius hemp principally) is expanding, and there is great scope for ground-nuts and other oil seeds. Close on four million acres in the Protectorate are privately owned, the bulk being comprised in twenty-four large estates, a small part only of which has so far been developed. Small holders to the number of about 270 divide some 165,000 acres between them.

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Although the war made a heavy strain on the services of all classes, the Protectorate suffered no serious set-back in the yield of its staple products. Many of the planters on active service were able to keep their plantations going under the supervision of friendly neighbours over military age. The shortage of shipping and heavy freight charges were compensated for by abnormally high prices, and, with facilities accorded by the Shipping Control, there was not undue delay, in the circumstances of the time, in getting the produce away. Greater difficulty was experienced with imports, due in the main to the demands for military purposes on a restricted transport service, both into and within the Protectorate. Occasionally there was a shortage in some essential article of food, and all prices ruled high; but, as the Protectorate is largely self-supporting, it cannot be contended that any serious hardship was suffered at any time comparable with that experienced in Great Britain and many other countries affected by the war. Large sums of money were brought in and the spending capacity of all classes, except those on fixed salaries, was increased. The future prospects of the Protectorate were probably improved by the war, which brought in its train far wider knowledge of Nyasaland, of its beauty, its climate, and agricultural possibilities. Its development depends on easy access to an open port and improved internal communications; this is the essence of the problem of the future. In the lake the Protectorate has an important and valuable waterway for two-thirds of its length; it requires good and cheap railway communication from the end of the lake to a good ocean port. That accomplished, the expansion of its agriculture will be rapid, not only with its present staple products but with many others, which, in present circumstances, will not repay cultivation.

It has been frequently discussed how far Nyasaland may be regarded as a white man's country. In its highlands—and the bulk of the Protectorate is at an altitude of from 2,000 to 5,000 feet above sea-level—the climate is generally healthy, and the white man may make there a comfortable home and rear a family; but if the agricultural resources of the country are to be fully exploited, the immigrant must be prepared to occupy lower and less healthy areas. These areas will, however, be readily inhabited by the native, and it is probably to him that attention should be chiefly directed as the producer who will

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most increase the output of the Protectorate. He has shown his capacity already as a cotton grower; given readily accessible markets and cheap transport, the cultivation of maize, groundnuts, oil seeds, and many other products which he is accustomed to grow for his own consumption will increase enormously. It is difficult to discern what have been the feelings of the native and what effect the war, as it was brought home to him in Nyasaland, is likely to have on his mind and future outlook. The unsettling effect at the outset has been touched on already. At the same time, a tribute must be paid to his ready adaptability to a very unusual state of affairs and to the loyal response which he made to the many and exhausting demands on him. Nature has been bountiful to the native of Central Africa, and normally there is no stress of life for him. It is not surprising that he takes his ease in the village and would preferably remain as he was; but the advent of the white man has changed for him in many ways his outlook on life, and has brought him to wish for many things which he had previously neither known nor desired. This to a large extent has made him an industrial being, and the growth of his wants will make him more so. Education and mission teaching are giving him knowledge of many strange things and a new conception of life outside the old family and tribal existence. There are already the awakenings of the national idea, and all this may have been quickened by the intercourse of the many natives from east and west and north and south gathered round the camp-fires in the late campaign. The war no doubt demonstrated to him his capacity as a fighting man in comparison with others whom he would otherwise have considered his superiors. But the Nyasaland native in the past has had confidence in his rulers, the power of the British Empire was in the war manifested to him as never before, and his tribal instinct enables him to give his allegiance to the biggest of all chiefs, the King, whose faithful subject he is content to be. Thus, while the war unquestionably developed his individuality, it must become more than ever the task of the Government to see that this tendency is directed and controlled within limits which will make him more and more a useful and productive member of the community for the general advantage of the Empire.

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SECTION IV

NORTHERN RHODESIA[1] AND THE LAST PHASE OF THE WAR IN AFRICA

Mainly by Sir Lawrence Wallace, K.B.E., C.M.G.

RHODESIA is divided by the Zambezi into Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Taken together, they are between three and four times the size of the United Kingdom and rather smaller than the Union of South Africa. They are wholly within the tropics. In 1914, though they were both under the administration of the British South Africa Company, of which Sir Starr Jameson was chairman throughout the war until his death in November 1917, and both were under the supervision of the High Commissioner for South Africa, they were on a different footing from each other. Southern Rhodesia, in virtue of a substantial settled white population, had a Legislative Council, with a majority of elected members representing the white settlers; and Ordinances passed by the Legislative Council, when assented to by the High Commissioner, constituted the ordinary legislation. In Northern Rhodesia there was no legislature, and legislation, as in the Native Protectorates farther south, was embodied in Proclamations. In the course of the war a small advisory Council of white settlers in Northern Rhodesia was constituted to consult with the Administrator on matters affecting the Europeans, but without any powers of legislation. In 1915–16 a proposal was made to combine the two territories under one administration, but it was not carried into effect. By the side of the Company's Administrator was a Resident Commissioner, who acted for both Rhodesias, paid from Imperial funds, and representing on the spot the High Commissioner and the Imperial Government.

[1] The Editor wishes to express his great obligation to the British South Africa Company, and especially to the late Mr. H. Wilson Fox, for obtaining from the Administrators the valuable accounts of the two Rhodesias which are given below.

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In August 1914 Sir William Milton, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., was and had been for many years the able and trusted Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, but he resigned in the following October, and in December was succeeded by Mr. (now Sir) Drummond Chaplin, who held the office through the rest of the war. He had previously been President of the Chamber of Mines in the Transvaal and one of the elected members for the Transvaal in the Union Parliament. The Resident Commissioner when the war began was Lieut.-Col. R. Burns Begg, K.C., a lawyer by profession, who had been head of the police in the Transvaal. He was succeeded, in April 1915, by Mr. (now Sir) H. J. Stanley, who had been Secretary to the Governor-General. Mr. Stanley, in turn, was, in July 1918, succeeded by Mr. C. D. Douglas Jones. Throughout the war one and the same man was Administrator of Northern Rhodesia, Mr. (now Sir) Lawrence Wallace, K.B.E., C.M.G. He had held the post since 1911, when North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia were amalgamated, and had had much previous service in the territory. Northern Rhodesia was therefore in charge of an officer of tried experience, a matter of much importance, for while Southern Rhodesia was, after the first few weeks, immune from all danger of German invasion, the north-eastern border of Northern Rhodesia was the scene of serious fighting at the beginning of the war, and the end found von Lettow raiding the territory. Its exposed position and the smaller number of the white population gave to Northern Rhodesia a different story in the war from that of the southern province. In the latter case the settlers were sufficiently numerous to form organized units for foreign service, and the territory was sufficiently secure to spare them. Nor were the calls upon the native population for carrier and transport service on the same scale in Southern as in Northern Rhodesia. Before the war the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia and the Northern Rhodesia Police in Northern Rhodesia, the former with a strength of about 550 Europeans and 640 natives, the latter about 800 strong, represented the local Defence Forces, responsible for the safe-keeping of the territories. The Commissioner at the head of both bodies, who in the war became Commandant-General of all the Rhodesian forces, with the rank of Major-General, was Colonel (now Sir) A. H. M. Edwards, C.B. The Commandant of the Northern

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Rhodesia Police was Lieut.-Col. F. A. Hodson, and the second in command was Major (later Lieut.-Col.) H. M. Stennett.

Northern Rhodesia included Barotseland, where the well-known Barotse chief, Lewanika, was, in unswerving attachment to the British Crown, analogous to Khama in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. He was well over 70 years when the war began, and died in February 1915, leaving a son who was duly recognized as his successor and gave promise of walking in his father's footsteps. The latter was formally confirmed as paramount chief of the Barotse by the High Commissioner, Lord Buxton, when he visited Northern Rhodesia in the summer of 1916.

In 1914 Northern Rhodesia [1] was bounded on the north by German East Africa and the Belgian Congo, on the east by Nyasaland, on the south by Southern Rhodesia, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and German South-West Africa, and on the west by Portuguese territory and the Belgian Congo. In two places it touched German territory: on the north-east for 150 miles from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Nyasa, and on the south-west, where is the narrow Caprivi Zipfel. At the outbreak of the war it was therefore open to attack at two places, in the north and in the south, about 800 miles apart. The railway from the south entered Northern Rhodesia at the Victoria Falls, where it crossed the Zambezi river gorge by a bridge of a single span of 650 feet, 400 feet above the water. It then ran northwards through the western part of the territory for 500 miles into the Belgian Congo. The whole of the eastern and most northerly portions of the territory, nearest to the principal sphere of hostilities, were without a railway or any means of quick communication.

In the north, 550 to 600 miles from the railway, there were two small British stations, Abercorn and Fife, quite near the border and 110 miles apart, with another station, Kasama, which became the base for supplies, about 100 miles south of Abercorn and 140 south-west of Fife. Opposed to them on the German side were Bismarckburg (Kasanga), 35 miles north of Abercorn, and New Langenburg (now called Tukuyu), 55 miles

[1] What follows has been slightly abbreviated from a very full account supplied, with map and illustrations, by the late Administrator, Sir Lawrence Wallace, K.B.E., C.M.G.

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north-east of Fife. The telegraph line from the south (the African Transcontinental Telegraph) passed along the border from Nyasa to Tanganyika. On the southern border there was a British station (Sesheke) on the bank of the Zambezi, with the German station, Schuckmannsburg, opposite, about four miles away from the other bank. The Administration head-quarters were at Livingstone, near the Victoria Falls. The bulk of the European population, about 2,300 all told, was concentrated along the railway between Livingstone and the Congo border, and there was a small European settlement around Fort Jameson on the border of Nyasaland. Over the rest of the territory were small stations, situated generally about 100 miles apart, each occupied by two or more district officials; and connected only by paths cut through the bush which covers almost the whole country. There were also mission stations and a few trading stores. The native population, estimated at about 833,000, a little more than three to the square mile, was sparsely scattered over the whole country. Except along the one railway, native carriers were almost the only means of transport, and mails were carried by runners. Wheeled transport with animal traction, except in certain localities, was not possible, as there are large areas on every through route covered by tsetse fly, and the roads through the forest-covered country were not sufficiently developed for mechanical transport.

When the war began the only force available for defence was the Northern Rhodesia Police, partly a military and partly a civil force. It consisted of

19 officers,
2 warrant officers,
5 British non-commissioned officers,
5 British constables, and
768 native non-commissioned officers and men.

Of these there were stationed at

Kasama .	2	officers,	and	99	native	N.C.O.'s	and	men.	
Abercorn .	—	„	„	21	„	„	„	On the northern border.
Fife . .	—	„	„	7	„	„	„	
Livingstone .	11	„	„	179	„	„	„	
Mongu . .	2	„	„	71	„	„	„	180 miles from the border of German South-West Africa.
Kasempa .	2	„	„	76	„	„	„	190 miles to the west of the railway.
Fort Jameson	2	„	„	77	„	„	„	On the Nyasaland border.

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The remainder were distributed at the various stations on civil police work, the whole distribution being arranged for purely domestic purposes.

The first measures taken, as in Southern Rhodesia, were to protect the railway bridges, especially the Victoria Falls Bridge. One officer and twenty non-commissioned officers and men of the Northern Rhodesia Police were placed at Sesheke, opposite Schuckmannsburg. A mobile column of the Northern Rhodesia Police under Lieut.-Col. Stennett was dispatched from Livingstone to Kasama, and a volunteer corps of Europeans was formed, some for use as mobile columns and others for local defence. This corps was known as the Northern Rhodesia Rifles. The whole medical arrangements were from the first undertaken by the Civil Medical Department, some of whose doctors were attached to the several columns. In 1917 the Northern Rhodesia Medical Corps was established, Dr. Aylmer May, Principal Medical Officer, being gazetted Major and Medical Director of the Corps. Eleven doctors of this corps and several Administration nurses served at the front for long periods during the operations in the north.

In the south-west the Victoria Falls Bridge, where trenches and other defences had been constructed and searchlights established, was being guarded by the British South Africa Police of Southern Rhodesia, and a telegraph line was constructed to Sesheke. Schuckmannsburg was remote from the rest of German South-West Africa, from which it was difficult of approach; and the Resident, Herr Von Frankenburg, with one European non-commissioned officer and a few native soldiers, surrendered without opposition on September 21st to a column of British South Africa Police and Northern Rhodesia Police under Major A. E. Capell, D.S.O., and Captain J. J. O'Sullevan of the Northern Rhodesia Police. Depots of supplies were established westward from Livingstone, so that if it should become necessary to send a mobile column to prevent invasion of the Barotse Valley, the delay entailed by a large following of carriers might be avoided, and a system of European scouts was formed far out to the west. Information sent in showed that there was no present danger of invasion from this quarter, and in December the column of Northern Rhodesia Police under Captain O'Sullevan was withdrawn

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from Sesheke and sent to reinforce the troops on the northern border, where it arrived on the 3rd of February 1915. The rapid advance of the Union Forces in German South-West Africa during 1915 made it probable that some of the enemy's forces would retreat into Northern Rhodesia, and detachments of Northern Rhodesia Police were placed on the line of the Zambezi river, reinforced by British South Africa Police sent from Southern Rhodesia. Mounted troops endeavoured to locate and capture Maritz, but the country was quite unsuited for rapid movement, and all the forces were concentrated at Sesheke under Lieut.-Col. Stennett, who had returned from the northern border, with scouts out westward to Portuguese territory. News was received in August that Maritz was detained in Angola and that the country was clear ; the troops were then removed from the Zambezi, but the Intelligence Scouts continued their work under Major Robert Gordon, D.S.O., with Arnold Weinholt as his chief assistant. Both were Australians. Weinholt had been shooting in German South-West Africa before the war and knew the country well ; he had been badly mauled by a leopard and had not fully recovered from his wound when he volunteered for war work, finding his own horses and equipment. The capture by Major Gordon with 3 scouts of a party of 8 Germans, and 1 rebel, with 5 camels and a horse, on the 17th September, completed their work, and there was no more movement on this southern border.

On the northern border Mr. C. P. Chesnaye, the magistrate at Abercorn, took what measures he could for local defence with the few police at his command, and sent patrols of volunteer Europeans and natives along the border to gain intelligence of enemy movements. The few European women and children on the border stations were sent south. Two days after the declaration of war enemy patrols were seen and there were various small skirmishes during August. On September 5th Abercorn was attacked; the attack was repulsed, but the enemy continued the siege and again attacked on the 9th, beginning to shell the prison, which had been made into a laager, at 6 a.m. Colonel Stennett had arrived with reinforcements three hours before, and the attacking force retired on the 10th, being followed and attacked at dawn on the 11th by a detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police, which drove them

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over the border. In this pursuit the long-sentence native prisoners at Abercorn volunteered and carried the machine guns into action, being subsequently awarded remission of their sentences by the High Commissioner. The villagers, living on the side of Abercorn opposite to the Germans, brought water on their own initiative into the besieged camp during the night.

The only telegraphic communication with Abercorn was by the African Transcontinental Telegraph Company's line along the northern border and through Nyasaland. During the war this line was continually cut and repaired until repair was no longer possible. Another telegraph line, however, was begun at once from Abercorn to Kasama, and later was connected with a line constructed from the railway to Kasama. In the meantime communications with the south were kept up by relays of runners and native cyclists. The messages took usually about 10 days to get through. Endeavours were made to send motor cyclists through, but the roads were too bad for any fast running by day or any running at all by night, and it was found that neither cyclists nor motor cyclists could beat the native runners, who in relays travelled night and day and carried some messages through the 450 miles to the railway in six days. The weakness of the northern border was a grave danger, not only to Rhodesia but also to the Katanga and its copper mines, if the Germans had really attempted to strike southwards in any strength. The restricted means and the slowness of transport made it difficult to move European troops northwards from the railway, and there were few native troops available. The Governor-General of the Katanga, therefore, in agreement with the Commandant-General, sent 500 Belgian native troops under European officers and non-commissioned officers to Abercorn, where they arrived with two field guns on September 26th. Various skirmishes continued to take place, in addition to German raids at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, as recorded elsewhere.[1] Fife was attacked on December 6th, and again on December 27th, when the attacking force was driven off by a charge of Northern Rhodesia Police led by Lieutenant Cussans at night at a time when it appeared that the enemy might succeed.

At about the same time a column of the Northern Rhodesia Rifles, under Major Boyd Cuninghame, was started north from

[1] See above, p. 244.

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the railway on a 600 miles march to the border with ox-wagon transport. A track had been cut through the bush some time before on a route as free from 'fly' as possible, but it was known that the oxen could not survive the journey. Major Boyd Cuninghame had great experience in this form of transport and most of his men understood it; it was the only possible means of transport at the time, and it was carried through very successfully. The road was heavy, sandy, and in places swampy; a start was made from the railway on the 23rd of December 1914 with 14 wagons and 252 oxen. Kasama was reached on the 2nd of February 1915, only two wagons having been left on the road. The forces on the border were all at this time under Colonel Hodson of the Northern Rhodesia Police.

By orders from home only passive defensive measures were to be taken, and little else could be done as long as the Germans held the command of Lake Tanganyika. It was not until late in 1915 that the British Naval Expedition, under Lieutenant-Commander G. Spicer Simson, with small gun-boats, dragged to Tanganyika through the Belgian Congo, was, as is told elsewhere,[1] in a position completely to destroy or capture the whole of the German ships on the lake. The defensive measures on the border entailed, however, some incursions into German territory, and the Northern Rhodesia Rifles, the Northern Rhodesia Police, and the Belgian force were often in touch with the enemy on both sides of the border. One of various encounters was a German attack in June 1915 on the Saisi post, which had been constructed on the Saisi river about 25 miles east of Abercorn to protect the most direct road to Kasama, then the base of supplies. The attack was a determined one, the fort was surrounded, and incessant firing was kept up all day, but the enemy retired during the following night, to return again a month later in much stronger force, with artillery, apparently resolved to take the plac The engagement opened on July 26th, at 2 p.m., with 7-pr. guns. The strength of the garrison was:

British:	Europeans	. .	3 officers, N.R.P. 4 N.C.O.'s, B.S.A.P. 3 N.R.R.
	Natives	. .	160 N.R.P. 6 B.S.A.P.
Belgians:	Europeans	. .	6 officers 2 N.C.O.'s } under Capt. Clymans.
	Natives	. .	280 native soldiers.

[1] See above, pp. 243–7

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all under the command of Major O'Sullevan. On the day of the attack a force of 270 Belgian soldiers under Major de Konick, with 50 N.R.P. under Captain Fair, was sent to help the Saisi garrison, but after some severe fighting was unable to get into contact with them, though it considerably helped to save the situation. Shell and maxim fire were kept up continuously till the 31st, when Major O'Sullevan was asked to surrender and refused to do so. The attack continued until August 3rd, when the enemy retired. This, until von Lettow's final inroad, was the most serious effort of the enemy to enter Northern Rhodesia. Small engagements, however, continued to take place on both sides of the border during the rest of the year, in which the Northern Rhodesia Rifles took a principal part, and there can be no doubt that this force of Europeans, containing many old campaigners, had a considerable effect on the enemy's further plans.

From August to October 1915 the Belgian troops were gradually withdrawn in order to take part in Belgian operations elsewhere. Recruits for the Northern Rhodesia Police had been training and were sent up as reinforcements under European officers. Two European companies of 125 men each,[1] formed from the British South Africa Police and from the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers, many of whom had been in the German South-West campaign in the 1st Rhodesian Regiment, arrived on the border in October, travelling by various routes in order to ease the difficulties of transport and of food on the road. All had some part in the engagements that continued to take place whilst arrangements for the serious invasion of German East Africa were being completed. Fighting had been proceeding in much the same way on the northern border of Nyasaland, but so far there had been no co-ordination between the Rhodesia and Nyasaland forces. On the recommendation of the Commandant-General that there should be only one Command, Brig.-Gen. E. Northey, A.D.C., who had been with the Expeditionary Force in Flanders, was sent out to take command of the Rhodesian and Nyasaland Forces, and on his arrival, early in 1916, preparations were immediately begun for active operations in German territory in connexion with General Smuts's advance from British East Africa.

[1] An account of these Special Service Companies is given in the Southern Rhodesia narrative below, pp. 328–36.

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In May 1916 the advance began. The force leaving Northern Rhodesia consisted of

No. 1 Column under Lieut.-Col. Murray from Abercorn:
250 B.S.A. Police Service Companies.
450 N.R. Police.
No. 2 Column under Lieut.-Col. Rodger, S.A.R., from Fife:
2nd S.A.R., roughly 200 rifles.
1 Section S.A.M.R. with 4 guns.
300 N.R. Police.

To move with the troops a transport column of 2,000 native carriers was needed; this was later increased and maintained at between 5,000 and 6,000 first-line carriers. From this date till the incursion of von Lettow near the end of the war this force remained outside Northern Rhodesia, taking an active part in the East Africa campaign; the borders of Rhodesia were practically free from the enemy, and the war work in Northern Rhodesia was directed to the provision and transport of supplies for the Rhodesian column, wherever it might be, to providing first-line carriers for the column, drafts for the Northern Rhodesia Police and King's African Rifles, and to helping Nyasaland in carriers for the Nyasaland forces.

Transport and Communications

Reference has been made to the difficulties of transport, which up to the outbreak of war had been carried on almost entirely by native porters. The long distances in Northern Rhodesia, with its scanty population, prohibit the passage through it of large numbers of men, for the country cannot feed them. Where the amount of transport is small and carriers can be fed from the villages through which they pass, this mode of transport, though very slow, presents no great difficulties. It is the common form of transport in Central Africa, and the natives are accustomed to it; it gives them almost the only opportunity of earning money without being long away from their homes, and they work in their own time. Where the amount of transport needs more carriers than can be fed by the villages on or near the road (and this soon happens if much has to be carried in a sparsely populated country) arrangements have to be made for the storing of food in depots along the route, and these arrangements become rapidly more difficult and more costly as the distance increases over which

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the food has to be carried to the depots. A carrier will eat in a certain time as much as he can carry, and transport of food has to be arranged in such short stages that at least some portion of the carrier's load of food will be delivered. When in times of scarcity the country through which the carriers pass cannot feed them at all, and food has to be sent forward from the base to feed the carriers through and back, the cost becomes prohibitive, if the distance to be carried is great, and only in the most urgent necessity can this mode of transport be used. This will be easily recognized when it is known that to send supplies under these conditions for 450 miles, at the rate of one ton delivered per day, about 16,500 carriers would be needed in constant employment, of whom about 2,500 would be carriers of supplies for the troops and 14,000 would be carrying food for these carriers and for themselves. If one ton per day could be considered sufficient for 1,000 troops and followers, there would be needed for 6,000 well over 100,000 carriers to supply their needs. The whole population of North-Eastern Rhodesia, from which the bulk of the carriers had to be drawn, does not include more than 112,000 able-bodied males.

The distance of 450 miles is given as an illustration, because that was the distance from the railway to Kasama, then the base of supplies for the troops. There were still 150 miles to the border at Fife and 120 miles more to Lake Nyasa, where all supplies had to be sent for a large part of the time that the Rhodesian column was in German East Africa. All European stores had naturally to be sent from the railway, and from the first it was evident not only that sufficient food for the native troops on the border could not be obtained near enough to their camps to avoid long-distance carriage and consequent need of carriers, whose numbers increased to an enormously greater extent than the distance to be carried, but also that the villages near the carrier routes could not feed the number of carriers passing through. It was this problem of transport that at the commencement of the war had to be taken on by the civil district officials ; it was the necessity of solving it, if Rhodesia was to be saved from invasion, that kept many of them from leaving to join the military forces either in Africa or in Europe, and to them is due the credit that they did solve it and kept the Rhodesian column in supplies until, towards the

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end of the campaign, it was so far from Northern Rhodesia, near the borders of Portuguese East Africa, that it became an impossibility, and Nyasaland, whose centre of supply was then comparatively near, took over the greater part of the burden.

As soon as possible after war had been declared all native chiefs and headmen were called in to the various stations and the position and the danger to which they might be exposed were explained to them by the magistrates and native commissioners. They were told that they would not be wanted to join in the fighting, but that heavy calls might be made on them for food for the native troops and for carriers to keep the troops supplied, and on the border they were warned against any raiding on their own account. In every case they promised help, and throughout the long period of the war they loyally carried out their promises. The calls on those tribes nearest to the theatres of war were very heavy, and for the larger part of the time from one-third to one-half of the able-bodied men were kept in turns either with the troops or on the lines of communication, whilst many hundreds of the women were bringing in grain for sale or were employed in grinding it into flour. At the same time from the whole area of North-Eastern Rhodesia (practically all the territory east of the railway) native food began to be sent forward to stations on the carrier routes for the feeding of carriers, and to Kasama, Fife, and Abercorn for the immediate needs of the native troops, and in the hope of creating a reserve against the rainy season, when transport of such food by carriers would be impossible.

On or near the border at the end of 1914 there were about 1,200 native troops with 200 more messengers, scouts, &c., and hundreds of carriers were needed to move with the patrolling columns. The feeding of all these and of the carriers passing up with European supplies and war stores had the effect of denuding the whole country for over 100 miles around of all its spare food, to such an extent that later some relief had to be given to prevent starvation. It was at this time that for a short while food had to be sent through by carriers who had to be fed whilst carrying the whole way from the railway to Kasama and back. Under these conditions and under the best circumstances only one load of food can be delivered out of fifteen sent from the base; the rest is eaten by the carriers. As short stages could not be established throughout, not more

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Northern Rhodesia : (*a*) Motor road near Mpika south of **Kasama**

Northern Rhodesia : (*b*) Motors crossing the Chambezi below **Kasama**

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than one load in twenty arrived. Fortunately these conditions did not last long. Large quantities of native food were brought to the Government stations, usually by women and children, for sale to the Administration store-keepers, but in order to avoid over-selling near the depots and to spread the demand evenly over the villages, sacks were given to the headmen of the more distant villages, or grain-bins were built, into which the village quota was placed under the superintendence of the headmen. It was considered that each family could easily spare 25 lb. of flour per season for the support of the troops and carriers, and when the bags or bins were filled the flour was transported, mostly by the villagers themselves, to the nearest depot, where the flour and the transport were paid for. In some cases more could be spared without difficulty, and educated natives were employed to buy within areas assigned to them. From the Mweru and Luapula district, for instance, 3,500,000 lb. of Kasava flour were sent forward about 200 miles, and a smaller quantity, but over a much longer distance, was sent from Fort Jameson.

During the year 1915 the number of troops was considerably increased, with a steadily increasing demand for supplies and for reserve supplies in view of the approaching offensive into German East Africa, and, as large numbers of carriers would be needed to accompany the troops, other methods of transport had to be found to bring up supplies from the south. Ox-wagon transport was used to take up the European troops, but could only be used for very special services, as, because of the tsetse fly, the oxen could not survive the journey. A road was therefore cut from Kashitu on the railway to Kasama and thence to Abercorn and Fife, in all 680 miles ; the sand portions were hardened, swamps banked, and streams bridged for mechanical transport. Such a road, however, could not be used during the height of the rainy season, and there was difficulty in obtaining sufficient suitable cars. It was used, therefore, only for the most urgent supplies, and though in this way it somewhat relieved the pressure on the carrier routes it could not be relied upon to carry anything like the amount necessary when the advance into German East Africa should begin. Accordingly a trial of what became known as the water route was made.

From a point known as Kabunda, on the southernmost bend

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of the Luapula river, 70 miles through Belgian territory from Ndola, the most northern railway station in Northern Rhodesia, it was known that the river was navigable by native canoes to where it flows out of the south of the Bangweulu swamps. The Chambezi river, which flows into the north of the swamps, is navigable by canoes for some distance upstream, at least in the rainy season. Between these rivers there are about 200 miles of papyrus swamp. This swamp is inhabited by a tribe of natives who practically live in their canoes. They had not been long under control and could not be controlled as long as they kept to the swamps, where they could not be followed in the maze of small channels known only to themselves, and through which they would at first conduct no one. As long as they kept to their swamps they had been left very much alone, but some time before the war they became more amenable and wished to build a few villages on the mainland. The swamps then became better known to the district officials, but whether there was a navigable channel practicable between the Chambezi and the Luapula was as yet unknown. The swamp natives, who for so many years had shown considerable independence and very little desire to move from their homes on the water, were disinclined to engage elsewhere in any kind of work and were of little use as carriers, but in the matter of water transport they were invaluable as canoemen.

These natives showed a channel through 400 miles of swamp and river, tortuous and difficult to follow by any one but themselves, narrow and shallow in places, but, with some few improvements, capable of being used for the transport of supplies to the north. The good offices of Mr. J. E. Hughes, formerly a Native Commissioner in the North-Eastern Rhodesia Service, who had special knowledge of the swamps and of their native inhabitants, were secured, and under his guidance, in January 1916, some loads were sent through as a trial and arrived in good time at a point where the motor road touched the Lukulu river (a branch of the Chambezi) about thirty miles south of Kasama. The route therefore may be taken :

1st stage. 70 miles of carrier transport from Ndola through the Belgian Congo to Kabunda on the Luapula river (time taken 5 days).

2nd stage. About 400 miles of canoe transport across the swamps to Chiwutu-wutu on the Lukulu river

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Northern Rhodesia : (*c*) Natives on the Luapula river south of the Bangweulu Swamps, coming for war loads

Northern Rhodesia : (*d*) Native carriers with war stores

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(average time taken about 28 days for the double journey).

3rd stage. 30 miles carrier or motor transport to Kasama.

Large numbers of natives were brought from the Barotse district to Ndola to carry on the first stage, and as their contracts expired they were replaced by other natives from North-Western Rhodesia. Up to 6,000 were employed on this stage at a time. The Belgian authorities gave permission for all loads to pass without restriction through that part of the route which lay in Belgian territory, and for the erection of a depot on the Luapula; they also had a wide track cut for the carriers. Mr. Goodall, a Native Commissioner in whose district most of the swamps were situated, and who was very well known and liked by the natives there, was appointed to recruit paddlers with their canoes and generally to take charge of the second or water stage. To his energetic work and tact in dealing with the swamp natives the success of the route is chiefly due, for it at once became a success. The natives took to the work and over 2,500 tons of stores passed over this route during 1916 and 1917. All canoes owned by natives in any and every corner of Lake Bangweulu capable of carrying two loads or more were pressed into the service; they were brought to Mr. Goodall on Nsumbu Island, sent down to Kabunda, and there numbered and registered, and a numbered metal label nailed to each craft. About 2,000 canoes were registered and considerably over 12,000 paddlers enrolled; these were not, however, all employed together, but took alternate spells of work and rest.

The use of this water route made it possible to send supplies from the south and, helped by the system of buying native food in the northern districts, the troops on the border and in German East Africa were kept in supplies. In May 1916 the advance took place into German East Africa, and a further call was made for carriers to move with them and to carry from the base to wherever the troops might be. Six thousand carriers had to be maintained with the Rhodesia column, a large number were employed in carrying from the base at Kasama to the column, many more were carrying in food to the depots, and more were on the water route. Altogether, throughout 1916, nearly 25,000 men on an average were kept in war employment throughout the year; this number was not

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constant, but varied between about 15,000 and 35,000. In order to keep up this supply of carriers, all recruiting for Southern Rhodesia and the Katanga mines had to be suspended, and as the wage offered there was double that paid to war carriers many natives undoubtedly suffered considerable loss.

In January 1917 the Governor of Nyasaland asked for help in carriers from Northern Rhodesia for service with the Nyasaland forces. This placed a further extra strain on the Northern Rhodesia natives, but over 12,000 were supplied on six months' agreement from the East Luangwa district, which borders on Nyasaland, and on which the calls for war carriers had not been so great as on the districts nearer the German border. In June of this year, including men enlisted for the Rhodesia Native Regiment, there were employed on war work of all kinds 37,000 Northern Rhodesia natives, of whom about 31,000 came from North-Eastern Rhodesia. The taxable males of North-Eastern Rhodesia number under 120,000, and, taking into consideration the old and unfit, those in civil employment, those in sleeping sickness areas who could not be fully employed, and those absent from the territory, it is estimated that only two-thirds of the total number were available to be called up for war work. Thus it will be seen that 40 per cent. of all available males in North-Eastern Rhodesia were at times employed on war work, and that nearly 30 per cent. were in fairly constant employment. The natives of North-Western Rhodesia could not be utilized to any great extent as war carriers. They would have had to walk anything from a four to a ten weeks' journey to the border; they could not carry sufficient food for themselves over the distance, and to feed them on the way and on the border, where they would have to rest after arrival, would have entailed a further call on carriers that could not be met. Towards the end of 1917 and in 1918 the demand for carriers slackened considerably, as the Rhodesian troops were then receiving the bulk of their supplies from Nyasaland. Reserves of food, however, were accumulated at Kasama and on the border, to provide for repatriation of carriers and for the returning troops when this should happen. Early in November 1918 this return took place in an unlooked-for manner, von Lettow arriving ahead of our troops, with the result that the greater part of the food reserves was destroyed before von Lettow surrendered.

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Von Lettow's Final Raid

During 1917 and 1918 our forces had been with other troops fighting von Lettow in Portuguese East Africa; he finally broke back northwards, and early in October 1918 had reached a spot near Songea in German East Africa, where on October 4th a severe engagement took place between his force and a detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police commanded by Lieut.-Col. Dickenson. Von Lettow was defeated and decamped northwards. Subsequently he turned westwards and attacked Fife. The civil administration station at Fife had become in the last years of the war a food depot for rationing military porters on their way to and returning from Lake Nyasa, and here had been accumulated a considerable quantity of native food. No fighting force, however, was stationed at or near Fife. Captain Allport, Northern Rhodesia Police, had arrived at Fife on the evening of October 31st after a final forced march of 38 miles, and was followed by Major Graham, Northern Rhodesia Police, in the early afternoon of November 1st; this latter officer had been following closely upon von Lettow's heels, but decided to cut through the bush to Fife when he found the Germans so near to that place. The buildings at Fife in which food had been stored could not well be defended, but from a western ridge they could be in a measure protected, and upon this ridge a position was prepared. The enemy heavily attacked in the evening of November 1st and endeavoured to rush the defenders, but was repulsed. On the following day a field gun was brought into action by the enemy, and with this gun, machine guns, and rifles, long-range firing continued for some hours. During the day the food stores were destroyed by fire. In the forenoon of November 3rd von Lettow's force disappeared to the south. In the early afternoon of the same day Colonel Hawkins arrived with the 1/4th Battalion King's African Rifles and 'B' Company, Northern Rhodesia Police. Before noon of the 4th, Lieut.-Col. Dickenson with the balance of the Northern Rhodesia Police also arrived in Fife. Major Graham reported that the whole German force under von Lettow attacked the Fife position, and estimated that from 6 to 8 companies were engaged with from 12 to 18 machine guns. The defending force consisted of 1½ companies of Northern Rhodesia Police with 3 Maxim and 3 Lewis guns.

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Shortly after noon on the 4th, Colonel Hawkins, with the 1/4th King's African Rifles and 'B' and 'D' Companies Northern Rhodesia Police, moved out of Fife in pursuit of the enemy, who was supposed to be marching on Kasama. It was realized that von Lettow's first movement southwards could be easily changed to the west, and Abercorn and Kasanga placed in danger. Measures were therefore taken to protect those stations. In the early morning of November 5th 'A' and 'C' Companies Northern Rhodesia Police left Fife for Abercorn, and the same day found 'D' Company Northern Rhodesia Police (which had been detached by Colonel Hawkins and ordered to proceed to Abercorn) at a point on the Stevenson road. This force arrived in Abercorn on the evening of November 9th and commenced preparations for the defence of the settlement. Von Lettow, however, continued southwards and the following report from Mr. Croad, magistrate at Kasama, gives details of the last few days before the armistice :[1]

'On the 31st of October Captain James had left for Abercorn, taking with him the only Police at Kasama who were of any use. Captain Jones at my request wired to the military authorities asking them to authorize the release of the Askari in the Kasama gaol, and when he left he told me this was authorized, and I released them and handed them over to Lieutenant Leslie. As many had been imprisoned for running away, they were not a hopeful lot. On the 1st the European women came down from Abercorn, as the Germans were reported at Mbozi and Fife.

'On the 2nd of November, as we could obtain no news from Fife, Mr. Alexander, Native Commissioner, and Sergeant Rumsey went up to Luchinda on the car and got back on Sunday. Lieut. Sibold, who had left with his King's African Rifles and recruits, was at Chinsali. He came in on the afternoon of the 2nd of November, and on his arrival he took over those released from gaol and the sick Northern Rhodesia Police at the camp.

'On Monday the 4th the car again went up and brought back news of the burning of Luchinda and of the Germans being there. On the 5th a wire came from Fife to the Supply Officer ordering the evacuation of all stores from Kasama, and if the Germans came down the destruction of all that could not be moved. As the enemy were then advancing on Kayambe (Pères Blanc Mission), the women were sent down by car the same afternoon to the Chambezi factory, on their way to

[1] Mr. Croad's report has been, for reasons of space, considerably abridged, but is given in his own words.

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Mpika. As the time was so short it was useless to send to the outstations to recruit carriers, and, as most of the local men had already been taken for King's African Rifles and military porters, very few men could be obtained. The cash and ammunition were sent down first and European rations and native food followed, both by car and carriers. As news of the enemy coming nearer Kasama arrived it became more and more difficult to obtain carriers, till when the news of the enemy being on the Kalungu river came in nearly all bolted. No private loads of officials were moved till the 7th, when 20 carriers only for the kit of each official were allowed. Every effort was made to help the Supply Officer to evacuate his stores. Mr. Lloyd, Native Commissioner at Nsumbu Island,[1] was told to send up all possible canoes, and arrangements were made to get everything possible away by carrier and car to the Lukulu Depot and thence by boat down the river to Nsumbu, out of the way of the German advance. All native villages along the enemy line of advance were deserted, and also those a long way off on either side. On Wednesday 6th we received news that Kayambe had been occupied, and on Thursday that the enemy were on the Chambezi river (north of Kasama). On the 8th the traders left Kasama, and in the afternoon news came of the enemy having been fired on by our Askari under Driver Weitz, British South Africa Police, M.T., near the Kalungu stream, about 20 miles north of Kasama. Mr. R. Thornton came in and attested on the 6th to scout till the critical time was past. I would wish to bring his case to your notice. He left his farm and property and did extremely well. He was sent out by Lieut. Sibold, as was Driver Weitz, in charge of some of the Askari, to scout and to report the advance of the enemy. Mr. Thornton, on the Abercorn road, heard Driver Weitz's firing and fell back exchanging shots with the enemy on the Kalungu. Lieut. Sibold had meanwhile taken up a position on the Milima stream six miles out of Kasama. Mr. Alexander had left on the 6th and Mr. Davey, Assistant Native Commissioner, on the afternoon of the 8th, for the Lukulu Depot to help in evacuating supplies from that place, and all available carriers were put on shifting loads from the Lukulu Depot to the Chambezi factory—some 3,000 odd loads remaining on the morning of the 9th. On the afternoon of the 8th Lieut. Leslie received a letter from Lieut. Sibold to burn food stores.

'I waited with Mr. Leslie in Kasama till 5 o'clock p.m. on the 8th. Mr. Barraclough, the telegraphist, reported that the line was cut in several places about a mile out on the Abercorn road and that armed natives had been seen clearing into the bush by his telegraph boys. Sergeant Rumsey, who was standing by the car a mile outside Kasama, said he had heard

[1] In the centre of the swamps.

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firing. The supply men had left and I sent Mr. Barraclough down on the motor bike to get his instrument fixed up at the Lukulu Depot. Lieut. Leslie and I left on the car about five, getting down to the Lukulu Depot at 6.30 p.m. About 8 p.m., as Mr. Barraclough could not get through on the wire to the south, Sergeant Rumsey drove Lieut. Leslie, Mr. Barraclough, and myself to the Chambezi factory. The transport was then in a very satisfactory condition—we passed gangs of natives all along the road, some going down with loads and others returning to the Lukulu. Some of these gangs did splendid work.

'We stayed at the Chambezi till midnight and returned to the Lukulu at 2 a.m. on the 9th. During the morning of the 9th Lieut. Sibold came into Lukulu and reported that the Askari he had placed on the Milima had left him on the night of the 8th, that they were scattered along the road, and that they had thrown away the machine gun. The gun was afterwards brought in in a damaged condition, the spring being lost. It seems that the Askari mistook Mr. Thornton's party crossing the Milima for the Germans. I should like to mention the excellent work done by Mr. C. D. Simpson, manager of the rubber factory. He gave all the help he could to every one, using all his boys to help transport, &c. Lieut. Sibold returned on the motor bike to collect his men, and at 11 a.m. I received the Administrator's wire asking me to take on and organize intelligence work, which I accepted. In the afternoon I sent Mr. Alexander to Chandamkulu village (between Chambezi and Lukulu Depot) to form a depot for the cars to run loads to, so that the carriers need not come as far as the Lukulu, as I knew they would run at the first news of the Germans. In the evening I heard that Lieut. Sibold was camping at Nkolenfumu's, about nine miles up the old mail road. I biked out to see him and to talk matters over, and on my return to the Lukulu, at his suggestion, I wired for 200 rifles and equipment.

'Mr. Goodall, Native Commissioner, for whom I had sent, arrived on one of the cars soon after I got back, and next day I gave him orders for arranging native scouts along the Lukulu north, to see if the enemy made any attempt to go west from Kasama. I sent on the 9th to Mr. Cooke, Assistant Native Commissioner at Luwingu, and Mr. Dewhurst, Native Commissioner at Chinsali, to come in from the west and east and to try and get in touch with the enemy, and told Mr. Cooke to report at once any movement of theirs to the west, to Kawambwa and Fort Rosebery, and also to Mr. Lloyd, Assistant Native Commissioner at Nsumbu, to send on to Mr. Jones, the magistrate. We know now that the Germans made no attempt to go west, only sending a small patrol to loot Chilubula Mission (Pères Blanc) and collect all food they could find. Their intention was to keep down the main road to Broken Hill and

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then to Ndola. On the 10th I tried to get up on one of the cars to Kasama. At noon I got away with Lieut. Leslie and Driver Weitz, Sergeant Rumsey driving. On the road we passed two cyclists I had sent out early and they reported the road clear. Just south of where the Chinsali road turns out of the motor road a mile out of Kasama, we found three trees felled across the road. They looked as if they had been felled the day before, and I am told that one of the Germans afterwards claimed to have done this on the night of the 8th, the day we left Kasama. I told Sergeant Rumsey to turn the car round and I made up the hill towards the old Labour Bureau house. We worked round to the north-east and came in by the golf course. We found the Germans in occupation of Kasama, but only saw two white men. I looked carefully at the buildings in Kasama, and the only houses burnt then were Mr. Booth's house and store, two stores of Messrs. Creed's, and the magistrate's office. All other buildings and boys' huts were standing. I could not see the Police Camp and did not go there. There was smoke from some small fires near the stream, and though I could catch glimpses of men moving about through the trees, I could not estimate their numbers. It seems from what I learnt later that one party left Kasama before another entered it. Thus on the 13th von Lettow's command stretched from the Milima, six miles north of Kasama, to the Chambezi, a distance of 58 miles. I left by car at 3.30 and got back by five, reporting by cyclist to Lieut. Sibold on the way. Mr. Thornton joined Lieut. Sibold the same morning, and Lieut. Sibold, leaving Mr. Thornton at 3.30 p.m., went up to Kasama. He cut off into the motor road whilst the Germans advanced down the old mail road, thus getting between him and ourselves. On his way back he found the Germans had cut him off and he was not seen again till the 14th, when he turned up about noon at the Chambezi factory.

'Mr. Davey, Assistant Native Commissioner, had made several trips with loads on one of the Ford cars during the day as drivers were short. On the next day, the 11th, the canoes came up and Mr. Goodall superintended their loading. These and the cars and a few carriers cleared 1,500 loads. At about 2 p.m. a cyclist came from Mr. Thornton and reported that he had exchanged shots with the enemy about 1 p.m. and that the Askari had counted nine German whites. Firing became audible at the Lukulu Depot at 3 p.m. and Mr. Davey and Lieut. Leslie left on one of the Fords soon after, having burnt about 100 bags, as the canoes had cleared and the carriers run away. Only some private kit was left for the cars, two of which turned up about four and took away the other whites and most of the kit. Mr. Thornton came in about 5 p.m. He had most of his Askari with him and had heard nothing of Lieut. Sibold. Sergeant Rumsey turned up shortly afterwards

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with his car, but Mr. Thornton refused to go on it, as he did not wish to leave his men. Sergeant Rumsey took all the rest of the kit down on his car, and I stayed with Mr. Thornton and the Askari. Corporal Williams volunteering to do the same, we marched with the Askari to near Chandamkulu's village, when Sergeant Rumsey, returning, met us about 8 p.m. with the car, some food, and news of the Armistice. We slept at Chandamkulu's. The Askari on the road were in a very disorganized state and grousing a good deal about not having proper guns and equipment, complaining of lack of food, and saying they would be better off if they went and joined the King's African Rifles column. If the Germans had advanced down the road I feel sure all except a very few would have bolted. They made no effort to keep any formation, and I had to tell them several times to keep a rear guard out.

'We got into the Chambezi factory at 6 a.m. on the 12th and found the evacuation of stores going on by canoes and carriers down the river. Mr. Davey, as there was no word of Lieut. Sibold, offered to take charge of the Askari and spent the day collecting them: they were coming in in twos and threes from the bush, where they had cleared from the Milima. He collected what rifles there were and issued equipment and ammunition. An outpost was placed at the Chinshi crossing under Mr. Thornton, with Driver Weitz to help him, and another down the river near the Lukulu junction under Corporal Williams. Native scouts were sent up the Chambezi and the Lukulu. German scouts were reported in the afternoon to have fired on natives at Safwa crossing up the river, but the motor road was reported clear in the evening for a distance of ten miles. A native report without any foundation, that the Germans were on the other side of the river, caused a general stampede of carriers and paddlers, and it was necessary to send after them to bring them back. In these scares a number of loads were thrown away and a good deal of looting took place. Things have since been found all along the road from Kasama that had been thrown away.

'On the 13th, at 8 a.m., the German advance fired into the Chambezi factory with Lewis guns and rifles. The firing lasted about a quarter of an hour, our Askari firing a number of shots, though nothing could be seen to shoot at. They seemed to have no idea of taking aim at anything, but extended and took cover well. These men were chiefly Northern Rhodesia Police. Mr. Thornton sent in a report that when the firing started, though his post was not fired on, all the Askari had bolted for the bush[1] and as soon as the firing started at the Chambezi all the boys and carriers cleared. The enemy were reported to have moved up the river and to be looking

[1] These men were without their own officers and some were from prison. See first paragraph of Mr. Croad's report.

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for crossings. About 11 a.m. the official wire about the Armistice came through, and at 11.30 Mr. Davey, with Sergeant Rumsey driving, went up the road on a car with a white flag. They first came on a German Askari on the road, and gave him a note to take to the nearest white German. They turned back with the car and on the road back came on a picket of one white man and 12 Askari. They took the white man back with them to Hauptman Spangenberg and gave him the copy of the wire and my letter to von Lettow, which he said should be delivered at once to von Lettow. He agreed to order his men not to fire. On the 14th, at 7.30 a.m., I went across the Chambezi and saw General von Lettow, who agreed to cease hostilities and to march his command to Abercorn and to hand over his prisoners white and black. He gave me the wire for the German Kaiser [1] and asked me to arrange that it should be sent through. He stated his main command did not need food, but Spangenberg's advance guard, that travelled light, did. As much as could be spared was issued to Spangenberg. General von Lettow left the same afternoon on his return to Kasama. On the 15th I returned to Kasama by car, and found Hauptman Kohl in occupation of my house, with most of the staff. Major Lambert of the King's African Rifles was also here, arranging matters of food, &c., with the Germans. General von Lettow camped three miles out of Kasama and came in on the 16th and camped just outside. He left Kasama on the morning of the 17th. The wires sent through with news for von Lettow were given to him and he wished his thanks expressed for them. On the 18th Hauptman Spangenberg came in and left on the morning of the 19th, taking most of the sick with him. On the 21st Dr. Marshall, of von Lettow's command, left by cars with the sick and the native sick by carriers for Abercorn. Native food was issued to Spangenberg and to the carriers with German sick.

'All my staff did very well and were quite willing to do anything they were asked to, to help on matters. They gave a good deal of help to the Supply Officer. I would wish to bring to your notice Sergeant Rumsey, who did splendid work driving and repairing cars, and who kept perfectly cool throughout. The telegraphist, Mr. Barraclough, did excellent work going up and down to repair the line, besides getting off wires at all hours of the day and night. Mr. Davey did a lot to assist by taking charge of the Police.

'There is only one thing to be said as to the state of the Awemba, and that is that they had the wind thoroughly up them as soon as they saw things were disorganized; they started their old habits of thieving, and no load or house was safe from them. They have done excellent work in finding porters throughout the war, and I agree with their chiefs that it is

[1] See Appendix I.

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disgraceful that they should have been left quite unprotected in the way they were. Looking at matters from this end, it looks much as if the military authorities had intended von Lettow to come down through Northern Rhodesia. It will take a long time to get these natives in order again and for them to regain confidence in the Administration.

'The magistrate's house still stands, also the Assistant Native Commissioner's, doctor's, and small guest house, two iron-roofed stores of the African Lakes, and one store of Messrs. Creed's stand: all other buildings are burnt or have the roofs blown off. The Lukulu Depot is completely burnt. All buildings have been looted. Kasama, though gangs have been on it cleaning up, is still in a most unsanitary state, and the smells all round are awful. There was no military order about von Lettow's command, the whole thing looking like a typical Arab caravan of the old days. No attempt at any sanitary arrangements were made. All the help possible was given to Lieut. Leslie, the Supply Officer, who did well under most trying conditions. I regret that we were not able to save more, but as soon as the native saw we were getting ready to leave and could not try to hold the place, he got frightened and out of hand. Chilubula was looted but still stands.'

Von Lettow's Surrender

Von Lettow lost no time in collecting his scattered forces and carrying out the arrangement to march his command to Abercorn, where his formal surrender took place on November 25th. It was at this spot that over four years before, and within a month of the declaration of war, a German force made its first attack on Rhodesia and had been defeated. On the same spot von Lettow laid down his arms before the same troops who had inflicted that first defeat and in the presence of many of the natives who had suffered from his incursion. The official surrender has been described as follows, in the *Bulawayo Chronicle*, by an eyewitness:

'General W. F. S. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O., arrived at Abercorn via Lake Tanganyika on the 18th November. He was accompanied by Major W. E. Puntis (representing Brig.-General Kendall, C.M.G., D.S.O., D.A. and Q.M.G., East Africa), Captain Thomas Anderson, Brigade Major (Capt.) W. H. Wood, M.C., Intelligence, Lieut. P. St. G. Kelton, and 2nd Lieut. K. G. Browne. It was decided that the 1/4th King's African Rifles should come into Abercorn on the 24th, and that the whole German force should come in in detachments on the following day. A flagstaff was erected on some

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open ground opposite the Government Offices, and at noon on the 25th November General Edwards formally accepted the surrender of General von Lettow-Vorbeck and his force. He was attended by his own staff, by Lieut.-Col. Hawkins, D.S.O., commanding the 1/4th King's African Rifles and his Adjutant, Major Lambert, M.C.; Lieut.-Colonel Dickenson, M.C., commanding the Northern Rhodesia Police Service Battalion, and his Adjutant, Captain Wardroper; Captain James, Northern Rhodesia Police; and Mr. C. R. Draper, the District Commissioner. The King's African Rifles and the Northern Rhodesia Police furnished the Guard of Honour.

'Von Lettow, whose striking presence is a good index of what must be a wonderful personality, came in at the head of his first detachment, which consisted of some Europeans, closely followed by some 400 Askari, with their machine guns, carriers, medical unit, and women. After these troops had been quickly formed into three lines in close formation, von Lettow advanced a few paces, saluted the flag, then, taking out a pocket-book, read therefrom his formal statement of surrender in German. He repeated it in English, whereupon General Edwards replied, accepting his surrender on behalf of His Majesty King George V. Von Lettow was then presented to the officers present, and in turn introduced his own officers, among whom some of the more noticeable were Major Kraut, Lieuts. Kempner and Spangenberg. Ex-Governor Schnee was also there. Then followed the most dramatic moment of the proceedings, when von Lettow called upon his troops to lay down their arms, the Europeans alone being allowed to retain theirs in recognition of the splendid fight they had put up. The Askari laid down their rifles, took off and deposited their equipment, and were then marched off by companies to the internment camp which had been prepared for them a mile away, an officer acting as a guide to each party. During the interval before the arrival of the next detachment, some 400 military porters were busy removing machine guns, arms, ammunition, and equipment to the Ordnance Store. Meanwhile, von Lettow proceeded to General Headquarters and signed the necessary documents of surrender. The above ceremony was repeated twice, and by 4 p.m. the last German Askari had laid down his arms. The whole force surrendering numbered 30 officers, 125 other Europeans, 1,165 Askari, 1,516 porters, 482 Portuguese natives acting as extra carriers, 282 followers, 13 headmen, 819 women, making a total of 155 Europeans and 4,277 natives. They had also one field gun, 24 Maxims, and 14 Lewis guns. Heavy rain fell during a great part of the proceedings, but this did not affect any one except photographers. It was a most impressive spectacle. The long motley column, Europeans and Askari, all veterans of a hundred fights, the latter clothed with every kind of headgear,

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women who had stuck to their husbands through all these years of hardships, carrying huge loads, some with children born during the campaign, carriers coming in singing in undisguised joy at the thought that their labours were ended at last. All combined to make a sight that was unique.'

Contributions to War Funds, &c.

The known contributions by the Europeans of the Territory to Relief Funds and general war charities amounted to about £17,000 as detailed in Appendix II. The most important organization established for the receipt of contributions and allocation of gifts was the Northern Rhodesia Red Cross and Relief Fund, which owed its inception to Mrs. (now Lady) Wallace. The members of the original committee elected were Lady Wallace, President, The Rev. Sir John Key, Bart., Colonel F. A. Hodson, Dr. A. W. May, Messrs. R. A. J. Goode, L. F. Moore, and H. A. Baldock (Hon. Secretary and Treasurer). Mr. Moore, the Proprietor and Editor of the *Livingstone Mail*, kindly undertook to publish an appeal and to acknowledge in the newspaper all amounts contributed to the Fund from time to time. In the first appeal, published on the 8th of September 1914, it was stated that 'the object would be to devote such a fund primarily to the needs of this Territory, but if, happily, it should not be required, the amount collected would be available as a contribution from the people of Northern Rhodesia to any similar funds in other parts of the Empire'. This policy was fully carried out. All cases of local distress were promptly and generously relieved, hospital and other comforts were supplied to our troops, both European and Native, employed in operations against German East Africa, and various amounts were contributed to many overseas funds. Other organizations and committees were formed in most of the small European settlements in the Territory and the money collected in aid of war charities was in many cases remitted direct to England.

The more advanced natives of the Territory contributed to many of the charitable funds, and others gave curios to be sold for the benefit of Red Cross Funds. The Paramount Chief of the Barotse tribe—the late Lewanika—contributed £200 'to assist in the conduct of the war'. The Angoni chiefs and natives of the East Luangwa district subscribed about £32

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towards the cost of an aeroplane and sent a letter expressing their loyalty to King George. The 'Comforts for Northern Rhodesia Troops Fund' was popular with the natives and benefited considerably by their donations.

General

In Northern, as in Southern, Rhodesia, on the outbreak of war, steps were immediately taken to locate all aliens known or suspected to be of enemy birth and sympathies. Inquiries as to 62 suspected enemy subjects resulted in 11 being interned in the Union of South Africa, 9 Germans and 2 Austrians, and in 17 being allowed to remain in the Territory on giving money security for good behaviour, 4 being Germans, 3 German Poles, 5 Austrians, and 5 Austrian Poles. The War Legislation of the Territory was embodied in 31 Proclamations, of the familiar kind, the final Proclamation being one of the 20th of June 1919, which terminated the employment of the Northern Rhodesia Police on active service.

So far as the effects of the war upon the native population could be gauged at the end of a year from the signing of the Armistice, speaking generally, the authority of chiefs and headmen had been greatly strengthened, upon them fell much of the onerous work in connexion with the enrolment of the populace for the various forms of war work, and, but for their readiness to assist the Administration, such good results could not have been obtained. Some monetary payments were made in recognition of this loyalty and for extra work performed. The effect of calling out such a large proportion of the people was on the whole good. Many who habitually shirked all forms of employment did their share during the war, and there is every reason to believe that the intermingling of tribes did much to break down the barriers of intertribal prejudice and mistrust. Signs were not wanting to show that natives of some areas, who before the war were unaccustomed to work in any numbers at steady employment, were after the war seeking work outside the boundaries of the Territory, and it was reported that the necessary discipline exercised over the long term military porter force had a decidedly good effect upon the young men who were engaged upon this class of work. From the districts bordering upon old German East Africa a somewhat restless and independent spirit amongst the younger

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men was reported. There seemed to be a desire to quit the village life and travel to neighbouring countries and ' see life '. This may be taken to be a natural reaction after the war and due to an ambition to secure some of the luxuries of life only obtainable by those whose wages are higher than the wage paid to local war workers. Comparatively high wages are paid at the Congo mines and in Southern Rhodesia, and chiefly in these places thousands of North-Eastern Rhodesia natives could find work. There is no doubt that considerable hardship was borne by the North-Eastern Rhodesia people during the war owing to shortage of food from time to time; this was unavoidable and in a great measure was due to the necessity of calling out the able-bodied males in the cultivating and harvest seasons. Further, the war, as elsewhere in the world, caused an enormous rise in the price of all imported goods. Till the end of 1915 the war had a depressing effect upon the trade and economic conditions of Northern Rhodesia, but in 1916 trade revived. The several mines in the Territory made considerable profits owing to the high prices paid for lead and copper. The farmers found a ready market for slaughter cattle, mealies, and other produce in the Congo mining areas, where every effort was made to increase the output of copper. On the other hand the work of missionary organizations in the Territory was, during the war, considerably hampered. Not only was the staff of most of the societies greatly reduced and their incomes curtailed, but in some cases teachers and pupils took their share in war work and in other cases the shortage of food prevented the ordinary routine of school work.

It is difficult to give any general summary of the personal effort made by Europeans and natives in Northern Rhodesia during the war. Early in the war it was found necessary to discourage volunteering for military service among the limited civil European staff, for a serious position might have arisen had a large number of experienced officials left their posts. Still, apart from those who joined the Northern Rhodesia Rifles for local defence, 88 Civil Service officials were on active service on the various fronts, nearly all of whom obtained commissions and 19 of whom were killed or died. The number of unofficial Europeans who went on active service, apart from local defence, was 355, and the total number of Europeans on active service, both officials and unofficials, was 40 per cent.

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of the adult male white population, a very high proportion, seeing that many of the district officials were precluded from volunteering and many of the settlers were unable to leave their wives without European protection. There were eighteen deaths among the Europeans in connexion with the operations in German East Africa; 27 distinctions were won by European officials, and 47 by the European members of the Northern Rhodesia Police.

Of the natives, 1,839 served in the Northern Rhodesia Police, 1,340 in the King's African Rifles, 258 in the Rhodesia native Regiments, 52 distinctions were won by those who served in the Northern Rhodesia Police, and about 100 natives in that body were killed, died, or missing. Nearly 41,000 first line military porters were enrolled for service with the troops in German and Portuguese East Africa 1916–18, and rather more than 2,300 were killed, died, or missing. This class of porter was engaged for a period of six months, but, as many were drawn from villages far distant from the spot of attestation and were sometimes retained pending reliefs, they were in most cases absent from their homes for 9 or 10 months. The numbers of carriers who worked within the borders of Northern Rhodesia have already been roughly estimated. The death-rate among them was normal, the deaths being estimated at about 300. The mileage of the routes over which food and military stores were transported on land by natives may be recapitulated as follows:

	Approximate miles.
1. Broken Hill to Kasama	425
2. Fort Jameson to Fife	400
3. Ndola to Kabunda to feed the waterway	70
4. Chiwutu-wutu (terminus of waterway) to Kasama	30
5. Kasama to Fife	140
6. Kasama to Abercorn	100
7. Abercorn to Fife	110
8. Fife to Lake Nyasa	110

Carriers also plied from all the Government stations in North-Eastern Rhodesia for various distances to Abercorn, Fife, or Kasama.

On the waterway, for approximately 400 miles from Kabunda on the Luapala river to Chiwutu-wutu on the Lukulu river, the loads transported, principally in native canoes, from February 1916 to July 1919 inclusive, numbered 130,701, a load denoting

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a carrier's burden of the average weight of 56 lb., and the total representing 3,267½ tons. The bulk of the loads consisted of food for native troops and porters, but stores of all kinds were included. As a result of von Lettow's final incursion into Northern Rhodesia and the consequent destruction of accumulated stocks of food and war stores at Fife and Kasama, it was found necessary to continue the water-transport till the middle of 1919. A number of passengers also used the route, especially when the troops were finally withdrawn from Kasama.

There were few parts of the Overseas British Empire in which more personal effort was called for and given than in Northern Rhodesia.

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APPENDIX I

GENERAL VON LETTOW'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE

COPY OF THE TELEGRAM

Handed in Chambezi Factory 8 a.m.
Received in Livingstone 9.20 a.m. 14th November 1918

From : DISTRICT COMMISSIONER, AWEMBA DISTRICT

To : ADMINISTRATOR, LIVINGSTONE

'No. 33. November 14th. I forward you a copy of a wire from General von Lettow which he has requested me to send through to the German Kaiser; will you please arrange this? I crossed Chambezi at 7½ hours this morning and was accompanied by Lieuts. E. J. Leslie, F. Davey, D. Barraclough. General von Lettow was accompanied by Captain Hoffman Spangenberg and arranged matters. General von Lettow will hand over all native prisoners here, Europeans at Abercorn, as that would be the nearest place. He will leave to-morrow and take his command to Abercorn. Supplies Officer will arrange food to Kasama. I shall be obliged if you will arrange from Fife or Abercorn to supply him from there; he will let us know in the course of the morning his requirements. Following is an amended copy of his telegram [1]: (begins)

To MAJESTÄT, BERLIN.

General Deventer theilt offiziell mit dass nach den von Deutschland unterzeichneten Waffenstillstandbedingungen bedingungslose Übergabe der Schutztruppen zu erfolgen hat; ich werde entsprechend verfahren. Lettow. (ends.)

General von Lettow much regretted evacuation of women, states there was no need for this. Has left all buildings in Kasama as he found them, with exception of Government offices which he blew up. I promised the General to do my best to get him latest information (as) to the position in Europe wired through; I shall be obliged if you will arrange this.'

[1] The German of the original copy has here been slightly amended.

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APPENDIX II

NORTHERN RHODESIA CONTRIBUTIONS TO RELIEF FUNDS

	£	s.	d.
Northern Rhodesia Red Cross and Relief Fund—General Purposes	3,493	18	2
Comforts for N.R.P. and B.S.A.P.	25	0	0
„ „ Naval Forces, Tanganyika	25	0	0
„ „ 2nd Rhodesia Regiment	50	0	0
„ „ Troops in command of General Smuts	20	0	0
„ „ Naval Forces in East Africa	17	11	5
„ „ Rhodesian Platoon in Europe	2	17	0
„ „ Native Troops	374	2	3
Rhodesian Prisoners of War	182	5	6
South African Red Cross Society	4	4	0
H.R.H. The Prince of Wales's Fund	226	1	6
Belgian Relief Fund (General)	34	4	7
„ „ „ (Children)	276	6	1
Belgian 'Bairns' Fund	17	0	0
Anglo-Belgian Hospital	17	0	0
British Red Cross Society	337	7	0
Aircraft Fund	4	10	0
Comforts for Troops	158	13	0
Polish Widows and Orphans	5	5	0
Widows and Orphans, British Navy	301	1	0
Serbian Relief Fund	35	10	0
Jewish Relief Fund	33	0	0
Russian and Polish Jews Relief Fund	51	5	0
Serbian and Rumanian Hospitals	30	15	6
Central Prisoners of War Fund	6	0	0
Prisoners of War in Germany	106	10	0
Rhodesian Soldiers' Comforts Fund	602	2	6
British Soldiers' and Sailors' Widows and Orphans	100	10	0
Helping Hand Fund	541	10	9
French Red Cross Society	184	1	9
King George's Fund for Sailors	8	8	0
Star and Garter Fund	36	8	0
Mine Sweepers	50	8	9
St. Dunstan's Hostel	153	17	6
Times British Red Cross Fund	6	0	0
Y.M.C.A. Hut Fund	213	7	0
'Christmas Cheer' Fund for Troops	12	0	6
'Our Day' (1915–18)	4,398	11	6
Comforts for Northern Rhodesia Troops, Special Christmas Appeal, 1915	421	5	0
Interest on Deposits	135	12	11
	12,699	11	2

Contributions not included in above:

Amount raised by various Committees in Northern Rhodesia—estimated	1,000	0	0
Livingstone Ladies' Sewing Party	1,150	2	11
Northern Rhodesia Staff of Beira and Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways (about)	1,000	0	0
Livingstone Café Chantant and White Elephant Sale (Belgian Children)	170	0	0
Miss Powell's effort (Livingstone)—St. Dunstan's Hostel	490	0	0
Lady Wallace's Entertainments (Livingstone)	210	0	0
'Our Day'—Broken Hill	416	0	0
	17,135	14	1

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PART IV

SOUTH AFRICA

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SECTION I

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Mainly by Sir Drummond Chaplin, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.[1]

SOUTHERN RHODESIA comprises an area of 145,633 square miles and lies between the Transvaal on the south, Portuguese East Africa on the east and north-east, a portion of late German South-West Africa and the Bechuanaland Protectorate on the west, and Northern Rhodesia on the north. In 1914 the European population was estimated to be between 30,000 and 35,000, of whom, during the war, over 5,000 men left the country on active service. The native population was estimated at about 750,000.

In the early days of the war exaggerated and misleading statements began to circulate, and it was deemed advisable to explain the position to the natives through the more influential chiefs. To the majority it came as a rude surprise that there existed a nation of sufficient power and hardihood to challenge the English. However, in response to the announcement they gave expression to loyal hopes which on the whole appear to have been thoroughly genuine. Practical evidence of their sympathy with our cause was afforded in the form of contributions to patriotic funds; some of the young men offered their services, and amongst the first to be accepted for active participation were 65 indigenous natives who volunteered as wagon drivers with the Imperial Forces in East Africa. About the same time a number offered themselves for service with the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment in East Africa, and 25 were selected and enrolled as scouts; these men did very valuable work. As might be expected, the natives, as a whole, had no proper appreciation of either the magnitude or the meaning of the war; but a broad distinction may be drawn between the inhabitants of Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The former,

[1] The following has been condensed from a most complete and exhaustive account supplied by the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia at the time, now Sir Drummond Chaplin, G.B.E., K.C.M.G.

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being the more intelligent and warlike people, took an active interest in and displayed a measure of understanding of what was happening, whereas the interest which the latter took in the war was practically confined to anxiety regarding the high price of goods ; they were content to allow events to take their usual course, quietly confident in the ultimate issue. The following passage from a message which the natives sent to His Majesty King George on the cessation of hostilities indicated their mental attitude :

> 'We wish to say that, when the King called upon us for help, we sent our young men, who fought and died beside the English, and we claim that our blood and that of the English are now one.'

When it appeared that war was inevitable, all railway bridges were guarded and special precautions were taken at the most vulnerable point of communication with Northern Rhodesia, the bridge over the Zambezi at the Victoria Falls, which is only 50 miles east of what was the Caprivi Zipfel. A detachment consisting of 2 officers and 10 European rank and file of the British South Africa Police, and 50 armed native police from Southern and Northern Rhodesia, with two Maxim guns, was stationed at the bridge. Two hundred European officers and men of the British South Africa Police were made available for concentration at 48 hours' notice, 100 at Salisbury and 100 at Bulawayo. Lists were opened and men were invited to register for Imperial, Rhodesian, or local service, with the result that 3,087 men registered their names, exclusive of the British South Africa Police and the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers. The British South Africa Police were called out on active service on the 10th of August 1914, remaining on an active service footing throughout the war, and early in the war a Volunteer Reserve was formed, consisting of 570 men of all ranks, who were either over the age limit for military service or for various reasons were unable to offer their services. In October 1914 a Martial Law and Public Order Proclamation was issued, which strengthened the hands of the Administration in safeguarding the territory, and steps were taken to deal with enemy subjects, as mentioned below. In the last year of the war, owing to the large number of residents who by degrees left the territory on active service, the question of internal defence caused considerable anxiety, and in 1918

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a Defence Ordinance was passed to operate for the period of the war and six months after peace had been declared. The principle of the ordinance was that all European male inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 50 years residing in any military district to which the operation of the ordinance was applied, were rendered liable to personal service in defence of the territory.

It was soon thought advisable to eliminate all danger of enemy incursion from the Caprivi Zipfel, and a mobile column of British South Africa Police was dispatched to the Victoria Falls, with Schuckmannsburg, the chief centre in the German strip of territory, as its objective. While the advance was being prepared, both sides of the Zambezi were patrolled, and a post established on the border at Kazungula, where, at the junction of the Chobe river with the Zambezi, is the extreme end of the late German Protectorate. The column then moved forward, co-operating with a detachment of Northern Rhodesia Police at Sesheke; Schuckmannsburg was occupied on the 21st of September, and shortly afterwards the British South Africa Police were withdrawn, leaving the Northern Rhodesia Police to patrol the German territory. At a later date, in the course of the German South-West Africa campaign, there was some apprehension that, upon the advance of the Union forces to Windhoek, small bands of Germans or rebels might attempt to retreat northwards and break into Southern Rhodesia. In the early part of July 1915 Maritz was reported to be moving along the course of the Okovango river in the direction of the Victoria Falls, and 100 British South Africa Police, with two Maxims, were dispatched to reinforce the Northern Rhodesia Police on the Zambezi and oppose Maritz at the Falls. Maritz, however, crossed over into Angola, where he was detained by the Portuguese, and the police were then withdrawn. A mobile column of 100 British South Africa Police was also sent during the South African rebellion from Bulawayo to Mazunga to watch the southern border of the territory, but the rebels made no attempt to cross the frontier.

Connected with local defence was the treatment of enemy subjects in Southern Rhodesia. In general, the same principle was followed as in the Union of South Africa, a considerable number were sent to the Union for internment, and those who remained were required to report themselves periodically.

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The following steps were taken. On the outbreak of war instructions were given to the police to prevent German and Austrian subjects from leaving the Territory and to locate and submit particulars of all enemy subjects resident in Southern and Northern Rhodesia; subsequently a notice was published in the Government Gazette which required all German and Austro-Hungarian subjects within the Territory forthwith to register their names and addresses and to surrender all firearms in their possession to the nearest magistrate. The number thus located was approximately 220, viz. 120 Germans and 100 Austrians: these men were considered as Reservists unless they could prove otherwise; and all who were found to be Reservists were considered as prisoners of war but were allowed parole until arrangements could be made for their internment. A few who declined to give their parole were detained by the police pending internment. Arrangements having been made by the High Commissioner for the internment of enemy subjects from Rhodesia in the Union, 93 German and Austrian Reservists were sent to Fort Napier, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, for internment in 1914, while all other enemy subjects were allowed to remain in the Territory, being in every case vouched for by two British residents of standing. This was the position until May 1915, when, in consequence of the bitter feeling aroused by the sinking of the *Lusitania*, it became necessary to intern the majority of the enemy subjects remaining in the Territory. The total number interned was 171, of whom 156 were resident in Southern Rhodesia. Of those allowed to remain in the Territory the majority had been long residents and were elderly men with wives and families. The conduct of naturalized British subjects of enemy origin was, on the whole, satisfactory. In one or two cases it was not all that could be desired, and a Proclamation was issued giving authority for the internment of this class, but it is pleasing to record that in no case was it found necessary to take action under the authority thus given. Among those who were originally interned as enemy subjects were a number of Czechs and Slovaks. These men were subsequently released in terms of the Agreement entered into by His Majesty's Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council. With few exceptions, all other enemy subjects interned from Rhodesia were repatriated, two only returning to the Territory.

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The First Rhodesia Regiment

Early in the war an offer was made to the War Office to furnish a Rhodesian contingent of 500 men for service overseas. The Army Council considered that local requirements were entitled to priority and suggested that the contingent should be made available for service in Africa. The offer was repeated to the Union of South Africa, the services of the contingent were accepted for the campaign in German South-West Africa, and the 1st Rhodesia Regiment with an establishment of 20 officers and 497 other ranks was quickly formed from members of the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers and from those of the public who were not volunteers but who had registered their names for Imperial service. The departure of the Regiment was somewhat hastened, its services being requisitioned by the Union Government to aid in suppression of the South African Rebellion, and on the 14th of November 1914, it left Salisbury for Bloemfontein, where it was utilized to garrison that place and Tempe until the rebellion was put down. It was then dispatched to Cape Town and shipped to Walvis Bay, landed on the 25th of December 1914, and was attached temporarily to the 4th South African Brigade.

On the 14th of January 1915 it occupied and garrisoned Swakopmund. It was then ordered to form part of a reconnoitring force which was moved up the Swakop river on the 7th of February 1915, to ascertain the strength of the enemy at Nonidas, and during the reconnaissance lost two men, killed. On the 23rd of February 1915 the general advance began, in which the regiment took part, being attached to the 3rd South African Brigade. Nonidas was occupied without opposition, and the 3rd Brigade was detached to protect the construction of the railway line across the great Namib Desert. This duty occupied the next three months, during which period the regiment moved forward with the construction to Arandis. In anticipation of an enemy attack on Trekkopjes the 3rd Brigade was advanced to that place, followed by the Rhodesians on the 26th of April 1915. Here a small engagement took place and the enemy was driven off, the Rhodesian casualties being one officer killed and five men wounded. The protection of the railway line still claimed the attention of the Rhodesians who, on the 23rd of May 1915, had reached Ebony

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and Usakos. On the 11th of June 1915 orders were received to concentrate at Usakos and join the 1st South African Brigade at Oronge, which was accomplished on the 17th of that month. The regiment left Oronge on the 19th of June and proceeded with the brigade to Kalkfeld, where it was thought the enemy would be brought to action, but when the objective was reached on the 24th of June it was found that the Germans had retired. From Kalkfeld the brigade proceeded to Omoronga and thence to Otjiwarongo, which was reached on the 30th of June. Here the Rhodesians remained in garrison until the end of the campaign, when the regiment was withdrawn to Cape Town and eventually disbanded.

Though little or no actual fighting had been experienced, the campaign had been a trying one, involving much fatigue-work in the building of fortifications, unloading of ships, long marches across the desert on short rations and with very little water, and continual disappointment at not having been in action. On disbandment many of the regiment went to England and offered their services to the War Office, whilst others were enrolled in other active service units then being formed in Rhodesia for service in German East Africa. The total number of officers and men actually enrolled for the regiment was 577, and the casualties amounted to three killed and five wounded.

The Second Rhodesia Regiment

On the 22nd of October 1914 the Legislative Council of Southern Rhodesia passed a resolution with the object of raising a contingent of 500 infantry to be placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government. The offer was accepted on the 16th of November, enlistment started on the 21st, and a fine regiment composed of men from all ranks of society was soon raised, the training being carried out at Salisbury. On the 9th of March 1915 the regiment, under command of Lieut.-Col. Capell, D.S.O., embarked at Beira for East Africa, reached Mombasa on the 14th, and on the following day enrailed for Kajiado, an up-country station on the Magadi branch railway line, which was used as a base for the advanced post at Longido, for the defence of the main Uganda railway, and for the protection of Nairobi. The regiment was warmly welcomed, as there were not at this time more than 10,000 troops in the

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country, the only European forces being the 2nd Loyal North Lancashires and a small number of East African Mounted Rifles. On the 19th of March intelligence was received that the enemy was concentrating to attack Longido. General Stuart, commanding the Nairobi District, inspected the regiment; his words were brief: 'I am paying the regiment the highest compliment by sending it on to the front to-day'—and at 4.30 p.m. it marched for Longido. The long line of outposts which ended at Longido entailed the dispersal of the handful of troops in East Africa to such an extent that it was decided to concentrate, and withdrawal from Longido began on the 6th of April. It was a hazardous movement, encumbered by ox-wagon transport, but the enemy did not interfere with it, and concentration at Kajiado was completed by the 14th. Longido was in German territory, and had been captured at considerable cost very early in the war. The withdrawal therefore invited much criticism, but under the circumstances it must be held to have been sound, in spite of the encouragement thereby given to the enemy.

On the 17th of April the regiment was ordered farther east and down the main line to Maktau and Tsavo; one company (B) to Maktau between Voi station and Taveta, and the remaining three companies to Tsavo, north of Voi on the main line. From Tsavo they reinforced Mzima—the terminal of a line of outposts of 37 miles. This was a time of small mobile columns and patrols, and few days passed without skirmishes. At this early stage of the war the enemy Askari were sorely out of control, and wounded men who fell into their hands were in most cases horribly mutilated. Later, however, these outrages ceased and the enemy in the firing line fought cleanly, often chivalrously. It was the season of the great rains; fever and dysentery decimated the troops, the country was covered as by a mantle with dense thorn bush through which a column of 250 men would creep in single file, ever expectant of the crackling of rifle-fire from front or flank; for scouting and reconnaissance was impossible. The only definite action in East Africa during this period was an abortive frontal attack on the 14th of July on the German advance post at Mbuyuni, 17 miles east of Taveta, both places being in British territory, which was held by some 800 of the enemy, who during the action received strong reinforcements. Our forces

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consisted of about 1,000 rifles with 2 mountain-guns, and B and C Companies of the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment took part in the attack. The total casualties on our side were approximately 2 officers killed, 6 wounded, and 200 rank and file killed and wounded. The regiment by this time was much depleted by sickness, and it was necessary to send it to the higher veld. Accordingly it concentrated again at Kajiado on the 25th of August.

On the 21st of September an unsuccessful attack, involving heavy casualties, was made on Longido, which had been re-occupied by the enemy. The only Rhodesian, Captain McQueen, who participated in it, as the regiment was held in reserve, won the Military Cross. About this time there was a lull in active operations, other than patrol affairs, and every one was looking forward to the arrival of the strong forces promised by the Union of South Africa. Ninety-five recruits came up from Rhodesia, and the establishment of the regiment was increased to 600. On the 10th of November the regiment entrained for Maktau to relieve the 25th Royal Fusiliers, and its work now consisted in protecting against enemy attacks, mines, and bombs the construction of the branch railway towards Mbuyuni, destined eventually to link up with the German northern line.

On the 22nd of January 1916 all available forces marched to attack Mbuyuni; the position was found to be lightly held, and the enemy were soon turned out of their formidable line of trenches, casualties on both sides being small. On the 24th of January Serengeti Camp, four miles farther on towards Taveta, was attacked and occupied; it proved to be an entrenched position capable of affording cover for 5,000 men and constructed on modern military lines; the enemy had evacuated it on the previous day. For the last few days Union troops had been marching in, and by the 2nd of February there was a complete South African Infantry Brigade at Mbuyuni. On the 3rd of February the German position on Salaita Hill, strongly fortified and honeycombed with earthworks, was bombarded with little visible result. On the 7th the Rhodesia Regiment with 16 officers, 350 rifles, and 5 machine guns, reconnoitred the position, worked its way between the main German force and its outposts, and inflicted severe casualties on the latter, suffering only one itself. On the 12th at dawn

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a concerted attack by the 2nd Division on the Salaita position began, the South African Infantry Brigade moving round on to the enemy's left flank, while the Rhodesians, 2nd Loyal North Lancashires, and 130th King's Own Baluchis demonstrated frontally. It was soon evident that the flank attack had failed, and that the South African Infantry Brigade was in full retreat. The German shell-fire was accurate, and about midday a general retirement on Serengeti was ordered, the Rhodesians and 130th Baluchis having assigned to them the difficult rear-guard operation entailed by the South African Infantry having retired round our right flank. It was successfully carried out by these two regiments, which on this occasion cemented a comradeship engendered by participation in many previous patrol and column fights. The casualties on our side were heavy; those of the enemy almost negligible. The Rhodesians were fortunate in losing only eleven killed and wounded.

By this time Lieut.-Gen. Smuts had arrived and visited Serengeti on the 20th of February. On the 7th of March a concerted move on Salaita and Taveta began, the enemy's left flank at the latter place being turned by the seizure of Chala Hill by the South African Horse; at the same time Salaita was bombarded on the 8th, and next day occupied without opposition. On the 10th of March the regiment entered Taveta, the enemy holding the nek between Latema and Reata Hills, about 4,000 yards farther west. On the 11th of March, about midday, the 1st East African Brigade moved to attack the enemy position; the 3rd King's African Rifles and 130th Baluchis attacked and were held up by rifle, machine-gun, and pom-pom fire; at 5 p.m. the Rhodesians were ordered to reinforce and carry forward the first-named regiments, but it was too late, they were already retiring, and the Rhodesians went forward alone. Had the attack been launched an hour earlier, it might have succeeded, but dusk soon intervened; gun-fire at 500 yards' range stampeded the ammunition mules, darkness fell, touch was lost in the thick bush, connecting files and orderlies became casualties or lost their way, and the necessary cohesion that could have been maintained in daylight was wanting. B Company ran out of all ammunition, and had to retire from the ground which they had gallantly won; C and D were attacked in flank and thrown back some

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distance ; A lost touch, and moved too far to the right ; E and F in reserve dug in when all had retired, and beat off a heavy counter-attack, but being entirely isolated, without support and surrounded on three sides, retired. No man had more than 30 rounds of ammunition left. About 3 a.m. on the 12th, two battalions of South African Infantry moved to the attack in the darkness. Gallantly they pushed forward, but their attack was shattered and only a remnant, with a small party of the Rhodesians, gained a footing in the enemy position, and remained there till daybreak, when the enemy was seen to be retiring across the bush-clad flats towards Kahe on the Northern Railway. The total losses in this fight were about 300 killed, wounded, and missing ; those of the Rhodesia Regiment numbered 60 killed and wounded out of 539 of all ranks who went into action. The regiment moved on the 18th to Unterer Himo, which was said to be held by the enemy, but they retired on our advance after having been heavily shelled ; in turn they subsequently shelled us from Rasthaus, causing little damage, and Rasthaus was similarly evacuated on the 22nd. Since the occupation of Taveta there had been heavy fighting round Kilimanjaro ; Moshi and Kahe had been captured, and the enemy pushed back into the Usambara Mountains ; the rains were now threatening, and the first brilliant phase of General Smuts's campaign came to a close.

As the Medical Officer reported 65 per cent. of the regiment to be unfit for further active service, its effective strength being 15 officers and 389 rank and file, including medical, transport, staff, and details, the regiment was ordered to Nairobi and arrived there on the 29th of March for a rest. On the 15th of May, now mustering 503 all ranks, it reached Taveta again, and on the 20th of May the long march down the left bank of the Pangani river began, whilst Hannyngton's column cleared the Usambara Mountains on our left flank. The march, arduous and rapid, sadly reduced the regiment, and only some 300 fever-sodden, weary men remained when the enemy held up the advance at German Bridge, near Bwiko. But on the morning of the 30th of May, alone and unsupported, the regiment cleared the enemy's front-line trenches and captured the German Bridge over the Pangani, with the small loss of 2 officers and 8 men wounded and 1 killed. The results of the little action were far reaching. We occupied Bwiko on the

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31st, and though the enemy opened on our camp with a 4·1-inch gun, little damage was done. Here, on the 6th of June, we crossed to the right bank of the Pangani river and marched down it until meeting the enemy at the trolley line at Mkalamo, which connects the Northern Railway with Handeni. For want of reliable intelligence a rather unsatisfactory action was then fought by the 1st East African Brigade, as during the night of the 9th and 10th of June the enemy managed to get clear away along the trolley line. The casualties suffered by the regiment in this fight were 1 killed and 3 wounded. From this point to Handeni the enemy fought a rear-guard action; small skirmishes and sniping were constant, but owing to their superior mobility it was impossible to get to grips. On the 16th of June, when the 1st East African Brigade camped two miles from Handeni, the German flag could be seen flying on a building, and the enemy's hymn of hate in the shape of 4·1-inch shells began before sundown, with little effect. When we advanced on the morning of the 18th only 170 rifles and 6 machine guns remained of the regiment, so saturated had it become with fever and dysentery during 15 months' soldiering in pestilential country. Handeni was unoccupied; the enemy had evacuated it in the night, having destroyed everything that could be of military use.

The Germans next stood on the Lukigura river, where they suffered heavy casualties at the hands of General Sheppard's 1st East African Brigade and General Hoskins's flanking column. The regiment was held in reserve. On July 7th it joined the remains of the 1st East African Brigade at Mkindu Msiha. The enemy held the Nguru Hills and shelled the camp, into which a division was crowded, intermittently day and night, with large calibre and long-range guns; it was trying to the nerves to wait, making no reply for want of guns that could carry the distance; and the casualty list in men, camp followers, and animals mounted up daily. At last on July 6th a concerted move was ordered; the regiment was inspected by the A.D.M.S., 86 of the men were pronounced unfit to march and many others doubtful; only 186 men were able to move out with the brigade on the 7th, and these were organized as a company under the command of Major Coker. The enemy, being outflanked, left the Nguru Mountains and decided to stand at the Wami river, where, on August 17th,

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a general engagement took place. It might have been highly successful if mounted troops had placed themselves between the Wami and Morogoro, some 41 miles distant: as it was, the enemy made an orderly retirement to Morogoro. The small detachment of Rhodesians went to reinforce the 29th Punjabis who were held up by the right flank of the enemy, and were hard pressed; the Rhodesians steadied the situation, but lost in officers 1 killed, 1 died of wounds, one wounded; in rank and file 4 killed and 10 wounded. On the night of the 24th, when the Division was in bivouac at the Ngerengere river on its march on Morogoro, explosions were heard from the direction of the town and central railway. The enemy was blowing up bridges and magazines, prior to evacuation, and on the 25th the Rhodesians, accompanied by their old comrades, the 130th Baluchis, were given the distinction of being the first to march into Morogoro, to settle and police the town.

On the 30th of August the regiment left Morogoro to rejoin the brigade; the enemy were retreating towards the Rufiji, and fought many a small delaying rear-guard action before ultimately making a stand at Dunthumi, Kisaki, and the Mgeta river. The regiment took little part in these skirmishes; it was composed of handy and willing men, the most important work at the time was road-making and bridge-building to support the heavy motor transport train, and to this they turned their hands. The Germans retired until the Mgeta river was reached, when they entrenched themselves; and in October the regiment took its place in the trenches and posts facing the enemy, usually within rifle range of his outposts. Here a long wait was made and desultory fighting took place almost daily. The country between Morogoro and the Mgeta river almost beggars description—low lying, forest clad, with miles of swamp covered with elephant grass; land sparsely populated by emaciated natives, who possessed no cattle, fowls, pigs, or goats, for nothing could live except the wild game; the tsetse fly held complete control and were there in their myriads; the roadside on the single line of communication was littered with thousands of putrefying carcasses of horses, oxen, and mules, and the air was black with large red-headed flies that would 'fly-blow' the blankets, clothing, hair, or anything they settled on; the heat was prostrating, and the troops went down with fever and dysentery

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in ever-increasing numbers, until on October 17th the regiment mustered only 126 of all ranks at Dunthumi. On December 31st an advance began. The objective, after clearing the enemy from the line of the Mgeta, was the Rufiji river, 40 miles south. By the 2nd of January 1917 the enemy had been cleared out of the Mgeta position with considerable loss, our casualties being few; troops had been landed at Kilwa, south of the Rufiji; whilst the East African Brigade, Nigerians, and Cape Corps pushed down from the Mgeta, fighting more or less all the way. The Rufiji was reached and crossed by General Beves's 2nd South African Infantry Brigade on the 3rd of January, and by part of General Sheppard's 1st East African Brigade on the 6th of January; but, in spite of hard knocks, the enemy managed to escape utter defeat by splitting up into small portions and melting away.

It was now the height of the rainy season, the country was flooded, operations were held up for months, and the 2nd Rhodesians with the 25th Royal Fusiliers started on the 11th of January 1917 for Morogoro, where the regiment on arrival mustered 91 all ranks. After some eight weeks' stay at Morogoro, it was ordered to Rhodesia. On the 3rd of April, General Hoskins, G.O.C., inspected the regiment, complimented it on its work and said good-bye; and on the 8th it embarked on H.M.S. *Himalaya* for Beira, which was reached on Friday, 18th of April 1917, after just over two years of hard marching and hard fighting in one of the most trying tropical campaigns ever experienced. The regiment was splendidly received by the people of Umtali on their way to Salisbury, where a magnificent reception represented the welcome from combined Rhodesia.

Officers and men of the regiment were granted furlough, and many were discharged as medically unfit. It was decided that the regiment could not again take the field as a unit, as it could not be kept up to strength by the manhood of Rhodesia, but training was continued until September 9th, when a contingent of two double companies left Salisbury for Europe. Here eventually they melted away, being absorbed to a large extent by the South African Infantry, while many were given commissions and others joined the Royal Air Force and the Tank Corps. On Friday, the 12th of October 1917, demobilization was complete and the fine little regiment ceased to exist.

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British South Africa Police Artillery Section : British South Africa Police Special Service Companies A and B : Native Rhodesia Regiments, &c.

The Northern Rhodesia Police were without artillery when fighting began in the neighbourhood of Abercorn and Fife on the northern border of Rhodesia. One British South Africa Police 7-pounder screw-gun with detachment complete was therefore sent north in September 1914, and rendered good service in the defence of Saisi, and subsequently in the attack on Namema. At a later date, in August 1915, a British South Africa Police 12-pounder gun and detachment was sent north to Abercorn and rendered good service in the attack on Namema. Before Brig.-Gen. Northey took command of the Nyasa-Rhodesian Forces between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, there was no single organized control on that particular section of the front. The Rhodesian troops were garrisoning the border from Abercorn to Fife, whilst the 1st King's African Rifles and Nyasaland Volunteers were concentrated at Karonga on Lake Nyasa, watching the Nyasaland border. At the outset the enemy had attacked both Abercorn and Fife, and had been driven off. A battalion of Belgian troops had been called in to assist the Northern Rhodesia Rifles, and posts were established at Abercorn, Zombe, Saisi, and Fife. The King's African Rifles early in the war had severely handled the enemy north of Karonga, and matters during the middle of 1915 were apparently at a deadlock, neither side taking the offensive. In view of the probable withdrawal of Belgian troops from Abercorn it became necessary for Rhodesia to undertake the whole defence of the north-eastern border. A force of 300 Europeans was thereupon raised in August 1915, and sent up to the front. This unit was divided into two companies named the 'Special Service Companies of the British South Africa Police', and consisted partly of serving police, but mainly of members of the Western and Eastern Divisions of the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers, with some ex-members of the 1st Rhodesia Regiment. A Company marched in two sections from railhead at Broken Hill and Ndola respectively to Abercorn, arriving there early in October 1915, whilst B Company proceeded via Beira, Chinde, and Nyasaland to Fife. A great deal of patrol work was performed, but no actual

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fighting other than the usual patrol engagements took place until a general advance was made in May 1916. By this time Brig.-Gen. Northey had taken command of all the forces between Lake Tanganyika and Nyasaland, and from the beginning of 1916 the Rhodesians had been incorporated in the Nyasa-Rhodesian Field Force, in which they remained incorporated throughout the campaign.

The advance began towards the end of May 1916, when A and B Service Companies participated in an attack under the command of Lieut.-Col. Murray on Namema, an enemy fort some 26 miles north-west of Abercorn. The calls upon the companies had been heavy, men being required for the Northern Rhodesia Police, medical service, transport and supply services, signal units, and so forth, with the result that only approximately 200 took the field as a unit. Namema was invested for nine days, and on the night of the 2nd–3rd June 1916 the garrison succeeded in breaking out of the fort and escaping, but with casualties and the loss of all their baggage column. The Rhodesians pursued, but before coming up with the enemy were ordered to Mwazia Mission and thence to Bismarckburg on Lake Tanganyika. The latter place fell on the 9th of June 1916, and after its fall General Northey ordered a portion of the Rhodesian troops to form the General Reserve to his main force, which was then pursuing the enemy north of New Langenburg. A and B Companies formed part of this force and marched to New Langenburg and thence to Buhora on the New Langenburg–Iringa road, where they arrived on the 9th of July 1916. At this date the enemy had concentrated at Malangali. There they were hotly attacked on the 24th of July by the King's African Rifles and 1st and 2nd South African Rifles, and driven northwards with heavy casualties and the loss of one 4·5 howitzer. During these operations the Rhodesians flanked the Malangali force to the west, and, pushing on in pursuit of a small detachment, reached Madibira on the 26th of July, without opposition. The enemy was brought to action at Lutego some 18 miles north-east of Madibira on the 28th of July, and routed, but not followed up, the Malangali force being now some 40 miles distant and unable to move as supplies had run out. A little later, however, the Rhodesians again took up the pursuit, and drove the enemy from Mahansi northwards on the 27th of August. Iringa was

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occupied on the 29th of August, and the pursuit was continued in co-operation with the 2nd South African Rifles.

The Germans retreated from Iringa in an easterly direction, through very hilly and thick country, and, after nine days of strenuous work on short rations, were on the 15th of September 1916 driven out of the hills into the plains of the Lulango river. The operations had mainly been carried through by the Special Service Companies, who did excellent work, in co-operation with the Northern Rhodesia Police. Orders were now received for the South African Rifles to guard the passes east of Iringa whilst the Rhodesians marched south to join the King's African Rifles, who had driven the enemy opposed to them out of Lupembe and eastwards to the plains about Mkapira. Concentration at Mkapira was effected early in October, and a defensive position selected and entrenched. During October it became apparent that the enemy was strongly reinforced, and on the 22nd of October 1916 he invested Mkapira. Prior to the investment, B Company had been sent to reinforce the base at Kisinga, and when the actual investment took place the Germans considerably outnumbered our troops. On the 29th of October, as supplies were running short and there appeared to be no possibility of co-operation from other troops, it was decided to attack the enemy and compel him to raise the siege. This was successfully accomplished at dawn on the morning of the 30th of October, when the besiegers were completely routed and driven in disorder from the field. Forty members of A Company gallantly charged a portion of the German line held by some 250 rifles and 3 Maxims, capturing 2 Maxims and inflicting heavy loss; whilst the King's African Rifles attacked another sector of the line about the same time, with equal success, capturing a 7-pounder gun and 1 Maxim. Owing to the retreat of the enemy's western force from the direction of Tabora to Mahenge, which entailed the cutting of our very long and vulnerable lines of communication from the north of New Langenburg to Iringa, it was of urgent importance that the Rhodesians and the King's African Rifles should be brought back to Lupembe, and here the Rhodesians arrived on the 4th of November 1916.

Meanwhile a fresh unit had been formed in Southern Rhodesia. This was the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment, consisting of 16

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European officers, 37 non-commissioned officers, and 507 native soldiers. This regiment left Salisbury on the 18th of July 1916, and proceeded via Beira and Nyasaland to New Langenburg to complete its training. On the 16th of September 1916 one company of the Regiment left New Langenburg for Songea, which was occupied without opposition on the 20th of September. A small attack was beaten off on the 12th of November; on the 24th of November the 5th South African Infantry arrived at Songea, and thereafter this company of the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment was brigaded with it. The other company of the regiment which had been left at New Langenburg was employed to watch the lines of communication north of New Langenburg, and was stationed at Buhora with advanced detachments at Mapagoro and Malangali.

The Service Companies with the Rhodesian column, having reached Lupembe, were called upon for further operations against the western German force which on its retreat had at the beginning of November cut the New Langenburg–Iringa road, isolated the 2nd South African Rifles from the south, and invested Malangali, where large supplies of food were stored. Forty motor-cars were placed at the disposal of the column for the relief of Malangali, 120 miles distant; 100 men of the Service Companies and 80 Askari of the Northern Rhodesia Police, together with 4 Maxims, were placed on the cars, and the journey was accomplished in one day. On the 12th of November Malangali was relieved, the main enemy force having moved forward in the direction of Lupembe, leaving two companies to continue the investment of Malangali. These two companies were broken up, the Malangali detachment was removed to a place of safety, and the Rhodesians returned by car to Nyombe, where the column had orders to concentrate. The investment of Lupembe, however, necessitated immediate action, the column left Nyombe for Lupembe on the 16th of November, and on the following day dispersed the enemy rear-guard some 20 miles east of Nyombe, proceeding thence to Lupembe, which was found to be safe, the King's African Rifles having arrived already from Mkapira and driven off the Germans. On the return of the Rhodesians to Nyombe, it was found that a detachment of the enemy about 400 strong with 3 Maxims and a 4·5 howitzer had reached Ilembule Mission,

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20 miles north-west of Nyombe. They had been left behind the main body to escort the 4·5 howitzer, and had been unable to keep up. The Rhodesians at once proceeded to Ilembule and, in co-operation with the company of the Rhodesia Native Regiment from Buhora, compelled the detachment to surrender on the 26th of November 1916.

After a month's rest the Rhodesians entered on a new phase in the campaign. The company of the Rhodesia Native Regiment which has just been mentioned was sent to Songea to join the rest of the regiment. The enemy force defeated at Mkapira had been reinforced by the remnants of the western force which had crossed our lines of communication and had taken up a position at Mfika, eight miles east of Lupembe. In co-operation with the King's African Rifles the position at Mfika was turned on the 26th of December 1916, and further operations, lasting until the 8th of January 1917, eventually drove the enemy out of the hills into the Lulango valley about Mkapira once more. At this stage the Rhodesians were withdrawn to Mfika, with the object of blocking the Ifinga area, from which the Germans were drawing food supplies. The rainy season had begun, the operations were conducted through very hilly and close country, but after a stubborn resistance the Germans were driven out by the beginning of February 1917, and retired rapidly southwards to the west of Songea, eventually making eastward to the Tunduru and Lindi areas. The Rhodesian column was thereupon withdrawn to Lupembe for a rest. During the Ifinga operations a portion of the Rhodesia Native Regiment at Songea had been invested at Kitanda, and after a siege of several days was relieved by a small force consisting of Rhodesians and 5th South African Infantry which had been successful in surrounding an enemy force some 400 strong at Likuyu and compelling them to surrender. The troops who had been driven off from Kitanda eventually concentrated with those who had been routed from the Ifinga area at Gumbiro. Here the force was divided into two detachments, one proceeding south as already stated, and the other making west with the object of cutting our lines of communication at Tundala between Old Langenburg and Nyombe. By the time when the enemy's intention became apparent the Rhodesian column had reached Lupembe and had had a few days' rest. It was immediately called upon to march

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with all speed to Tundala, and reached it on the 22nd of February to find the enemy investing the small garrison, whilst his baggage and main column had been passed to the west, giving him a free run west or north-west as he desired. The Rhodesians and King's African Rifles drove the besiegers west, but it was apparent that little could be effected by pursuit, and that it was necessary to throw some force on to the Northern Rhodesia border between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa to protect Fife and Abercorn, and to prevent an enemy move south into Rhodesia. The Rhodesians were accordingly hurriedly moved to Old Langenburg, thence to Mwaya across Lake Nyasa, and thence to New Langenburg by road.

At Mwaya the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment had been concentrated, having been withdrawn from Songea and now forming part of the Rhodesian column. From New Langenburg that regiment was moved to the Igali Pass, and thence along the New Langenburg–Bismarckburg road to a position which would cover Fife. The enemy having concentrated at St. Moritz on the Songwe river, east of Lake Rukwa, the Native Regiment, reinforced by a company of the Northern Rhodesia Police, was ordered to advance on St. Moritz, whilst the remainder of the Rhodesian column marched to Itaka on the New Langenburg–Bismarckburg road with the intention of striking north from that place to get west of the enemy. The 1st Battalion of the King's African Rifles was to co-operate from the east of Old Utengule, and thus three forces were to strike simultaneously at St. Moritz. Unfortunately plans miscarried and the Native Regiment was driven back and surrounded near St. Moritz, which necessitated the remainder of the Rhodesian column proceeding to their assistance. Relief was effected on the 2nd of April 1917. Thereupon the enemy immediately broke north and the Rhodesian column, the Rhodesia Native Regiment, and the 1st King's African Rifles were brigaded together for pursuit. A long chase ensued, the brigade reaching a point two days' march south of Tabora, by which time the enemy had been driven into an area of operations of the Tabora Force which finally accounted for him. The column then returned to Rungwe near New Langenburg for a week's rest, reaching Rungwe on the 16th of June 1917. By the 27th of June it had been moved across Lake Nyasa

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to Wiedhaven, from whence the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment marched via Songea to Kitanda, and the remainder of the column to Songea in reserve to the forces now operating east and north-east of Songea against an enemy concentration about Mahenge. The column was soon split up, and distributed on the lines of communication and on the flanks of the fighting forces. The Rhodesia Native Regiment was called on to push northward and co-operate with some of the Northern Rhodesia Police in ousting a detachment from the Mpepo area on the Ruhuje river, which resulted in the Germans being driven on Mahenge towards the latter part of August 1917. The object was to destroy the various detachments or drive them in upon Mahenge, where a concentration of our troops might effect the complete annihilation of the German western force. The King's African Rifles successfully drove the enemy northwards towards Mahenge, the detachment at Mpepo was compelled to retire in the same direction, and our Northern force drove the troops opposed to them southwards on the same point. But from Mahenge the combined parties of the enemy quickly moved south-east with the intention of joining the eastern force, which was then being driven south from Kilwa and Lindi; a portion of the Rhodesian column hastily pushed eastwards to Liwale to intercept the retreat, arrived two days too late; the pursuit was taken up, but the start gained proved too much; and the column was moved to Tunduru, which was reached on the 28th of November 1917. Eventually these western fighters were accounted for by our eastern force, and von Lettow with about 3,000 troops crossed the Ruvuma river into Portuguese East Africa.

From Tunduru the Rhodesians returned to Songea for a well-earned rest. Meanwhile, early in 1917 the Rhodesian Administration was asked by the Army Council to furnish another native regiment for service in German East Africa in addition to reinforcements for the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment. This resulted in the formation of the 2nd Rhodesia Native Regiment, which was trained at Salisbury and left for Nyasaland at the end of August 1917. This regiment was placed in reserve at Fort Johnston on Lake Nyasa and eventually, at the end of January 1918, was merged into the 1st Rhodesia Native Regiment, the two forming one complete battalion known as the Rhodesia Native Regiment. The Rhodesian

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forces in the field now consisted of the remnants of A and B Service Companies, the Northern Rhodesia Police, and the Rhodesia Native Regiment with complete departmental units.

During the early part of March 1918 the Rhodesia Native Regiment, with Maxim and Lewis gun detachments of the Service Companies, marched south from Mbamba Bay on Lake Nyasa to Mtengula, a lake port in Portuguese territory, where it was brigaded with the Cape Corps for operations east of that place, von Lettow having moved south and occupied the area about Mwembe and Mahua. An attempt was made in May 1918, in co-operation with an eastern force pushed in from Porto Amelia, to surround him, but in spite of heavy casualties he managed to retreat southwards. Marching rapidly via Malema, Inagu, Alto Mulocue, and Mulevalla to Nyamakura, he threatened Quelimane. The remainder of the Rhodesian column was in consequence withdrawn from Mbamba Bay, where it had been resting, and moved by lake to Fort Johnston and thence by road to Limbe and Mlanje ready to undertake any further operations that might be necessary. The Rhodesia Native Regiment was ordered to march from Mwembe and Mtarika to Mlanje, but before arriving there, the Northern Rhodesia Police had been ordered to Lugella to co-operate with other forces concentrating on that place. The Rhodesia Native Regiment was then advanced from Mlanje farther south to Aringa, while the Northern Rhodesia Police and detachment of Service Companies, having reached Lugella, endeavoured to bring the enemy to action about Nyamakura. They had no success, for von Lettow broke north-east through our converging columns, marched rapidly through Ociva and Nyamirue and took up a position east of the Nyamirue river. The Lugella force was then ordered to march to Alto Ligonha via Ille and endeavour to assist in forming a line north of the enemy, while the Rhodesia Native Regiment and detachment of Service Companies were ordered to march to Inagu. For a short period all Rhodesian troops were placed temporarily under command of the Eastern Force and assisted in heading von Lettow off from the north, whilst he by rapid marching endeavoured to work round the right flank of the Eastern Force and strike north via Ille and Regone. In this he was successful, but was harassed throughout by the Rhodesia Native Regiment in co-operation with a battalion of the King's

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African Rifles. The Northern Rhodesia Police and Service Company detachment had meanwhile been moved rapidly to Regone, arriving just too late to co-operate with the Regone Force. These troops were therefore ordered to move rapidly northwards to Lurio and endeavour by hard marching to strike north of the enemy about Mahua. Lack of supplies handicapped the force, and after gaining Angoros, north of Lurio, it was withdrawn to Fort Johnston, the enemy having made good his retreat through our lines. The Rhodesia Native Regiment reached a point north of Mahua and was then withdrawn to Fort Johnston, the pursuit being left to the King's African Rifles. An attempt was made to head the enemy off on the Mbamba Bay–Songea road, and the Northern Rhodesia Police and Service Company detachment were immediately shipped to Mbamba Bay, whence they marched on Songea. About Fusse, the Rhodesians once more came in contact with the enemy, and in an all-day engagement succeeded in checking but failed to stop him, and von Lettow continued to move rapidly north-west on Nyombe, the pursuit being taken up by a battalion of King's African Rifles. As the Rhodesian border between Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika was completely unprotected, and as large supplies were concentrated at Fife, the Northern Rhodesia Police and detachment of the Service Company was ordered back to Mbamba Bay, whence it was shipped to Mwaya and thence by road to New Langenburg and Fife. Owing to the small accommodation on the lake steamers only one company was moved at a time, with the result that the battalion was strung out in companies along the Mwaya–Fife road at one day's interval. The leading company reached Fife about the time when the enemy arrived at Mbozi north of Fife. The second company was engaged by the enemy about 12 miles north of Fife, and reached Fife a few hours before von Lettow with his whole force attacked the garrison, but was driven off. The remainder of the battalion arrived two days later, when von Lettow moved off in the direction of Kasama. Shortly afterwards the Armistice was signed and operations ceased. The campaign had been extremely severe and trying, entailing operations through three wet seasons. Casualties had been heavy both from engagements and from sickness. The head-quarters of the Column marched approximately 4,250 miles, and when it is considered what a large

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amount of patrolling was effected, it is safe to add another 1,500 miles on to the total for this service, giving a total mileage of approximately 6,000 miles marched.

In addition to the units already mentioned, a number of men were specially recruited for miscellaneous services in German East Africa, such as Pay Department, Military Labour Corps, Medical Services, &c., the total numbers of whom are entered in the Appendix. Further, a Mechanical Section was formed to transport supplies from line head near Broken Hill to Kasama and eventually to Abercorn and Fife. When the operations necessitated the movement of troops eastward, the Mechanical Transport was transferred to the Nyasa-Rhodesia Field Force and operated on the New Langenburg and Iringa route, on the Tundala–Lupembe route, Wiedhaven–Songea, Mbamba Bay–Songea, and finally on the Zomba–Fort Johnston–Malokotera lines of communication.

Rhodesians on the Main Fronts

It is difficult to give accurate information in regard to Rhodesians who went overseas on their own account or who joined the Union Forces of South Africa, but there is no doubt that many who were rejected as medically unfit or over the age limit for service in the Rhodesian active service units went to England and offered their services, which were in most cases accepted. It is known that Rhodesia was, during the war, represented on every front throughout the world, and that Rhodesians served in nearly 150 different units. An extremely large proportion of Rhodesians who went on active service received commissions in various regiments, and the only other units representative of the country apart from the Rhodesian Regiments already mentioned were certain platoons attached to the King's Royal Rifle Corps. The first platoon to be formed was attached to the 2nd Battalion of the Corps, and they proceeded to France in November 1915. Subsequently, another platoon was attached to the 3rd Battalion and went to Salonika. The following is a brief account given by a member of the platoon attached to the 2nd Battalion, who went over to France in 1916:

After a few days at Havre the platoon joined the 2nd Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps in the Loos sector, but as the Division were on the point of coming out for a month's rest,

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they were not sent into the line. They marched back to the town of Villers, where the Rhodesian platoon underwent intensive training. The first experience of trench warfare was at the Double Crassier in the Loos sector about March 1916, the officer in command of the platoon at that time being Lieutenant McMillan. The casualties up to the 30th of June 1916 included this officer, who died of wounds, and several other ranks killed and wounded. About June 30th the platoon was strengthened by the arrival of 30 to 40 more Rhodesians, and the formation of two platoons was suggested. However, before this could be carried out, the attack on the Double Crassier of June 30th took place, and of the 60 odd Rhodesians who went over the top, about 52 were either killed, wounded, or wounded and taken prisoners. Several decorations were awarded for this attack. The Division then moved down into the Somme sector in July, fought through the battles of Mametz Wood, High Wood, &c., and sustained many casualties in these engagements. About this date several of the N.C.O.'s were sent away for commissions, and from this time onward the platoon was continually being called upon to furnish men for commissions.

In January 1917 the Division moved farther south and took over trenches in the occupation of the French in front of Peronne. For a time the Germans were fairly quiet, but when our artillery began to wake them up, what had at one time been looked upon as a rest became very much the reverse, and casualties were frequent. From there the Division gradually moved north, and although not actually engaged in the battle of Messines Ridge, it was held as Army Reserve. The next tour in the line took place at Passchendaele Ridge, and was about one of the worst experiences as regards discomfort. They then moved up to the Nieuport sector, and on July 9th the Rhodesian platoon was called upon to raid the Germans for the purpose of identifying the opposing Division. They were successful in gaining their object, a prisoner from the Marines being captured, but unfortunately when the raiding party were coming back through our wire, a German shell landed in their midst and caused about 6 or 7 casualties, amongst them being the officer in charge, Lieutenant McDowall, who was severely wounded and was awarded the M.C. for gallantry. On the following day the Germans, under cover

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of a terrific barrage which destroyed the bridges over the canal, attacked in great force and succeeded in capturing the officers and men of the Battalion who had not either been killed or wounded. The same fate befell the 1st Northamptonshire Regiment on the right. The following day 3 officers and about 33 men of the Battalion who had been buried in a dug-out and were overlooked managed to swim the Canal and rejoin the remnants. After this reverse the Battalion was taken back to a secret camp near Dunkirk and the two Battalions were reinforced.

After a quiet time for many months in the Cambrai area the Division moved to the Arras sector about August 1918, and participated in the general advance, although no serious fighting took place. The Battalion, however, suffered many casualties through gas—apparently of a new kind, from which several men died. The Division was then transferred to the St. Quentin area, and on September 18th took part in a big offensive, the objective being the village to the north of St. Quentin. This operation was completed by a second attack on the 24th of September, when B Company of the Rifles, which included the Rhodesian platoon, took 70 odd prisoners. The platoon at this time was only about 14 strong.

Departments connected with the War

A Pay Branch was organized shortly after the outbreak of war to deal with all matters relating to pay and accounts in connexion with the war. It managed the accounts of all the Rhodesian units on active service in Africa, of Rhodesians serving in Africa with other units, and of various details of other corps serving in Rhodesia. All Rhodesian active service units, including 2,862 European and 2,800 native soldiers, were completely armed and equipped for service in the field by an Ordnance, Transport, and Supplies Department. Clothing was mainly supplied from England, but in some cases it was found necessary to requisition on local sources, and uniform for native soldiers was partly made at Salisbury. In addition a considerable amount of cloth and uniform was supplied to the Nyasa-Rhodesia Field Force. The same department supplied two guns, nearly 4,000 rifles, and a great quantity of ammunition. It provided rations for all units in training and, for a time, for A and B Special Service Companies, who were

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rationed from Salisbury, though operating west of Iringa in German East Africa, 800 miles from railhead. It bought and dispatched from Zomba large quantities of mealie meal and rice for the Nyasa–Rhodesia Field Force and, at the request of the Imperial Government, bought in Rhodesia and forwarded to the troops in East Africa nearly 12,000 head of cattle. It equipped complete medical units with medical stores and comforts for the East African Campaign, maintaining the supply to the end, and it purchased 90 motor-cars for the British South Africa Police Mechanical Transport Section. A great volume of work devolved upon the Postal and Telegraph Department of Southern Rhodesia. Over 340 miles of telegraph wire, with other material and apparatus, were supplied to the military authorities for use in Nyasaland and the conquered territory in East Africa. Telegrams to the estimated value of £30,000 were sent free for the Imperial Government over the Southern Rhodesia lines, public telegrams to and from troops on active service in Africa were sent at half rates, casualty telegrams were sent free. Letters to all troops on active service in Africa were sent free, and so were letters and money orders for prisoners of war in all countries. Throughout the war a Daily War Message was sent to all telegraph and telephone offices in Southern Rhodesia where a newspaper was not published.

Contributions to War Funds, &c.

From the beginning of the war to the end of July 1919, contributions from Europeans and natives in Southern Rhodesia to various War Funds totalled in cash the sum of £200,000. Included in this sum were the following gifts:

4 Aeroplanes.

3 Ambulances presented by the children of Rhodesia and the sum of £4,800 in cash for their maintenance.

	£
Prince of Wales's National Relief Fund	4,583
St. Dunstan's Home for Blinded Soldiers and Sailors	4,912
British and South African Red Cross Societies, including 'Our Day' Funds	23,858
Belgian Widows and Orphans	9,174
'Empire Crisis Fund' and Overseas Contingent Fund	4,365
Rhodesian Prisoners of War Fund	5,970

Most of the money subscribed was for the benefit of the Rhodesian troops. Clubs were opened and largely used by

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soldiers both at Bulawayo and Salisbury, a number of dependants of fighting-men were in receipt of regular grants from War Funds during the war, and assistance continued to be given after the war to returned and disabled soldiers and to the dependants of those who had been killed. In addition to the £200,000 subscribed, the gifts in kind included bags of maize for the Imperial forces in British East Africa, large quantities of oranges and tobacco, and 18 cases of clothing for Belgian relief valued at £900. It is estimated that the total amount in cash and kind contributed by the natives reached the sum of £4,500; and besides the above, there were known to be considerable sums privately subscribed and also gifts sent by individuals direct to various War Funds of which there is no official record, while large sums were sent to England, through the banks and otherwise, for investment in the various War Loans.

A conspicuous feature in the war work of the country was the effort made by the women of Rhodesia. Every town and village had its working parties and comforts committees, and the members of the comforts committees met the trains that passed through between Cape Town and Beira, attending to the wants of the numerous troops that were always to be found upon them. The Comforts Committee in London also did most excellent work in general and to Rhodesians who went overseas to join the forces. This committee distributed the tobacco, cigarettes, and other parcels received from Rhodesia, each parcel was specially packed, labelled, and sealed before dispatch, and a very small proportion of the parcels failed to find their proper destination. The Rhodesian prisoners of war were supplied with the full amount of parcels allowed, and, in addition, personal parcels were sent every three months. The correspondence with regard to prisoners of war was very great, and taxed the capacity of the staff to the utmost. Relatives and friends were kept advised of any information received from prisoners, and everything possible was done to render the prisoners assistance. After the Armistice was signed and the prisoners arrived in England, each man was given a sum of £5 which had been cabled from Rhodesia. Board and accommodation was also provided for them in London and elsewhere during their leave. The Committee also rendered great assistance to men who had been demobilized and were unable

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to get passages to South Africa owing to the shortage of shipping. The success of the Comforts Committee was due to the London Office staff of the British South Africa Company, without whose help, given early and late, and often in circumstances of great pressure of work, the work of the Fund could not have been carried on.

General effect of the War

War legislation in Southern Rhodesia, embodied in Ordinance and Proclamation, and most prolific in the first few months of the war, included familiar precautions and restrictions and such measures as were necessitated by the military employment of police and the raising of volunteer forces. The Military Service Act of 1918 has been already mentioned, and a War Pensions Ordinance was passed in 1917. An Income and Excess Profits (war period) Ordinance passed in 1918, supplementing previous war-taxes, showed that Southern Rhodesia, like other parts of the Empire, felt the financial burden of the war, and the total war expenditure incurred by the Administration may be set down at £2,000,000. But the financial strain was eased by advances from the Imperial Government to cover the cost of military operations, and, taken as a whole, the material prosperity of the territory hardly suffered from the war. It was not directly affected, its borders were free from invasion, and the local natives remained loyal and contented. The beginning of the war synchronized with good rains after drought and found the country fairly well stocked with supplies of all kinds, while the protection afforded by the Navy allowed necessaries to come forward in reasonable quantities. Both merchants and people adopted a thoroughly patriotic attitude, the former refraining, as a rule, from acts of profiteering and the latter from food hoarding. As time went on and the difficulties of obtaining shipping space increased, supplies were drawn more and more from the Union of South Africa, where manufactured articles had greatly increased. With continuance of the war nearly every commodity, as elsewhere, rose very considerably in price, and the greater cost of living had to be met by an all-round increase of wages and salaries. Still, the country was fortunate in its two chief industries—mining and agriculture. In mining the gold output was fairly well maintained, but the proportion of

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base metals was the most important contribution of Southern Rhodesia to the Allied cause. The chief metals produced were coal, chrome ore, copper, asbestos, tungsten, scheelite, arsenic, and antimony. In agriculture every effort was made to increase the production of maize, and arrangements were made with the Imperial Wheat Commission to purchase the surplus grain produced. Advantage was also taken by the Imperial Government of the large number of cattle in the country to appoint a Commission to buy cattle for feeding the troops in East Africa. The increased demand for the products helped to maintain the financial stability of the country. There was, it is true, a considerable shortage of able-bodied men owing to the numbers that volunteered for active service, but their places were taken in offices and commercial houses by women clerks, and among manual workers, town police, and gaol warders by Dutchmen from the Union.

It may fairly be summed up that extraordinary cost of necessaries and means of production, difficulties of communication and transport, drain of manhood and war liabilities of various kinds were offset by abnormal demand for the raw products of the territory at abnormal prices, and that, while Southern Rhodesia beyond all question played a worthy part in the war, in turn it passed through the years of the war with no little profit and no great distress.

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APPENDIX

LIST SHOWING NUMBERS WHO RENDERED DIRECT MILITARY AID

Europeans

No. 1 Mobile Column to Schuckmannsburg	57
No. 3 Mobile Column to Sesheke	105
B.S.A. Police Artillery Section	4
1st Rhodesia Regiment to German South-West Africa	586
2nd Rhodesia Regiment to German East Africa	1,477
A and B Special Service Companies B.S.A.P.	497
Rhodesia Native Regiment	194
B.S.A. Police, Mechanical Transport	179
Miscellaneous Services, German East Africa	129
South African Sharp Shooters	9
Rhodesia Overseas Unit	36
Recruited for Union of South Africa	254
Nurses	12
Proceeded on own account (approximately)	2,038
	5,577

Natives

	Natives	*Cape Boys*
2nd Rhodesia Regiment	25	—
No. 1 Mobile Column	53	—
B.S.A. Police, Artillery Section	6	—
A and B Service Companies	—	13
Mechanical Transport	—	5
German East Africa (Miscellaneous)	286	—
Rhodesia Native Regiment	2,360	—
2nd Cape Corps	—	4
Ox transport G.E.A.	22	—
	2,752	22

Out of a Civil Service, numbering 685 in 1914, 438 volunteered and 299 went on active service. Of the non-official European inhabitants, 5,176 volunteered. The number of Europeans who held commissioned rank was 1,720. The number of all European ranks killed in action, died of wounds or disease or other causes of which there is record, was over 700. The native casualties included 31 killed and 142 died.

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The total number of distinctions gained by Rhodesians[1] during the war is estimated at 961, including 63 foreign decorations. The British honours included 2 V.C.'s, 71 D.S.O.'s, 188 M.C.'s, 69 D.C.M.'s, 76 M.M.'s, and 389 mentions in dispatches. The winners of the Victoria Cross were Captain F. C. Booth, D.C.M., of the British South Africa Police, Rhodesia Native Regiment, and the Middlesex Regiment, and Lieut.-Col. J. Sherwood Kelly, D.S.O., C.M.G., of the Norfolk Regiment and previously of the British South Africa Police.

[1] Including Northern Rhodesia also.

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SECTION II

THE NATIVE TERRITORIES OF SOUTH AFRICA

Supplied by the Local Administrations

BASUTOLAND, THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE, AND SWAZILAND

THE three native territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland are under the direct authority of the High Commissioner for South Africa, who legislates for them by Proclamation. Under him the territories are administered in each case by a Resident Commissioner and staff. Of the three, Basutoland is British territory, the other two are Protectorates. To the great advantage of the whole of South Africa, Viscount Buxton filled the difficult dual post of Governor-General of the Union and High Commissioner throughout the war, from the date of his landing at Cape Town on the 8th of September 1914. The Resident Commissioner of Basutoland, when the war began, was Sir Herbert Sloley, K.C.M.G., whose whole official life had been connected with the territory and its people. Upon his retirement, Mr. Coryndon, now Sir Robert Coryndon, K.C.M.G., succeeded him in January 1916, and upon Coryndon's appointment to be Governor of Uganda towards the end of 1917, the new Resident Commissioner of Basutoland was Lieut.-Col. E. C. I. Garraway, C.M.G., one of the many medical men who have risen to high administrative office in the Colonial Service. Prior to his transfer to Basutoland, Colonel Garraway had been from May 1916 Resident Commissioner in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. He succeeded Lieut.-Col. Panzera, C.M.G., who was Resident Commissioner in the earlier part of the war, and was followed, in its latest stages, by Mr. J. C. Macgregor. Mr. Macgregor had served for some years previously in the Protectorate and had already acted as Resident Commissioner. In Swaziland, at the beginning of the war, Mr. Coryndon was

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Resident Commissioner, second to none in knowledge of South African natives, and, prior to his appointment to Swaziland, specially cognizant with North-West Rhodesia. His successor was Mr. D. M. G. Honey, who had been Government Secretary in Swaziland since 1907.

Of these three territories the Bechuanaland Protectorate alone was conterminous with German South-West Africa; the other two were far removed. The chief foreign influence in Basutoland was wholly on the Allied side, the influence of the French Protestant mission, by far the strongest Christian mission in Basutoland, and controlling the largest number of schools. There was a larger proportion of South African Dutchmen in Swaziland than in Basutoland or the Bechuanaland Protectorate, for Swaziland had, prior to the South African war, come under the control of the South African Republic. It had attracted a number of concessionaires, both Dutch and British, for tin and gold were to be found in the country, over and above its grazing and agricultural facilities. The concessions were, with the help of a Special Commission, brought within reason in the years which followed the South African war. Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate were suffering somewhat from drought in 1914, but, with this exception, conditions, financially and otherwise, were normal in all the three territories, and were not substantially affected by the war.

The following reports have been supplied by the respective local administrations through the High Commissioner. Their general tenor is to show that these native areas were not substantially affected by the world upheaval, nor yet by the South African rebellion or the campaign in German South-West Africa nearer home. There was not the remotest sign or suspicion of abnormal native unrest, and when native leaders, such as Khama, the well-known chief of the Bamangwato, who has died since the war, were sufficiently enlightened and intelligent to grasp the meaning of what was taking place, loyalty to the British cause was active and responsive in high degree. In South Africa, in short, there was the same story to tell as in all parts of the world where the British, few among many, had the keeping of native peoples and their lands, a story of contentment with the *status quo*, readiness to uphold it, and confidence in the ultimate result of the war.

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BASUTOLAND

Basutoland is situated in the most mountainous part of South Africa. It is bounded on the north and west by the Orange Free State, on the east by Natal, and on the south by the Cape Province. Its area is 11,716 square miles, and is roughly the size of Belgium. The whole territory is very mountainous, the most accessible parts being those bordering on the Orange Free State. The eastern border overlooking Natal is comprised of the main range of the Drakensberg Mountains and consists of sheer precipices with very narrow and steep passes here and there. The northern boundary dividing the territory from the Orange Free State is the Caledon river, and the western boundary is demarcated mainly by a wire fence. The Census of 1911 showed a population of 404,507, of whom 1,896 were Europeans. Out of this population 320 European males and 38,976 native or coloured males were between the ages of 20 and 40. There would be a slight increase in the number of native males of that age at the outbreak of war in August 1914.

Immediately on the outbreak of war, the Paramount Chief, on behalf of the nation, sent expressions of loyalty and devotion to His Majesty the King. This loyalty was proved later by the monetary contributions from the nation referred to below. At first, owing to a natural failure to realize such great and complex events, most of the chiefs and headmen could not follow exactly the reasons for the declaration of war or the courses of the various campaigns. Even later, when the main facts of the struggle became clearer, it was too much to expect of the Basuto tribes that they should understand—as we understood—the great effort made by the whole Empire in men and material. The leading native paper, *Leselinyana*, controlled by members of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, published week by week the most important happenings, and this intelligence was read with interest by those who were able to do so. If it must be admitted that the attitude of the natives was generally apathetic, this should not by any means be ascribed to feelings of disloyalty, which certainly did not exist, but to a perfectly excusable failure to grasp the situation.

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It must be remembered that very few of the natives have even seen the sea, and Johannesburg or Kimberley is to them a very large town. During the Rebellion in the Union the attitude of the chiefs and natives was very good, and the territory remained quiet during that time.

On the outbreak of war, as the territory is bounded on all sides by the Union of South Africa, no measures were taken for local defence. On the outbreak of the Rebellion steps were taken to guard any ammunition stores and magazines, and frequent patrols were sent along the Orange Free State border, but the scene of activities never came close enough to the Basutoland border to cause any undue uneasiness. During the trouble with the Hlubis in East Griqualand, the Chief Makaola, brother of the Paramount Chief, and Chief of Qacha's Nek District, was prepared to prevent any similar trouble and discontent spreading over the border into Basutoland. There were a few enemy subjects in Basutoland at the outbreak of the war. Most of these were members of the Roman Catholic Mission, the majority of them being women, and it was found reasonable to allow them to remain on the Mission premises, with the exception of one German priest, who was interned at Pietermaritzburg, and a German brother, who was repatriated to Germany after the Armistice.

War legislation was very sparse. Only about seven Proclamations in all were issued, dealing with the usual matters, censorship of news, trading with the enemy, and so forth.

In the circumstances of the Territory it was not practicable to render direct military aid, but a creditable number of individuals volunteered for active service, and certain native labour companies were raised. The Civil Service Establishment of Basutoland comprises 94, including hospital nurses. Of these 32 men and 3 ladies went on active service. All the Civil Servants of military age volunteered for service, but it was, of course, impossible to release all of them. Ten out of 13 Police Officers were released. One hundred and thirty European inhabitants, apart from officials, went on active service.

In 1916 it was decided to raise a company of Basuto to go to France with the South African Native Labour Corps. Five hundred natives volunteered and two Basutoland officers went with them. During 1917 it was decided to raise as many

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native companies as possible. The matter was discussed in the National Council, and the chiefs agreed to the project, but did not show any energy over the recruiting of the companies. It was left to the natives themselves to decide whether they would like to go or not, and they received little or no encouragement from the chiefs. In all 1,397 natives were recruited. They consisted chiefly of men who had passed through the native schools and were anxious to see something of the world, as well as to express their loyalty by acts. These men signed on for twelve months. They did very good work in France, chiefly at bases loading and unloading ammunition and material.

The following casualties were incurred by Europeans :

Killed or Died	*Invalided*	*Wounded*	*Wounded and Prisoners*	*Prisoners*
19	8	20	2	2

and the following distinctions were gained :

1 C.B.E.	1 D.S.O.	5 M.C.'s.	1 bar to M.C.
1 D.C.M.	1 M.M.	1 M.S.M. (native).	
2 M.B.E.'s.	2 Croix de Guerre.	1 Legion of Honour.	

The total contributions of money recorded amounted to £71,981 7*s.* 9*d.*, made up as follows :

	£	*s.*	*d.*
(*a*) Contributions by the nation towards the War, part of which was spent in buying aeroplanes . . .	50,026	10	11
(*b*) Contributions by the nation for War Relief Funds . .	2,861	3	7
(*c*) Contributions by Europeans for War Relief Funds . .	19,093	13	3
	71,981	7	9

Apart from the above, considerable sums were sent by Europeans to various Relief Funds, Comforts Funds, &c., of which there is no record. The European ladies of the Territory worked during the whole war in making socks, shirts, and other comforts for the troops. Two ladies were appointed Members of the Order of the British Empire for these services.

During the war the Administration was carried on with a greatly depleted staff. After the Armistice officers returned to duty, and the staff was again brought up to strength. Politically the war made no change and, but for the increased cost of living, the effect of the war was hardly appreciable.

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THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE

The territory of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, over which a British Protectorate was proclaimed in 1885, is bounded on the south and south-east by the Union of South Africa, on the north-east by Southern Rhodesia, on the north by the Zambezi and Chobe rivers, and on the west by what was German South-West Africa. It has never been surveyed as a whole, but its area is estimated at 275,000 square miles, not far short of the combined area of Norway and Sweden. Its mean altitude is about 3,300 feet. Immediately north of the Chobe river is a narrow strip of land known as the Caprivi Zipfel, stretching from the junction of the Chobe and Zambezi, at Kazungula, westwards to what was German South-West Africa: at the beginning of the war the Caprivi Zipfel was German territory, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate was therefore open to attack on the whole length of its northern and western boundaries.

The population, according to the Census of 1911, was 125,350, made up as follows:

European or White . . .	1,692
Coloured	355
Aboriginal Natives . . .	123,303
Total . .	125,350

The European or White population consists chiefly of farmers and traders; the former operating in those areas of the Bechuanaland Protectorate which are known as the Lobatsi, Gaberone's and Tuli Blocks of farms (on the south-eastern boundary of the territory) and in the Tati and Ghanzi districts (on the eastern and western boundaries respectively). The traders are scattered about the territory, mostly at the larger native villages, and the more important stations on the single line of railway (403 miles in length) running through the territory, being a section of the proposed Cape to Cairo railway line. Owing to scarcity of water in the Kalahari or western portion of the territory, the native population is concentrated on the south-eastern border, at places along and within easy reach of the railway, and also on the banks of the large rivers to the north and east of Lake Ngami. It is chiefly made up of

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Bechuaña tribes and remnants of former tribes. The principal chiefs, at the outbreak of hostilities, were :

Khama, Chief of the Bamangwato, whose chief village, Serowe, was the largest in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Sechele II (son of Sebele), Chief of the Bakwena, at Molepolole.

Gaseitsiwe II (son of Bathoen), Chief of the Bangwaketse at Kanye.

Mathiba Moremi, Chief of the Batawana, at Tsau, about 50 miles north of Lake Ngami.

Linchwe, Chief of the Bakgatla, at Mochudi.

Baitlotle Ikaneng, acting Chief of the Bamalete, at Ramoutsa.

The 1911 Census figures for the respective tribes were :

Bamangwato	34,886
Bangwaketse	18,098
Bakwena	13,103
Batawana	11,074
Bakgatla	10,706
Bakhurutse and Makalakas	7,228
Bamalete	4,462
Barolong	4,033
Bakalahari	10,155
Various	9,558
Total	123,303

The principal villages were :

	(*Estimated population*)
Serowe (Bamangwato)	25,000
Kanye (Bangwaketse)	12,000
Molepolole (Bakwena)	9,000
Maun (Batawana)	5,000
Mochudi (Bakgatla)	8,000
Ramoutsa (Bamalete)	3,500

Immediately the Chief Khama heard of the outbreak of hostilities, he telegraphed to the Resident Commissioner, asking that an expression of his deepest sympathy should be conveyed to His Majesty the King, as also an expression of the continued loyalty of himself and his people, and his willingness to assist in any way. The other chiefs also sent loyal and sympathetic messages. As soon as it could be done, the Resident Commissioner held, at head-quarters, a meeting of the various Protectorate chiefs, for the purpose of explaining to them the

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causes of the war and the position in relation thereto: they again all made earnest protestations of loyalty, expressed their desire to help in any way, and asked the Resident Commissioner to convey, through the High Commissioner, to His Majesty the King an expression of the heartfelt and grateful loyalty of themselves and their people. Their attitude, from the beginning of the war to its conclusion, was one of unswerving loyalty to the British Throne.

There was no military force in the Bechuanaland Protectorate when war broke out in 1914, in fact the territory had for years past enjoyed the benefit of the general security afforded by the presence of the Imperial garrison in South Africa, but, for the maintenance of law and order there was in the territory a force known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, numbering 134, and consisting of

Europeans

Officers	14	
Warrant Officers	3	
Non-commissioned Officers	28	
Men	26	
	—	71

Natives

Non-commissioned Officers	13	
Men	50	
	—	63
Total		134

and in addition there were 100 Bechuana messengers.

The police were stationed in small detachments at various places in the territory; the force, small as it already was, was further reduced through a number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men proceeding to the front, and it ultimately became necessary, in the interests of the public service, to legislate against members of the force retiring from it, notwithstanding that the period of their engagement had expired, unless expressly authorized by the Resident Commissioner, in writing, to do so. Those who had no option but to remain in the territory were loyally assisted by the native chiefs in maintaining order and guarding the northern and western borders, and also the south-eastern border during the rebellion.

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At one time, when the Imperial garrison had been withdrawn from South Africa and an invasion of the southern district of the Bechuanaland Protectorate by rebels from the Transvaal appeared imminent, the Chief Linchwe furnished 20 men for patrol work with the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police on the Transvaal border, and he and Gaberone (the aged chief of a section of the Batlokwa tribe) kept the authorities well informed; Baitlotle, the acting chief of the Bamalete, on receipt, in the dead of night, of a warning message from the Assistant Commissioner at Gaberone's, immediately summoned up his men and ordered detachments to proceed with all speed to guard railway bridges and culverts in his reserve, and it is gratifying to record that these men were at their respective posts before dawn. Meanwhile a detachment of the Kimberley Regiment was being rushed up by rail from the south and reinforced the Protectorate Police at Lobatsi, Ramoutsa, and Gaberone's, also relieving Baitlotle's men at Metsimacwaane railway bridge. The territory, however, was not invaded on this occasion.

The Resident Magistrate of Ngamiland and the few police under him were also loyally assisted by the Chief Mathiba and his people in putting their head-quarters in a state of defence in anticipation of an attack, and in patrolling the northern and western borders of the territory under difficult circumstances; it is interesting to note that some of the men on duty on the western border were mounted on oxen, which, for work in heavy sand and long stretches of thirst, do better than horses.

On the 9th of November 1914 a detachment of Germans raided the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police out-station at Kwanganae, about 27 miles from Rietfontein on the border of South-West Africa: the non-commissioned officer in charge of this out-station was away on patrol at the time, but the enemy killed one messenger, slightly wounded another, and set fire to these messengers' huts.

At the end of December 1914 a party of 13 rebels under one Jack Pienaar succeeded in crossing from the Transvaal into the Bamalete Reserve: a detachment of the Bechuanaland Rifles was sent from Mafeking to Ramoutsa to assist the Protectorate Police in their endeavour to intercept them, but the rebels moving rapidly in a south-westerly direction, with the evident intention of striking the Molopo west of Mafeking, crossed into

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the Bangwaketse Reserve; a detachment of motor-cars left Lobatsi to try and intercept them, but a shortage of petrol brought them to a standstill. Meanwhile, the Chief Gaseitsiwe had taken the field with as many of his men as he could mount and came within sight of the rebels in the south-eastern portion of the Bangwaketse Reserve. Pienaar, swerving to avoid him, fell into the hands of Commandant du Plessis, of the Union Defence Force, to whom he and 11 rebels surrendered without a shot being fired. The thirteenth man, seeing that capture was inevitable, rode away undetected, and two or three days later was taken prisoner by one of Gaseitsiwe's men, who handed him over to the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police at Pitsane on the Molopo, 40 miles west of Mafeking.

These were the only two occasions on which the territory was invaded.

There were no German and Austrian officer reservists in the territory when war broke out. There were a few of the rank and file, however, and one of them, an unemployed young German, who had been heard abusing the English and boasting of his intimate knowledge of the Kalahari Desert, was arrested at once and sent to an internment camp in the Union; the others were kept under supervision and instructed to report periodically to the nearest magistrate or police officer; no action was taken against any of them until the beginning of November 1914, when it was decided to intern them; a composite coach (1st and 2nd Class) was accordingly attached to a mail train due to pass through the Bechuanaland Protectorate on the 11–12th of that month, and 1 Austrian and 8 Germans were conveyed in it to the Internment Camp at Pietermaritzburg, the escort consisting of 1 European officer and 6 European non-commissioned officers and men of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police. An Austrian subject from Ngamiland was subsequently sent to the Pietermaritzburg camp, bringing the total to 11. There were no enemy subjects of other nationalities in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

War legislation was on the same general lines as elsewhere. Twenty-three proclamations were issued during the war and in connexion with it, the two earliest being measures to restrict the export of food-stuffs and of warlike stores. Two were concerned with the occupied territory which adjoined the Protectorate.

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As already stated, there was no military force in the Bechuanaland Protectorate when war broke out; no such force was subsequently raised, and it was therefore not possible to render any direct military aid, but all officials and police who could be spared were released for active service, and the administration gave every assistance to civilian inhabitants of the territory who desired to join His Majesty's Forces. It should be placed on record also that the Civil Service branch of the Administration rendered valuable assistance in many ways, such as recruiting for the South African Native Labour Contingent, thus setting Europeans free for the firing line, and maintaining peace and order within the borders of the territory, thereby avoiding the necessity for any armed force being kept back which could be spared from South Africa. The total number of commissioned officers and officials on the establishment at the commencement of hostilities was 35; all who were of military age volunteered for active service, but, in the interests of the public service, it was not possible to allow more than 9 to go. In addition to them, 16 of the rank and file of the police proceeded to the front, bringing the total to 25. The number of European inhabitants (not officials) who volunteered and actually proceeded to the front was 72.

The natives were at first somewhat timid when approached on the subject of supplying a company for service overseas with the South African Native Labour Contingent, but their chiefs rose to the occasion, and the call was so readily answered that many had to be returned to their homes. Some of them subsequently found their way to the gold and diamond mines, and when it was decided, at a later period of the war, to send more natives overseas, the number who came forward was somewhat disappointing, the majority of those who were still in the territory being required to plough and reap for the families of the men who had gone away, and for aged and disabled people, to look after cattle in these cases as well as after their own—a matter of no mean importance when the surface waters dry up and water-holes have to be sunk in the sandy beds of rivers—and, in short, 'to keep the home fires burning'. Altogether 555 natives were attested for overseas with the South African Native Labour Contingent, viz.

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From various small tribes in the Northern Protectorate	70
Bakwena	74
Bangwaketse	203
Bakgatla	127
Bamalete	49
Batlokwa	32
Total	555

It should be mentioned also that a large number of natives were required by the South African railways for the extension of the railway line from Prieska to what was then German South-West Africa, and in connexion with the railway within that territory. For those purposes the Chief Linchwe supplied 312 Bakgatla, and the Chief Baitlotle 93 Bamalete, making a combined total of 405. The number of Bechuanaland Protectorate natives who proceeded to German East Africa was 21, viz. 5 Bamalete and 16 men from the Francistown district. The total number of natives who proceeded from the Bechuanaland Protectorate to various theatres of war was therefore 981. An officer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police was for some time attached to the Overseas Native Labour Contingent, and two civilian residents of the territory, who had a knowledge of the Bechuana language, were given commissions in that Corps.

The casualties among the Europeans were, of the members of the Protectorate service, 3 rank and file killed, 1 officer and 2 rank and file wounded, 1 rank and file missing; of civilians, 2 officers and 4 rank and file killed or died, 1 officer and 1 rank and file wounded. One native was killed and one was wounded. The following distinctions were won:

Officials

1 D.S.O.
1 M.B.E.
2 Mentioned in Dispatches.

Civilians

2 M.C.'s.
2 D.C.M.'s.
1 M.M.
1 M.S.M.
3 M.B.E.
1 Legion of Honour.
2 Mentioned in Dispatches.

The following is the amount of the native and European

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contributions which were received and dealt with by the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration :

	£	s.	d.
Native contributions	3,967	18	7
European contributions	6,060	2	7
	10,028	1	2

The natives subscribed as under :

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Bamangwato (Chief Khama)	1,642	13	9			
Bakgatla (Chief Linchwe)	758	2	0			
Bangwaketse (Chief and Acting Chiefs)	716	13	7			
Batawana (Chief Mathiba)	545	5	9			
Damara (Chief Nicodemus)	305	0	0			
Miscellaneous amount	0	3	6			
				3,967	18	7

Details of contributions by European communities :

	£	s.	d.			
Francistown	2,516	9	6			
Gaberone's	255	11	11			
Palapye Road	168	4	6			
Mochudi	183	10	0			
Molepolole	174	14	6			
Ngamiland	548	14	6			
Serowe	1,013	9	6			
Lobatsi	578	8	11			
Kanye	92	8	6			
Kazungula	64	9	6			
Mafeking	148	11	11			
Miscellaneous	315	9	4			
				6,060	2	7
				10,028	1	2

The disbursements were as follows :

	£	s.	d.
Prince of Wales's Fund	1,810	0	9
Royal Red Cross	3,809	11	2
Army and Navy Families Association	40	0	0
Belgian Relief Society	386	17	5
Overseas Tobacco Fund	112	8	0
Vegetable Products Committee	25	17	0
Prisoners of War Bread Fund	64	16	0
Tipperary League	3	0	0
R.S.P.C.A. (Wounded Horses)	5	0	0
Blue Cross Society	4	0	0
Y.M.C.A. War Work	204	5	11
Star and Garter Fund	75	2	10
St. Dunstan's Home	532	8	9
National Institute for the Blind	37	0	0

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Royal Patriotic Corporation, British Soldiers' and Sailors' Widows and Orphans	412	2	0
Mercantile Marine Service Association	30	0	0
Sir F. Milner's Home	10	0	0
Dr. Barnardo's Homes	5	0	0
Mine Sweepers' Fund	14	10	0
Lord Roberts' Memorial Workshops	100	2	0
Lady Carson's Fund	5	0	0
South African Gifts and Comforts	94	14	0
South African Red Cross	243	16	6
Governor General's Fund	834	18	11
Russian Jewish War Fund	23	10	6
Matabele Central War Fund	175	8	6
Roberts' Heights Hospital	61	9	0
Sailors' Hostel (Lady Buxton)	478	15	0
White Cross League	80	0	0
Materials for Protectorate Aid Corps	12	0	5
Francistown and District Returned Soldiers' Relief Fund (Amount held on fixed deposit)	281	0	0
Balance	55	6	6
	10,028	1	2

Owing to its geographical position the Bechuanaland Protectorate did not, except at Kwanganae, on its western border, experience any of the horrors of war which unfortunately befell other countries, while from the financial point of view the territory may be said to have benefited through the war. Like other parts of South Africa, however, after the war it felt some of the bad effects of the war, especially as regards the increased cost of labour, food-stuffs, and other necessaries of life. On the other hand, it is fair to assume that the experience gained by the natives who joined the Overseas South African Labour Contingent will be a very great benefit to them: the principles of discipline have been drilled into them, contact with higher civilization has broadened their minds, and, as is natural with natives, their experiences will, for years to come, be discussed by them with their sons and friends—which cannot fail to result in a general improvement of the conditions under which they live.

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SWAZILAND

Swaziland is bounded on the west, north, and south by the Transvaal, and on the east by Zululand and the Portuguese province of Mozambique. Its area is 6,678 square miles, being considerably smaller than Wales. The main road from Lourenco Marques, through Swaziland, would no doubt have afforded advantages for an attack on the Union, had the Germans been in a position at any time to land troops. It is probably more than a coincidence that the German Consul-General in Johannesburg paid the territory a visit shortly before the outbreak of war and obtained all information as to routes, population, &c. As things were, however, Swaziland came in no way into direct touch with the war. The European population is small, amounting in 1914 approximately to 1,200. About 400 were adult males, the larger proportion of whom were of Dutch descent. The natives numbered a little over 100,000, of whom approximately 20,000 were adult males. The Swazis were a homogeneous tribe under a Chieftainess Regent, the Paramount Chief Elect still being a minor. On the outbreak of the war the chiefs affirmed their loyalty to His Majesty, and their attitude, and that of the people, remained consistent throughout. As time went on they evinced little interest in the war, the eventual defeat of the Central Powers being accepted as a matter of course.

Rifle clubs existed in the various districts and were utilized in taking measures for local defence. The Europeans were supplied with arms and ammunition and undertook to give local service if called upon. In the early days of the South African Rebellion, before it became clear that Swaziland would be outside the scope of operations, members of the rifle club at Mbabane, the head-quarters of the Administration, voluntarily underwent mounted drill, providing their own horses, in order to meet any eventuality. While the Government at no time had any reason to fear a native rising, the fact of being armed and of belonging to an organization easily mobilized gave to the more isolated sections of the European community a feeling of security which might otherwise have been absent. No enemy subjects were interned in the territory. A few came over the border from the Transvaal or from Portuguese Territory. These were sent for internment into

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NABOTSIBENI, Chieftainess Regent of Swaziland,

WITH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

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European inhabitants (not officials) who volunteered was 118. Through the good offices of Major A. M. Miller, D.S.O., O.B.E., late R.A.F., a number, both of officials and others, were enabled to join what was then the Royal Flying Corps.

When natives were required for war work in France, efforts were made to induce the Swazis to volunteer. These efforts were unsuccessful, as only 67 were obtained, and the great proportion of them were of the servant class, house and stable boys, &c. The raw natives said they would fight for the King against other natives, but they feared the sea and they did not wish to take part in a war between white men. Captain (later Lieut.-Col.) C. R. I. Ross Garner went in charge of the Swaziland and Bechuanaland Protectorate contingents. The Swazi Contingent returned after a year's work, well pleased with their treatment. Further efforts were made to raise another contingent, but instructions were received to discontinue recruiting owing to the decision of the Home Government not to continue this class of labour.

The casualties were :

Killed and died . . .	14
Wounded	9

and the following awards were made for war service :

Name.	*Award.*	*Theatre of War.*
Lieutenant R. B. Lovemore	D.S.O.	France.
Major M. W. Whitridge	D.S.O.	German East Africa.
Captain B. Nicholson, D.S.O.	M.C.	South-West Africa.
Lieutenant C. Glen Leary	,,	France.
Captain L. A. Payne	,,	,,
Lieutenant E. Lewell	,,	,,
Captain W. C. Wilks	,,	,,
Captain C. J. Murphy	,,	,,
Captain C. C. Taylor	,,	,,
Lieutenant D. M. Miller	D.F.C.	,,
Lieutenant N. Lovemore	A.F.C.	,,
Captain E. Robinson	Italian Silver Medal for Valour	German East Africa.
Mrs. Isabella M. Blanshard	M.B.E.	

In addition there should be mentioned the name of Major A. M. Miller, late R.A.F., who, though he was not resident in Swaziland at the outbreak of war, had his home there. He was awarded the D.S.O. and the O.B.E.

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Contributions of Europeans and Natives

(i) *Swaziland War Relief Fund.* This fund was inaugurated at the beginning of hostilities, and had for its object relief of distress caused by the war, or to render financial or other assistance to persons who had volunteered and served during the war, or to their relatives or dependants wherever resident. Generous responses were made to the appeal issued, and in consequence of numerous entertainments, &c., a substantial sum was collected and partly distributed. In January 1920 there was still in hand a balance of £3,825, held in trust for final distribution. In addition to the above, the following contributions to special funds were made by the residents of Swaziland:

	£
Prince of Wales's Fund	230
Red Cross Fund	239
St. Dunstan's Hostel	170
The Belgian Widows' and Orphans' Fund	415
Governor-General's Fund	293
Royal Flying Corps Hospital	87
Overseas Club Tobacco Fund	22
British and Foreign Sailors' Society	16
Christmas Gifts, Comforts, &c., for Swazilanders on Active Service	220
German South-West Africa Equipment Fund	1,060
Other contributions, of which there is no record (about)	300
	3,052

(ii) *Swazi Natives War Fund.* The Chieftainess Regent, with the principal chiefs, voluntarily suggested that they should raise a fund from the natives of Swaziland, as a contribution to the war. This fund was raised without Government assistance, and resulted in a total contribution of £3,000, which was sent to the King, and was, by His Majesty's command, devoted to the purchase of two aeroplanes for the R.A.F. The native police and the native labourers of the tin mines also contributed to the War Relief Fund.

(iii) *Women's War Work.* Ladies of Swaziland formed working parties and were indefatigable in supplying comforts to the troops. In addition, by sales of work, &c., a sum of £700 was raised to be distributed in relieving hardship resulting from the war.

In common with the rise elsewhere there was a rise in the prices of food-stuffs and other commodities. The cost of living increased considerably, but in other respects the war did not

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the Union. No action was found necessary with regard to the very few enemy subjects, missionaries, residing in Swaziland. War legislation was embodied in 26 Proclamations issued in the course of the war.

Almost every man of British birth or descent, eligible for military service, desired to volunteer. A good many of them were officials who could not be spared, and in any case it was not considered right that a territory in the position of Swaziland should be unduly depleted of its few potential defenders. While this was the case from a Government point of view, the only object in the minds of would-be volunteers was to get to the front. The late Captain R. Clarke-Perkins, D.S.O., called a meeting, with the Commissioner's permission, and it was then decided to raise a fund for the equipment of a troop of horse to serve in South-West Africa as a part of the Imperial Light Horse. Thirty-one men under Captain Nicholson, D.S.O., M.C. (afterwards Government Secretary), were accepted for service and did duty as a Swaziland troop of their regiment, through the Rebellion and through the South-West campaign. On the conquest of South-West Africa, most of the troops volunteered for service elsewhere. Altogether during the war Swaziland contributed in personnel 47 officers, 91 other ranks, 1 nursing sister, and 1 to the Voluntary Aid Department. The following schedule shows the areas in which they fought. Many served in several campaigns.

SCHEDULE

	S.A. Rebellion.	*German South-West Africa.*	*German East Africa.*	*Europe.*	*Mesopotamia.*	*Egypt and Palestine.*
Officers . .	1	24	12	39	5	2
Other Ranks	2	43	41	39	–	3
Total . .	3	67	53	78	5	5

A good many of the Dutch section of the white community also volunteered and did good service. Owing to the necessity of carrying on the Government, only 22 officials could be allowed to go. Several were permitted to resign in order to join up, and on their return after the war were reinstated. During their absence they were replaced by temporarily employed men ineligible for military service. The number of

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In common with the rise elsewhere there was a rise in the prices of food-stuffs and other commodities. The cost of living increased considerably, but in other respects the war did not

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affect general conditions in the territory. There was a small increase in the number of immigrants, land increased in value, and, apart from the rise in prices, no hardships were suffered by any class of the community, white or black. Taxation remained practically as it was before the war except for Customs duties, in which there were increases, and except for a tax on excess profits of mining during the war. Development was necessarily retarded, especially in mining, owing to the absence of facilities for obtaining capital. The natives were affected to the extent that articles of native trade such as blankets and beads went up largely in price, and they had also to pay more for the food-stuffs (mostly maize) which they purchased. They grow a large proportion of their food, however, and work was at all times easily obtainable.

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SECTION III

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

CHAPTER I

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

By the Editor

In the chronicle of The Empire at War, South Africa and the South Africans hold a unique place. Alone among the self-governing Dominions, the Union of South Africa had the Germans at close quarters on its border. Alone among the self-governing peoples of the Overseas Empire, the South Africans did much fighting on their own continent, not merely at their own doors but also elsewhere in Africa. The Union of South Africa was the only self-governing Dominion in which foreign war was supplemented by internal rising. It was the only self-governing Dominion in which the people, white and coloured, were led on the path of co-operation by men not of British race and, a few years back, not British citizens.

Even in normal times the Union of South Africa stood quite apart from the other self-governing Dominions. Like Canada, it had the dual white race, with all the complications which duality involves, but intensified by the memory of a war still fresh in mind. It had also, what Canada had not, a native population far outnumbering the whites; an immigrant East Indian element, not to be paralleled in the other Dominions; acute labour problems, but not, in the same sense as elsewhere, a labour democracy. The self-governing Dominion, again, did not in South Africa include the whole British field. Side by side with the area covered by self-government were a native Crown Colony and native Protectorates, still under the Mother Country's control; and under her ultimate control, with the intermediary of a chartered company, was Rhodesia, a home for white settlers as well as natives, in a political as

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well as a geographical sense approximating to the self-governing Union.

Such was South Africa in normal times, but the times immediately preceding the war were not normal. Twelve years had passed from the date of the Vereeniging treaty, when the Great War came; four years from the birth of the Union, rather less from the date when its first Parliament was opened. That Parliament was still in existence, but was growing old, an election for a new House of Assembly being due in the autumn of 1915. A new Governor-General had been appointed and was shortly expected. For a full two years past the conditions of South Africa had been exceptionally complex and dangerous. There had been a political rupture, the seeds of which were in the racial feud. There had been white labour riots, with a fringe of native trouble, which threatened the whole life of the community. The supremely difficult East Indian immigrant problem attained the zenith of its difficulty. The general situation had been saved, partly by the personal and political courage of the responsible ministers, largely by the fact that the various elements of discord tended rather to counteract than to reinforce each other.

The Union of South Africa, as its name implies, was framed, most wisely, as a Union not a federation. The central legislature is practically omnipotent over the four contracting provinces. South Africa stood in this respect at the opposite pole from Australia, where the federating States retained in their own hands extensive powers. It was well that South Africans took this course, for there was more divergent feeling between the constituent members of the South African Union than between those of the Australian Commonwealth. A large part of the Orange Free State, in particular, was instinct with Boer nationalist sentiment. Except at Jagersfontein and Koffyfontein, outposts of the Diamond Fields, the province had ever been in the main a purely pastoral and agricultural state, not leavened with any such disturbing and modernizing alien element as the gold mines of the Rand had attracted to the Transvaal. In the towns the large majority of the trading and professional element and of the skilled artisans were whole-hearted for the Union and the Empire: outside the towns, in some districts, such as the Caledon Valley, the loyalty of British settlers to some extent leavened Boer nationalism.

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But, taken as a whole, the countryside of the province, with its Dutch farming population, was a fruitful field wherein to revive the bitterness of the past.

Deservedly honoured among his own people for unshaken steadfastness to the cause of his country's independence, broken in health and half blind, Ex-President Steyn survived the beginning of a far greater war than that in which he had played his stern and stubborn part. As Vice-President of the South African Convention, he had co-operated in the creation of the Union, but otherwise he held aloof from active politics, outwardly quiescent but never reconciled. His mantle fell upon Mr. Hertzog, who had been a Free State judge, and in the South African war a Free State general. He had been one of the signatories of the Vereeniging treaty and, like Steyn, one of the fathers of the Union of South Africa. But, notwithstanding the fact that he had taken a prominent part in the negotiations which ended the Anglo-Boer war, he was an able and aggressive exponent of Boer nationalism, and an avowed advocate of two separate nationalities in South Africa, of a two-stream policy, to quote his own simile. Joining the first Cabinet of the Union, under General Botha's leadership, as Minister of Justice, in two years' time, by his public utterances, he caused a Cabinet crisis. General Botha resigned in consequence, and on the 20th of December 1912 returned to power with a reconstituted ministry, from which Mr. Hertzog was excluded. From that date onward, in Parliament and out of it, he led a following of dissentient Boers, the majority of whom were Free Staters. At a congress of the South African party, in other words the Dutch party, held in November 1913, there was in effect a trial of strength between his own section and the Ministerialists, with the result that he and his adherents, including General de Wet, openly seceded, and in the following January constituted themselves a new political party.

The leader of the British party, when the Union was formed, was Sir Starr Jameson. No man had done more to achieve the Union, as anxious to reconcile the two nationalities as Hertzog was to keep them apart. He led the Opposition in the Union Parliament on temperate, constitutional lines, till 1912, when his health gave way, and one of the best-loved and most attractive personalities in South African politics passed

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from the scene. His successor was Sir Thomas Smartt, an Irishman, who had held office in the Parliament of the Cape Colony, first under Gordon Sprigg and subsequently under Jameson himself. Though British in all ways, by birth, education and instinct, Mr. Merriman, the last Premier of the Cape Colony prior to the Union, had been allied to the Dutch not to the British side, for he had been a vigorous and outspoken opponent of the South African war. He took his own line as a free lance in South African politics; on the formation of the Union the Dutch preferred to be led by a man of their own race, and he abstained from taking office in General Botha's Ministry. But he stood firm for reconciliation of the two races, and had no lot or part in organizing or leading the nationalist movement.

The Prime Minister in 1914 will always stand out in history. General Botha was now 52 years of age. He had been born in Natal under the British flag, but his home had been outside Natal, though on its borders, in the Vryheid district of the Transvaal, carved out of Zululand. As a member of the Transvaal Volksraad before the South African war, he had not seen eye to eye with President Kruger and he had none of the narrowness of the old-time Boer. The war had proved him to be as conspicuous for patriotism as for military skill; but it had shown him also to be a leader at once chivalrous and sane, who fought a losing cause without himself losing either heart or head, and who fought it as a cause with a future, not to be weighted with a record of unworthy fighting or purposeless bloodshed. After the war, when the Transvaal was made a self-governing colony, he became its first and only Premier; and from leading the Transvaal he went on to lead South Africa, owing much to high character and personal magnetism. His chief colleague and unswerving supporter, General Smuts, was a younger man, 44 years old in 1914. He, like Hertzog, had been born in the Cape Colony, but went to Johannesburg in 1896 to follow up his career as a barrister; and he was State Attorney, principal legal adviser of the Transvaal Government, at the time of the South African war. He was the only leading man in active politics on the Boer side who had had a University training in England, having graduated at Cambridge with first-class honours. Skilled in law, when the South African war came, he showed no less

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

GENERAL BOTHA

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GENERAL SMUTS

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aptitude for soldiering, and stood in the front rank among the Boer guerrilla leaders, able in after years to tell to his British opponents, in Othello's words,

> Of moving accidents by flood and field,
> Of hair-breadth 'scapes.

In strength of intellect, as his public speeches have abundantly shown, he had no equal among his countrymen in South Africa. In the Transvaal and in the Union he worked hand in hand with Botha; and, supplementing each other in a singular degree, the two men combined were the driving force of South Africa.

The Union of South Africa had been achieved by co-operation between the leaders of the two rival white races. Complete reconciliation was still far to seek; but as long as Botha and Smuts held the reins of power, the race feud was not all-absorbing, and meanwhile a cross current of class antagonism gathered strength. Labour disputes, of the gravest kind, marked the year 1913 and the early months of 1914. There was a miners' strike in the Transvaal in May 1913. A mass meeting of miners was held in the middle of June; in the first days of July there was a gathering in the market-place at Johannesburg, heavy rioting, and loss of life; the Prime Minister and Smuts intervened at no little personal risk; a commission of two Transvaal judges was appointed to inquire into the causes of the disorder; all through July the position was serious, and a general strike of white labour throughout South Africa was threatened. But at the very end of the month concessions which, when previously offered by the mine-owners, had been rejected by the Federated Unions, were accepted, and for the moment the danger passed away. One of the most awkward features of the crisis was that the British forces in South Africa were requisitioned to keep the peace, not far short of 3,000 troops of the Line being employed on the Rand from the time when the trouble first became serious until the beginning of August. There were three or four months of comparative peace and then, in the early days of January 1914, Labour was in arms again—this time directly against the Union Government. In the course of retrenchment, some employees on the Government railways had been dismissed; on the 7th of January the railway men's Union threatened a strike, and two days later put their threat into

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effect. In support of the railway men, the Trades Federation threatened a general strike of white labour, and definitely proclaimed it on the 13th of January. It was a white man's quarrel, though it looked for a moment as if coloured labour would be drawn in, for there was trouble with Basuto workmen at the Jagersfontein mine, troops were brought up, and some natives were killed and wounded. But the Government stood firm, and they had behind them the backing of the general public. White labour in South Africa was, and is, less of a national force, more of a privileged class, than in most other lands. A narrow basis for the trade organizations was coupled with extreme views, uncongenial alike to the conservative Boer and to the sober-minded elements in the British community. Moreover, the new Citizen Defence Force, though still in its infancy, was now organized and more nearly efficient than it had been in the previous year; it could cope with the situation without the aid of Imperial troops. The force was called out in certain districts of the Union, especially on the Rand and in Bloemfontein, until some 60,000 men were under arms; 20,000 fighting citizens were mobilized on the Rand; martial law was proclaimed; and a committee of Public Safety was formed at Johannesburg, always the main focus of industrial unrest. Here the strikers barricaded the Trades Hall, in order to prevent the arrest of their leaders; but when guns were brought upon the scene they capitulated, and on the 21st of January the strike collapsed, having had a short, though most strenuous, life.

There was a general arrest of the Labour leaders, and the Government took the strong measure, secretly and swiftly, of placing nine of the foremost men on board ship at Durban and deporting them to England; while among those who remained behind, Creswell, then and now a member of the Legislature, was fined and sentenced to a month's imprisonment, the sentence being subsequently remitted. The deportation was outside the law and, when the Union Parliament met on the 30th of January, it was necessary for the Government to procure the passing of an Indemnity Bill, which was not carried without strong challenge of their action, by Merriman in particular. They were criticized also outside South Africa, for, from a political point of view, the most important feature in these South African labour troubles was

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that they tended to cause friction between the self-governing Dominion and the Mother Country. The use of Imperial troops to quell a South African labour dispute had already been called in question, and the deportation caused much excitement in Labour circles in the United Kingdom. While the nine were on their enforced voyage to England, their case was raised in the House of Commons, the Home Government being pressed to advise the Crown to refuse assent to the Indemnity Act, when passed. Mr. Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wisely refused to interfere with the discretion of the government of a self-governing Dominion; but none the less the deportees, upon their arrival in England, were treated by sympathetic members of the British Labour Party as heroes and martyrs and were made the subject of a Sunday demonstration in Hyde Park. The war came as a timely peace-maker in this awkward dispute. On the 10th of September General Botha announced in the House of Assembly that, with a view to removing all grounds of discord at a critical time, the nine exiles would be allowed to return to South Africa.

Side by side with these industrial disturbances was the perennial Asiatic difficulty, dating from times before the South African war. Here again was a question which involved more than purely South African issues and threatened the good relations between the Union and India. In June 1913 a consolidating and amending Immigrants' Regulation Act was passed, intended to be the last word on the controversy, but it left the East Indians in South Africa labouring under a sense of grievances unredressed and expectations not fulfilled. They adopted an attitude of passive resistance; in the autumn, in defiance of the law, they organized a march from Natal into the Transvaal; they were turned back and their leader, Gandhi, was put into prison. The Asiatic population in Natal numbered at the 1911 Census over 133,000, considerably exceeding the number of white citizens of the province; and, following the lead given them by white labour, they went out on strike in all directions, at the collieries, on the sugar plantations, at the port of Durban. There were collisions with the police and many arrests. Soon the jails of Natal were overflowing with East Indian prisoners. In 1911, as a practical protest against the treatment which had been meted out in South Africa to the Indian subjects of the King-Emperor, the

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Government of India had prohibited any further emigration from India to South Africa. The emigrants had been mainly coolies from southern India, who for many years previously had been introduced into Natal, as into other sugar-growing British colonies, under indenture to work on the plantations. In view of what was taking place in South Africa in this autumn of 1913, the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, speaking at Madras on the 24th of November, gave strong expression to the feeling which had been aroused in India and which was not confined to native Indians alone. He referred to the passive resistance which the Indians in South Africa had organized, 'to laws which they consider invidious and unjust, an opinion which we, who watch their struggles from afar, cannot but share'; and he assured the passive resisters that 'they have the sympathy of India, deep and burning'. He expressed the opinion that the trouble which had arisen should be investigated by a strong and influential committee upon which Indian interests should be fully represented; and very wisely the Union Government moved in this direction. On the 10th of December it was announced that a Commission of Inquiry into the Natal strikes had been appointed, and an Anglo-Indian of high standing, Sir Benjamin Robertson, was sent by the Government of India to be present at the sittings and to hold a watching brief. The recommendations of the Commission provided a basis for a settlement. Indian grievances were due partly to actual provisions of the law, partly to its administration. Special resentment was caused by a discriminating poll-tax, which the law enacted, of £3 a head on all time-expired Indian labourers who did not return to India, and by the absence of any security for the status of married Indian women, no allowance being made for Indian polygamy. Eventually, on the 1st of July 1914, a Bill was passed into law 'to make a provision for the redress of certain grievances and the removal of certain disabilities of His Majesty's Indian subjects in the Union and other matters incidental thereto', and the poll-tax was abolished. The marriage difficulty was also adjusted, and the law was supplemented by an agreement arrived at between General Smuts on behalf of the Union Government and the East Indian leader Gandhi, by which certain recommendations of the Commission on points of administration were adopted and various other concessions

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were made, on the understanding that the settlement would be accepted as final.

Such were the conditions prevailing in the Union of South Africa when the war began. Like the United Kingdom, the Union was, for the time being, very much not at unity within itself, and the various elements of discord had all lately come to the surface. The sequel was to show how far, under pressure of war, the differences would be exaggerated or composed. One thing, however, was certain: there was hearty goodwill between the Liberal Government in England and the responsible leaders of the Union. Evidence of this was given in July 1914, the month immediately preceding the war. The Union Government, in want of funds, had not been able to raise all the money required in the open market; and seven millions were lent from the Imperial Exchequer—a loan, which unkind critics in South Africa subsequently attempted to interpret as a bribe to secure co-operation in the coming war.

Parliament was not in session at Cape Town when the war came; and on the Union Ministry fell the whole responsibility of deciding how far South Africa should go in making common cause with the rest of the British Empire. They left no doubt whatever as to their views. On the 4th of August, before the British ultimatum had taken effect, they telegraphed that they fully recognized the obligations of the Union in the event of hostilities, and were prepared to take all measures necessary for the defence of their country, releasing for active service, should they be required, the Imperial Regular troops then stationed in South Africa, other than the men connected with the Garrison Artillery. The offer was gratefully accepted by the Home Government in a message dated the 6th of August.[1] On the same day a further telegram was sent from England to the effect that, if the Union Government were willing and able to seize such part of German South-West Africa as would give them command of Swakopmund and Lüderitz, and the wireless stations there or in the interior, their action would be welcomed as 'a great and urgent Imperial service'. It was added that any territory thus occupied must be at the disposal

[1] The Regular troops which were withdrawn from South Africa, the equivalent of a whole infantry brigade, with a brigade of artillery, formed part of the 7th Division which went to Belgium in October 1914 and fought with so much distinction at Ypres. The two cavalry units joined Byng's 3rd Cavalry Division, which also went to Belgium in October 1914 and fought at Ypres.

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of the Imperial Government for the purposes of a final settlement at the end of the war, and that other Dominions were taking similar action on the same understanding. This telegram was followed on the 9th by another, which again emphasized the urgent necessity of seizing the coast wireless stations in German territory by a joint naval and military expedition, to be followed by the capture of the long-distance station at Windhoek in the interior. The message was in the hands of the Union Ministry on the 10th, and on that same day General Botha intimated that he and his colleagues cordially agreed to co-operate with the Imperial Government for the required purpose, the Imperial Government being responsible for the naval, the Union Government for the military operations.[1] Thus the Union of South Africa, under its great Boer leader, decided on more than passive resistance to Germany, on immediate and active support of the cause of the Empire. It was a decision of much military importance at the moment, and still more important was its bearing on the future.

When this decision was taken, there was, as has been said, an interregnum in South Africa. The outgoing Governor-General, Lord Gladstone, had left; his successor, Lord Buxton, had not yet come. The acting Governor-General was the Chief Justice of South Africa, Lord de Villiers. He was a notable link with the past and, like Mr. Schreiner, who in the following November became High Commissioner for the Union in London, had ever been a mediating force between the two white races, having crowned his public services by presiding over the Convention which framed the Union. He did not live to hand over the reins to the new Governor-General and to swear him into office; for he died on the 2nd of September, leaving behind him the record of a great Judge, and a South African citizen honoured by all men.

Lord Buxton landed on the 8th of September, and on the 9th opened a very brief emergency Session of Parliament. The Governor-General's speech announced that 'the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany and Austria has led my Ministers to advise the issue of a Proclamation calling out and mobilizing a portion of the Defence forces of the Union

[1] For this telegraphic correspondence see P.P.Cd. 7873, April 1915, *Correspondence on the subject of the Proposed Naval and Military Expedition against German South-West Africa.*

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for the protection of the interests of the Union, and for the purpose of co-operating with His Majesty's Imperial Government in guarding the welfare of the Empire'. On the same day General Botha moved a resolution in the House of Assembly 'fully recognizing the obligations of the Union as a portion of the British Empire', and giving assurance 'of its whole-hearted determination to take all measures necessary for defending the interests of the Union and for co-operating with His Majesty's Imperial Government to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire'. There were, he urged, only two alternatives, the path of faith, duty, and honour or that of dishonour and disloyalty. He told his hearers, who were now for the first time publicly apprised of the coming expedition against German South-West Africa, that German troops were entrenched on the border of the Union and had already trespassed across it. He amplified this theme of German infringement of Union territory three days later, on the 12th of September, in the Senate, Ministers of State, who are members of either House, being given by the Union Act the right of speech in both Houses. The Government policy found ample support, but was bitterly opposed by a small minority. In the Lower House, Smartt, the leader of the regular Opposition, the Unionist party, spoke strongly in its favour; on the same side was Creswell, the Labour leader, in spite of his recent collision with the Government. Hertzog was the principal speaker on the other side. He allowed that an Afrikander would rather live under the British Government than under the German; but he demurred to giving the Union Ministry authority—as he phrased it—'to make a raid on German South-West Africa'; and he moved an amendment to the effect that, while the House was ready to take all measures necessary for the defence of the Union territory, it was of opinion 'that any act in the nature of an attack, or which may lead to an attack, on German territory in South Africa, would be in conflict with the interests of the Union and the Empire!' An appeal was made to him by Merriman, for the sake of unanimity, to withdraw his amendment; but he went to a division, 12 members voting on his side, 91 for the Government. An amendment was moved in the Senate, deprecating offensive action against German South-West Africa, and was defeated by between four and five to one.

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A Senator who did not vote either way was General Delarey. He admitted that there could be no question of South Africa remaining neutral in the war, but he had conscientious scruples which forbade him to support the policy of the Government. Parliament passed some measures of urgent importance in view of the crisis, an Additional Loan Appropriation Act, a Public Welfare and Moratorium Act, and a Currency Act; on the 14th of September it was prorogued to the 20th of November, but did not actually meet again until the 26th of February 1915.

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CHAPTER II

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REBELLION

By the Editor

GENERAL DELAREY stood high in the affections of his fellow countrymen. His home was near Lichtenburg on the western side of the Transvaal, and in the South African War he had commanded the burgher levies of the western Transvaal with marked success, proving himself to be a bold, skilful, and chivalrous fighter. He had been one of the three Boer generals best known to fame, the other two being Botha and de Wet. When Parliament rose on the 14th of September he had already left Cape Town for the Transvaal, and all South Africa was shocked by the news that on the night of the 15th he had been shot dead in the western suburbs of Johannesburg. The South African War had made other reputations, some of them hardly overshadowed by the three names already given. This was especially true of General Christian Beyers. Like some others, notably General Smuts, he was a Cape Colonist by birth who became a Transvaaler and by profession a lawyer who became a general. He moved into the Transvaal as a young man of 20, and was a solicitor at Pretoria when the South African War came to pass. A man of courage and resource, he rose from the ranks to be a leader in that war, and fought hard and well in the central and northern Transvaal. He was made chairman of the Vereeniging Boer Convention which ended the war, and a little later, after responsible government had been granted to the Transvaal, he gave general satisfaction as Speaker of the elected House of that colony. Rumour had it that he was affronted at not being chosen to be Speaker of the Union House of Assembly, preference being given to a nominee of the Cape Province. When the South African Defence Act was passed, and the Citizen Defence Force came into existence, he was appointed the first Commandant-

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General. In that capacity in 1913 he visited England, and after all military doors in the United Kingdom had been opened to him and every facility for information given, he went to Germany also, where, if report be true, he was made much of by the Kaiser. When the Union Government decided to undertake the expedition against German South-West Africa, it was arranged that he should in due course hold the chief command. Of less note and inferior standing but still effective fighting men were Kemp and Solomon Maritz. Kemp had been Delarey's chief lieutenant in the South African War, and at the Vereeniging Conference he had been strong for continuing the war. Maritz, in the later stages of that war, was a most enterprising and troublesome guerrilla leader, operating in the west of the Cape Colony, and raiding within measurable distance of Cape Town itself. Irreconcilable after the war, he spent some years in German South-West Africa; but, on the formation of the Union Defence Force, both he and Kemp took commissions in it and went through the prescribed training. In the summer of 1914 Kemp was a Major and in charge of the military district which included the western Transvaal, while Maritz was in charge of the north-western districts of the Cape Province, with head-quarters at Calvinia, and in the middle of August 1914 was promoted to be Lieut.-Colonel in the Defence Force. Training camps under the command of these two officers, at Potchefstroom in the one case, at Upington and Kakamas in the other, had been fixed for the first fortnight in September.

In South Africa in 1914 the memories of the long-drawn fight between Boer and Briton were still fresh. It must be assumed that many Dutchmen only passively acquiesced in the new order, and the majority of them only because the political leaders of the new order were Dutch; that an appreciable number, by instinct, memory, and tradition, were reluctant to accept it as final; that some, but not many, were prepared for active rebellion, should a suitable occasion arise and a leader of repute be found. It must be assumed, too, that, if the hearts of all had been disclosed, it would not have been possible to divide the whole Boer population into two camps, but that between settled and resolved loyalty to the Union on the one hand, and irreconcilable enmity to the British Empire on the other, there were endless shades of

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view and inclination; that where loyalty ended and rebellion began was far more difficult to appreciate and to define than in more matured communities with generations of stable government behind them. Even when rebellion actually came, there was not a clear-cut unmistakable issue. In the minds of most of those who went out in arms there were, it cannot be doubted, varying shades of rebel views, ranging from an aggravated form of passive resistance to the policy of the Botha Government and the campaign against German South Africa to positive rebellion for the overthrow of British sovereignty and the establishment of a South African Republic.

Similarly, it would be difficult to analyse and to define the attitude of the Dutch Afrikander population towards Germany and the Germans. When the Boers were at war with Great Britain, Germany was regarded as the Dutchmen's friend; and though the friendship had not proved to be a factor of substantial value, the German Protectorate in South-West Africa was ready to hand, as an asylum for irreconcilables of the Maritz type, especially for the Cape Colony rebels, who had not been included in the terms of the Vereeniging treaty but had been left amenable to the laws of their own colony and many, if not most, of whom were residents in the districts which bordered on German territory. Some hundreds of them, after the end of the South African War, were to be found in German South-West Africa. To many of the number German rule was not palatable, and between them and the German Government and German settlers there was no love lost. But a certain proportion more or less cast in their lot with the Germans, and among them, in September 1914, a small volunteer force, known as the Vrij Korps, was raised under the leadership of one Andries de Wet, who had married a German wife and become a naturalized German subject. The contract between those who joined this force and their commander recited that 'The Volunteer Corps is established for the purpose, united with the people of South Africa, of winning back the old freedom of the Republics'. It could be alleged, and was alleged by General Hertzog among others, that one main ground for opposition to the policy of invading German South-West Africa was, that it entailed an attack upon Afrikander fellow countrymen. In any case there were the Germans on the Union border, immediate neighbours to the region where

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the British population had always been scantiest and anti-British feeling most rife; and it is not to be supposed that in the Union of South Africa alone in the world German intrigue and German penetration would not be active in stimulating and exploiting whatever was inimical to British interests.

Thus it may be summed up that, almost of necessity, before the war, there was in the background among the Dutch population of the Union of South Africa a standing element of disloyalty in varying degrees, and in the German Protectorate next door an obvious basis of support for such disloyalty. When the war came, and Germany and Great Britain were open enemies, there would be those who held with Botha and Smuts, that duty and interest, good faith, and the future of South Africa pointed to whole-hearted support of the Empire. At the opposite pole there would be a few irreconcilables, to whom the difficulties of England were the opportunities of South Africa; and there would be a large number who waited on events. The removal of the Regular troops, the decision to strike at German South-West Africa, both lent themselves to diametrically opposite interpretations; the one and the other could be exploited by the enemies of Great Britain, and on the facts lying rumours could be and were engrafted, working mischief even though one rumour might be incompatible with another, as when a myth that the leaders of the Union were themselves mediating revolt ran side by side with the carefully expounded tale that compulsion was to be used to secure men to fight against the Germans. Taking the conditions of time and place, the Boer temperament, and the antecedent history, it would be difficult for imagination to construct a set of circumstances more likely to produce the crisis which actually came to pass.

The eastern side of the Union, the more British side, was not troubled with rebellion. The trouble was in the west, in the Orange Free State, and on the borderland of the German Protectorate. There had been for some time past elements of unrest in the south-western Transvaal, in the districts of Lichtenburg and Wolmaransstad, where Delarey and Kemp had their homes, and which harboured a seer of oracular repute. He inspired implicit belief in many simple minds throughout the countryside; his hard sayings, capable of diverse interpretations, duped some and were turned to mischievous account

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by others. Among his dupes, it would seem, was General Delarey, whose growing years—for he was 67 when he died—were clouded with mysticism. The seer, a Boer farmer, Nicholas Van Rensburg, had served with Delarey in the South African War and, having prophesied with considerable success, had gained a firm hold on his mind. For some time before August 1914 the prophet had had an access of visions; they were held to indicate the restoration of Boer Independence, and in one of them the number 15 figured. After it was known that war had begun, notice went round these districts, commandeering the burghers to come, armed and mounted, to a meeting on the 15th of August at Treurfontein, a railway junction near Lichtenburg. The orders were issued in the name of Delarey, who was announced to address the meeting; a Commandant and a Field Cornet, Wolmarans and Claassen by name, afterwards among the first to rebel, took a leading part in summoning their neighbours, by letter and by word of mouth; and the prophet was also active. The local farmers, and those who were responsible for the peace of the districts, took alarm and communicated with General Botha at Pretoria. Botha then sent prompt instructions to warn the people against the illegality of the proceedings, called Wolmarans to account, and asked Delarey to come up to Pretoria to see him on the matter. After much searching of heart, Delarey arrived at Pretoria on the 13th; Botha wrestled with his old friend's hallucinations and secured his promise that no mischief should come from the meeting. The meeting was held, some 800 farmers being present, but unarmed. Delarey made a speech as vague as the prophet's utterances, and his mystified audience went back to their homes, none of them wiser men. The first act of the drama had been a fiasco.

The Union Government had committed themselves to two decisions with regard to the war, to dispense with the Regular garrison and to join in an expedition against German South-West Africa. The first decision was taken on the Ministers' own initiative; the second, in response to a wish expressed by the Home Government. The first was matter of common knowledge; the second was withheld from the public, until the consent of the Union Parliament to the invasion of German territory should have been obtained, though it is worth noting that the telegram sent to England was one of acceptance

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without any reservation as to Parliamentary approval. Two men, at least, outside the Cabinet circle had been taken into confidence with regard to this second decision, Delarey and Beyers. Delarey had been told by Botha when the two men had their long interview at Pretoria. Beyers was necessarily informed, as Commandant-General of the Defence Force. He did not like the policy and the ministers knew it; but he gave no indication of any intention to resign and oppose, possibly enough, it might be contended, because Parliamentary approval had yet to be secured. The immediate need of the moment was to ensure the safety of the Union in war-time in the absence of the Regular troops; and accordingly, even before the request of the British Government with regard to German South-West Africa was received, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, General Smuts, made arrangements for conferring with the Defence Force Commandants in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State Provinces. The meeting with the Transvaal Commandants was held on the 14th of August, the day after Delarey's interview with Botha, the day before the Treurfontein meeting. The two ministers were present, and Beyers, and some sixty officers in all. Among them was Maritz, who had no concern with the Transvaal division of the Defence Force, but had arrived at Pretoria on the 11th to see Beyers and was invited by him to the meeting. The Commandants, as a whole, were entirely at one with the Government; but a small minority, including Kemp and Maritz, persisted in raising the German South-West Africa question, which was not before the meeting, and of which they were presumed to know nothing, and gave clear signs of opposition. They and Beyers absented themselves from a further and more informal consultation with General Botha on the same evening, holding a private meeting of their own. In their absence Botha was warned that mischief was brewing; he made inquiry of Beyers, was reassured by him, and received a similar assurance from Kemp some days later. On the 19th of August the Commandants of the Orange Free State were called together, and no difficulty arose, one officer alone making reference to the question of German South-West Africa.

On the 21st of August a strictly confidential meeting of the chief military officers of the Union was held at Pretoria,

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to discuss a plan of campaign against the German Protectorate. Sir Duncan Mackenzie came up from Natal; General Lukin was present; Beyers was present during part of the proceedings, and assented to Mackenzie's views. Mackenzie was to lead an expeditionary force, to be landed on the German coast. Lukin was to cross the frontier from Port Nolloth. Farther inland, a force under Maritz was to be in readiness to support Lukin if necessary. While he was at Pretoria, on the 15th of August, the day after the meeting of the Transvaal commandants, Maritz was instructed by General Smuts, when he returned to his command, to mobilize a force of 1,000 men; if the number was not forthcoming from the ranks of the Defence Force, the deficiency was to be supplied by volunteers from the general population. Maritz had not been told by the Government of their intentions with regard to German South-West Africa; his instructions were wholly compatible with a purely defensive policy; and, as a matter of fact, it was not intended at the time that he and his men should cross the frontier. But the mobilization order may well have been construed by him as evidence of coming invasion, even if he had not already known all from Beyers. For he was Beyers's man, according to all accounts; on Beyers's recommendation, with the reluctant assent of General Smuts, he had been placed or kept in charge of a critical place at a critical time; and on his return to take up his duties he was strengthened in position and influence by promotion in rank.

Calvinia, the head-quarters of his command, is very far south of the Orange river. Many miles to the north of Calvinia, on the south side of the river, is Kakamas, which was the scene of a government Labour Colony, with some 2,000 residents, largely of the 'bijwoner' class. Fifty miles north-east of Kakamas, on the northern bank of the river, where it is now crossed by the railway line from Prieska, linking the Cape Province to South-West Africa, is Upington, the chief settlement of the Gordonia district of the Province, a long straggling township, within 90 miles of the frontier. It was not until November in this year, 1914, that the line from Prieska to the southern bank of the Orange river over against Upington was opened; the connexion with the German railways being completed in the following June. Half-way between Kakamas and Upington, on the northern bank of the river,

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is the small settlement of Keimoes. Almost due west of Upington is the point at which the 20th degree of east longitude intersects the Orange river. Up to this point from the sea the northern bank of the river was the Anglo-German boundary, running very roughly west and east. From it the boundary line, leaving the river, ran due north, along the 20th meridian. At this corner of the frontier collision might be expected, if there was a forward move on either side. Seventy miles by the track to the north-west of Kakamas is a drift over the Orange river, known as Schuit Drift. Here there was a small post of Union police on one side of the river, and a German police post on the other. Some Boer farmers, who had been living on German territory, near the border, had been instructed by the German authorities to come with their cattle farther inland. Not liking the order, a few families moved off in the opposite direction, came to the British station at Schuit Drift and obtained permission to take refuge on some islands in the river 10 miles lower down, the islands being British territory. Here they were followed up on the 21st of August by four German soldiers; some shooting took place; and a German was killed. The Boers immediately reported the matter to the Union police at Schuit Drift; the corporal in charge of the station went down to the spot, and refused to hand over the men who had been concerned in the shooting to a strong detachment of German soldiers, who came on the scene on the following day. The refugees then sought security by trekking farther into Union territory, and German patrols subsequently pursued them, but without effecting their arrest. The incident, in short, resulted in undoubted trespass upon British soil, but otherwise in no overt act of war.

Higher up the boundary line, in the Gordonia district, there had already been evidence of German encroachment. This was at a place called Nakob, nearly 90 miles from Upington, where, as at Schuit Drift, two little outposts faced each other on either side of the line, though here there was no river to mark the boundary. Twenty-four miles north-west of the German post was a substantial German settlement at Ukamas. Confusion was caused by the fact that the same name, Nakob, applied to both the British and German stations. In the middle of August it was proved by personal eyewitness that a commanding hill on the British side of the boundary had, with

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German foresight and thoroughness, been prepared for military occupation, and Germans were observed upon it.

In all this frontier region Maritz had been deputed to keep watch and ward. It was far removed from the public eye, with easy access to the enemy. On hearing of the Schuit Drift affray, after his return from Pretoria, on the 23rd of August he went from Kakamas to Schuit Drift; the police officer in charge of the British station was absent down the river; and, crossing the river to the German police station opposite, Maritz apologized for the collision which had taken place. He then on the telephone warned the German authorities of coming invasion and asked for arms and ammunition to enable him to resist the Government, whose servant he was. Thus August went out with a record of an abortive meeting at Treurfontein, of minor incidents upon the Anglo-German frontier, not pointing to any desire on either side to attack in force; of conferences of military men in the Union; of a general atmosphere of restlessness, expectancy, and suspicion. One man knew his own traitorous mind; that man was Maritz.

It will be remembered that the training camps under Kemp and Maritz had been arranged for the first fortnight of September, and that Parliament had been summoned for the 9th. All the time the news from Europe pointed to the irresistible strength of Germany. On his way to Cape Town to attend the special session Delarey, on the 5th of September, paid a visit to Kemp's camp at Potchefstroom, and making one of his vague speeches urged upon the young men gathered for training obedience to their commandant and his officers. As has been already told, the proceedings in Parliament made public the decision of the Union Government to join in invading German South-West Africa; they also disclosed bitter opposition to the policy on the part of the nationalist group. Such opposition had already been indicated by violent speeches made at a nationalist congress held at Pretoria on the 26th of August. MacKenzie's expedition had been due to leave Cape Town for Lüderitz on the 11th of September, and on that date Beyers telegraphed to MacKenzie, 'as one soldier to another', wishing him and the force under his command every success. The start, however, was delayed until the 15th, and meanwhile, on the 14th, the vanguard of Lukin's force, opera-

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ting from Port Nolloth, secured Raman's Drift on the Orange river and overpowered the German police post on the northern bank. This was the beginning of invasion, the first definitive act of war. By this time Delarey had come to Cape Town and gone again. He had received an urgent telegram from Beyers, asking him to be at Pretoria on the 14th or 15th; and on the evening of the 12th, the crucial debates being over and the divisions taken in both Houses, he left for the Transvaal. He had been expected to travel via Kimberley and come to Potchefstroom, but he took instead the route through Bloemfontein to Johannesburg. On the way he was joined by an officer on Maritz's staff, Joubert by name, who was travelling to Pretoria to see Beyers, Beyers having telegraphed to Maritz to come himself or send Joubert. On the evening of the 14th Delarey reached Johannesburg, and Joubert reached Pretoria. Kemp, meanwhile, had been with Beyers at Pretoria on the 12th and 13th, and on the 13th sent in his resignation to the Government, Beyers, as his commanding officer, being in the ordinary course the recipient of the letter. The training camp at Potchefstroom, of which Kemp was in charge, was to be broken up on the 16th, and he had made no secret of his resignation or of his views.

The prophet's mystic number 15 had now come round again and the 15th of September was big with events. Kemp's resignation was formally accepted by the Government; and Beyers himself resigned, embodying his resignation in a letter of unrestrained bitterness, basing his case upon the decision of the Government to attack German South-West Africa. It was dated the 15th and given to the Press before the resignation could possibly be accepted by the Minister of Defence, General Smuts, who was still at Cape Town and who received it by telegram. The Government censorship, however, held up publication of the document until, in four days' time, its appearance in print was coupled with a crushing reply from Smuts, accepting the resignation.

In the morning of this day Joubert conferred with Beyers; in the afternoon Delarey was brought to Pretoria in Beyers's motor-car, sent to Johannesburg for the purpose; between 7 and 8 in the evening Beyers and Delarey motored forth in hot haste for Potchefstroom. Their way lay through or round Johannesburg. It happened that a gang of ruffians, known

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from the name of their leader as the Foster gang, was at the time infesting Johannesburg. On this same day they had murdered a detective, escaping for the moment in a motor-car; and patrols of armed police had in consequence been placed round the city and its suburbs, with orders to stop all motor-cars. This precaution had already resulted, about 7 o'clock in the evening, in the shooting by mistake of a doctor, whose car did not stop when hailed. Some two hours later Beyers's car came on the scene. It passed the police cordon on the near side of Johannesburg, its occupants and driver ignoring the summons to stop, and reached, a little after 9 o'clock, the village of Langlaagte on the farther side, south-west of the main city. Challenged again, it sped on, and a policeman fired at the tyre of the rear right wheel, to bring it to a standstill. He fired low; the shot dropped short; and the ricocheting bullet killed Delarey. This was the conclusion arrived at by a Supreme Court Judge, deputed to hold a judicial inquiry, after sitting for seven days and hearing over 70 witnesses. Previously it had been noised abroad with evil intent that Delarey had met with foul play, the death of a popular hero being laid at the door of the Government.

The verdict was death caused by misadventure. Yet more sober minds than that of the prophet may well have seen in what had taken place something more than accident and other than human design. For some ill-omened scheme had again miscarried. The plain facts of the case were that the late Commandant-General of the armed forces of the Union, having divested himself of his official duties to the Government, having issued a manifesto, for which, as General Smuts told him in the plainest words, he would in the German Empire have been liable to the extreme penalty, having had the latest first-hand information from his traitorous subordinate on the German frontier, was hurrying, in company with the man whose name and character carried most weight in the western Transvaal, to a camp whose Commandant, having taken counsel with him, had also thrown up his charge, and where 1,500 young men under arms had been inoculated with the disloyal talk of their officers. It was significant that, on the morrow of the tragedy, Kemp telegraphed to Pretoria to be allowed to withdraw his resignation, but his request was refused.

Delarey was buried at Lichtenburg on Sunday, the 20th of

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September. Men of all views and parties came to the funeral. General Botha paid his tribute to an old friend and comrade-in-arms, and Beyers spoke in terms which left nothing to be desired. His text was loyal patriotism, as illustrated in the life of Delarey. As Delarey, though opposed to the South African War, had fought in it heart and soul for his country, so, inasmuch as the Parliament of the Union had decided upon a campaign against German South-West Africa, the citizens of the Union must do their duty. Botha's recollection of the speech was that Beyers, while affirming his own dissent from the policy of the Government, intimated that his personal services would be available, if required. Yet there were ominous signs of ill-feeling on that day. The car, in which the death had taken place, was prominently in evidence in the market-square, and round it the farmers of the district imparted or imbibed suspicion and distrust. Well aware of the imminent danger of a rising, the Prime Minister, after the funeral, before he left Lichtenburg, called the Commandants of the district together in private conference, urging them to use all their influence against rebellion, and bidding them tell their people that volunteers alone would be used for service against the Germans, that not one man would be commandeered. On the day after the funeral a public meeting was held in the market-place at Lichtenburg by those who were opposed to the Government. Among the speakers was de Wet, who had not hitherto taken an active part on the side of the Opposition. Beyers spoke, but on strictly constitutional lines, deprecating rebellion; and when the old Republican flag was raised, he would have none of it. The outcome of the meeting was a resolution of protest against the German South-West Africa campaign, coupled with a request that the Government would answer the resolution by the 30th of September. Three days later, on the 24th of September, another meeting, the first meeting of the kind in the Orange Free State, was held at Kopjes, in the Vredefort district on the main trunk line to the Transvaal, at which de Wet spoke in temperate terms, and Conroy, an extremist, in open praise of rebellion. Again a resolution was passed in similar terms to that at Lichtenburg. On the 28th, at Klerksdorp in the Transvaal, there was another meeting with a like result. No answer was sent by the Government to the Lichtenburg resolution; but, on the 28th of

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September, General Botha held a meeting of his constituents at Bank on the outskirts of the Rand, at which he explained at length the policy of the Government. He gave the fullest assurance that the coming campaign would be conducted with volunteers only, and made public the fact that he had himself taken over the duties of Commandant-General and would personally lead the Expeditionary Force. The Lichtenburg commandants had already been privately informed by him that he would act as Commandant-General, when he called them together on the day of the funeral; and he had given them an assurance, which he asked them to make widely known, that no unwilling citizen should be commandeered for service in German South-West Africa. Further, on the following day, the 21st, a Government communication had been addressed to the District Staff officers throughout the Union and to the Magistrates of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, to the effect that the Government had no intention of commandeering members of the Citizen Force Reserve and the National Reserve for war service in South Africa outside the Union. There was, however, the admitted fact that some units of the Active Citizen Force had already been called out, with liability to serve in South Africa outside the Union.[1] Prior to his speech at Bank Botha had held at Pretoria a second conference of Transvaal Commandants; and all present agreed to serve with him in German South-West Africa, some as Commandants, some in the ranks; they then went home to their respective districts to recruit volunteers.

Thus in the Transvaal and in the Orange Free State September ended, like August, with the record of an unexplained movement cut short, this time by a terrible tragedy. There was the ugly fact that the head of the armed forces in the Union, and one of his chief lieutenants, had thrown up their commissions; there was ample evidence of strong opposition to war with Germany and of wilful misconstruction of the

[1] Under Sec. 77 (i) of the Defence Act of 1912 'The Governor-General may, in time of war, by proclamation call out and mobilize the whole or any portion of the Coast Garrison Force, the Active Citizen Force, and the Citizen Force Reserve, for active service against an enemy *anywhere in South Africa within or outside the Union*'. A Proclamation of the 19th of August 1914, No. 177, intimated that such portions of these forces 'as may be notified from time to time in the Government Gazette shall be and are hereby called out for service anywhere in South Africa within or without the Union', and the first calling out of specified units was by notice in the Gazette, No. 1423 of the 24th of August.

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Government policy. Malcontents in the Free State, under de Wet's leadership, had joined hands with malcontents in the western Transvaal; and there had been no lack of inflammatory speeches. On the other hand, the principal opponents of the Government had so far not openly transgressed the bounds of constitutional opposition; the position of the Government had been clearly defined, and there was a strong rally to Botha's side, as was shown by the first public meeting in October. This was held on the 2nd of October, at Potchefstroom, which had seemed to be a nest of disaffection. Kemp and de Wet were present and spoke; but the people would not hear them out, and the meeting was broken up. The chief danger-point at this date was not in the western Transvaal nor in the Orange Free State, but on the Anglo-German frontier, where Maritz was making his plans.

Loyalty was not in him and he had never been at pains to disguise his views. Self-exiled after the South African War, he had found refuge in German territory and had taken a hand in the fighting with the Hereros; the Germans had been his friends, as the British had been and, from his point of view, remained his enemies. He took service in the Defence Force under the British flag, but flag or oath of allegiance meant nothing to him. He was a rebel at the Training School at Bloemfontein, as before and after, and treasonable communication with the Germans was in his normal line of business. So ingrained was his treachery that the Germans themselves did not trust him. Yet he was a hard and comparatively resolute man, whom young men followed, not of liking but of constraint. When he went down to Schuit Drift, he had with him an emissary from the Government of the German Protectorate, Piet de Wet, brother of the man who raised and commanded the Vrij Korps and, like his brother, a naturalized German. De Wet carried on to Windhoek Maritz's request for arms and ammunition, and Maritz's Staff Officer, Joubert, was another intermediary, coming and going from German territory, where he owned a farm. The Intelligence Department for communicating with the enemy was very effective, and Beyers at Pretoria had the full benefit of it. Maritz urged Beyers to come down and address the burghers in his camps in the early part of September; but Beyers preferred that Maritz or Joubert should come to him at Pretoria. When Beyers resigned on

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the 15th of September, Maritz came more immediately under the direction of the Minister of Defence, General Smuts.

The sequel to the entry of Lukin's troops into German territory at Raman's Drift on the 14th of September was a proclamation by the German Governor in terms that, as a British force had come over the border and brought the European war into South Africa, the Germans would resist by all the means in their power, but warring against the British alone, not against 'the Boer people of South Africa'. The proclamation was dated the 15th of September, and early on the next day, the 16th, Andries de Wet and his Boer corps, which had been raised after Piet de Wet returned from Maritz, and had been formally authorized by a proclamation issued by the German Governor on the 9th of September, overpowered the half-dozen Union police at the Nakob station. Three days later, on the 19th, they captured the magistracy at Rietfontein farther north. On the 26th there was a more serious British reverse, in German territory, at a place called Sandfontein, between Raman's Drift and Warmbad. Here an advance detachment of Lukin's force, some 250 strong, was intercepted by the Germans and cut to pieces. Shortly before this reverse occurred, on the 22nd of September, a telegram was sent to Maritz from the Defence Department, stating that the Government proposed to proclaim martial law in the district under his command, and inviting his suggestions, to which he replied on the following day that the proclamation was unnecessary and would cause trouble and dissatisfaction. On this same day, the 23rd, General Smuts telegraphed again, asking Maritz whether he could dispatch a strong force from Kakamas to Schuit Drift, and also move his troops at Upington westward to the border, the object being to co-operate with Lukin's advance on Warmbad. The necessity for such co-operation was abundantly proved by what happened at Sandfontein three days later; but the main purpose of the telegram, it would seem, was to make Maritz show his hand, and it had the desired effect. On the 25th he telegraphed a long reply. He refused to send a force to Schuit Drift, pleading want of training, and lack of guns and equipment. He stated explicitly that, if ordered to cross the frontier, all his officers would resign, that officers and public alike were under the impression that the camps were for peace training only, and

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that if the action of the Government brought in its train a counter German invasion, the public would not resist the invaders. He would do his best to support the Government on the British side of the border, but he urged reconsideration of the campaign against German South-West Africa, emphasized the difficulty in which he was placed, and ended his telegram with the words, 'If there are further plans that I must attack German South-West Africa under these conditions, I shall be glad if my resignation is accepted.'

For the Union Government the position was critical in the extreme. To have taken Maritz at his word, and then and there accepted his resignation, would have precipitated a rising before there were trustworthy troops to hand, and would have left him master of the field. For he had under his command from 1,400 to 1,500 men. The members of the Active Citizen Force, who had been called up for training and not been disbanded, numbered between 1,200 and 1,300, distributed between Kakamas and Upington, the latter being the larger camp of the two. They were all under his influence and control, and most of them infected with his treason. In addition there were some 150 volunteers at Upington, and a smaller number at Kakamas, in either case under a leader whom Maritz could trust and the Government certainly could not. In the middle of September, both the camp at Upington, between two and three miles from the township, and the township itself, which plied a busy trade with the Germans, were, in the words of a Police Inspector who was there at the time, 'simply seething with sedition and disloyalty'; and the conditions at Kakamas were much the same. Far from being kept short of equipment, Maritz had been abundantly supplied; and in the latter days of September his large demands for munitions, stores, and transport roused the apprehensions of the Defence Department and led to special inquiry. Under the circumstances there was nothing for it at the moment but more or less to mark time, while gathering strength.

When it was decided to invade German South-West Africa, Major Enslin, afterwards Brigadier-General, was appointed Chief Staff Officer to Maritz, but did not at once take up his appointment. After Beyers had resigned, as suspicion of Maritz deepened, Enslin was sent down to Upington, ostensibly to enter on his duties, in reality to inquire and report and, in

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the event of Maritz's resignation, to take command. He reached Upington late on Saturday night, the 26th; two hours later another trusted officer of the Government came on the scene, Captain Erasmus, sent independently of Enslin, as Chief Intelligence Officer. Enslin knew Maritz well; they had served together in the South African War; but Maritz, with good reason, did not relish new-comers from head-quarters and found it convenient not to see them on the Sunday. The two officers gauged the situation, concerted plans, and on the 28th the action of the drama began to move with bewildering rapidity. Maritz seems to have been led on to his undoing by sense of his own importance and desire to impress it on others. Erasmus learnt that letters had been passing between him and the German Governor, that he had an agreement with the German Governor, and was authorized to draw on the Germans for funds. Enslin too had interviews with him; and the telegraph line was kept busy on this 28th of September. Enslin's first telegram to Smuts was in measured terms. He gave his impression that Maritz and his officers were prepared to defend the Union against invasion, but would resign if ordered to cross the border. He spoke of the need of 2,000 tried soldiers to replace the existing force, and suggested that the appointment of Colonel Brits to the command would have a good effect with the farmers of the district. He had no grounds for thinking that Maritz would take arms on the German side, but advised that his resignation should not be accepted until the relieving force was to hand, lest it should incite the Germans to attack Kakamas, where stores had been accumulated. As the day went on, and he saw more of Maritz, his apprehensions grew, and in the evening he telegraphed again, urging that either he himself or Erasmus should be recalled, to report personally on the position. The first of these telegrams brought on the same day two telegrams from General Smuts: one direct to Maritz, instructing him to come at once to Pretoria, leaving Enslin in charge; the other to Enslin to the same effect, but adding that troops were being sent up as quickly as possible from Durban and Cape Town, and prescribing the action to be taken in the event of a German attack. Enslin's second telegram procured the recall of Erasmus; he left on the 29th, with the goodwill of Maritz, who still regarded him as a friend and asked him to see Beyers when

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he reached Pretoria. Maritz meanwhile, on the 29th, telegraphed refusal to leave his command and called attention to his long telegram of the 25th still unanswered. Smuts replied on the 30th, again ordering him to Pretoria to discuss the whole position, and informing him that the necessary steps had been taken to send reinforcements.

The two antagonists were fencing with each other, and knew it. Smuts was sending up troops, ostensibly to reinforce Maritz against the Germans—and beyond question there was real and imminent danger of German attack. Maritz appreciated that the troops were directed as much against himself as against the Germans, and professed to have the position well in hand and to need no reinforcements. Telegrams kept passing between Enslin and Smuts, and on the 2nd of October the clouds began to burst. On that day Maritz once more, in insolent terms, telegraphed refusal to comply with the Minister's instructions, while the Minister definitely informed Maritz that a regiment of mounted troops and a battalion of infantry under Colonel Wylie were being hurried up, to co-operate with him in the defence of the Upington–Kakamas area, but to be independent of his command. He was not told, but Enslin was, that Colonel Brits had on that day been formally appointed to take over the control of all the Union forces in this region, and that under him Major Bouwer was to relieve Maritz. But Maritz diagnosed what was coming; and, on the afternoon of this 2nd of October, he left Upington with part of his force, marched westwards towards the border, thereby outwardly conforming with his original instructions, and established a new camp at a place called Vanrooisvley, 25 miles west of Upington: the remainder of his Upington force followed him on the next day; and a few days later the Kakamas troops were concentrated at or near Vanrooisvley. Enslin, however, had remained at Upington; Colonel Wylie joined him on the 4th; on the 7th Colonel Brits arrived; and on that day a letter from Brits, and a telegram from Smuts, were sent to Maritz, instructing him to report himself to Brits at Upington; not later than the 9th was Brits's order.

The bearer of the letter reached Vanrooisvley on the evening of the 7th; Maritz was not there but came back on the following morning, and in the evening of that day, the 8th, the messenger returned to Upington with an off-hand

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answer from Maritz, demanding his discharge and making Brits welcome to take over his command. The evidence which Major Leipoldt, who carried the letters to and fro, subsequently gave of the hours spent in Maritz's company on this 8th of October is very noteworthy. Maritz placed at his disposal correspondence with the German Governor extending over two years, from August 1912, and ending with a letter of the 20th of September 1914, in which the Governor cancelled a treaty, also shown to Leipoldt, on the ground that Maritz and his associates had not kept its terms and by force of arms prevented the invasion of German South-West Africa. Maritz seemed carried away by inordinate vanity. Beyers, according to his account, was his follower, not his leader. 'I am the liberator of South Africa, I am putting him on to this.' Possibly his boast had some substratum of truth.

The 'Liberation' of South Africa began on the following day, the morning of the 9th, when he went into open rebellion. He made a speech to his men, with much emotion and protesting much, addressed them as 'Burghers and countrymen', said his cause was the freedom of his country, abused General Botha in unmeasured terms, lauded the Germans and the Kaiser, spoke of Beyers, De Wet, and Hertzog as approving his plans, and had a treaty read out which had been concluded with the German Government of South-West Africa. There was a loyal machine-gun section in his force. These he had already disarmed and arrested, and they were sent off on the same day, with a few other loyalists, about sixty in all, as prisoners to German territory, where, after suffering much, they were eventually rescued in the course of General Botha's campaign. The very large majority of his men for the moment followed his lead, young men dominated by an unscrupulous commander and not wishing to share the loyalists' fate. On the following day the Boer corps from South-West Africa and a German detachment came up to Vanrooisvley. Not knowing what had happened on the 9th, Colonel Brits wrote a letter to Maritz, enclosing his discharge and instructing him to hand over his command to Major Bouwer, the bearer of the letter. Bouwer reached the rebel camp early on the 10th, and was immediately taken prisoner by Maritz. The two men were old brother officers, and Maritz was again at pains to display his German correspondence, including a treaty. This

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was not the cancelled agreement which Leipoldt had seen, but one signed on the 8th of October, being the document which had been read out to the camp on the previous day. A few days later Maritz sent a copy of it to Colonel Brits. It recited that Maritz had declared the independence of South Africa and begun war against England; it gave recognition by the German Governor to the rebel forces and the future republic; and it assigned Walvis Bay to the Germans, Delagoa Bay to the Boers. Eventually, Bouwer was released and sent back to Upington on the same evening, on condition that he reported to the Government what he had seen and learnt, and conveyed a message from Maritz demanding that a guarantee should be given by the following morning to the effect that Hertzog, Beyers, de Wet, Kemp, and Muller should be sent down to interview Maritz, in which case he would be guided by them and surrender, if they so advised; in default of such a guarantee, he would attack. This message was telegraphed by Colonel Brits to Pretoria on the same night. On the 12th a Government notification was published far and wide, giving details of what had passed, and Martial Law was proclaimed throughout the Union of South Africa.

The South African rising of 1914 was, taken as a whole, a lukewarm, half-hearted movement. For this reason it is most difficult to follow up the story, or to make it intelligible. One day seemed to contradict another. Strong speech and rash action went hand in hand with compromise. Fighting and negotiating proceeded simultaneously. The Government was anxious, by all possible means, to avoid spilling of blood; the rebels did not want to kill their kinsfolk. But, above and beyond considerations of humanity and of policy, the rebellion was marked by indecision on the rebel side. Even Maritz, at once the most resolute and the most vainglorious of them all, seemed trying at one and the same time to burn his boats and to put the fire out. His message to the Government may have been mere camouflage; no answer could possibly have been given by the time he indicated; but it was only one of other similar overtures. On the 13th he opened correspondence with Colonel Brits, proposing a meeting for 'amicable discussion', his letters, the last of which included the already mentioned treaty, being a mixture of defiance and cajolery.

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At the same time he repeated to the Government, through the Civil Superintendent of Kakamas, his request or demand that Beyers, Hertzog, and the others should be sent down to confer with him. The Government went far to meet his wishes. As soon as his first message was received, General Botha urged Beyers to go down, offering him special facilities and permitting him to take with him any or all of the other men named. But Beyers, after a day or two's delay, declined to go. Upon learning that Maritz had gone into open rebellion, Botha immediately telegraphed the news to Ex-President Steyn. 'A word from you', he rightly said, 'will go far.' The only reply was a courteous letter on the next day, to the effect that Steyn disapproved the policy of the Government in attacking German South-West Africa and could not intervene without expressing his disapproval. This elicited a letter from Botha, again asking Steyn to 'speak a word to warn our people against treason, against the everlasting stain that anything of the kind would be upon our national honour', but adding, almost pathetically, that if the word could only be spoken on the lines which Steyn had indicated, 'it is better to say nothing'—and nothing was said. Maritz had freely used Hertzog's name. The Prime Minister, accordingly, gave Hertzog an opening for publicly disavowing the traitor, but Hertzog thought otherwise. Had he spoken out, he said in evidence, he would have lost all his influence in the Orange Free State. The attitude taken up at this crisis by such men as Steyn and Hertzog was the real tragedy of the rebellion. Deplorable as the rising was, it was none the less a great opportunity, such as is rarely presented to an infant nation. It was an occasion, to be taken by the hand, for letting the dead past once and for all bury its dead, for proving that the peace of Vereeniging was not a truce but a final settlement; that the Union of South Africa was a union of races, as of states, one and indivisible; for proclaiming to the world, in the manful words which Colonel Brits addressed to Maritz, that traitors would have to reckon with 'Afrikanders who love this country, but who will not allow the fair name and the honour of the Afrikander to be disgraced for all time'. That not a few men of leading, outside the ranks of those who openly sinned, when a more excellent way was shown, deliberately preferred the narrow, racial, party views of the past to

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the dictates of uprightness and the call of the coming time, is the saddest part of the whole story.

After his speech on the 9th of October, and his colloquy with Bouwer on the 10th, Maritz moved camp. He was at Keimoes on the 11th, sent on men to occupy Kakamas, and followed himself in due course. A republic was proclaimed and a provisional Government; a party was sent to take possession of the town of Kenhardt; and thence detachments rode farther south, towards Carnarvon in one direction, Calvinia in another. But it was clear that the country was not going to rise; one of the detachments soon surrendered to the Government, the other was captured. Brits meanwhile moved troops from Upington to Keimoes; Maritz unsuccessfully attacked them near Keimoes on the 22nd of October, was wounded himself, and driven back to Kakamas. Brits followed up and on the 24th defeated the rebels at Kakamas, whence they fled to Schuit Drift, Maritz having already taken refuge in German territory, at a place appropriately known as Jerusalem. This would have been the end, for Maritz now, in a lucid interval, counselled his young men to surrender to the Union Government, when the report came through that Beyers was up in arms in the Transvaal, and de Wet in the Free State, with the result that the greater number stayed where they were on the German border, awaiting further developments.

The news that Maritz had risen lit the fire in the north, which then in turn kept alive the rebellion farther south. It reached the Government at Pretoria by telegram from Brits on the night of the 10th of October. On the evening of that day a meeting was held in the Opera House, to commemorate the anniversary of Kruger's birth, and Beyers had been advertised to give the principal address. He met with a most stormy reception; the police were called in, and under police protection he left the hall. Evidently, by many citizens at Pretoria his recent action was hotly resented; this proof of their hostility may well have intensified his bitterness against the Government, and, now that Maritz had declared himself, sped him in company on the downward path. On the next day, which was a Sunday, orders were telegraphed to all the district Commandants in the Transvaal to commandeer burghers for the defence of the Union, and the proclamation of martial law followed on the 12th. On the 13th a private

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meeting of some leading opponents of the Government was held at Kopjes. De Wet presided, and Kemp was there, but Beyers was not. Among those who were present was General Liebenberg, who had no rebel views. On the way to the meeting he had been startled by being told that plans had been formed for a full-blown rebellion, with a provisional Government, headed by Beyers as President, and de Wet and Maritz as Commandants-General, and de Wet's speech at the meeting confirmed his fears. De Wet urged that there was no time to be lost; that his hearers must collect men, each in his own district; and they must make for Maritz, who had the necessary supplies of money and ammunition. Liebenberg thereupon refused to take any hand in rebellion and induced the meeting to be content for the moment with sending a deputation to the Government at Pretoria. The delegates accordingly, on the following day, had a four hours' interview with General Botha; they asked that the troops should be withdrawn from German South-West Africa and met with the inevitable refusal. But the Prime Minister repeated his pledge that only volunteers would be employed, and he asked the delegates to use their influence to quiet the people and maintain law and order. Neither de Wet nor Kemp took part in the deputation, but de Wet accompanied them to Pretoria and spent his time in private conference with Beyers. Not a few ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, then and afterwards, were active in working in and for the rebel cause. But the leaders of the Church, it should be noted and remembered, rose to the occasion in response to General Botha. Some time previously, while at Cape Town for the meeting of Parliament, he had warned them of the imminence of rebellion, and on the 13th of October they issued a strong manifesto, condemning the rebel movement as 'a faithless breach of the treaty signed at Vereeniging and a positive sin against God'.

The first overt act of rebellion in the Transvaal was on the 19th of October. The scene, as might have been expected, was Lichtenburg. The principal actor was Claassen, the Field Cornet who, with Wolmarans, had made mischief in August. In accordance with the Government order, burghers had been collected, armed, and mounted at the Government expense; the Commandant noted signs of disaffection, and determined to move his men outside the district. When they came to

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the railway station to be entrained for Potchefstroom, Claassen mutinied and rode off at the head of a number of men with their horses and rifles, subsequently holding up trains, and commandeering burghers in Beyers's name. Beyers himself finally left Pretoria on or about this 19th of October. For some days after the meeting at the Opera House he had lain low, in or near the city; within reach, for it was at this date that he was personally invited by Botha to go down to Maritz. He now went to the westward, and it will be well to follow his movements and the course of the rebellion in the Transvaal, before noting what took place at the same time in the Orange Free State.

The half-heartedness of the rising, to which reference has already been made, was very much in evidence in the Transvaal. It was a civil war with comparatively little fighting. The Government carried to the utmost limit the policy of not creating bad blood by spilling blood. Their object was to capture or disperse any rebel forces in the field, not to kill. In the case of some actions there were subsequent disputes as to which side fired first, as though when citizens are in arms to overthrow the State, the defenders of the State are guilty, if they resort to force; and eventually the loyal troops, especially those of British extraction, began to turn restive at the leniency shown to the other side. In going westwards, Beyers was setting his face towards the rebel country of Lichtenburg, which held Kemp and his following, with Maritz and the Germans in the distant background. He went to the Magaliesberg district, where he had won distinction in the Anglo-Boer war, to a farm among the hills, called Damhoek, on the southern side of the range, over 40 miles due west of Pretoria, some 24 miles north-west of Krugersdorp, and within easy reach of Rustenburg. Here he gathered a commando, and here two emissaries visited him on behalf of the Government, in the vain hope of turning him from his evil intent. One of them was the son of Ex-President Steyn. In spite of his recent failure to induce Steyn to make a public pronouncement against Maritz, Botha again appealed to him in a letter of the 22nd of October, sent by special messenger. He wrote that the Government had sure intelligence that preparations were being made for a general insurrection, the movement being headed by de Wet, Beyers, and Kemp; and, reminding the

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Ex-President that 'Our people still continue to look up to you as their greatest figure, and they will listen to you as they would to no one else among them', he urged in the strongest terms that Steyn should write to the three men named and ask them to meet him. The letter had its effect, and Dr. Colin Steyn went forth to find the men and bring them under safe conduct of the Government to his father's home in the Free State. On the 24th he saw Beyers at Damhoek, but Beyers refused to go unless and until de Wet went also; there then ensued, as will be seen later, a search for de Wet; and meanwhile Beyers went his own way.

On the 25th he rode off with his followers to Kommissie Drift, a farm at cross roads, six miles south of Rustenburg, where other adherents of the rebel cause were gathering to meet him. Warned of the meeting, General Botha, on the night of the 26th, brought up a loyal force along the railway which runs from Pretoria to Rustenburg, and early in the morning of the 27th swooped down upon Kommissie Drift, in the hope of encircling the rebels and taking them all prisoners. The surprise was complete, but not the capture, only 90 being caught. They fled in all directions, and Beyers with a small party made westwards for 15 miles, halting at a place named Rooival or Roodewal. Colonel Dirk Van Deventer followed hard on his track with a handful of men: at Rooival there was some shooting, but the pursuers were few, their horses were tired, and on the same night Beyers, still riding in a westerly direction, reached Steenbokfontein, 30 miles distant from Kommissie Drift, to the north of the Lichtenburg district but not far from its border. Here he was joined by Kemp on the following day, and, after Beyers had addressed the burghers present, a proclamation was put forth in the nature of a protest against the invasion of German South-West Africa and against martial law, bearing the signatures of de Wet and Beyers, 'Generals of the Protesting Burghers'. De Wet's consent to the use of his name had apparently been taken for granted.

On the day before Kemp and Beyers met, on the same day on which the skirmish at Kommissie Drift took place, Kemp had been the principal speaker at a very large meeting at Hakboslaagte, about six miles north of Treurfontein, the mischievous prophet being one of his supporters. The meeting

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stood adjourned, while Kemp and the rebel commandant Wolmarans went off to fetch Beyers. Some ten days previously a loyal commando from the Standerton district, 1,000 strong, well led by Colonel J. J. Alberts, had started for the German border. It had been held up at Potchefstroom by the Government, in consequence of disquieting reports received from the Lichtenburg district. On the night of the 27th Alberts received orders to move up to Treurfontein; and, detraining his men on the 28th some distance short of that place, at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th he rode into the village of Treurfontein. He began patrolling the neighbourhood, having already caught a number of rebel scouts, and one of his commandants operating to the north of Treurfontein, in the direction of Hakboslaagte, blundered into a rebel commando and lost 110 men. Shortly afterwards the rebels were seen advancing from three directions, and Alberts accordingly disposed his men in three sections. His centre faced due north, and from the enemy ranks opposed to them some men came out with white flags, making as though they wished to parley. The commandant of the centre then sent a written note, which was carried by his brother, who walked out unarmed; and, as the latter drew near to the rebels, they shot him dead. This outrage brought on a serious fight. Alberts ordered his men to fire and charge: firing and charging, they hunted the rebels westward till nightfall for 25 miles, killing some, wounding more, and taking some hundreds of prisoners. These were Kemp's men, but were under the immediate command of Wolmarans and Claassen.

It is not clear what part, if any, Kemp took in this fray. He had parted from Beyers, but rejoined him two or three days later at Vleeskraal, still in the Lichtenburg district but some distance to the south-west of Treurfontein, well out of reach of Alberts's force. Here, on the 2nd of November, 2,000 burghers gathered together, to be told by Beyers that, now that England was at war with Germany, the time had come to win back their freedom, and that 1,000 men, under Kemp's command, were to be sent to Maritz to bring back rifles and ammunition. Volunteers were called for: 500 stepped out: 250 more were persuaded to go; and with 750 to 800 men Kemp started that same evening. As the South African War had abundantly proved, he was a resolute roughrider of the

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veld, and the venture, which he now took in hand, was almost the only incident in the rebellion which had a touch of picturesqueness and romance. Riding south-west, early on the morning of the 3rd he reached Schweizer Reineke, some 35 miles north of Bloemhof: here he commandeered supplies. Following the Harts river valley, then striking westward into the Kalahari across the railway between Taungs and Vryburg, on the 8th he drew near to Kuruman. In the days of Moffat and Livingstone the name of Kuruman was known as that of a remote missionary outpost, a kind of sacred oasis in the desert, with an ever-running stream. In the Anglo-Boer war the little town had been hardly pressed, bravely held, taken and retaken; and now a Boer commando threatened it once more. Some 300 fighting-men had been raised in the district to provide for such an emergency as had arisen; but the large majority of them, with their commander, were at the moment 100 miles away, called off by rumour of a German inroad. There was, however, left a Captain in the Defence Force, Frylinck by name, in private life an attorney, practising at Kuruman; he showed a bold front and was more than equal to the occasion. Early on the morning of the 8th, with 25 to 30 men, he went out to meet and skirmished with Kemp's advance guard: he fell back fighting on the town, was reinforced by 50 more men, beat off the rebels and held the forts. Kemp then encamped three miles beyond the town, and sent in an ultimatum. There was a meeting between him and Frylinck: Kemp demanded a surrender of the Government property: the stout-hearted attorney refused to surrender anything. The townspeople and the police gave way, handing over horses and rifles; but Frylinck and his 75 men would have none of it, and took up a position four miles away, within reach of water, with rifles, horses, cattle, and wagons. The rebels surrounded them, but either from policy or from want of ammunition made no attack, and on the afternoon of the 9th Kemp made off again. Full of fight, Frylinck hung on to his heels; the missing loyalists with their Colonel came up and followed too: another small band joined in the pursuit; while far in the background, too late for the fighting, Alberts and his commando came down from the Transvaal. Sixty miles west of Kuruman, on the 13th, the Kuruman men headed Kemp out of his course, farther into the desert, away from all

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chance of loot. Three days later, at Witzand in the Gordonia district, where he was fain to water, they worried him for the best part of a day. Then they could follow no farther, and on the 18th Kemp struck the Orange river at or near Kheis. Kheis lies a long distance south-east of Upington, half-way between that place and Prieska. Between Upington and Kheis the river makes one of its great semicircles, with the convex side of the arc towards the north. To reach the German border and safety, Kemp had to trek down the river to the north-west, while the troops from Upington, moving north-east, would cut his route. He was fighting more or less the whole way. From the moment that he reached Kheis patrols buzzed around him. At a place named Rooidam, 35 miles north-east of Upington,[1] in the sand dunes on the edge of the desert, Bouwer, the new commander of the Upington forces, brought him to bay; but yet again he slipped away, helped by a kindly fall of rain. He now rode west, and on the 26th of November, at Zwart Modder, by the dry bed of the Molopo river, fighting still, at length he joined hands with a party of the Vrij Korps from German territory. He moved on slightly to the north, to Grondneus, over against Nakob, where he was again reinforced; and here for the time being his troubles ended. He had lost a third of the number with which he started; and the five hundred who remained were worn out, ragged, largely horseless. But the Germans gave them food and clothing, as they passed on to Nakob, where they waited for two days, they were harangued into high hopes by Maritz and a German officer who was with him; and, as November ended, they crossed into German territory, to be in due course refitted and reorganized. Kemp had achieved a great feat of courage and endurance. For over three weeks he had trekked, beset with foes, traversing waterless desert. He had held his men together and won through: he rode in a bad cause but he rode boldly and well.

On the evening on which Kemp left Vleeskraal, Beyers

[1] The maps, including the map attached to the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, from which the map given in this book has been taken, place Rooidam west of Upington; but Colonel Bouwer's evidence is perfectly explicit on the point, that it was to the north-east, as given in the text. Possibly there were two places of the same name. It is exceedingly difficult to follow this last stage of Kemp's riding, e. g. the fight at Rooidam is dated the 26th of November, and the arrival at Zwart Modder is dated the same day, which would seem to be impossible.

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moved south at the head of 1,100 or 1,200 men, making for the Free State and de Wet. On the 4th of November the Government had telegraphed instructions to the commandants and magistrates in the different areas of the Transvaal, to circulate messages through their districts, intimating to the burghers who had gone out that, if they laid down their arms at once and went to their homes, no steps would be taken against them and they would suffer no harm. A Lichtenburg man, sent with these tidings to the Lichtenburg rebels, reached Beyers's laager on the 4th: he was not allowed to communicate with the rank and file, but had a long interview with Beyers himself. Beyers, after consulting his Council of War, evolved proposals for what was styled 'a friendly solution of the present position', the main terms of which were that the Government should continue to employ only volunteers against the Germans and that no rebel officer or leader should be prosecuted. The terms were telegraphed to Pretoria, and were accepted, provided that surrender took place immediately. Meanwhile, Beyers and his commando had moved on again, and on the 5th crossed the railway line from Fourteen Streams to Potchefstroom, near the roadside station of Kingswood, within six miles of the Vaal river. There was a small Government force stationed at Kingswood, patrolling the line: Beyers's men were seen cutting the railway fence and the loyalists fired upon them. The rebels passed on to the river, followed by the loyalists: shots were interchanged and a few casualties resulted, but on the same night Beyers took his men across the river and encamped on the Free State side. Here, on the next day, the 6th, he received the Government's answer to his proposals and stipulated that, before laying down his arms, he should be given a pass to meet de Wet and that his men should not be molested in the meantime. The reply, which was dated the same day, was a free conduct for him to visit Ex-President Steyn, to whom, it was understood, de Wet was on his way, but the suggestion that military operations should be suspended was not accepted. Before this message could be received, Beyers had trekked again and laagered at Gruis Drift on the Vet river, 20 miles south of the Vaal. Here, in the early morning of the 7th, he was surprised by a strong Government force and over 350 of his men were taken prisoners. After this fight the safe conduct reached his hands, and, having

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trekked still farther south with his commando, to Bultfontein in the Hoopstad district, he went to Bloemfontein to visit Steyn at the latter's home at Onze Rust. He saw him on the 10th of November: de Wet was not there, and Steyn telegraphed to General Smuts, strongly urging that a free pass should be given to Beyers to go to de Wet. But de Wet at the time was in the full tide of fighting and looting, and a meeting between him and Beyers, now chastened by adversity would only have revived the drooping spirits of the latter and prolonged the rebellion. Smuts accordingly refused and on the 12th of November Beyers was sent safely back to his commando, which, reinforced by a contingent under Conroy, now numbered some 1,500 men. While he was still laagered near Bultfontein, a Government force of 1,000 men under Colonel Celliers, which had been sent up from Kimberley to Boshof to intercept him if he moved farther south, came upon the scene; and on the 16th of November the rebels attacked. They were broken and dispersed, losing in a three days' chase from 500 to 600 prisoners. For Beyers this was the beginning of the end, and for the next three weeks, the last three weeks of his life, he was a hunted fugitive. With a few men he fled east, in the direction of Reitz, then doubled back westward into the Hoopstad district, and finally turned north, making for the Vaal. On the 8th of December, his small following of some 30 men was harried by Government troops and driven to the river, at a point near where he had crossed on his way south. After some fighting on the river-bank the rebels surrendered, all but two. Beyers and one other had ridden into the river, heading for the farther side; they were sighted and fired on; to protect themselves they slipped off their horses, the river was in flood and carried them under. When Beyers's body was recovered two days later, there was no mark of a bullet wound upon it; the river of the country had swept him away, he was not killed by his countrymen.

So ended the tainted career of a gifted man, who in earlier days had served his people well. When Delarey died, the rebellion, not yet disclosed, lost its one faint chance of enlisting character on its side. When Beyers was drowned in the Vaal river, the rebellion in being lost what brain power it possessed. In either case it was a merciful ending, well for the man—and better for South Africa.

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As has been said, the rebellion did not touch the eastern Transvaal. Apart from other reasons, the eastern districts were very especially General Botha's 'sphere of influence'. Here had been his old home, and his personality dominated the east just as Delarey in his lifetime led the west. The eastern limit of the rising may be taken to have been Bronkhorstspruit, about 40 miles east of Pretoria. Here the minister of the Dutch Church was a ringleader of the local rebels, and a member of the Union Senate, Wolmarans, made a mischievous speech at a meeting held on the 12th of October. Outside the western area of the province, not all of which was seriously disaffected, the Pretoria district, with the adjoining district of Rustenburg on the west, and Waterberg on the north, were the only parts of the country which gave trouble. There was some evidence to show that, when Beyers finally went out, leaving Pretoria for Damhoek, he had in his mind a plan to rush the capital and overthrow the Government by a combined attack from all sides. He himself was to come in from the west, de Wet from the south, and simultaneous attempts were to be made from the east and north. If he had any such scheme, it was scattered to the winds when his commando was broken up at Kommissie Drift. On the eastern side of the city the leader was to be General Christian Muller. He had been a hard-fighting officer in the South African War, and had greatly distinguished himself in the later stages of the war under Viljoen's command, along the line of the Delagoa Bay Railway. After the war he was a business man of substance in Pretoria, a contractor and chairman of the Transvaal Land Bank. He was one of the small group of Transvaal Commandants who showed restiveness and suspicion of the Government at the first conference of Commandants on the 14th of August, and his name was in the list of the men by whom Maritz professed that he would be guided. He was in Beyers's confidence, but, like some others, appears to have hesitated before finally committing himself and, through the intervention of a friend, had a personal interview with General Botha, who nearly dissuaded him from joining the rebels. A few days after Beyers left Pretoria, he made up his mind the wrong way and went out on the 24th of October. His first rallying-point was a farm, Donkerhoek, about 15 miles from Pretoria on the eastern side, on the Diamond Hill battle-

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field. Here he made an Independence speech, but seems only to have attracted a small following, which, however, was considerably increased when, on the 29th of October, he moved on to Bronkhorstspruit. On the 5th of November, at the Albert Silver Mine, near Bronkhorstspruit, Government forces came into touch with his commando. There was an interchange of messages, and the rebels were invited to surrender unconditionally, but rode off amid desultory fighting. Two days later, on the 7th, they were surrounded at a place called Molutzekop: Muller was badly wounded; the second in command, Wolmarans (not the Senator) was killed; and most of their followers were taken. Muller escaped for the moment, but a few days later was taken also.

The rebels who had fled from Kommissie Drift dispersed in different directions. Parties trekked in and out of the Magaliesberg range and along the Crocodile river, most of them eventually making northwards for the difficult Waterberg district, behind which was the Bushveld. They were dogged here and there by Government forces, the chief commandant on the Government side being Colonel Dirk Van Deventer. He drove them out of the hills near Waterberg, intercepted them from trekking farther north, and they were gradually caught or surrendered in small detachments. The rebel among them who gave most trouble and was reported to have caused most loss of life was a man of the name of Fourie, known as Japie Fourie. He was on active service under the Government when he joined the rebel ranks, and, having been at length caught on the 16th of December, was four days later court-martialled and shot—the only rebel who suffered the death penalty. By the end of the year the movement in the Transvaal had been finally stamped out.

The Free State, from its central position, was a special danger zone, and the seeds of disaffection had long been in the soil. The Free Staters, as a body, had been more reluctant than the men of the Transvaal to accept the terms of Vereeniging, and Steyn had refused them to the end. When, after the war, responsible government was given to the Orange river Colony, as it was then styled, the British minority was too small to induce moderation and compromise, and Hertzog's Education Act was at once evidence and embodiment of anti-British feeling and policy. Hertzog carried on his bitterness

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into the Union Parliament, and, when he broke with Botha, the adherents of the nationalist party, which he formed, were mainly drawn from the Free State. Personal antipathy, party faction, and republican sentiment all combined in this Province, and all were favourable to rebellion. It is probable that, while Beyers resented the authority of Smuts, de Wet was jealous of Botha's commanding position; and, though Hertzog stood outside the confessed rebels, his hostile attitude to the Prime Minister was, in the first degree, a contributing cause of the trouble. That seems to have been the opinion of a leading Free Stater, Colonel George Brand, who told the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, 'I have come to the conclusion that the whole thing is based on personality and spite.' General Brits was equally outspoken—'The personal hatred against the Government was the immediate cause or motive which led these disappointed political sedition-mongers to arouse to its utmost the race hatred which culminated in the rebellion.' Because, again, in party politics the Free State was anti-Government, therefore the rebellion in the Free State attracted a relatively larger number of men in responsible positions than was the case in the Transvaal, more rebels being subsequently brought up for trial before the Special Tribunals from this Province than from the Transvaal and the Cape together; and because Hertzog had divided the Union House of Assembly against the Government policy in regard to German South-West Africa, and it must have been well known that Steyn shared his views, the rising, assiduously presented as a protest against that policy, was specially plausible in the Free State. After the mischief had been done, Steyn and Hertzog exerted themselves to effect a compromise, which would quiet down the civil war already begun; but, inasmuch as it was perfectly obvious that they held the Government responsible for the trouble, there could only be one conclusion, that their sympathies were with the rebels. They had not spoken out in repudiation of Maritz's treachery, and when de Wet, in open rebellion, represented to the people that they were on his side, no contradiction was forthcoming. On the 17th of November, General Smuts telegraphed to Steyn—'No word from you to your people has publicly gone forth, advising them and pointing out their duty. Your silence, however well meant, is taken by many as approval of de Wet's attitude and allegations.'

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In civil life these two men were by far the most influential figures in the Free State; but, when fighting was in the air, no name in the Province could compete with that of de Wet. He was now 60 years of age. He never sat in the Union Parliament, but, when Hertzog formed his dissentient party, he became, outside Parliament, a strong supporter of it. Outwardly he did not figure at all in the prelude to the rebel movement, and it was only after Delarey's death that he took a prominent part. But, having begun, he excelled all others in reckless violence. Beyond question, his entry into the rebellion constituted its great danger in the Free State; but, equally beyond question, his conduct of the rebellion in the province was its undoing. Not only did it bring General Botha personally into the field, with his best Commandants; but de Wet's own blatant folly, and his terrorizing methods, must have alienated from him many citizens of doubtful mind but of more sober sense than he exhibited. He insulted magistrates and mayors, looted shops and post offices, and made a burlesque of his cause by a speech, in which he gave as a typical instance of the oppression against which the Free Staters were invited to rise, that he had been fined 5*s*. for striking a Kaffir. He was, in short, at this stage of his career an impossible man who made his cause impossible.

The area of disturbance covered the northern and more especially the north-eastern districts of the province, where of late years he had made his home and where his influence was strongest. The townships entered and left, the scenes of the fighting were very much the same as had become familiar in the South African War. Open disaffection did not spread to the southern half of the Province below Bloemfontein. Nor were there wanting men of position to support the Government by force of arms when the crisis came, Brand, Manie Botha, and others. Brand, who has already been mentioned, was son of the wise and moderate President of former years, Sir John Brand, and inherited his father's qualities. He had been one of de Wet's best officers in the South African War and had opposed acceptance of the terms of peace. But, as an officer in the Defence Force of the Union, he knew and did his duty and, as will be seen, it was his command which took the principal part in breaking up de Wet's muster in Mushroom Valley. De Wet appealed to him as one of his dearest and bravest

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generals in the past: the answer went back that on de Wet alone rested 'the responsibility for this stain on the history of the Afrikander people in the Free State'.

At the Kopjes meeting of the 13th of October it was announced that a further meeting would be held on the 22nd near the same place. Accordingly, on the 22nd a large number of burghers, some of them armed, were gathered together, but the meeting resolved itself into a private conference of leaders under de Wet's chairmanship. Kemp was present; one or two Free State members of the Union Parliament were also present, and the following resolution was passed:

'Whereas the Dutch South African people in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal are oppressed, the meeting resolves to confide all further measures to General Beyers in the Transvaal and to General De Wet in the Orange Free State.'

It will be remembered that, subsequently to the earlier meeting, de Wet had conferred with Beyers at Pretoria, and that on the 19th Beyers had gone out to Damhoek. From the meeting on the 22nd de Wet went home to his farm near Memel, a small township in the Vrede district, near to the Transvaal border and still nearer to Natal. Recruiting for the rebellion began, and a son of de Wet crossed into the Transvaal to beat up recruits. But the Transvaalers on this side were supporters of the Government, so much so that from Volksrust, 30 miles from Memel, two emissaries went forth in a motor-car, on their own initiative, to find de Wet and dissuade him from his headlong enterprise. They found him eventually, but only to be arrested with their chauffeur and carried along with him as prisoners. He started from his home on the 27th of October with 70 men; and, picking up more as he went along, on the 28th rode into Vrede, 40 miles from Memel, at the head of 300 followers. Here he made his famous 5*s.* speech, forcing the magistrate who had committed the outrage of fining him to be present and take note of his words. With abundant insults to the magistrate, Mr. Fraser, who was a brother-in-law of Steyn, he announced his intention to join Maritz and procure arms, then to move on Pretoria and proclaim 'a free South African Republic'. At the outset of his speech he told his hearers—'I can never commit a greater

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act of rebellion than I have already committed.' Yet, when on his trial before the special tribunal, he pleaded Not Guilty of treason, and even recanted his first confession of having been guilty of sedition. The movement had by this time taken fire farther west, in the Heilbron and Vredefort districts. Heilbron proved to be a hot-bed of rebels, the leader among them being Rocco de Villiers, a local attorney, whom de Wet rewarded by appointing him an Assistant Commandant-General. De Wet visited the town on his way to and from Kopjes, with the result that the two local Commandants of the Defence Force suddenly went over to the rebels. In the Vredefort district, where Serfontein, one of two rebels of that name, uncle and nephew, men of political standing and influence, had been at work, Kopjes, Parys, Vredefort, were all entered by rebel forces. On both sides of the main railway the north of the Free State was rising in arms against or for the Government.

De Wet rode out of Vrede towards Lindley on the evening of the 28th, but camped on the way, and did not reach Lindley till the 3rd of November. In the interval he was visited, on the 29th, by Hertzog and Colin Steyn together, and promised he would go to visit the Ex-President, if Beyers went too. He also received deputations from the Senekal and Bethlehem districts; for the whole countryside was in confusion, and the most part of the people knew not what to do or why. The deputation from Senekal, commissioned to remonstrate with de Wet, came back impressed in his favour; and of the two local Commandants, one joined the rebels with a majority of followers, the other stood firm for the Government. The Bethlehem deputation interviewed de Wet, went on to Pretoria, interviewed and scolded General Botha, came back to de Wet and interviewed him a second time, urging him, as General Botha had advised, to visit Steyn, and proposing personally to conduct him. He promised to go, but put off, and shortly afterwards some 600 men of the Bethlehem district went out with the rebels.

Reinforced from one quarter and another, de Wet entered Lindley with 1,200 men behind him. Moving on in a snowball progress, gathering recruits, looting, cutting up the railway, he rode south-west and, on the 7th of November, encamped six miles north of the Sand river, at a farm named Lindeques

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Kraal, east of which, and nearer the river, on the same northern side, is the Doornberg, which had seen no little fighting in the South African War. Its slopes and ridges run west and east for some six miles, parallel to the river. On the evening of this same day, a small loyal force under Commandant Cronje, ordered north from Winburg, laagered over against Doornberg, on the southern bank of the river, having ascertained that the rebels were encamped at Lindeques Kraal. On the next morning Cronje crossed the river with part of his commando to reconnoitre, and was attacked by much superior numbers, the rebels attempting to cut him off from the river and from the main body of his men on the southern side. There was a race for a kopje, which commanded the road and the bridge, shooting at close quarters followed and lives were lost on both sides. Either side claimed that their adversaries fired first, and the rebels brought an unfounded charge against Cronje's men of misusing the white flag. After this skirmish Cronje with his immediate following fell back, fighting continuously, not on Winburg but on Theunissen or Smaldeel junction, where the Winburg line joins the trunk railway. The main part of his force had already gone back to Winburg; and on the next morning, the 9th, de Wet rode into the town. His son had been killed in the Doornberg fight and, embittered by the loss, he excelled himself in violence and outrage. The Mayor was assaulted, the Magistrate arrested and carried off, stores and private houses were ransacked, and, after a day's wholesale looting, the rebels, now amounting to 4,000 men, made off on the 10th in a south-easterly direction, riding towards Clocolan and Ladybrand.

Some 18 miles south-east of Winburg, more south than east, on the line of the Little Vet river, is a tract known as Mushroom Valley, though hardly a valley in the strict sense. Here, after the South African War and under the Crown Colony régime, irrigation works were initiated and carried out with much success, an artificial lake being created, two miles long. At the end of the valley nearest Winburg is the ridge of high ground known as Hoenderkop. In Mushroom Valley, as a good rendezvous, de Wet laagered, and commandos kept coming in until his force seems to have numbered at least 5,000 men. General Botha, meanwhile, on being notified of Cronje's reverse, came down from Pretoria to Theunissen with

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a strong body of troops, and reached Winburg on the night of the 11th. Brits and Lukin, who had both been brought back from the German border, were ordered to co-operate with their forces, and so was Brand with his brigade. The plan was the standard South African plan, to try to encircle the enemy, and it had a common South African result, of achieving substantial but not complete success. Brand was to march direct on the valley and make the main attack; on his right, Lukin was to bar the west; Brits, leaving the railway at Brandfort, was to come round to the southern and south-eastern side, barring the exit in the direction of Clocolan; while Botha himself was to come in on the north, having made a cross-country detour to the road from Marquard to the valley. Marquard was a township of recent date, lying 27 miles east-south-east of Winburg, and had taken its name from a former Dutch minister of Winburg, much respected and loved. Brand, who had guns with him, trekked through the night of the 11th, took possession of Hoenderkop at daybreak on the 12th, and promptly attacked the main rebel force. The rebels were completely surprised and, after a short engagement, broken up and dispersed; but, unfortunately, the other commanders had not yet taken up their appointed positions and the circle was not complete. The rebels fled north, but came up against Botha, then turned south towards Clocolan. Eventually, five or six hundred were caught, but, on the day after the fight, on the 13th, de Wet, who had not forgotten his cunning, slipped past Botha and made off to the north-west with 2,000 men. Mushroom Valley was, on a larger scale, a repetition of Kommissie Drift. In either case the encircling movement partially failed; but, on the other hand, the dispersal was complete and the cohesion, which the rebels then lost, was never subsequently regained.

On the 12th of November, the day of the Mushroom Valley fight, Beyers, it will be remembered, left Steyn and returned to his commando at Bultfontein, where, possibly, de Wet may have hoped to join him. Enslin, who, like Brits, had been recalled from the Upington district, was guarding the main line south of Kroonstad, when news reached him that de Wet might be expected. At daybreak on the 16th, the same day on which Celliers broke up Beyers's force and drove Beyers eastward, de Wet made a strong attack on Enslin's troops at

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Virginia Station, where the line crosses the Sand river, and where there had been a severe action in the South African War. Enslin captured 50 of de Wet's men, followed him down the Sand river and took more. Shedding his men, as before he had gathered them, de Wet fled through the Hoopstad district and crossed the Vaal. But it was not as it had been in the South African War, when his pursuers were not sons of the soil, when every farm-house gave him a welcome, and every Dutchman was his friend. Brand had warned him that he had against him men who knew the country as well as himself, and motor-cars move quicker than horses. He rode through the Wolmaranstad district, and on the 27th of November crossed the great north railway above Vryburg with hardly more than a hundred men. On this same morning Brits reached Vryburg to follow him up and telegraphed for motor-cars, which were sent up by special train from Kimberley. On the 29th, 50 of the fugitives were caught, including the Transvaal rebel Commandant, Wolmarans, and on the 30th the motor contingent came within sight and shooting distance of the 50 men who still toiled on. The sandy desert held up the motors at the remote police outpost of Morokwen, about 100 miles north-west of Vryburg; and 80 mounted men, under Colonel Jordaan, with two useful camp followers in the shape of camels, then took up the trail. Their orders were not to come back without de Wet. Fifty miles more they rode through the desert, and eventually they came up with him on the morning of the 2nd of December, in the extreme north of British Bechuanaland, 15 miles from the bed of the Molopo river, on a desolate so-called farm named Waterbury, where no white man permanently lived. Even then he tried to ride off on his worn-out horse; but his enemies were all round him, and the old past master of escapes was caught at last.

On the 12th of November the Government issued a proclamation intimating that, with the exception of the leaders in the rebellion and of those who had violated the rules of civilized warfare, all rebels in the field who surrendered voluntarily and gave up their arms and any Government property in their possession to the nearest magistrate before the 21st of November, would not be criminally prosecuted but allowed to go to their homes, on condition that they in no way further abetted the rebellion. Dated, as it was, on the day on which the

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Mushroom Valley rout took place, this notice had an excellent effect, as was shown by details of surrenders communicated to the Press on the 21st. It would have been still more fruitful had not the rebel leaders used every effort to keep the terms from the knowledge of their men and to feed them instead with lying reports that the Government intended to confiscate their property and deport them beyond the seas. The time limit of the amnesty was therefore extended for the rank and file, and, on the other hand, instructions were given on the 28th of November to commandeer the live stock of recalcitrant rebel leaders, though this order was subsequently withdrawn.

In the north-east of the Free State, where de Wet's influence was greatest, the rebellion was widespread and comparatively longlived. The leader in the Harrismith district was Wessel Wessels, a man of standing and position, and a member of the Union Council of Defence. He posed as taking action on the Government side, while in secret communication with de Wet; and he stooped to tampering with the loyalty of the neighbouring Basutos, a letter from him of the 15th of November being intercepted, in which the Basuto chiefs were informed that Wessels and his fellow rebels stood 'on the side of the German Government and Emperor Wilhelm'. On the morning of the 2nd of November, still under the guise of a supporter of the Government, he held up and disarmed the town of Harrismith, his men pulling up the railway on both sides of the town and breaking communication with loyal Natal. A second entry into the town a few days later had for its object and as its result commandeering of stores. Wessels then operated as an Assistant Commandant-General to de Wet in this eastern section of the province. His home was not at or in the neighbourhood of Harrismith, but near Reitz, and Reitz, from its central position, was the main scene of his activities. It lies about 50 miles from Harrismith to the west of north, on the railway between Frankfort and Bethlehem and half-way between these two places. On the 24th of October it was rushed by a rebel force from Frankfort under Nicholas Serfontein, the member for Frankfort in the Union Parliament, and remained in rebel hands till the 4th of December; the local Commandant joined the rebels, and it was estimated that nine-tenths of the population of the town and the surrounding district was actively or passively on the rebel side. In the

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latter part of November, Beyers paid a hurried visit to the district, after the rout of his forces at Bultfontein. Here, on the 23rd of November, Wessels issued two proclamations as Assistant Commandant-General, threatening opponents of the rebel cause with arrest and deportation, and announcing that the rebels were out to win back the independence of South Africa. 'We are determined to win,' he announced, 'indeed our cause is won.' At this date he had to hand an appreciably strong force, for he had been joined by Nicholas Serfontein and his Frankfort commando, and also by the Heilbron men whom the rebel Commandant, Van Coller, led. Still his announcement was somewhat premature, for, de Wet being now in full flight from the Free State, General Botha gave his personal attention to this rebel concentration at Reitz. With ample forces at his disposal, under some of the best Commandants, he organized a drive on the lines with which this area of the State had been made very familiar in the South African War. There were various skirmishes, and the Government troops reoccupied Reitz on the 4th of December; on the 5th Wessels and his two rebel colleagues, beginning to realize the position, but not yet knowing of the collapse of de Wet, made overtures to Botha on the basis of being allowed to communicate with de Wet. They were told that de Wet had been taken and were urged to desist from further armed opposition. They tried one more letter, were answered with a demand for immediate and unconditional surrender, and they surrendered accordingly on the 8th of December with 1,200 men, at Tiger river, two or three miles from Reitz on the Bethlehem side. In the course of the next few days there were other piecemeal surrenders: Conroy, one of the irreconcilables, was caught; and before the year ended, as in the Transvaal, so in the Orange Free State, the rebellion was at an end.

In the seclusion of Jerusalem Maritz regained his health and spirits. On the 18th of November two officers of the Union Defence Force, who were scouting south of the Orange river, came into touch with him at Nous, which lies a little east of south from Schuit Drift. There was a conference, at which Maritz tried to seduce the two officers from their allegiance, while they in turn attempted to persuade him to surrender—in either case without success. Maritz was accom-

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and the capture or surrender of small parties, here and there, completed the tale. Kemp surrendered with his men, but not so Maritz. Once again, as after the South African War, he preferred exile to becoming amenable to the laws of his country: with 50 others he rode off into German territory, and a little later sought more obscurity and greater safety in Portuguese West Africa. The prophet appeared again upon the stage in the last act. Presumably, Kemp had brought him down from the Transvaal, and he continued to have visions in Maritz's camp, though he prudently declined to foresee when a loyalist commandant, whom Maritz had taken prisoner, would be sent home. He was one of those who surrendered at Upington, and his end, as far as the rebellion was concerned, was a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment.

After the fight at Upington the Germans sent out a force to support Maritz, and a little later made a small attack on Kakamas, without success. The leading opponents in the Union of the invasion of German South-West Africa made much of the friendship shown by the Germans to the Boers at the time of the South African War, to which the pertinent rejoinder was made, in what way and to what extent had German friendship borne fruit? The same question might have been repeated after the rebellion came to an end. It is true that in some degree the Germans had given substantial assistance. German territory became a base for attack upon the Union and a refuge for the rebels, when hard pressed. Money, food, clothing, guns, rifles, ammunition, had been supplied. On the other hand, German soldiers took little part in fighting by the rebels' side, such fighting men as co-operated from German territory being mainly Boer residents in that territory. In the last stage of the rebellion Maritz and Kemp, with their forces, were given notice to quit the German Protectorate, because food supplies were running short: when the surrender came, the Germans were at pains to secure the horses of derelict rebels and to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the Union Government; and when Maritz sent back across the border the German guns and field train, which had been lent to him, in charge of 50 men, the men themselves were detained and not allowed to go back to their land. The Germans guaranteed the existence of an independent South

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African Republic, if and when that Republic should have been achieved; but the achieving was left to the Boers themselves, and from the Republic, when established, was to be deducted Walvis Bay for the benefit of Germany. A telegram from the Kaiser himself, which was published at Windhoek on the 17th of October 1914, gave or confirmed the guarantee; but the condition was made that the rebels should attack immediately. In the words of a witness before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, who had lived for over ten years in German South-West Africa, the Germans had no love for the Afrikanders, 'they threw the chestnuts into the fire and the Afrikanders were to pull them out'. A fairer way of putting it is that the Germans wanted to use the Afrikanders for German purposes, just as, in turn, the rebels wished to make use of the Germans. The German attitude was quite intelligible. After the rebellion ample evidence was forthcoming, though no evidence was needed, of German intrigue in the Union long before the war came to pass, and, as a means of giving trouble, wholesale rebellion against Great Britain on the part of the Dutch Afrikanders would obviously have been welcome to Germany. But, short of this, the facts of the case were, that while the rebel leaders were boldly advertising the magnitude of the help which would be forthcoming from the Germans, the latter were not only not able to give help in the form of a strong army but had no adequate force to defend their own borders. The number of troops in German South-West Africa had of late years been depleted and, if there had been no rebellion, possibly no attempt might have been made to defend the Protectorate against British ships and South African forces. Hence, in default of a rising *en masse* in the Union, very possibly even in preference to it, what the German authorities most desired was to remain on friendly terms with the Government and people of the Union—in their own phraseology, not to bring the European war into South Africa. They knew that, in the event of war, their South-West Africa must fall into the enemy's hands, that they would thereby be deprived of a base for raiding British sea-borne traffic, of a long-distance wireless station, of various facilities for helping their own cause and injuring that of Great Britain: they realized that British occupation of their territory meant, to put it at the lowest, handing over to Great Britain a valuable

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panied by Germans and by Piet de Wet, and the latter confided to one of the two loyalists that Maritz had been premature in starting the rebellion, having received in September a dispatch from Beyers, in which he was instructed to hold his hand until Beyers made the first move. The day on which this meeting took place was the day on which Kemp reached Kheis: in the course of the next ten days Kemp and Maritz joined hands, and, as soon as Kemp's men had been brought over the border, the two rebel leaders, on the 2nd of December, went on to Keetmanshoop, to confer with the German Governor, to procure arms and ammunition, and to settle their plans for the future.

At this time and place a long manifesto was drawn up, addressed 'To the People of South Africa', and fathered by Maritz, as 'Commandant-General of the Republican Forces in the Cape Province, with the consent of the Provisional Government'. It was highly seasoned with statements and allegations of the familiar kind: it proclaimed a free and independent South Africa; and it gave a list of the names of those who were presumed to have been chosen to form a Provisional Government, headed by Beyers and de Wet. It seems to have been the practice among the rebels to append each other's names to their proclamations, and Kemp pleaded at his trial that his signature had not been authorized. The record of this particular document is interesting. It was sent to Windhoek to be printed, and it was eventually published on the 30th of December, in a Windhoek newspaper printed in Dutch but edited by a German, which had a short life of about six months from the beginning of September 1914, covering the period of the rebellion. The proclamation bore the date of the 16th of December; and it appeared from evidence subsequently given by Piet de Wet to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, that when the printed version came back to Maritz, he tried to suppress it, having probably by that time learnt that Beyers was dead and de Wet a prisoner.

There was sporadic fighting in the course of December in the Schuit Drift area, and Maritz achieved some small success. Subsequently to a fruitless attempt made by Union troops from Kakamas to round up a local rebel, Stadler, he captured a loyalist commandant with ten other men, and a few days later, on the 18th of December, attacked Nous, taking

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130 prisoners. About this date Kemp's commando, again ready to take the field, joined Maritz's force at Schuit Drift, while on the Government side the command at Upington had, in the middle of December, been taken over from Bouwer by General J. L. Van Deventer.[1]

The New Year opened; the rebel fortunes were at a low ebb; Kemp was in bad health; German support was becoming precarious. There was a small fight in Union territory, west of Upington, at a place called Lutzeputs; and later, on the 23rd of January, Maritz sent one of his officers to Upington to treat for surrender. Van Deventer telegraphed to Pretoria for instructions, detaining the messenger in the meantime; and either because Maritz suspected treachery, or in order to snatch a success which would ensure more favourable terms, or again, because the Germans could no longer feed his men and Upington was the only remaining source of supplies—whatever was his motive, at daybreak on the next day, the 24th, he attacked Upington in force. Van Deventer had 2,000 men under him, considerably outnumbering the rebels; but he had several miles of front to hold; spies were plentiful in Upington, and the arrangements made for the defence of the town must have been well known to Maritz. Moreover, the Germans had supplied him with artillery, the guns being, it was said, served by ex-Transvaal artillerymen. It was a hot attack and achieved initial success, the rebels effecting a lodgement in some of the town defences. But subsequently the garrison, in their turn, brought guns into play, and about noon the attacking force was beaten off, with the loss of 70 prisoners, over and above other casualties, which were considerable on both sides. It was a last effort, and on that same evening Maritz wrote to Van Deventer asking for a personal conference to negotiate surrender. On the next day Van Deventer sent an answer in terms dictated from Pretoria, demanding unconditional surrender, but giving hope of lenient treatment. The conference took place on the 30th: terms were drawn up and signed, providing for the surrender of over 1,200 men: the main body of rebels surrendered at Upington on the 2nd and 3rd of February: others came in at Kakamas;

[1] Afterwards Sir Jacob Van Deventer, Commander-in-Chief in the latter part of the East African Campaign. He was not the Van Deventer mentioned above as having done good service at Kommissie Drift and in the Waterberg, who was his brother.

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pawn wherewith to negotiate at the end of the war. What would have suited them best was that the Union of South Africa should remain neutral and German South-West Africa should remain safe: in other words, the policy of South African neutrality, which Hertzog and those who thought with him advocated, was emphatically the German policy, for the simple reason that, in its practical effect, it meant siding with Germany against England. It may be summed up that the partnership between the Germans and the rebel Boers was ill assorted and insecure, having no basis beyond that of a common enmity. The outcome of it was to supply the best possible argument for ousting Germany from South-West Africa, and to leave to the unsuccessful rebels the melancholy reflection that they had relied on a broken reed.

Very shortly after the rebellion ended, Parliament met at Cape Town on the 26th of February 1915. Four members of the House of Assembly were reported as being in custody, three of them being Free State representatives, and two of the three, the Serfonteins, uncle and nephew, representing Kroonstad and Frankfort respectively, in the heart of the rebel districts. The elder Serfontein, however, in a few days' time, was back in his place in the House and spoke, with little sign of contrition for what had taken place. The Governor-General's speech referred to the armed rebellion which had broken out 'as the result of a treacherous conspiracy', the suppression of which had cost much blood and treasure; but it noted, on the other hand, and rightly, that the great bulk of the population had remained 'thoroughly loyal in its support of the constituted authority of the Union', and that many thousands 'willingly underwent danger and privation in order to restore peace and to vindicate the honour of the Union'. General Botha was absent in German South-West Africa, and Smuts led for the Government; but the Prime Minister sent a message, which his colleague read out, making an earnest appeal to Parliament 'to put aside, when considering the treatment of rebels, all feelings of revenge or reprisal', and advocating a policy of wise forbearance, especially in regard to the rank and file.

On the 1st of March a Blue Book was laid before Parliament, entitled *Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government with regard to its Suppression.*

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It had been written by Professor Leo Fouché, Professor of History in the Transvaal University College at Pretoria. He had been employed by the Minister of Defence, General Smuts, to write the daily bulletins for the Ministry, as the rebellion ran its course, and, from the material which the Government had to hand, was asked to compile the very able record which was now given to Parliament and to the public. The substance of this Report and its conclusions were not likely to commend themselves to Hertzog, who regarded the Blue Book as a Government brief, and he moved for a Select Parliamentary Committee to inquire into the armed rising. The terms of his motion were recast by Mr. Merriman, and the motion, as amended, was accepted by the Government. The Committee of seven, with Mr. Duncan as Chairman, began sitting on the 5th of March, and on the 16th of April reported the evidence of 24 witnesses, not having time to do more, as Parliament was prorogued on the 21st of that month.

While the question of a Select Committee was being debated, a suggestion was made that a Judicial Commission of Inquiry should be held ; but it was pointed out that such a Commission must wait until the trials of the rebels had been concluded. Eventually, on the 5th of November 1915, a Commission of three Supreme Court Judges of the Cape Division was appointed ' to inquire into and report upon the causes of and circumstances surrounding the recent Rebellion in South Africa ', Mr. Justice Lange being Chairman ; and, though the inquiry was boycotted by those who sympathized with the Rebellion, at the end of 1916 a report was issued, with a volume of evidence, which will stand to all time as the most authoritative account of the rising, with the most measured and impartial verdict.

The Session produced two Acts, as the outcome of the Rebellion. One was ' The Removal of Disabilities (War and Rebellion) Act, 1915 ', the object of which was to prevent Members of Parliament and electors from losing their seats and votes respectively, through absence on active service. The second, which was the main contentious Act of the Session, was ' The Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act, 1915 '. The Government had to be indemnified for acts done in suppressing the rebellion, the rebels had to be punished, and under either head the opponents of the Government could find, and did

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find, ground for opposition. Machinery for trying the rebels was already in existence, called into existence by the troubles which had arisen prior to the war. It was supplied by an Act which became law in July 1914, by Section 18 of the 'Riotous Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1914', which provided, in such emergencies as had now come to pass, for a Special Criminal Court of not less than two nor more than three Judges of the Supreme Court. The 1915 Act, as passed, contained four chapters. The first indemnified the Government for and validated acts done in suppression of the rebellion. The third chapter dealt with compensation for losses or damage suffered by the loyalists in consequence of the rebellion, the compensation to be assessed by Commissioners. As an illustration of the feeling of the public in the Orange Free State with regard to the rebellion, it may be noted that in that province the provisions contained in this chapter of the law were largely superseded by voluntary efforts. Mutual Help Associations were formed, and large sums were raised from private sources, to compensate rebels as well as loyalists. The short fourth and last chapter contained miscellaneous matter. The second chapter was the most important part of the Act, providing for the punishment of the rebels. It embodied the policy of leniency, which the Prime Minister had so strongly advocated, and which General Smuts fully supported in moving the second reading of the Bill. A distinction was in effect drawn between the leaders in the rebellion and the rank and file. Even for the leaders who were indicted for trial and found guilty of high treason the death penalty was not prescribed, unless they had committed murder and would have been amenable for the crime under the common law. Imprisonment for life or a term of years, and a fine not exceeding £5,000, either or both, were made the maximum penalties. For the rank and file of the rebels, who had not surrendered under the Amnesty Proclamation, no greater punishment was provided than detention during the continuance of military operations in the Union or in German South-West Africa, discretion being given to the Minister of Justice to authorize release at an earlier date, and ample provision being made for appeals, to be heard by specially appointed Commissioners. In addition, proved rebels were disqualified for ten years from serving in any public capacity

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or holding any position under Government, and were forbidden possession of arms and ammunition.

The debate on the second reading of the Bill in the House of Assembly lasted from the 3rd to the 17th of March. The second reading was carried by 70 votes to 15. The great majority of members, Dutch as well as British, would probably have subscribed to Mr. Merriman's description of the Bill as 'an honest attempt to wipe the slate clean, as it can be wiped clean, and to start afresh with a more sober policy'. But the speeches of the minority in this and the other debates of the session, which concerned the rebellion, showed no cessation of animosity against the Government, and every sign of sympathy with the rebels. What other conclusion could be drawn from such phrases as 'being actually driven to take up arms', or again, 'naturally, it was morally wrong to go into an ill-armed revolt—it was worse, it was a tactical blunder', than that there was ample excuse for the rebels, if not complete justification? The view put forward and pressed that the rebellion was of the nature of an armed protest against the wrongful action of the Government in invading German South-West Africa made a brief for the leading rebels when placed upon their trial. This was serious enough, although the plea availed nothing before High Court Judges interpreting and upholding the law of the land as well as the dictates of common sense. But more disastrous was the lead which it gave to disordered public opinion, the bulwark which it erected in defence of wrongdoing and crime. Hertzog urged, with some substratum of truth, that 'the people of this country have no inherited love for the Constitution, as the Englishman has. Constitutional Government is not, as with the English people, an integral part of the life of the nation.' But he himself had helped to form the Constitution: the future of South Africa was and is bound up with constitutional liberties: on this basis alone could a South African nation arise and stand: the whole problem was to bring home to Dutch Afrikanders the responsibility of responsible government. To extenuate rebellion under the term of an armed protest was to betray the true interests of the people of South Africa.

General Smuts stated that, on the Government side, in the course of the rebellion, 131 men had been killed and 272 had been wounded; that the rebel losses had been heavier; and

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that the total casualties caused by the rebellion were about 1,000. It would seem that some 30,000 Government troops were employed in suppressing the rising, two-thirds of whom were Dutch Afrikanders: the casualties as between Dutch and British were in the same proportion; and most of the commandants were Dutch. Deplorable as it was that Boer should be ranged against Boer, it was far better that a Boer rebellion should be quelled mainly by men of the same race, than that it should pass into history as one more instance of British domination in South Africa. Out of a total number of rebels, estimated at about 10,000, 2,054 surrendered under the Amnesty Proclamation and were allowed to go peacefully to their homes; 1,831 surrendered after the time limit for the Amnesty had expired, and 5,792 were taken prisoners. All of them, with the exception of 293, were treated as rank and file, liable only to temporary detention and to the disabilities provided by the Act. The 293 men who remained were ranked as leaders in the rebellion, on the ground that they had been Government officials, or persons of standing in the community, or men who accepted posts in the rebel service. In the event, 289 were placed on their trial before the Special Tribunal, 149 in the Orange Free State Province, 105 in the Transvaal, 35 in the Cape.

From Parliament the policy of forbearance passed on to the Court of Justice. The heaviest sentence imposed was in Kemp's case, imprisonment for seven years and a fine of £1,000. De Wet was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a fine of £2,000. Kemp was accounted the more guilty of the two, as having, on the eve of the rebellion, held the King's commission as an officer of the Defence Force, and as having actually joined arms with the German enemies of his country. Wessel Wessels was sentenced to imprisonment for five years and a fine of £1,000; Rocco de Villiers to four years' imprisonment and a fine of £500; Nicholas Serfontein and Conroy to four years' imprisonment. Mild in the extreme as these sentences were, the trials had hardly been ended before leniency was carried further. While the High Treason Court was doing its work, the campaign in German South-West Africa was, in July 1915, brought to a successful conclusion, placing the Government in a strong and safe position for the exercise of mercy at discretion. In the general election which followed

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in October, a general amnesty formed one of the items in the nationalist programme, and Hertzog largely added to the number of his supporters, though the policy of the Government was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the total electors of the Union. When the new Parliament met on the 19th of November, the Ministers, in the Governor-General's speech, expressed the hope that, on the conclusion of the trials, 'the general conditions of the country may then enable them to consider the sentences passed by the Court, with a view to determining, in the light of the special facts and circumstances of each individual case, and with due regard to the public safety, whether they would be justified in recommending the exercise of clemency to any special case'. Not content with this pledge, Hertzog, on the 30th of November, moved that 'the Government should without further delay take the necessary steps for the immediate release of General de Wet and his fellow prisoners, and for the grant of a full and general amnesty to all who were concerned in the late armed rising'. This motion was handsomely defeated, on an amendment moved by Merriman; but shortly before Christmas clemency was exercised in somewhat wholesale fashion, General de Wet and no fewer than 118 other prisoners being released. The fines were exacted in all cases in which they had been imposed, and an undertaking was required that the released prisoner should not move outside his own district until the expiry of his term of sentence, and should not take any part in politics. Having paid his fine and given his undertaking, de Wet immediately upon his release made a political speech. Three months later a Parliamentary Return of Persons tried before the Special Treason Court, ordered to be printed on the 24th of March 1916, showed that at that date only 50 rebels were still left in prison, and before the year 1916 ended they had all been released. Never, surely, in history had open rebellion been so gently treated, and never was so lenient a Government so ill requited. In the Orange Free State Province, the chief stronghold of rebel sympathizers, Hertzog at the General Election carried every seat but one, and the feeling against the Government among the apologists for the rebellion was as though the Ministers had been ruthless tyrants and not the most merciful of men.

Reference has so far been made almost exclusively to the

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Dutch Afrikanders, for the reason that the rebellion shaped itself as a civil war among them, not as a race contest between Dutch and English. But, because the part played by the British citizens of the Union could be taken for granted, it must not therefore be minimized. Alike in what they did and in what they forebore from doing and saying, they deserved well of South Africa. Apart from commandants and trained fighting-men, in whom by the nature of the case the fullest confidence could be placed, British settlers in the disturbed districts were individual centres of loyalty; and yet again Rhodesian soldiers who, on their way to the campaign in German South-West Africa, halted to garrison Bloemfontein, were another British factor on the Government side. Solid for the Empire, with infinitesimal exceptions, and enthusiastic for the cause with which Great Britain had identified herself, the British population of the Union would not have been human, had they not deeply resented such slanders as were embodied in Beyers's letter to Smuts, or more clumsily formulated by de Wet, the policy of neutrality advocated by the nationalist group, and the attempt to undo a broad and generous settlement by force of arms. To many of them the lenient treatment meted out to the rebels, even when full allowance had been made for the ignorance and confusion of misguided men, must have seemed dictated by political expediency and near akin to condoning crime. Yet, if the Government erred, it may well have been on the right side. South Africa is a land of long memories, inaccurate but unforgiving. In this year, 1915, exactly a hundred years had passed since the rising of Slachter's Nek, when South African rebels were hanged for high treason; and Slachter's Nek was still remembered and quoted. If it were a choice of evils, it was far better that crime should be inadequately punished than that a new watchword of exasperation should be given for another century. Apart from the question of what justice demanded, or what were the lines of political wisdom, the personal attitude of the Boer members of the Government towards the rebels, and above all, of General Botha, was wholly admirable and great. As Smuts was not slow to remind the House of Assembly, the Prime Minister had been assailed by unfounded calumny and virulent misrepresentation: nothing had been left unsaid or undone which would have embittered a small-minded man.

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Yet Botha's one and only concern was, as far as it was humanly possible, to eliminate bitterness. Personally he took the lead in striking down rebellion; personally he shouldered the responsibility and odium; personally he preached and practised mercy and not sacrifice, appealing to his fellow Boers to sink their differences, to forget and forgive, and to his British fellow citizens, most of them political opponents, to make allowances for men whose allegiance was not rooted in the blood. General Botha had in him much of that rare combination of breadth of mind and largeness of heart which has made Abraham Lincoln stand out in history.

To his personal leading and influence, backed at every point by the strong will of the Minister of Defence, his never failing colleague, General Smuts, must be attributed the fact that the Government was so well served in the rebellion. One Boer commandant after another did his duty capably and well. It may be read into the story that, but for the stringent orders of the Government against shedding blood, the rebels would have had short shrift at the hands of the loyalists, for the commandants knew their business and meant business; they were out for the honour of their race and the honour of their cloth: they were men under authority, having soldiers under them, fully minded to uphold the lawfully constituted Government of the Union and to make their recalcitrant fellow countrymen obey the law.

The root principle of the Government policy was to discriminate between the main body of the rebels and the comparatively few men who threatened or cajoled them into arms and played the part of leaders. This broad distinction must be borne in mind in attempting to form a sober estimate of the rebellion, as it will stand hereafter in history. The entry of Great Britain into war with Germany beyond question placed a strain upon the loyalty of the Dutch Afrikander community, and it is not surprising that men, the bounds of whose mental horizon were not as wide as those of South Africa, hardly as wide as those of their own province, more nearly coincident with the limits of their particular district, and whose guide and counsellor in each case was the leading Boer of the district, should have been shepherded into rebellion. But the leaders knew well what allegiance to the British Crown demanded and implied: they knew well, or could and should

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have known, that, in going to war with Germany, Great Britain was fighting the battle of freedom and democracy against military despotism: well they knew—if only from object-lessons in South-West Africa—that German methods were not as British ways: they openly admitted that they would rather live under British than under German rule: they were perfectly well aware that, had their foes in the South African War been Germans and not English, not only republicanism but self-government of any kind would have been banished from South Africa. They knew, if they stopped to think, that it was vital to England to strike at Germany, wherever a stroke would be effective, and that neutrality was tantamount to befriending Germany at England's expense. They knew that citizens of the Union were bound by the decisions of the Parliament of the Union, and that armed protests are a negation of constitutional Government. They might have quoted the high authority of Sir Wilfred Laurier in support of the thesis that a self-governing Dominion has the right to decide whether or not actively to participate in the wars of the Mother Country. But Laurier never contended that Canadians were not bound by the decisions of the Dominion Parliament: he never doubted, and openly stated, that constitutionally when Great Britain was at war Canada was at war also; and when the whole British Empire was at stake, and the path of duty was plain, he did not hesitate for one moment in supporting his political opponents and throwing the sword of Canada into the scale. There was no answer to General Botha's contention in the Union Parliament that South Africa was 'an ally in the British Empire' and *ipso facto* at war; that there were only two ways open, the one the way of faith, duty, and honour, the other that of dishonour and disloyalty.

The South African rebellion was the result of a half-fledged conspiracy, possessing community of sentiment, but lacking concert in action. There can be no manner of doubt that the main motive, which supplied the driving force, was to restore a Republic or Republics, and with the support or at least the active goodwill of Germany, whose ultimate success was never doubted, to sever South Africa from the British Empire. The decision of the Government to intervene actively in the war on the side of Great Britain was made by misrepresentation a contributing cause of the rising, as well as a pretext to

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conceal the real issue, although the hardihood of putting forward the plea of an armed protest, as having substantial meaning, is amazing, seeing that every rebellion is an armed protest against somebody or something. It cannot be doubted again that personal spite and party faction were also contributing causes. Very few human actions, even in the case of a single individual, are the outcome of one motive alone; and when a partnership has been formed, whether for good or evil, variety of motives is necessarily called into play. There are rebels and rebels. When the United States were rent in twain by civil war, Robert Lee was, in the eyes of the people of the north, an arch rebel, a traitor to the Union. Yet in purity and nobility of character few have equalled him among the sons of men. General Smuts testified to Delarey in the Union Parliament as having died without a stain upon his character, as having had no concern with the seditious movement; but the evidence which was subsequently brought to light seems to show that he was a potential rebel, on the eve of actively co-operating in rebellion, when his end came. Yet, as far as the east is from the west, so far was Delarey from a man of the type of Maritz. There was no trace in him of intensity of race bitterness, none of personal jealousy. Botha and Smuts were his intimate friends, and his friendship was not confined to Boers alone; nor, on the other hand, were respect and affection for him only to be found among Dutch Afrikanders. It was a British member of the Union Senate who spoke of him as 'a simple, God-fearing farmer, a soldier of genius, and a perfect gentleman'. Republican instincts and traditions appear to have overmastered him with a sense of destiny, and with the fatalism of a visionary he could only read into the future what he had known and loved in the past. Maritz, on the contrary, from first to last, was a traitor of the commonplace type, making no attempt to conceal his objects and his methods, flying from justice when the game was up in approved traitor fashion. He was the most thorough-going criminal of all; but, on the principle 'To whom much is given of him much will be required', Beyers stands for the heaviest sentence at the bar of history, and the kindly haze of death cannot obscure the measure of his guilt. For he was responsible for the armed forces of the Union, beyond all men responsible for their spirit and their use. Endowed with strength of intellect, he had the will, the power, the opportunity to lead

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men into noble courses or into vile. Maritz was at first his tool, but, as so often happens when a lower-grade sinner is more resolute than his employer, he seems in the end to have forced his hand. How far Beyers's visit to Germany influenced his conduct will never be accurately known. His bitterness against England was illustrated in his letter of resignation, and personal antipathy to Botha and Smuts, or at least impatience of their control, probably contributed to his backsliding. He was in reality the central figure among the rebels, by far the most dangerous among the human factors. Yet he never seems to have fully made up his mind, and his course of action was marked by vacillation, inconsistency, and subterfuge. In this respect he embodied the main characteristics of the South African rebellion, its least attractive feature to those who search among rebels and rebellions for something staunch and thorough, some element of manfulness even in crime. As there are rebels and rebels, so there are rebellions and rebellions. In past times, when rebellion was less respectable than it is at the present day, it was very much more to be respected. Rebels really took their lives in their hands, and rebellion was the road to the scaffold, not to a seat in Parliament. The South African rebellion was of the modern type: it was an attempt at an armed rising with limited liability. The goal was clear before the leaders' eyes; it was what they styled the independence of South Africa, which meant, in plain English or plain Dutch, the domination of one of the two white races by the other. But their outward progress towards the goal was conditioned by prudent regard for their persons and their pockets. If the sun shone upon their enterprise, they were out for the whole cause and nothing but the cause: if the clouds gathered, they were but making a forcible protest against an unpatriotic government. They, and their apologists on their behalf, spread a network of lying excuses: they counted, with good reason, upon the leniency of the Government and the kindliness of their fellow citizens so often illustrated in the past history of South Africa: they traded upon this mercy and loving-kindness and they repaid forbearance with additional rancour, generosity with slander and abuse. It may fairly be summed up that the South African rebellion was, as far as the leaders of the rising were concerned, not redeemed by one single trait and not ennobled by one solitary action.

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

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CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA

By Mr. J. Saxon Mills, M.A.

Of all the minor operations of the war none was more marked by picturesque and moving adventure, none was carried through with swifter and more complete success than the campaign against German South-West Africa.

The late German Protectorate of South-West Africa affords a classic example of those 'lost opportunities and rejected addresses' with which the highway of British Imperial history has been said to be strewn. Comprising 322,000 square miles, an area more than two and a half times as large as the United Kingdom and more than half as large again as Germany in Europe, it belonged ethnologically and physically to the South African sub-continent. The Power which held sovereign rights over the greater part of South Africa had an inevitable and *a priori* interest in this block of territory to the west which marched with the remainder of South Africa along a frontier of a thousand miles. This interest was indeed generally recognized even by the Germans themselves. Long before the eighties of last century German traders and missionaries had appealed for the protection of the British Power, and it must be allowed that the German Government gave to the British Ministers ample time and opportunity to assert any claim which they might be inclined to advance. But neither the Foreign and Colonial Offices at home nor the Ministers on the spot at the Cape seemed able to foresee what the establishment of a foreign Power in this region might mean for the future destinies of South Africa. The voice of Sir Bartle Frere cried, indeed, in the wilderness, and only a word was required to secure the territory for South Africa and the Empire. But the word was never spoken. When, in 1884, Germany established in this region her first colonial possession, the beginnings of her now lost colonial empire, regrets were abundantly expressed but were unavailing. Walvis Bay

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alone, which is nevertheless the only safe natural harbour of any size along that inhospitable shore, remained to England. The exercise of very elementary decision and foresight would have saved both Germany and South Africa the suffering and expenditure of a campaign which was the direct result of the refusal of the British, even when invited to do so, to assume their natural rights and responsibilities.

South-West Africa is bounded on the west by the South Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Orange river, which divides it from Namaqualand, a part of the Cape Province of the Union of South Africa. Its eastern frontier coincides for more than 650 miles with the 20th meridian of longitude, then turns at right angles 60 miles inland, thence going straight northwards, until it turns once more to the east to form the 'Caprivi Strip' which extends till it touches the Zambezi. This wedge of territory, which penetrated menacingly into the solid body of the British possessions, was secured by Count von Caprivi, Bismarck's successor, in the Anglo-German agreement of 1890. Its political object is clear from a glance at the map. It brought the Germans on to the Zambezi as the much later Franco-German Convention of 1911 brought them on to the Congo. It was a feeler stretched eastwards towards German East Africa, a move in the German policy of constructing a wall of partition east and west to block the British expansion northwards. On the north, German South-West Africa was bounded in the main by Portuguese Angola.

South-West Africa was, in one sense, the most important of the German dependencies. Inasmuch as a large part of it lay in the southern temperate or sub-tropical zone, it became in some degree a colony of settlement, the only German oversea possession of any size having that character. But the history of the dependency was a long record of disastrous native wars which retarded the process of colonization, so that in 1914 there were only some 15,000 Europeans in the country.

A good deal of the territory consists of what the late Lord Salisbury would have called 'light soil'. The coastal strip for 60 or 70 miles inland is a wilderness of red-hot sand and burning rock, a real 'thirst-belt' in which the streams are seldom more than dry channels and the 'water-holes' are few and fugitive. It is a country 'versteint, verödet, verdorret', like the landscape in Uhland's great ballad. But this is only

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the unpromising glacis of an interior which, at an average altitude of 4,500 feet, has great potential wealth, agricultural and mineral. The Germans were not happy in their dealings with native populations. But in the tasks of administration and development they had displayed in South-West Africa their congenital industry and efficiency. By the outbreak of the Great War 1,400 miles of railway had been built, 870 miles of which were on the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, the standard gauge of the Union of South Africa. Towns, bridges, roads, hospitals, and the other essentials of civilization were being constructed, Swakopmund, the commercial but harbourless capital on the coast, being amusingly Teutonic and imposing in appearance, a genuine shoot from the Fatherland planted amid blistering sunshine and marrow-penetrating sea-fogs.

Some people may have thought, when the Imperial authorities invited the Cape Government to capture the German wireless station at the capital of Windhoek, that the invasion and subjugation of German South-West Africa would be an easy task. On the map the country appeared to be hopelessly intercepted between the armed forces of the Union on south and east and British sea-power on the west. But this view of the strategic position needs some correction. The territory is indeed provided with the most formidable of natural defences. On the west, where it seems wholly exposed to attack, the sterile and waterless coast-line, 930 miles long, is flanked by shallows and low islands and infested with violent storms and dense sea-fogs. A military force landing at any point would have to carry with it all its supplies, including drinking-water. It is not surprising that the Germans should have refused to believe, even when their senses afforded the clearest evidence, that the colony could be invaded from the sea. When the difficulties of landing had been surmounted, a second line of defence had to be faced in 60 or 70 miles of almost impassable sand and rock.

South and east, also, the Colony is naturally fortified. Beyond the Orange river, itself a formidable obstacle, with its deep gorge and infrequent, easily defended fords or ' drifts ', lies another thirst-belt, stretching along the southern frontier between the river and what were then the nearest Cape railway stations at Steinkopf and Prieska. On the east the straight invisible frontier runs through the parched and uncharted

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waste of the Kalahari Desert, with the Cape Police station of Rietfontein almost on the frontier, one of the remotest and loneliest outposts in the world-wide British Empire.

In fact, though the German forces in the Colony were, in numbers, by no means a 'contemptible little army', the South-West African campaign was, in the main, a long and terrible struggle with Nature in her most savage and relentless aspects. For British troops from the homeland these difficulties might well have been unsurmountable. They were barely and with infinite suffering overcome by Anglo-Dutch forces accustomed to the physical conditions of South Africa, many of them having actually served on one side or the other in the Boer War.

South-West Africa had long been regarded by the Germans, and equipped accordingly, as a base for eventual military operations against the British Power in South Africa. It is this anticipation of a coming 'day' which explains such phenomena as the 'Caprivi Zipfel', the direction of the railway lines, the establishment of *places d'armes* near the Cape border, such as Ukamas and Kalkfontein, and the enormous reserves of munitions of war, guns, machine-guns, material of all kinds, which fell into the hands of the astonished invaders. The German population largely consisted of well-trained reservists, ready to hand for the time when the German forces would invade South Africa and be welcomed everywhere by the insurgent Dutch. But this outlook left important factors out of account. As so often before and during the war the Germans failed to assess those imponderable but abiding moral forces which often prove so much stronger than the purely material and selfish.

It is difficult to estimate the numbers of the German forces that took the field at the outbreak of the war, but in the latter days of the campaign there were still about 5,000 men in the field, regulars and reservists who had received their military training in Germany and then been settled, no doubt with a military purpose, in the Colony. The Germans were hopelessly outnumbered, but the personnel they had available reached a high standard of efficiency, and if, as in East Africa, they had been led by a resolute and skilful commander, the defence of German South-West Africa might have been greatly prolonged. As it was, they showed to little advantage in the fighting.

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The Union forces, though less highly trained, were excellently adapted to the work in hand. It is officially stated that the number of white troops raised for the campaign of 1915 amounted to 76,467. It has been seen, in the first volume, that the military forces of the Union had been reorganized on a defensive basis by the South African Defence Act of 1912. The Act had only lately come into operation, but there were plenty of men in South Africa of the right sort ready, and many of them burning with enthusiasm, to take their share in the great struggle on which the world was then entering. Roughly speaking, we may say that the Union forces actually engaged in the task of invasion amounted to 50,000 men.[1] Of these 23,000 were Dutch and mostly mounted troops, while the British, who comprised mainly the infantry units, amounted to 27,000. Without under-estimating the splendid work done by the Burgher mounted forces, it may be said that the heaviest burden of endurance was laid upon the infantry, which was largely recruited from the towns. There was more movement and adventure in the work of the mounted forces, while the infantry had to endure not only the greater toil of foot-tramping over knee-deep sands and knife-edged rocks, but the weariness of waiting and watching along lines of communication or in stationary camps, amid conditions desperately trying to health and temper. The Burgher troops were a weapon that never failed in the hands that wielded it. They exhibited all the qualities of boldness, resource, and self-reliance which had enabled them to hold out so long against the forces of the Empire during the Boer War. They never hesitated to abandon base and communications and to ride into the wilderness dependent upon such food and water as they could carry in their saddle-bags. Throughout the campaign they executed with unfailing success those flanking movements which were the constant and characteristic method of reducing the enemy's positions. But ever on the central force, steadily advancing on foot between the flanking columns of mounted infantry, fell the hardest toil. General Botha never failed to give due and generous recognition to an infantry which, composed of both English and Dutch races, was no less

[1] The *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa, No. 5, 1910–21* (p. 399), gives the total European South-West African forces as 67,237 and the Native Labour Contingents as 33,546. The deaths numbered 427, the wounded 560, and prisoners of war 782.

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'astonishing' in its indomitable spirit than the men to whom Napier applies the epithet in his records of the Peninsular War.

The strategical ground-plan of the campaign was determined by the railway system of the country. Not only were the railways indispensable for the work of transport and supply in a land where the very existence of the armies depended upon the efficiency of these services, but the capture of the lines meant the subjugation of all the organized portions of the colony, including the central capital, Windhoek, with its powerful wireless station; it meant the extrusion of the enemy, if he was not encompassed and cut off beforehand, into the trackless spaces where his surrender could only be a question of time.

Two lines ran from the sea-board into the interior. The first, some 350 miles long, started from Swakopmund, near Walvis Bay, and ran to the copper, silver, and lead mines of Otavi and Tsumeb, with a short branch to Grootfontein. The second ran inland from Lüderitz. In addition, a central line extended north and south through the heart of the Colony. The Swakopmund–Otavi line joined this main trunk line at Karibib, the line from Lüderitz Bay at Seeheim, but the central line which passed through Windhoek and Keetmanshoop on the long stretch between Karibib and Seeheim, was continued south, for purely strategical reasons, to Kalkfontein, in the direction of the Cape frontier.

Three main routes for the invading forces were indicated—eastwards into the interior from Swakopmund and Lüderitz, which towns would need to be captured from the sea; northwards across the Orange river drifts and along the central main line; and in addition to these, a westward invasion over the vast desert which flanked the Colony on the east. The convergence of these main lines of attack, if it did not envelop and intercept the German forces, would secure to the invaders all the centres of administration and all the settled and civilized portions of the territory.

Operations began in September 1914, the first enterprise of the Union forces being the occupation of Lüderitz, the more southerly of the only two ports—such as they were—on the German sea-board. The town, named after a German colonial pioneer, Herr Lüderitz, who was drowned at the

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mouth of the Orange river, consisted of a medley of irregular buildings and streets of deep sand with a small but sheltered harbour in front and a bare and forbidding country around. The task of capture and occupation was committed to the Union force known by the letter 'C', comprised of the 1st Transvaal Scottish, the Rand Light Infantry, D Squadron of the 1st Imperial Light Horse, the 7th Citizen Battery (15-pounders), a section of the Cape Garrison Artillery with two 4·7 guns, and engineers. It was commanded by Colonel P. S. Beves of the Permanent Union Force.

This little force, about 2,000 strong, with its supplies and munitions of war, sailed from Cape Town on September 15th in an imposing small armada of five ships—two transports, two supply ships, and H.M.S. *Astraea* in charge of the convoy. One of the supply ships, the *Monarch*, had on board 4,000 horses and mules, 500 tons of cold storage meat, and 750,000 gallons of drinking-water from the reservoirs on Table Mountain. The military staff believed that Lüderitz was held by a small force of Regulars and Town Guard, that the town would be defended until the last possible moment and then be evacuated along the railway line, the sea water condensing plant, the wireless station, and the lighthouse having been previously destroyed. The plan of operation was to land a force south of the town, cut the railway behind the place and thus intercept the garrison and, if possible, save the condensing plant and the wireless installation. But this design was frustrated by a storm, accompanied by a heavy sea, which prevented the landing of any large force on the exposed shore, though as a matter of fact a small party, commanded by a very intrepid Dutch officer, Captain C. K. de Meillon, did enter the town from the landward side and found it deserted by soldiers long before the Union troops landed.

The main force anchored off Lüderitz in the evening twilight of September 18th, not very far from the spot where Bartholomew Diaz, first of all Europeans, had called more than four centuries ago on the adventurous voyage in which he discovered the Cape of Storms (1485). The next morning the Bürgermeister formally surrendered the town, the troops were landed, and with a quiet but impressive ceremony the British flag was hoisted on the town hall. The wireless station had been destroyed but otherwise the town was intact. The civil

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inhabitants numbered about 750, who proceeded at once to signal to the German troops outside the British lines and were accordingly all bundled away, loudly protesting, into Union territory. The German forces had retired to Kolmanskuppe, a diamond-mining centre, 10 miles away; subsequently they moved back 2 miles farther to Grasplatz, and then another 8 miles to Rothkuppe. On retiring to the last place they had left a rear-guard post at Grasplatz and here some of the Union forces had their first baptism of fire. The German post was cut up, as was another detachment, a few days later, at Charlottenthal.

But in the meantime the rebellion had come to a head in the Union and it was decided to stay the advance and hold Lüderitz until the rebels were beaten. For this reason too, Force 'D', under Brig.-Gen. Sir Duncan MacKenzie, which had been destined for Walvis Bay and Swakopmund, the British and German ports in close neighbourhood, north of Lüderitz, was diverted to Lüderitz, where it arrived on September 30th. It consisted of the 1st Natal Carbineers, the 1st Eastern Rifles, the Kaffrarian Rifles, the 1st Kimberley Regiment, the Pretoria Regiment, and the 12th Citizen Battery (15-pounders), with field-hospitals, sappers, &c. 'C' and 'D' were thereupon amalgamated at Lüderitz under Sir Duncan MacKenzie's command into what was known as the 'Central Force'.

A few days before this was effected the Union force, which was to invade the German territory from the south, had suffered a severe reverse, the only serious defeat sustained by the South African armies in this campaign. On September 2nd, Force 'A', consisting of five regiments of the South African Mounted Rifles, three batteries of the Transvaal Horse Artillery and the Witwatersrand Rifles, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Lukin, Inspector-General of the Union's permanent forces, had left Cape Town for Port Nolloth, 280 miles northwards along the coast not far from the mouth of the Orange river, the German boundary. From this port a short 2 ft. 6 in. railway runs up country to the valuable copper mines at Ookiep. At Steinkopf, a station 61 miles inland, the line turns south, Steinkopf being the nearest point on the line to Raman's Drift, the Orange river ford into German territory. But the 45 miles intervening are a real 'thirst-belt', a stretch of sun-roasted sand, and the

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history of the Great War itself will scarcely record a finer feat of enterprise and endurance than the trudge through this scorching and blinding waste.

Three regiments were sent forward to capture Raman's Drift. At the first attack, delivered at dawn, the Germans fled, all except one officer, who was captured after putting up a heroic resistance. A patrol of the 5th Regiment of the S.A.M.R. pursued the retreating enemy, routed them in a sharp skirmish and kept in touch with them till they reached their camp at Sandfontein, a small kopje in the middle of a sand-hill-bounded plain, 24 miles north-east of the Drift and about half-way to the town of Warmbad. Here they found the water-pumps destroyed and the wells poisoned. When the 4th and 5th Regiments arrived the Germans had disappeared. Patrols were sent out to sweep the surrounding country, and then the position was occupied by a squadron of the 1st S.A.M.R., which had been sent up to relieve the first garrison, the rest of the troops returning to the river.

Meanwhile, General Lukin's main force had already reached the Drift on September 24th. On the 26th the small force, left in the air at Sandfontein, was heavily attacked by Germans converging from three directions through the hill passes. Reinforcements were sent up—a second squadron of the 1st S.A.M.R. with 2 guns and 30 men of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, all under the command of Lieut.-Col. R. C. Grant, who commanded the 1st S.A.M.R. Scarcely had these troops off-saddled when clouds of dust were seen north, south, and east, where German columns were advancing to attack and surround the position.

Colonel Grant, with only 257 men, 2 field and 2 machine-guns, was hopelessly cut off from his support by an enemy numbering some 1,500 men, with 10 field and 6 machine-guns. It is hard to understand why he was not informed by his scouts of the neighbourhood of these large forces in time to retreat on to the main body. It can only be assumed that he had taken insufficient precautions in the belief that the enemy had evacuated the surrounding country. From 9 in the morning to 4.30 in the afternoon the little garrison stood at bay. The two Transvaal Horse guns were worked with much skill and effect, and though the defenders were hopelessly outclassed by the superior force of the enemy's artillery, they foiled every

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attempt to close in upon the position. Yet in the long run the only hope lay in prompt assistance from the main body on the Orange river. Here again the failure to send more adequate reinforcements appears to require explanation. Only two squadrons of the 4th S.A.M.R. seem to have been available. Colonel Grant heard the fire of this small force in the distance about noon, but the noise and the hope simultaneously died away. The relieving force had been held up by entrenched troops, armed with four machine-guns, and had fallen back. An hour later one of the Union guns was put out of action; the other had only two gunners left and had soon to be rendered useless by the Artillery officer in command. As the strenuous day wore on, the German columns began to close in. Their fire killed nearly all the defenders' horses and an advance from the south enabled them to enfilade the positions with their machine-guns. Even so, late in the day an attempt at a cavalry charge from this direction was foiled. But the end was inevitable. Colonel Grant was himself wounded, and at 4·30 the long struggle against overwhelming odds was given up. 'Cease fire' sounded, and the little garrison, which had lost 12 killed and 40 wounded, surrendered to Colonel von Heydebreck, the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces, who had himself conducted the attack.

No explanations can wholly exonerate the leaders of Force 'A' from responsibility for the Sandfontein reverse. The garrison at that place should not have been left in the air, and when they were attacked the situation might have been relieved by a more adequate and determined attempt at reinforcement. But it is only fair to the Union command to record that the defection of Maritz, who was in charge of the Union troops on the eastern frontier of the German Protectorate, released large German forces which would otherwise have had to watch for an advance from Upington. Maritz's treachery had the effect that the western force at Raman's Drift was suddenly deprived of his co-operation, while the German troops, whom he would otherwise have held on his front, were marched swiftly westwards against the little force whose invasion from Raman's Drift had been reported to the German command. In the last day of the march 70 miles, it is said, were covered.

After the affair at Sandfontein, in which, in addition to the

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12 killed and 40 wounded, 205 officers and men were captured, the German losses being 14 killed and 25 wounded, both parties drew off. The Germans trekked 50 miles inland, while the Union forces returned to the Orange river. Ultimately 'A' force was disbanded after two months' service, most of the men being diverted to the work of suppressing the rebellion in the Orange Free State.

The rebellion in fact held up all the operations against the German Protectorate. The force at Lüderitz, which, according to Reuter's correspondent, who fully described the operations here, now amounted to 6,000 men, composed of two infantry brigades and a section of mounted and general units, remained practically inactive from its arrival in September until its definite advance in March 1915. Skirmishes with the enemy occasionally took place. For example, a force of Union troops raided as far south as Elizabeth Bay on October 15th and 16th, and a few days later the Germans were attacked in their position on the railway at Rothkuppe, about 20 miles east of Lüderitz, when most of the enemy were captured. A very important task, also, was the reconstruction of the railway destroyed by the Germans as they fell back. This work was under the very efficient charge of Sir George Farrar, head of a great industrial concern, the East Rand Proprietary Mines. He brought high personal courage and organizing ability to his task, which was practically completed when in April 1915 he was killed by a collision of his trolley with a locomotive engine.

Sir George Farrar, with his construction gangs and military guards, had rebuilt the line to Chaukaib, 40 miles eastwards, by the early days of November 1914. Hither, while the Germans retired to Garub 20 miles farther on, the British main camp was advanced, and none who endured the subsequent weary months of waiting in this choking and scorching furnace will forget the experience. 'We breathed sand,' wrote Reuter's representative, 'we chewed it; we took it in our food—literally there was sand with the sugar; we thought sand; we dreamed it.' Waiting under such conditions is a more severe test than the hardest and roughest fighting, and some who had enlisted for only six months were so discouraged as to insist on their discharge. But the great body 'stuck it' with unshaken constancy. Conditions might in some respects

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have been worse. There was plenty of food and, eventually, of water. It was perhaps a welcome relief to the monotony of life that practically every morning the camp was visited by German aeroplanes, which were more noisy than effective. While the infantry was concentrating at Chaukaib, the mounted troops raided towards Garub, where a severe skirmish took place, after which the Germans withdrew still farther eastwards to Aus.

An interesting interlude was General Botha's visit to the camp on the 8th of February 1915. His dealings with the rebels were now complete and he was on his way to Swakopmund to take up the active command of the northern force, which by this time had occupied that position. The General, who was received with the utmost enthusiasm, addressed the troops. 'It has been hard on you', he said, 'to have to be lying apparently idle here for so long a time, but still you have been doing very good work indeed. I know that the British Empire is grateful to you for the work you have done. We, in South Africa, have undertaken this task, and we are going to carry it through with all possible determination. Your loyalty and your ability are going a long way towards achieving it. I am now going to discuss the whole situation with General MacKenzie and I hope you will soon get the order to go forward. I wish you all possible success. God bless you.' On February 19th MacKenzie moved forward to Garub, where his troops spent another four weeks, in the Homeric phrase, 'eating their souls'. By March 30th, however, he had occupied Aus.

In the meantime events had been happening farther north at Walvis Bay and Swakopmund. On the 21st of December 1914, an expeditionary force, under Colonel Skinner, left Cape Town for Walvis Bay. It consisted of the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the 1st Imperial Light Horse, Grobelaar's Scouts, a heavy artillery brigade, and a machine-gun section. The vessels transported, among other supplies, thousands of tons of drinking-water. Walvis Bay had been in British hands, with some adjacent territory along the coast and inland, since 1878. The port had been seized by the Germans but it was not defended against the British landing on Christmas Day, though there was a brief skirmish between a German patrol out from Swakopmund and a party of entrenched Rand riflemen. Swakopmund, a German town, lies 13 miles farther

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north along the coast, and Walvis Bay was used as a base for operations against it. The Union forces on landing, set themselves to put Walvis, which was a mere congeries of dilapidated wooden huts, into a position of defence and to prepare for the eventual advance into the interior.

On the 13th of January 1915, Colonel Skinner, taking with him the Imperial Light Horse and Grobelaar's Scouts, moved out on a reconnaissance northwards towards Swakopmund. His object was simply to discover the whereabouts and probable intentions of the enemy, but his advance proceeded without any resistance. At one point, however, a mine blew up under the feet of an advance guard, two further explosions followed and two troopers and their horses were blown to pieces. It transpired later that these were not the ordinary contact mines but were exploded from a neighbouring dug-out by a German who effected his escape. Mines were a constant source of danger and worry to the invading force, but very few casualties resulted from them. So far as this immunity was not mere good fortune, it was due to the assistance of the natives in detecting the mines, to the discovery of German documents revealing their whereabouts, and also to the circumstance that the explosives tended to deteriorate rapidly when buried in the sand. Another danger which required ceaseless vigilance arose from the German practice of poisoning the wells. General Botha more than once remonstrated with Colonel Francke, who now succeeded von Heydebreck in the chief command of the German Forces, on this flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention. The German commander replied that the practice was legitimate if a notice was posted at the wells saying the water had been rendered unfit for use. It is scarcely necessary to say that the posting of such warnings had been generally forgotten, and Botha was at last obliged to warn Francke that he would be held personally responsible if this barbarous custom was continued. The warning seems to have had in some degree the desired effect.

Swakopmund, a rather vulgar and pretentious German town, well equipped with hotels, beer-gardens, and picture palaces, and presenting a strange contrast to the humble and primitive Walvis settlement, was found to have been evacuated by the German troops, so that Skinner's temporary visit was turned into a permanent occupation. The first task was to make

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the water again drinkable and to bring up our supplies from Walvis. This was not easy, as the railway was not yet constructed, and the landing of cargoes from the sea was almost impracticable at the open roadstead at Swakopmund, exposed to the full force of the Atlantic. Still, the occupation was maintained and the official surrender took place on January 16th, when the Union Jack was hoisted over the signal station with appropriate ceremony. The defences of the town were arranged while the Germans retired to Nonidas, a few miles out in the dry channel of the Swakop river. No further advance was attempted pending General Botha's arrival to take charge of the operations. On February 11th, after his visit to the Lüderitz expedition, he arrived at Swakopmund, and by a singular coincidence four days later the Swakop river, which had not indulged in such an escapade for ten years, came down in a flood which, though incidentally washing away the railway across the river's mouth, ensured that water would be found henceforth not far from the surface along the entire bed of the illusive stream.

Botha was followed to Walvis Bay by the mounted burgher commandos, who arrived in brigades of 2,000 to 3,000 each with many thousands of horses. These troops were to play their usual and characteristic part in Boer tactics when the advance into the interior began. They would supply the flanking and enveloping columns sent out on either side of the main central body. Much difficulty was experienced at Walvis in the water provision for the rapidly growing multitude of men and horses. The main supply of local water had to be pumped from wells four miles distant, but this was so brackish that the horses refused it 'neat', and it had to be largely diluted by fresh water transported from the Table Mountain reservoirs at Cape Town. The horses, too, had suffered in condition during stormy passages from the Cape. Yet in spite of these and other difficulties General Botha was moving out of Swakopmund by February 22nd.

Owing to their Sandfontein success and the assistance which they derived from the rebels, the Germans held the whole line of the Orange river and almost the whole of the eastern border, including the Union post at Rietfontein. From September 1914 until February 1915 all forward movements were stayed until the Union forces had got the better of the

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German and rebel forces which were far over the border into Union territory. These operations were under the able direction of General Van Deventer (afterwards Sir Jacob Van Deventer), a Boer officer who had won experience and distinction during the Anglo-Boer war, in which he had served as 'fighting-general' to General Smuts.

On December 18th the enemy attacked Nous, a post about 17 miles south of Schuit Drift. The Union garrison, many of whom may have sympathized with those who had joined the rebel leaders, Maritz and Kemp, made a poor resistance and their commander had some difficulty in rallying the best of his men and withdrawing them to Kakamas, distant 44 miles away. The enemy next attacked Upington on January 24th. Here Van Deventer himself was in command. Served well by the South African artillery, he inflicted such a defeat on the assailants that the rebel commander, Kemp, surrendered with over 550 officers and men. The last enterprise of the enemy in Union territory was an attack upon Kakamas on February 3rd. Here, too, they were beaten off and this was the end of the rebellion. At the end of February Van Deventer was free to assume the offensive. Raman's Drift had already been recovered in January. Schuit Drift and Vellor Drift also were soon captured, and by the end of the first week in March all the Orange river with its gateways into the German Protectorate belonged to the Union forces, and Van Deventer was over the border at Schuit Drift, riding boldly into German territory.

We may now envisage once more the general plan of invasion. The ultimate and decisive idea was an enveloping movement against the capital, Windhoek, and to this end two main forces co-operated. There was, firstly, the northern force under General Botha's personal command, advancing along the railway from Swakopmund and Walvis Bay; and, secondly, a southern force under General Smuts's chief command, divided into three separate columns, one under Sir Duncan MacKenzie moving eastwards along the line from Lüderitz, another under Van Deventer, advancing north from the Orange river, and a third under Colonel Berrangé, which left Kuruman on March 6th on its journey across the Kalahari Desert to attack the Germans from the east. These last three forces were to concentrate on the neighbourhood of

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Keetmanshoop and move northwards to join hands with Botha in the final operations against Windhoek.

We will first accompany Van Deventer in his progress northwards from the Orange river. Leaving his left wing, under Colonel Bouwer, to advance from Raman's Drift, farther west, he marched from Schuit Drift straight on Nabas, a strongly entrenched position, which he stormed after five hours' fighting, all with the rifle. The capture of Ukamas followed, an important military post, near the south-eastern terminus of the railway, obviously designed and equipped with a view to an eventual attack upon the British Power in South Africa. The next place occupied was Hudab, 50 miles farther on, the main objective being Kalkfontein, another important military station. It was obvious, however, that even if he captured Kalkfontein, Van Deventer's further progress northwards would be barred by the formidable barrier of the Great and Little Karas Mountains. Noachib, the pass between the two ranges, if held successfully by the enemy forces, would have barred any advance to the rendezvous of the southern columns at Keetmanshoop. To a Boer General the corresponding tactics were traditional. Instead of a costly frontal attack the position must be turned by a flanking movement round the eastern and northern flanks of the range. With this object he detached his brother, Colonel-Commandant Dirk Van Deventer, with a portion of the 4th Mounted Brigade, to march northwards and join Berrangé, when that leader should emerge from the furnace of the Kalahari, somewhere in German territory, west of Rietfontein. This expedition fared well. Fighting his way through Davignab, Plattbeen, and Geitsaub, Dirk Van Deventer accomplished his task and on April 14th joined hands with Berrangé at Kiriis West. The main column entered Kalkfontein on Easter Monday, April 5th, and was joined on April 7th by Colonel Bouwer's column, 900 strong, from the south. This force on its way from Raman's Drift had occupied Warmbad, a budding tourist resort with warm springs and baths and a good many fashionable villas. On the 11th General Smuts himself arrived at Kalkfontein in order to take command of the southern campaign, which, thanks to his organizing ability, was now well in its stride and assured of ultimate success.

Berrangé's march from Kimberley through the entire

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breadth of the desolate and almost waterless Kalahari, one of the most adventurous single feats in the whole record of the war, had undoubtedly a very decisive effect on the result of the campaign. It brought an ominous menace against the German communications and paralysed the enemy's grip upon such southern posts as Aus and Keetmanshoop. It was on March 6th, the day of Van Deventer's final capture of Schuit Drift, that Berrangé started from Kuruman, that delightful oasis of plashing waters and pleasant orchards in the midst of a howling waste—the station, famous in missionary annals, where Livingstone had wooed and wed Dr. Moffat's daughter. The column, which consisted of the 5th South African Mounted Rifles, the Kalahari Horse, Cullinan's Horse, and the Bechuanaland Rifles, with artillery, Maxim guns, and the usual details, had already marched 147 miles from Kimberley. It had before it a 'trek' of 250 miles over a sweltering and desolate wilderness of burning sand and limestone before it reached Rietfontein, on the border of German South-West Africa. The character of this parched region may be gathered from a report, literally true or not, that there are natives living in it who have never seen water, their only substitute being the tsama, a wild melon, which grows plentifully there. The water-holes along the route were as rare as the proverbial angels' visits.

To transport a column of 3,000 men through such country was a remarkable feat of organization. The column had to carry its water, and this was effected by a combination of donkey and ox wagon and light motor transport; the motor-cars were especially useful, swiftly replenishing the artificial water bases or portable tanks which had to be established along the route of the column where water-holes were far apart. So through 'loose, heavy, heart-breaking sand' [1] the sweating and gasping files toiled on till they crossed the border on March 31st, having beaten back a German patrol at Schaapholk, in Union territory, killing and wounding 24. Hasuur, a German post 16 miles over the border, was occupied without resistance. Hence a party of Kalahari Horse was sent 60 miles north-west to Koes, where it had a skirmish with the enemy and retired carrying away large quantities of cattle. Berrangé meanwhile pushed on westwards in order to get astride the railway and

[1] See an excellent account of the march by Major C. E. S. King, D.S.O., in *United Empire*, April 1919.

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intercept the Germans if they retreated northwards. Another mounted force was dispatched to cut the railway 70 miles north of Keetmanshoop, a spirited manœuvre which was not successful. On April 14th, however, Kiriis West was captured where, as already related, Berrangé joined hands at once with Dirk Van Deventer. This flank movement of Berrangé and Dirk Van Deventer, menacing the German communications northwards, had the unquestionable effect of loosening the enemy's grip on all his remaining southern positions.

General Smuts, whose brain had been behind all these operations, lost no time in carrying forward the next phase of the southern campaign. His columns were soon marching from the east and the south towards Keetmanshoop, while from the west MacKenzie was advancing upon the central line and, as we saw, had occupied Aus on March 30th. This last of the converging columns was destined to deliver the conclusive stroke in the south and to its fortunes we will now return. Aus, though a tiny settlement of some 160 persons, was strategically important, as General MacKenzie obtained here a base on the central plateau where the country was less difficult and sterile in character. Food, grass, and water could be reasonably relied upon *en route*. MacKenzie left Aus and the line on April 15th with his mounted troops and struck north-eastwards towards Bethany, Beersheba, and Gibeon, the last named being a station on the central line some 100 miles north of Keetmanshoop. His object was to intercept the Germans in their retreat northwards.

This retirement was now in full swing. A few days after MacKenzie left Aus, Keetmanshoop had been evacuated and entered by General Smuts. MacKenzie had therefore no time to waste if he was to bestride the central line behind the retreating German forces. He had the only remaining chance, as the enemy had eluded the pursuit of the eastern and southern columns. Unfortunately he had stayed too long over his preparations at Aus, but once on the move he brought into play all the qualities of dash and daring for which he was famous. He reached Bethany on April 17th and Beersheba on April 20th. Here a few days halt was necessary. Starting again it was 'boot and saddle', hard straight riding towards the objective, often pursuing elusive clouds of dust where parties of the enemy were getting away with all speed. Close

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to Gibeon he dispatched a force by night to get round to the rear, north of the Germans, and thus to prevent their escape. The result was a severe check. The Germans got the Union force enfiladed with machine-gun fire, killed and wounded 71, and took 70 prisoners. This reverse was fully retrieved the next day when the main force attacked the German rearguard with an energy redoubled by the long previous delays and disappointments. The action began at dawn and lasted until 11.30 a.m. The Union gunners did splendid service, racing from position to position and quickly silencing the German artillery. Attacked on three sides, the enemy was driven back, fighting a rearguard action in order to cover the retreat of the main body. The Union forces were practically spent. They had ridden hard on half rations, covering 210 miles of difficult country in eleven days and nights. After a 20 miles' chase of the enemy nature could do no more, and the Germans, taking advantage of a very favourable route along the Great Fish river, got the bulk of their southern force away. Gibeon, fought on the 26th of April 1915, was the biggest engagement in the campaign. If it did not achieve its full purpose, it finished the enemy in the south. The German loss was 8 killed, 30 wounded, and 166 captured, with some guns and much ammunition and material. In Great Namaqualand, as the midland and southern parts of the German Protectorate were called, no German soldier was left. On April 27th General Smuts travelled from Keetmanshoop to Aus, whence he issued a proclamation announcing the conquest and occupation of all the southern territory by the Defence Forces of the Union of South Africa. On the 29th he left Aus for Swakopmund to discuss with General Botha the concluding operations of the general campaign.

The next and final phase was the co-operation of the southern force, now concentrated on the line north of Keetmanshoop, and the northern force in a converging movement on Windhoek, the German capital. The two forces, however, intentionally or not, did not move in close correspondence. Otherwise, Botha would have been astride the railway, north of Windhoek, in time to intercept the Germans retreating northwards after their defeat at Gibeon. The Germans had hitherto been encouraged by the most sensational reports transmitted from Berlin through the wireless installation at Windhoek. London,

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they had heard, was in flames owing to Zeppelin attacks and England strictly blockaded. Ireland had declared her independence and was at war with England. Help was promised from South America, a hope, however, which must have seemed rather forlorn after the destruction of Admiral von Spee's squadron off the Falkland Islands. The German forces were urged to hold out until May 15th, the precise significance of which date is not determinable. Prisoners captured during General Botha's advance seemed still to cherish hopes of reinforcement, but letters picked up during the operations indicated that the more intelligent Germans, resident in the Colony, were under no such delusions.

Botha began his advance from Swakopmund on February 22nd and occupied Goanikontes and Husab. No further advance was made until March 19th. The country in front of him was of a character probably unparalleled in any part of the globe. It is an unqualified waste of sand and granite rocks and kopjes, without a drop of water or a vestige of life. Across this wilderness all the food and water had to be transported *pari passu* with the advancing columns. The Germans were themselves fully convinced that an advance in force into the interior from Swakopmund was an undertaking beyond human power. But the impossible was achieved. On March 19th, in the usual disposition of a central force with mounted columns moving on either flank, Botha advanced and drove the enemy from his positions at Pforte, Jakalswater, and Riet. At Pforte the mounted troops, under Colonel Alberts, rode down upon the enemy so suddenly that they captured 210 prisoners with guns. At Riet the heavy artillery won the day and Jakalswater was evacuated as a result of these two successes.

It is not surprising to hear that, when at Riet, Botha's impulse was to advance at once north-eastwards to Karibib, 60 miles away, the junction of the western and southern lines, and there intercept the Germans on their retreat, or right across country eastwards to the capital itself. The Commander-in-Chief was aware that the southern operations were nearing completion and that the main body of the Germans must be falling back northwards along the line. But the necessary transport was not at that moment forthcoming, and he was compelled, no doubt much to his annoyance, to withdraw most

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of his mounted forces to Swakopmund and there wait until preparations were ready for a re-start. It would have been dangerous to retard the progress of the southern operations so as to keep time with his own. They were therefore allowed to continue independently, and Botha himself visited MacKenzie's troops two days before their advance upon Gibeon.

On April 26th the Commander-in-Chief was ready to resume his advance. He abandoned the railway line and struck into the interior along the bed of the Swakop river. Simultaneously Colonel Skinner was ordered to advance with the Imperial Light Horse on a reconnaissance in force from Trekkopjes in the direction of Ebony. On his way out by night he met a strong force of the enemy with guns moving, apparently, against Trekkopjes. He retired on to that position, where he was heavily attacked in the morning, the enemy shelling his camp and advancing later with fixed bayonets. But the defending force, which included the Scottish, Rhodesian, and 2nd Kimberley Regiments, held their ground and excellent service was rendered by a Naval armoured motor-car section just arrived from England which had been reported by the German air-scouts as field-kitchens. The action which had raged for about four hours ceased at 11.30 with the withdrawal of the Germans.

Meanwhile, Botha, with three brigades of mounted burghers under Brigadier-Generals Brits, Myburgh, and Manie Botha, was advancing along the dry, sandy bed of the Swakop river in the usual formation of wide-spreading parallel columns. On April 30th he was at Dorstriviermund. A few days later he sent Generals Myburgh and Manie Botha to cut the line between Karibib and Windhoek. On hearing that this had been done, Botha, taking with him General Brits with the 2nd Mounted Brigade, the Transvaal Horse Artillery, and a detachment of the Heavy Artillery Brigade, left the Swakop Valley and struck straight for Karibib, the junction of the lines from north, south, and west, distant 40 miles away. It was a hazardous adventure, as the distance had to be covered in a single journey, the country being entirely waterless, and it was quite uncertain what opposition might be encountered *en route* or at the terminus, or whether even at Karibib water would be obtainable. But the columns plodded on through stifling heat and choking dust till at last the little town was

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sighted in its hollow, between low scrub-grown kopjes, amid an outer encirclement of weather-worn granite mountains. It was an anxious moment when an envoy with the white flag was sent in to demand the town's surrender. Any delay or opposition would have made the water-problem desperate, as the last supply had been left 40 miles to the rear. To have been held up at Karibib might have meant destruction or surrender. Happily the suspense soon ended by the return of the messenger announcing that the town would be surrendered. A few of the leading citizens advanced with a white flag to meet the Union forces, and the town was at once occupied. The thirst-tortured horses drank deep and long in the big cement trough, brimming with clear, cool water, and the repaired railway was soon bringing up fresh supplies of food. In a few days the 4th Infantry Brigade, which had marched along the railway line, joined the burghers at Karibib.

The capture of Karibib sealed the fate of Windhoek. The Mayor having telephoned to Botha at Karibib that the town would be surrendered, the Commander-in-Chief started on May 15th with a fleet of 17 reliable motors across country to receive the capitulation, the burgher brigades, a battery of artillery, and a machine-gun section having ridden on ahead. It was villainous going, but in the morning of the third day the church spires and the 360-feet-high wireless masts were sighted above the bush-country surrounding the town. The Burgomaster, in a spotless white suit, came out to meet the Union General, and the terms of surrender were then and there arranged. The advance of the Commander-in-Chief and the mounted troops to the Rathaus or Town Hall was a splendid sight, and the Union Jack was hoisted over the building with impressive ceremony.

Only sixteen days had passed since Botha had left Swakopmund on what seemed an impossible enterprise. It was the splendid courage, endurance, and marching powers of his troops, after advancing far ahead of their food and water, that had thus secured bloodless entry into the capital of the German Colony. The great advantage of the occupation —that for which the Imperial Government had urged the campaign upon Botha and his Cabinet—was the capture of the wireless station, said to be the second largest in the world, and to have cost a quarter of a million sterling. By this

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colossal apparatus communication had been maintained with Berlin more than 5,000 miles away. But the occupation of the capital had also a moral effect which assured a speedy and victorious end to the campaign.

In fact, on the day following the occupation, a message arrived from Karibib that Colonel Francke and Governor Seitz were ready to ' converse ' with General Botha about the terms of a general surrender. Botha at once returned to Karibib, arranged an armistice of 48 hours from midday on May 20th and proceeded with an escort to a rendezvous at Giftkopf, 30 miles from Karibib. The peace conditions proposed by the German authorities would have been cool even in a less torrid clime. The proposal was that hostilities should cease on the basis of both sides holding the country they then occupied until the result of the war in Europe was decided. In short they were to mark time as they were, until the fate of the Protectorate should be decided in the wider field of war. General Botha would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender; the armistice ended and the Union forces prepared for the final act in the drama.

Some time, however, was required to bring up additional troops from the south of the colony and to arrange commissariat and lines of communication. It was June 18th before a start could be made. Three separate columns took part in the advance. Botha was in the centre with two mounted brigades, an infantry brigade under Brig.-Gen. Beves and some heavy artillery. Two burgher columns operated on each flank of this central body. Brig.-Gen. Myburgh with two mounted brigades rode on the right, while Brig.-Gen. Brits operated on the left. On June 20th Botha occupied Omaruru on the northern line and then advanced against Kalkfeld, a strong German position where an entire army corps could have been comfortably and effectively posted. The Germans failed to hold it and thus abandoned the last defensive line between Karibib and Otavi, the junction 100 miles to the north. Thenceforth the advance was a pursuit. Passing through Otjiwarongo, the Union forces were 6 miles from Otavi on June 30th. Here some attempt at resistance was made but was easily overcome, and on July 1st the Union troops entered the town, the enemy concentrating about 10 miles to the north on the line to Tsumeb. The advance from Karibib, through

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a wilderness of sand and bush, had been a wonderful achievement, but the end was now in sight. When the infantry entered Otavi they found that an armistice was already in force. It had been arranged by exchange of messages on July 6th, and the Germans were given until the morning of July 9th to return a decisive answer.

Meanwhile, the detached columns advancing to right and left of the central force had considerably 'outrun the constable'. These flanking troops, consisting of mounted burghers, had cut loose from their communications and, living off the country and what supplies they could carry at their saddles, had pushed far north and completely surrounded the enemy. Myburgh on the right crossed the Otavi–Grootfontein line on July 4th, roughly flung back an enemy force which stood up to him at Gaub, and reached Tsumeb. Here a flag of truce was sent out by the Germans, but in the midst of the parley shells from German guns concealed in the neighbouring hills began to burst round the British advance guards. The result of this piece of treachery was that the mounted troops rode at once into the town and captured it with its entire system of defences. The Germans excused the firing during parley as a mistake, and demanded the return of the town, as it had been seized during the currency of a general armistice. But Myburgh was not so easily beguiled. Getting through by telephone to General Botha at Otavi, he learnt that the armistice was purely local to that position. Tsumeb was then formally surrendered, together with large military stores and a number of Anglo-Dutch prisoners.

Brits had advanced even further afield. At Tsumeb, Myburgh got into telephone communication with that gallant commander at Namutoni, the Germans' most northerly base, 50 miles north-west of Tsumeb. Strange and exciting events had been occurring at that remote spot. A considerable number of Anglo-Dutch officers and men were interned there. On the afternoon of July 5th a German officer, who had been on patrol, rode into camp all bloody with spurring and announcing with the utmost excitement that the burghers were coming in. The Marconi installation was at once destroyed and the white flag hoisted. Thereupon the senior officer of the prisoners rushed up to the German head-quarters and insisted that as the white flag was flying there should be no

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more destruction of material, and that the prisoners should take charge of the arms and the surrendered camp. This was agreed to but still no British forces appeared, and at dusk there was a general suspicion that the alarm had been a false one. The Germans became anxious to resume control of the camp, but the prisoners had charge of the arms and ammunition and were not inclined to oblige their captors. Ultimately, a compromise was arranged under which the arms were all stored in the guard room which was jointly guarded by both parties. Still the expected invaders did not arrive. The truth was the German patrol officer had fallen in with a guard of motor-machine-guns 40 miles in advance of the main column and had concluded that all Botha's force was just behind. It was not until 11 a.m. on the 6th that Brits entered the town and put an end to a highly embarrassing situation. He was received with an overwhelming and almost speechless emotion of joy by the Anglo-Dutch prisoners.[1]

By this time the Germans were fairly encircled and brought to bay. Yet even so, Governor Seitz and Lieut.-Col. Francke sought to defer the evil hour. The officers' watches had almost ticked out the last moment of the truce (2.30 p.m., 9th of July 1915) when an engine and single carriage brought to the appointed spot on the line outside Otavi a German Staff Officer with the sealed envelope containing the acceptance of Botha's terms. Those terms were not humiliating; some thought they were even too generous to an enemy whose conduct had not been conspicuously humane and chivalrous. The officers were allowed to retain their arms and to live under parole at any place they chose. The non-commissioned officers kept their rifles but no ammunition, and were to be interned within South-West Africa, wherever the Union Government decided. All the 'reservists, Landwehr, and Landsturm' of all ranks were allowed to return to their farms under parole, and retain their arms so as to have means of self-defence against the natives.

The Union forces in this trying campaign had given a splendid example not only of constancy and resolute endurance but also of whole-hearted co-operation, upon which the com-

[1] The whole story of Namutoni was told me with much graphic detail by Lieutenant B. Wahl of the Union forces, himself a prisoner of the Germans. (J. S. M.)

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mander-in-chief laid special emphasis in the General Order issued at the end of the struggle. That concerted action was in large measure the outcome of General Botha's high personal influence coupled with strategic genius. His short remaining span of life was to be engrossed in political not in military activities, and in German South-West Africa he took the field for the last time. It was a worthy ending to his military career, and the implicit confidence which he inspired in those who followed him, British and Dutch alike, marked him out to all time as emphatically a leader of men.

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

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CHAPTER IV

THE SOUTH AFRICANS IN EAST AFRICA

By Major K. N. Colvile, M.A.

THE story of the South Africans in the East African campaign covers the most important two years of that campaign, when, after standing for long on the defensive, the British were able to invade the enemy's territory and, in the result, to sweep the German flag entirely out of the former German Colony. It is not suggested that the South African troops did all the fighting. They did not. Coloured troops were present in large numbers and showed magnificent fighting qualities, while they were able to withstand a climate in which white troops could not continue long to campaign successfully. But there was hardly an important operation during 1916 and 1917 in East Africa in which South Africans did not play a leading part, and some of the most brilliant achievements are to be credited wholly to South African units. Moreover, it was under a South African commander-in-chief, the great soldier and civilian, General Smuts, that the all-important first year of the offensive campaign was carried out; it was a second South African, General Van Deventer, himself one of General Smuts's most effective lieutenants, who directed the final operations.

It was not till the South African Rebellion and the German South-West African campaign were over that the Union had troops to spare for any other fighting, but as soon as the end was in sight in South-West Africa a start was made with raising a force of infantry and artillery to fight in Europe. A small contingent of riflemen with signallers and an ambulance was also made ready for service in East Africa by the end of July 1915, a little later a force a thousand strong, known as the 2nd South African Horse, was raised, and by the end of the year the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade,[1] then and for long after commanded by Brig.-Gen. P. S. Beves, was organized for service in East Africa. To this was added all the other

[1] The 1st S.A.I. Brigade was the contingent which went in that same autumn to Europe.

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arms of a complete contingent: a mounted brigade (the 1st), under Brig.-Gen. J. L. Van Deventer; an artillery brigade of five 13-pounder field batteries, under Lieut.-Col. S. S. Taylor; supply columns, field ambulances, and railway operating companies. This self-contained expeditionary force sailed for Mombasa at the end of December 1915, and the beginning of January 1916.

Meanwhile, another brigade of infantry (the 3rd), under the command of Brig.-Gen. Berrangé, and another mounted brigade, under Brig.-Gen. Brits, were being trained. The 3rd South African Infantry Brigade arrived in East Africa early in February 1916, the 2nd South African Mounted Brigade two months later. A coloured battalion, subsequently expanded into the Cape Corps, under Colonel Morris, of which a separate account is given below,[1] also reached East Africa in the early part of the year. Finally, mention should be made of a locally raised unit, Belfield's Scouts, composed of Boer settlers in East Africa.

Most of these troops took part in the operations which began in March 1916. In the next month, after Taveta had been taken, the army was re-organized and the following South African units then figure:

In the 1st Division (under Major-Gen. Hoskins) the Cape Corps, and 5th Battery South African Field Artillery.
In the 2nd Division (Major-Gen. J. L. Van Deventer):
1st South African Mounted Brigade (Brig.-Gen. M. Botha, and subsequently Brig.-Gen. Nussey).
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 9th South African Horse.
3rd South African Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. C. A. L. Berrangé).
9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th South African Infantry.
Divisional troops.
2nd and 4th Batteries South African Field Artillery.
South African Motor Cyclist Corps.
In the 3rd Division (Major-Gen. Coen Brits):
2nd South African Mounted Brigade (Brig.-Gen. B. Enslin).
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th South African Horse.
2nd South African Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. P. S. Beves).
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th South African Infantry.
Divisional Troops.
1st and 3rd Batteries South African Field Artillery.
Army Troops.
South African Scout Corps, and Belfield's Scouts.

[1] See pp. 497–501.

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These remained the units till, their numbers being reduced by sickness and casualties and their main task achieved, a process of disbandment began in the autumn of the year.

To command this enlarged army, a General of higher rank than any previously in the country was required, and since South Africa was providing so strong a contingent, the appointment of a South African, if one could be found, was obviously desirable.

To that end General J. C. Smuts, who under General Botha had conducted the southern portion of the operations in German South-West Africa and was Minister for Defence in the Union, was approached, but without success, and General Smith-Dorrien, who had commanded the Second Army Corps in France in 1914 and subsequently the Second Army, was appointed. He proceeded from England to Cape Town *en route* for East Africa but fell ill and was compelled to resign his command, which was again offered to General Smuts. This time General Smuts accepted it and forthwith went to East Africa, taking with him as his Chief of the Staff, another South African, Brig.-Gen. J. S. Collyer, who had served in the same capacity under General Botha in the South-West African campaign.

The story of General Smuts's campaign is told elsewhere in this volume and a detailed account of the doings of the South Africans in the course of it would be in effect a retelling of the greater portion of that story. In the attack on the German position between Latema and Reata, the 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade was sent in with the bayonet at the end of a stiff day's fighting and eventually carried the position. After the occupation of Taveta, the two S.A. Infantry Brigades were transferred to the 1st Division, and took part in some very severe fighting around Masai Kraal. But the decisive factor was a brilliant night march (20th–21st March) by General Van Deventer's troops, who were ordered to move across the railway, then south across the Pangani river and so to take the enemy full in the rear in the neighbourhood of Kahe. When they reached the river it proved to be 20 yards wide and very deep and swift, and no bridges were available. The 1st South African Horse thereupon swam the stream and, on foot, stormed Kahe Hill, which they subsequently held against strong counter-attacks under the direction of von Lettow-Vorbeck himself.

Operations were now in progress on all sides of the German

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colony, except the Portuguese frontier. South African troops, however, were for the present employed wholly in the main or northern sphere of operations, and here the most notable undertaking during April, indeed one of the most gallant performances of the whole campaign, was General Van Deventer's march upon Kondoa Irangi, which General Smuts calls 'the most important strategic point on the interior plateau of the enemy territory'. This march took 16 days, the last six being in an incessant downpour of rain, during which man and beast had no rations, living entirely on what they could find. The total distance from Arusha, their starting-place, was about 140 miles. Van Deventer was then called upon with barely 3,000 rifles to repel a counter-attack by large German forces transferred from the Usambara to the Central Railway under the personal direction of von Lettow-Vorbeck; but his troops held firm and by the beginning of May had been reinforced by the 7th and 8th S.A. Infantry from the 2nd Brigade, and by the 1st Battery South African Field Artillery, which was supplemented later by still more artillery.

Towards the end of May, General Smuts's main force began its advance eastward from the Pangani to clear the enemy out of the Pare Mountains. Presently, it was to turn south and then combine with General Van Deventer's troops in an attack on the Central Railway. In this advance the 3rd Division, which included the remainder of the South Africans under General Brits, participated and it was carried out with complete success: Handeni was taken by the aid of a flanking movement on the part of General Beves's 2nd S.A. Infantry Brigade, on June 19th; from here the force swung to the south and advanced to the Msiha river, close to the Nguru Mountains, where serious opposition was to be expected. Here General Smuts halted till August.

Meanwhile Van Deventer, who had been relieved from all fear of further attack by the development of his Chief's campaign, had himself taken the offensive and advanced on a wide front to the Central Railway. His troops moved in several columns in the middle of July and by the end of the month had occupied Kilimatinde, Dodoma, and Kikombo, thus putting the whole length of railway from Kilimatinde to Kikombo into British possession. Van Deventer then concentrated his whole force at Nyangalo, except a small force

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which was left to garrison Kilimatinde. During these operations General Manie Botha had to return to South Africa and his command fell to Brig.-Gen. Nussey, who had been General Van Deventer's chief Staff Officer.

General Smuts had now to clear the enemy out of the Nguru Mountains and in characteristic fashion he employed his countrymen, under General Brits, for a flanking movement, sending them away to the right up the valley of the Lukigura to Kimbe and so through a cleft in the middle of the mountains into the valley of the Mjonga, through which his direct path lay, in the rear of the enemy's position. The force started on August 5th, but when on the 8th General Enslin, with the 2nd Mounted Brigade, reached Mhonda, where the cleft debouches into the Mjonga valley, he sent back word that the path was impossible for wheeled traffic. The infantry, under General Beves, with all the transport was therefore sent back; the former to reinforce General Hannyngton, who was trying to force the direct road through Matomondo, the latter to follow General Sheppard round the left or eastern flank. The Mounted Brigade, less one regiment which lost its way, found itself where the whole Division was to have been, seeking to stem the flow of the enemy's retreat, and though its presence hastened the enemy's evacuation of his positions, it could not maintain itself and hold him up. The British advanced successfully, but the enemy escaped. Kwedihombo, at the extreme southern point of the Ngurus, was occupied on August 15th. From here General Enslin was dispatched to outflank the enemy's position on the farther bank of the Wami and as soon as he had succeeded in crossing the river, a matter of some difficulty, the enemy abandoned his trenches and made off to the south.

Meanwhile, General Van Deventer's troops had achieved what was perhaps the finest of all the fine marches of this campaign, the march to Kilosa. Indeed, it was in great part the menace of this movement that brought von Lettow's men so rapidly out of the Ngurus. He started on August 9th, and after continued fighting and making his way through most difficult country he reached Kilosa on the 22nd. The troops with next to no rations and often lacking water, had covered 220 miles from Kondoa Irangi to Kilosa in less than a month, in almost continual contact with a stubborn and not unskilful

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enemy. The animals in addition suffered terribly from the prevalent 'fly'. Nevertheless, even now no rest could be given. On the 24th the 1st Mounted Brigade was dispatched, all but one regiment, to co-operate with General Enslin's 2nd Brigade, then at Mlali, and on the 26th the remainder of the force was ordered to push on and occupy Kidodi and Kidatu, some 70 miles farther south on the Ruaha river, whither it was thought the enemy might seek to retreat in face of the Commander-in-Chief's main advance.

This had now begun, the roads in the rear having been sufficiently repaired. On August 2nd the 2nd Mounted Brigade was sent across country to Mkata, 25 miles to the south-west, on the Central Railway. Thence it moved on, shortly followed by the 2nd Brigade from Kilosa, to Mlali, whence it could strike at the line of retreat of the enemy from Morogoro, General Smuts's next objective. It was on August 24th that Captain W. A. Bloomfield of the Scout Corps won the V.C. for bringing in one of his wounded men under heavy fire.

Morogoro, approached by the infantry from the north-east, was occupied on August 27th. The enemy retreating from it found themselves confronted by General Enslin's force at Mlali and abandoning their heavy guns took to the hills and made for Mgeta. General Enslin dismounted his men and went southward to cut off the retreating force, while General Nussey's troops, also on foot, occupied Mgeta. At this point General Smuts, together with General Brits and his infantry, less two regiments which were with General Hoskins, arrived at Mlali and General Brits was ordered to go right round the edge of the mountains towards Kisaki with his whole division including General Enslin's brigade. This force reached Kisaki on September 5th and on the 7th attacked, General Beves with the infantry from the north, General Enslin, after a circling movement round the right flank, from the south-west. But the bush was thick, the enemy strong, and the operations imperfectly co-ordinated. The attack was a failure. On the 8th General Nussey, who had marched through the heart of the Ulugurus, came on the scene, with no idea of General Brits's movements, and came into contact with the enemy. He held his ground but could not make progress. General Brits for long could not, owing to the bush, get into touch with the new arrival though the firing was audible, but in the evening his

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orders to General Nussey to withdraw to his own camp got through and were acted on. Even the arrival, next day, of the Commander-in-Chief could not greatly mend matters and it was not till September 15th, when the rest of the force had made its way round the other side of the mountains, that General Enslin moved across by the north of the town to Dakawa and Kisaki was evacuated, the Germans being now everywhere driven back over the Mgeta. The advance of General Hoskins's division had been retarded more by the difficulties of the road than by the enemy, but General Hannyngton had had three days very stubborn fighting at the Dunthumi river, in which the 5th South Africans participated.

Meanwhile, the Belgians and British operating in the Lake area, with whom were the South African Mounted Rifles, occupied Tabora; General Northey, from Nyasaland, occupied Iringa; and in the course of the autumn the whole coast was occupied save the Rufiji delta. A new phase in the campaign was shortly to begin, but at the moment reorganization and the restoration of communications had to be taken in hand. In connexion with the latter the main contribution of South Africa was in putting into operation the section of the Central Railway from Kilosa westward. The reorganization of the force affected the South Africans greatly. In the first place, many thousands of them had at this stage to be invalided back to South Africa, and this necessitated the disbandment of the 3rd Division (Brits's Division). The fit men and horses of the 2nd Mounted Brigade were transferred to the 1st, still under General Nussey, which now consisted of the 1st, 4th, 7th, and 9th South African Horse. The 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, under General Berrangé, included the 7th, 8th, and 10th South Africans and, in addition, one Indian and one African regiment. These two Brigades were now included in the 2nd East African Division, commanded by General Van Deventer. The 2nd South African Infantry Brigade under General Beves was transferred to Army Reserve, and the 5th Regiment was taken from it and sent to General Northey, its place being taken by the Cape Corps. General Brits at this juncture returned to South Africa. Thus not only were the South African troops reduced in numbers,[1] but they were not

[1] At the end of 1917 the effective strength of the remaining battalions appears to have been only 200 apiece.

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henceforward employed, as they had been to a great extent hitherto, in large self-contained bodies. Moreover, owing to the unhealthy area in which the campaign was now to be carried on and the considerable accessions about this time of coloured troops, they had no longer so much of the work thrown upon them.

General Van Deventer's head-quarters were now at Iringa, which he had taken over from General Northey, and in concert with General Northey he had to guard against the attempts of the Germans in the Mahenge area to break away westward and to round up as far as possible the scattered bodies still at large in the western area. This was largely a matter of patrol work with a number of mobile columns to strike or reinforce where needed. But the difficulty of provisioning a large European force, and still more a mounted one, on this front was very great, and only three units of dismounted Horse or infantry and one mounted squadron remained in the field, the remainder being moved back to the railway. Finally, about the New Year, after several gallant but fruitless attempts to encircle the enemy, notably one near Lukegeta, the offensive in this area was abandoned, and the 2nd Division withdrawn to Iringa, the cordon being maintained by Indian and African troops. The Division was soon afterwards broken up and General Van Deventer returned for a time to South Africa.

At Songea, in General Northey's area, on February 12th, Sergeant F. C. Booth, a South African, attached to the Rhodesia Native Regiment, won the second South African V.C. of the campaign for bringing in a wounded man under heavy rifle fire and rallying his native troops at a moment of danger.

In the main area of war, the British were now pressing down from the north and simultaneously from the coast, where the bases were shifted farther and farther south, to Kilwa and later to Lindi. General Beves, with whom the South Africans were, contributed to this plan a characteristic flank march westward from Kisaki and then southward. As usual the move was tactically successful, securing early in January 1917 a crossing of the Rufiji, and by the end of January the line of the Rufiji was firmly held.

On January 20th General Smuts went to England to represent the Union at the Imperial Conference and was succeeded in his command by General Hoskins. The rains shortly afterwards

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suspended all major operations and no great progress was made till May, when General Hoskins, having organized the new bases for the coming campaign, went home and was succeeded by General Van Deventer. The 7th and 8th South Africans, who had now joined the Kilwa force, suffered many casualties in a stiff fight at Narongombe on July 19th. General Beves's brigade was at first in reserve on the Rufiji, later it was moved to the southern coastal base at Lindi, whence it advanced to the final thrust which drove von Lettow from Narungu and Mahiwa and the Makonde plateau and thence over the Portuguese border. Meanwhile, South African troops had participated in the capture of Mahenge, and it was the Cape Corps and Colonel Breitenbach's South African Horse that after a long chase ran down the notorious Captain Naumann and his much-travelled band.

At the close of 1917 the whole of German East Africa was cleared of the enemy and only von Lettow's band of fugitives in Portuguese territory upheld the German name in all the African continent. The Union troops had done their work and were almost entirely withdrawn.

The Union of South Africa deserved conspicuously well of the Empire in regard to the campaign in German East Africa. It supplied the immense majority of the white troops employed in that campaign. Only one battalion of the Regular Army took part in it, the 2nd Battalion of the Loyal North Lancashires, and only one Service Battalion, Driscoll's Scouts (the 25th Royal Fusiliers). Southern Rhodesia sent the 2nd Rhodesia Regiment and East Africa provided some white levies, but otherwise the white fighting units came from the Union of South Africa. White troops were required to give the necessary backing for the crucial operations of 1916 and, had not the Union of South Africa risen to the occasion, units badly needed on the Western Front would probably have been of necessity diverted to East Africa. The numbers of the South African white forces employed in Central and East Africa are given in the South African Year-Book[1] as 43,477, and the total casualties as 2,762, including 1,611 deaths. What was

[1] *Official Year-book of the Union of South Africa*, No. 5, 1910–21, p. 399. The figures given in the White Book *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920* (The War Office, March 1922), p. 302, are for South Africans in the East African Expeditionary Force, 2,855 total casualties, including 1,674 deaths. On p. 347 the deaths seem to be given as 2,141.

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the proportion as between Dutch and British is not stated, but probably in East Africa the Dutch preponderated, as did the British in the contingent on the Western Front. The Union supplied in East Africa two commanders-in-chief of Dutch extraction, Generals Smuts and Van Deventer, and in addition to its white soldiers it sent to fight the coloured Cape Corps. Without General Smuts and without the South Africans whom he led with so much ability and effect, the difficult problem of subduing German East Africa would have presented infinitely greater difficulty.

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CHAPTER V

THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON THE WESTERN FRONT

By Major K. N. Colvile, M.A.

SOUTH AFRICA, owing to circumstances which have been explained, was not at the outset of the war in a position to send troops to Europe,[1] and the course of events was far from setting her hands free. The Rebellion had to be put down before the German South-West Africa campaign could be proceeded with, and when the South-West campaign had been triumphantly completed the burden of East Africa was to hand.

But the Union Government did not wait for the conclusion of General Botha's campaign before deciding that, as soon as it was ended, help should be given to the Imperial Government in the larger task, and as early as April 1915 the matter was being informally considered by the two governments. In June 1915 it was first publicly announced in South Africa that a contingent was to be sent to Europe, and in July a definite proposal was made to the British War Office that a force should be raised and equipped, as far as possible, from Union stores and at Union expense, and should be paid and maintained from Union funds up to the date of embarkation, after which it was to be a charge upon Imperial funds. This offer was gladly accepted, and it was added that infantry would be especially welcome. The contingent was to be given the pay and status of British regular troops. This pay was considerably less than that paid by the other self-governing Dominions to their troops (the pay being based on the domestic rates of wages and cost of living), it compared unfavourably with the rate paid by the

[1] What follows is concerned only with units raised in South Africa and styled South African. But very many South Africans came to England at the first outset of the war and served in British units, the proportion, in the absence of any force of their own fighting in Europe, being far greater than in the case of the other self-governing Dominions. South Africans served in many units, particularly in the King's Royal Rifle Corps and in the London Regiment, and the number of South Africans in the Air Force from first to last was estimated at some 3,000.

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Union Government to its forces later on in East Africa, and subsequently the rate for privates was raised to 3*s*. a day.

Recruiting was at once opened, under Sir Charles Crewe (who at a later date served in East Africa) as Director of Recruiting, the purpose being to raise and maintain an infantry brigade of four battalions with 15 per cent. per month allowed for reinforcements.

This was the main task and in the event, so heavy were the casualties, it proved as much as the Union, now committed to the upkeep of a considerable force in East Africa, could compass. In addition there were raised :

5 batteries of S.A. Heavy Artillery (a sixth was raised in April 1916).
S.A. Field Hospital.
S.A. Field Ambulance.
S.A. Signalling Co. R.E.
To these must be added at a later date :
2 Forest Companies.
Miscellaneous Trades Co. R.E.
2 Railway Operating Coys.
White Labour Battalion.
6 Coys. A.S.C. (Horse Transport)—coloured.
Various coloured Labour Battalions.

The Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig.-Gen. H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., Inspector-General of Union Forces, and lately commanding in German South West Africa, with Major J. M. Baker as Brigade-Major, was made up as follows :

1st South African Infantry (Cape of Good Hope Regiment). Commanded by Lieut.-Col. F. S. Dawson.
2nd South African Infantry (Natal and Orange Free State). Commanded by Lieut.-Col. W. G. C. Tanner.
3rd South African Infantry (Transvaal and Rhodesia). Commanded by Lieut.-Col. E. F. Thackeray.
4th South African Infantry (South African Scottish). Commanded by Lieut.-Col. F. A. Jones, D.S.O.

The contingent was mobilized at Potchefstroom, using cantonments erected by the Imperial Government after the South African War, and embarked between August 29th and October 17th with the following strengths :

1st S.A. I. Bde.	160	Officers	5,648 O.R.
S.A. Heavy Artillery	34	,,	636 O.R.
S.A. Signalling Co. R.E.	6	,,	198 O.R.
S.A. Field Ambulance	10	,,	240 O.R.

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SIR HENRY LUKIN

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On arrival in England the infantry and Signalling Company went to Bordon, where much of their training was carried out on the estate of Lord Selborne, a former Governor-General of South Africa; the artillery to Bexhill in Sussex; and the Field Ambulance to Fleet in Hants. The Signalling Company was moved later to the Signalling Centre at Hitchin in Hertfordshire.

By the beginning of November 1915, the brigade was fit for inspection by Sir Archibald Hunter, G.O.C. the Aldershot Command, and was expected to go to France with the Irish Division in a month's time. On December 2nd the Field Ambulance was inspected by Queen Mary. Then at the eleventh hour the destination was changed. As the result of Turkish influence and intrigue, the Senussi, on the western confines of Egypt, were threatening Egypt and making the Arabs restless. Immediate military action was deemed imperative and troops accustomed to desert conditions were in demand. So on December 7th the South Africans were put under orders for Egypt and immediately after Christmas the brigade, together with the ambulance, embarked at Devonport. They touched at Malta, where an acquaintance of olden days, Lord Methuen, was in command, and on the 10th of January 1916 they reached Alexandria.

Throughout the year 1915 the Turks, with the aid of German arms and money, had been stirring up trouble on the western borders of Egypt, particularly among the Senussi. In November the crews of two torpedoed vessels, *Tara* and *Moorina*, wrecked on their coast, were seized and held prisoners, the Anglo-Egyptian post at El Sollum was sniped, and it was no longer possible to regard the state of affairs as anything short of war. The small garrisons in the western frontier ports were accordingly withdrawn to Mersa Matruh, on the sea coast, about 180 miles west of Alexandria, and about 120 miles east of El Sollum. At the beginning of December some fighting took place without any definite result, but the British forces being reinforced defeated the enemy and drove them back on December 25th. There were no actual operations in progress when the South Africans arrived.

They were inspected by Sir John Maxwell, commanding the troops in Egypt, on January 18th, 1916, and at once the 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Tanner, proceeded by sea to

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Mersa Matruh. From here they marched in company with the 15th Sikhs and the 1st Battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, the whole forming a single brigade under Lieut.-Col. Gordon, and a column of cavalry, to Bir Shola—a very trying 15-mile march, and thence to Hazalia, where they came upon the enemy and at once attacked his position. The Sikhs led, with the South Africans in support. Then the South Africans too came into the firing line, prolonging the line to the right, and the two battalions, thence forward blood-brothers, charged together up a slight and level slope. The enemy were dug in and fought well, but were driven out, the South African battalion losing 11 killed and 106 wounded. The column then returned to Matruh.

On February 19th, the whole of the South African Brigade was assembled at Mersa Matruh and on the following day a column including the 3rd South Africans, the whole under General Lukin, marched west along the coast for three days as far as Umjeila, about 45 miles distant. There they halted for five days and the 1st South Africans joined the column. The march was then continued to Maktil, which was reached on the second day, the 24th. The enemy was now in view some 3 miles away, and his main position was found to be 8½ miles to the south-west, near Agagia. On the 25th the column rested and a small attack by the enemy was driven off. On the next day, the force, with the aid of 6 armoured cars which had just arrived, attacked. The 3rd South Africans under Colonel Thackeray made a frontal attack, the Yeomanry and armoured cars operating on either flank. The 1st South Africans were in reserve. The enemy, whose position consisted of a ridge of sand-dunes, tried to outflank the attackers' right, but a company of the 1st South Africans was thrown out to check this move, and when the British had worked to within 500 yards of the enemy the whole force was thrown in and the position taken, together with Gaafer, the Germanized Turk, who was in command. The Arabs fled among the sand-dunes hotly pursued by the South Africans and the Yeomanry. The South African losses in this gallant and successful little action amounted to 14 killed and 103 wounded. The following day (27th) was spent at Agagia. On the 28th Barrani was occupied and made an advanced base for the whole South African Brigade and on March 9th, General Lukin moved forward upon

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his final objective, El Sollum, about 50 miles west. El Sollum, which possesses an excellent harbour, is encircled by mountains here 600 feet high, and approached from the east only by a narrow pass between mountain and sea. The brigade marched at first still along the coast, then inland to Bir-el-Angeria with the object of occupying the passes and the plateau above El Sollum. Angeria was reached on the morning of March 12th and the Medean pass, five miles away, was seized without fighting. On the 13th the force moved along the hills and the coast to the foot of the Halfaia pass, and on the 14th occupied this pass too unopposed. Here they learned that the enemy had evacuated El Sollum the evening before. The armoured cars at once went in pursuit of the enemy and captured all their heavy guns and machine-guns. On the 15th Lukin entered El Sollum. The Duke of Westminster's armoured cars successfully harassed the Senussi's retreat, and by a famous raid west of El Sollum, in the course of which the cars covered 300 miles of desert in 24 hours, released the prisoners from the *Tara* and *Moorina*.

Thus the campaign had been brought to a triumphant conclusion, for of pursuing the Senussi into the heart of their own country there could at present be no thought, and big events were preparing elsewhere. Accordingly, on the 28th, the brigade started to return by sea to Alexandria and went into camp at Sidi Bishr, a little east of Alexandria. Here a draft of 8 officers and 400 other ranks joined to make good the casualties of the campaign, and after being inspected by General Sir Archibald Murray, who was on the eve of his advance on Palestine, they embarked on April 13th and 15th on four transports for Marseilles, and a week later landed, at last, in France.

But another slight delay awaited them. Their health and condition were excellent, but owing to a single case of typhus on board the *Oriana* it was necessary to put the 4th Regiment and a part of the 1st in quarantine, so that these troops did not actually reach the front till May 11th. The remainder proceeded at once up the line, brigade head-quarters being established at Bailleul, and on April 25th the first South African detachment was in the trenches, only however for instructional purposes.

In the middle of May they were assigned to the 9th (Scottish) Division and replaced the disbanded 28th Brigade, their

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fellow brigades, the 26th and 27th, being both Scottish. Regarded at first as somewhat unwelcome intruders into what prior to their coming had been a purely Scottish division, the South Africans soon gained and never lost the confidence and goodwill of those with whom their lot was cast. Hard fighting and efficient in a high degree, at the same time they readily assimilated themselves to their comrades from the Old Country, with the result that all had a good word for the South African Brigade. In the early part of June the brigade, still with its Field Ambulance, was moved into the Steenbecque–Morbecque area for further training and finally, on the last day of the month, proceeded to the Somme, where on the morrow was to begin the greatest battle that had yet been fought in the war. They were now part of the XIIIth Corps and the 4th Army (Sir H. Rawlinson). In all the story of this tremendous battle there is no page more glorious than that which deals with these South Africans, now for the first time going into European battle-fields.

The great attack by the French and the British, over a 25-mile front from Gommecourt to Fay, began in the early morning of July 1st. The brigade was at first in reserve near Bray, but on the 5th the 1st and 4th Battalions were in the line from the junction with the French (on the Somme) to Briqueterie trench, east of Montauban, and they suffered a few casualties. During the following week there was a good deal of fighting in this sector, on a limited scale, especially in and about Bernafay Wood, and the 2nd Battalion, which had been in support, took a hand. The 2nd and the 4th had about 200 casualties apiece, the 4th losing their Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. Jones, on the 11th. He was succeeded by Major D. M. MacLeod.

But the 14th was to see the South Africans launched on what proved to be their most memorable adventure. On this day the 1st Battalion was lent to the 27th Brigade for the important attack on Longueval, which was to be followed, if possible, by an attack on Delville Wood, perhaps the most famous of the many woods of bloody and glorious memory—Mametz Wood, High Wood, Trônes Wood and the rest—in that sector. The attack progressed fairly well and the northern part of Longueval was duly taken. Thereupon, the South African Brigade was ordered to proceed on the next day, July 15th, to attack

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Delville Wood which adjoins and commands Longueval on the north-east. This task was entrusted to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions, with the exception of two companies of the last named which were detached to help in the fighting still in progress at Longueval. The attacking force was commanded by Colonel Tanner of the 2nd.

Delville Wood is, or was (for there is little left of it to-day), roughly in the shape of an equilateral triangle, each side being some three-quarters of a mile long, with blunted angles and its apex pointing due north. It was full of rides, along which the enemy had made trenches, and the main ride, running east and west, was known as Prince's Street. Already the wood was reduced to a collection of bare and splintered tree trunks and undergrowth tangled with the debris of shattered branches, and the ground from end to end was pitted with shell holes.

By 7 a.m. the 3rd Battalion and one company of the 2nd had entered the wood from the south-west and occupied the southern part up to Prince's Street. Then the other three companies of the 2nd battalion were sent to the assault, and by 9 o'clock, in spite of the strongly held trenches in the wood itself and heavy artillery fire, they had reached the northern edge. But, as in all these woods, the points of debouchment were held with particular obstinacy and the wood which by this time afforded little real cover was an easy mark for the enemy's guns. At 3 p.m. the whole wood was won except for a strong point in the north-west corner, abutting on the orchard-fringed northern arm of Longueval village. The South Africans had now a front of from 1,300 to 2,000 yards to hold with a force never very strong and already seriously weakened. Yet more than one powerful German counter-attack was repulsed. General Lukin had received back his 1st Battalion but not the wing of the 4th employed in Longueval. This, however, returned to him that night. He now sent up reinforcements which were sadly needed, for the losses in the wood throughout the night were heavy, the Germans counter-attacking all along the line, and on the northern edge of the wood they got home and effected a lodgement, practically annihilating one company of the 2nd Battalion. They were, however, quickly driven out again and the front restored. On the following day (the 16th) an attempt was made, in conjunction with the 11th Royal Scots of the 27th Brigade pushing

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due north from the heart of Longueval village, to clear the remaining north-west corner. But the Scots were held up and in spite of desperate fighting the attack as a whole failed. Here it was that the brigade earned its first V.C., Private William Frederick Faulds of the 1st Battalion winning it for gallantry in bringing in under fire a severely wounded officer. The 3rd Battalion alone took, on this day, 3 officers and 130 men prisoners, but the casualties were again very heavy in all the battalions, and the men were now terribly exhausted and in need of sleep. To give them some slight respite, therefore, from the incessant artillery bombardment of the northern part of the wood, they were withdrawn during the night south of Prince's Street.

But they had not yet abandoned the attack. At 2 a.m. on the 17th another combined advance by two companies of the 1st Battalion and the troops holding Longueval was attempted. Again it failed, and the sun rose on the brigade indomitable still, but wearied almost to the limit of human endurance. Their casualties that day were again heavy. Their commander in the fighting line, Colonel Tanner, was wounded and Colonel Thackeray took his place. The men had hardly the strength to dig themselves in where they found themselves at the end of the day.

Reinforcements—not many were available—were again sent up. The enemy, now pressing continuously from the north, penetrated farther into the wood during the night, but were again driven out, and on the following morning (18th) for the third time the British from Longueval—the 76th Brigade (Gordons and King's) and the South Africans from Delville Wood attacked the orchards which formed the outskirts of the village. For the third time they were driven back by the terrific fire of the German machine guns.

Early in the afternoon the Germans attacked with eight battalions, and Colonel Thackeray reported to General Lukin that his position was critical. Colonel Dawson, with a last reinforcement of 150 men, was therefore sent forward. He found Buchanan Street and a part of Prince's Street still held, and with the assistance of the personnel of the Trench-Mortar Battery, which was also brought up, this line was established, and at 10 a.m. on the 19th a part of the South African line was taken over by other troops. But the remainder had still

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many hours more to endure. The Germans attacked that night on three sides. These several attacks were delivered and repulsed, and only two South African officers remained unwounded. For yet two days and a night more they lay in the wood, where the 18th Division was now carrying on the fearful combat under heavy bombardment, till at last, on the evening of the 20th the gallant remnant of the brigade, with Colonel Thackeray, was relieved, and 3 officers (two of them wounded) and 140 other ranks marched out of the wood which they had been ordered to take and to hold at all costs and had so held for six days and five nights. When at midnight on July 14th the brigade first received those orders it had numbered 121 officers and 3,032 other ranks. The total of the survivors was about 750 of all ranks.

Sir Henry Rawlinson issued a special order to the brigade praising their 'gallantry, perseverance, and determination'. The words are too cold a description of their heroic valour, which their countrymen have recognized by making July 15th a general holiday for the Union, in the same way as the Australians commemorate the Gallipoli landing (April 25th), and the Canadians the capture of Vimy Ridge (April 9th).

The battalion casualties for the whole of the July fighting were:

1st	592
2nd	651
3rd	811
4th	653
Total . .	2,707

Of officers, 30 were killed, 47 wounded, 15 reported missing, a total of 92 casualties. In addition the Signalling Company lost roughly 50 per cent. of its effectives.[1] A Medical Officer wrote that of those who came out unscathed 'many looked battered and were beyond recognition'. They well might.

The brigade had not finished with the Somme, but for the moment it had to be withdrawn to a quieter part of the line. Accordingly, it was transferred from the XIIIth Corps in the

[1] A wooden memorial cross was erected on the southern side of the wood towards Longueval inscribed 'In memory of the officers and men of the First South African Brigade, who fell in action in July 1916 in the battle of the Somme', and a memorial service was held on Sunday, 17th of February 1918.

The casualties in the overseas contingent up to August 16th were 3,389, of whom 716 were dead and 507 missing.

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4th Army to the IVth in the 1st Army (Sir Charles Monro), and moved to the Frévillers area, north of the Arras–St. Pol road. Here they were reorganized, 40 officers and 2,826 men joining from Bordon during July. On August 5th they were inspected and highly praised for their recent exploits by Sir Charles Monro. On August 23rd, while in the trenches in the Vimy sector, they were visited by the King. On September 4th Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War, distributed honours to the brigade. During September their most notable exploit was a successful raid by 60 volunteers from the 2nd Battalion (September 13th and 14th).

But the Somme battle was still in progress and South Africa was needed again. On October 5th the brigade was restored to the 4th Army, and on the 9th it was in the line again in front of Eaucourt l'Abbaye, the 2nd Battalion in the front line, the 4th in support.

Eaucourt l'Abbaye is only a matter of 2,000 yards north-west of Longueval and Delville Wood (which had not come wholly into British hands till August 24th), but in July Delville Wood had been a salient, now the Butte de Warlencourt, the objective of the present attack, was the buttress of a blunt re-entrant. The weather at this time was abominable, and the mud of the Somme was earning eternal notoriety. On the afternoon of October 12th, three days after coming into the line, the South Africans attacked, in conjunction with a Highland brigade, the Seaforths and the 2nd and 4th South Africans being the assaulting troops. No Man's Land here was very wide, nearly 600 yards, and swept by machine-gun fire. The casualties were terribly heavy and the attackers had to retire and held their position till relieved on the night of the 12–13th, but a part of the 2nd succeeded in digging in within 150 yards of the enemy and on the evening of the 14th the 3rd South Africans, who had relieved the 2nd and 4th at dawn of the 13th, captured a strong position on the right called The Pimple. On the night of the 16–17th the 1st took over. In the early morning of October 18th, in very wet weather, another attack was delivered and a footing was established in Snag trench. The Germans here fought with great determination and courage. Of the 1st Battalion, which had relieved the 3rd in the line, two companies overran their objective and were annihilated, and other attacks on that afternoon and the next day also failed. On the night

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of the 19–20th the South Africans were relieved, having in the 10 days' spell of fighting suffered 1,150 casualties. Some men were actually not shot but drowned, and of the wounded some lay out for 8 days before they could be evacuated.

At the end of this month the brigade, still with the 9th Division, moved to the Arras area and in November were visited by a notable figure in South African history, Lord Milner. In December, Brig.-Gen. Lukin was promoted to command the division and Colonel Dawson succeeded him in command of the brigade, the command of the 1st Battalion being taken over by Major F. H. Heal. The strength in the field at this date was 3,762 out of an establishment of 4,565. Christmas was spent in Arras.

Throughout the winter—an intensely cold one—the division held the trenches in front of Arras and the brigade suffered in that time 166 casualties. On January 3rd a party of the 3rd South Africans carried out a successful raid in a somewhat novel mode. The faces of all the participants were blackened and the Zulu language only used. Early in March, they moved to Ostreville to prepare for another great offensive, and while there were visited by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, and by Mr. Walter Long, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In April 1917 they were back in front of Arras and were visited by their great countryman General Smuts, newly come from East Africa.

The division now held about 1,800 yards of the front which ran just east of Arras from the Scarpe river northward to a point slightly beyond the Bailleul road, and from this position they were launched in the early morning of April 9th, Easter Monday, to take their share in the great battle of Arras. The best-known part of this battle was the capture by the Canadians of Vimy Ridge, but the whole British force, and not least the South African Brigade, fought magnificently and in the opening stages with complete success. The objectives, which included St. Laurent Blangy and Athies, were three German lines, the nearest, on the South African front, being about 800 yards away, the next 900 yards beyond that, the last 800 to 1,000 yards farther still, making necessary a total advance of about a furlong more than two miles. All these lines were very strongly held.

The South Africans were in the centre of the division and

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attacked on a two-battalion front of 600 yards, two companies of each battalion being in front, two in support. The two leading battalions were the 3rd, still under Colonel Thackeray, and the 4th, under Colonel Christian. Zero hour was 5.30 a.m. and by 6.4 a.m. the first objective was duly reached, the 3rd Battalion losing heavily. The 'mopping up' was carried out by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The advance was resumed at 7.30 a.m. according to programme. The wire at this point was not fully cut, and the troops, advancing down a slope commanded from across the narrow valley, suffered many casualties, but they streamed down into the railway cutting and stormed the steep bank and the dug-outs cut out of the hill beyond. At 12.45 the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved on against the third objective, including Athies, and took it by 2 p.m., and in the afternoon the whole brigade was relieved and moved back to the line of the 1st and 2nd objectives to reorganize. Meanwhile, the 4th Division 'leap-frogged' over the 9th and took Fampoux. The South African battalions were already weak—none of them more than 600 strong—and they had suffered 684 casualties during the day, the 2nd faring best, the 3rd and 4th worst, but the whole attack, here as well as elsewhere, was splendidly successful. They had taken 51 officers and 2,088 other ranks, 17 guns and 84 machine-guns.

Two days later, the brigade again advanced, this time in conjunction with the 4th Division, and on the 12th delivered an attack from Fampoux in the direction of Roeux (where the Chemical Works were for a long while to be a fatal bone of contention) and Mount Pleasant Wood. The 2nd Battalion in this affair lost 16 officers and 285 men out of its remaining strength of 400, and the 1st and 4th not very much less; but the attack failed. On the night of the 15–16th April the brigade was finally withdrawn, the total casualties in the six days' fighting having been 1,404. On the 22nd they moved to the Monchy–Breton area for training and were here inspected by the G.O.C. 3rd Army, General Allenby. During the next two months 1,448 reinforcements joined from England, but even so the brigade was below strength.

For the next three months, however, it was in comparatively quiet parts of the line. In June it was in divisional reserve, still in the Arras district, where the fighting had become intermittent. Then, while the fierce struggle in Flanders was

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in its first stages, the division was transferred to the IVth Corps, and the brigade had its head-quarters at Neuville Bourjonval and held the trenches at Trescault. From here it moved to Achiet-le-Petit, in the old Somme–Ancre area.

But the Flanders battle, long delayed by the mud, was now at its height and the South Africans were needed again. On September 15th the division was transferred to the Vth Corps, in the 5th Army, and moved to Brandhoek to take part in a projected advance east of Ypres. The brigade was put into the front line on the 17th, just north of the Ypres–Menin road. The ground was waterlogged, like most of the ground on that sector, and held by the enemy with machine-guns ensconced in the famous concrete pill-boxes which had lately come into extensive use.

At 5.40 a.m. on September 20th the attack was launched on a two-battalion front, the 3rd supported by the 1st on the right, the 4th supported by the 2nd on the left. It was still dark (there was no other cover for the assembly) and the ground was very slippery. The first of the day's three objectives, the Steenbeek stream, was, however, carried, the 4th Battalion going even farther; but the troops operating on the brigade's right were held up by a strong point known as Potsdam Redoubt. From this the South Africans were exposed to a severe enfilade fire. Thereupon they attacked the redoubt and carried it. The second objective was attacked at 7 a.m., the 1st and 2nd being now in the lead. The 1st attained its objective without difficulty, but the 2nd met with stubborn resistance on its left from the north of Zonnebeke. Nevertheless, the second and third objectives, including several fortified farms and the Zonnebeke and Bremen redoubts and the hamlet of Zevenkote, were carried within three hours from the start and held against several counter-attacks for two days, the brigade losing some 1,250 men before it was relieved on the morning of September 22nd. It was here that Lance-Corporal Hewitt won the V.C. He attacked a pill-box, and in spite of being twice wounded got to the loop-hole and inserted a bomb.

On October 12th as part of the XVIIIth Corps, the brigade moved into the support line on this same sector, along the Ypres canal bank. The battalions were successively in the trenches from the 13th to the 23rd of October and suffered 261 casualties, and then, the Ypres offensive being at last ended,

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the division moved to the Belgian coast, whence, after suffering considerably from exposure in that marshy region, they started on November 20th to march to rest billets at Peronne. It was now attached to the Xth Corps.

Meanwhile, Sir Julian Byng had made his famous surprise attack at Cambrai and ten days later the Germans counter-attacked with regrettable success. Accordingly, no sooner did the division, on December 3rd, reach Peronne than it was ordered to take over the line at Gouzeaucourt from the 1st Guards Brigade, which had then succeeded in checking the German attack. This was carried out on the next day. The division was now transferred from the Xth to the VIIth Corps (General Congreve).

The South Africans, who were now almost at full strength, at once went into the trenches near Gauche Wood, and remained under continual fire till the 13th of January 1918. In addition to the bombardment there was more sickness in that December, particularly from trench-feet, than in any previous month. The casualties were at first about 30 a week, but the bombardment afterwards became less severe.

On January 23rd the brigade was in the line again, its strength being now down to 79 officers and 1,661 other ranks. Then on January 31st it was taken out and given a month's well-earned rest in the Sezanne area. Here it was reorganized, the 3rd Battalion [1] being disbanded and merged in the other three. A little later General Lukin left the division, which passed to Major-Gen. Tudor. Already in October, another change had taken place, Colonel Tanner being appointed to the command of the 8th Brigade in the 3rd Division, and being succeeded in the command of the 2nd Battalion by Lieut.-Col. Christian.

In March the brigade was moved up again to the Cambrai front (on the extreme left of the 5th Army) and on the night of 12–13th March took over 2,000 yards of the line east of Heudicourt, having to hold a succession of trenches to a depth of about a mile. It was not, however, possible to hold such a length of trench continuously, so that the defence was

[1] This battalion was recruited from the Transvaal and Rhodesia, but the Transvaaler seems to have preferred a mounted corps and the Rhodesians had from the beginning of the war established connexions with several British regiments, notably the K.R.R.C.

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organized in strong points, each held by 30 or 40 men, with machine-guns covering the intervening spaces. The two bastions of the position were Quentin Redoubt, held by a company of the 1st, and Gauche Wood, held by a company of the 2nd Battalion. Reserve positions were at Revelon Farm and Heudicourt.

The brigade was now at full strength, and in this position it enjoyed eight days of unusual quiet. Then the storm broke—the much bruited German offensive was really to begin and the South Africans, so severely tried in every big battle since their arrival in France, were specially hard pressed.

At 4.50 a.m. on March 21st the enemy began a heavy bombardment of the British gun positions and back areas. The infantry stood to arms, but the fog at dawn was very thick, so that they could see but 30 yards in front of them, and had no idea what the enemy was doing. Then, between 8 and 9 a.m. it was reported that the enemy had crept under cover of the mist into Gauche Wood. In this wood the 2nd South Africans had established three strong posts and a fourth in the trenches on the south-west of it; in addition it had two machine-guns and a section of trench-mortars. The Germans penetrated from the east and then from the north, and in such force that the two easterly posts were overwhelmed, only about half of one garrison getting back; the other was annihilated. The third post was now withdrawn and the whole available force concentrated on the fourth post. Here a very strong defence was maintained and the enemy lost severely, especially as the fog began to lift.

But the 21st Division, on the South Africans' right, was driven back with the loss of Vaucellette Farm, thus uncovering the South Africans' flank and endangering their whole position. The key point on this sector was a low eminence known as Chapel Hill, at the point of contact of the two divisions in question, which gave observation of the whole reserve line of trenches. Early in the afternoon a company of the 2nd South Africans was sent to secure this point and found the enemy already ensconced in the trenches on the northern ridge of the hill. An attack was made by 'A' Company of the 4th Battalion under Captain Bunce and the trenches recaptured, with the result that night found the South Africans still holding their whole position except Gauche Wood itself; but the 9th

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Division was the only division in the sector which had not had to give ground, a point commented on in the Commander-in-Chief's dispatches. During the night they were withdrawn from the front line into the reserve trenches, and brigade head-quarters moved back to Sorel to preserve the general alinement. The divisional artillery served the brigade well and succeeded in giving assistance not only to its proper front but to the South Africans on Chapel Hill and to the 21st Division.

The following day (22nd) was again foggy. The 11th Royal Scots from the 27th Brigade (old friends from Delville Wood days) were sent up to reinforce the South Africans. All day the enemy pressed hard on the critically placed right flank, and though Chapel Hill was held the adjoining Revelon Farm was captured, and in the afternoon the 21st Division's front had been pierced, Heudicourt outflanked, and the South Africans were beginning to be rolled up from the right. It was realized that a further retreat was imperative if the line as a whole was to be maintained, and everything depended on the brigade's ability to hold on till dark. In this difficult and dangerous position the stress fell for the most part on the company officers, the resistance being wholly maintained by individual companies or platoons which were unable to communicate with one another or with brigade head-quarters. But the junior officers (as so often in the war) were equal to the occasion, and the troops fought their rear-guard action with skill, resolution, and success. Yet the position was very critical. The artillery was withdrawn and at dusk the enemy, whose airmen had been exceedingly active, were seen from Sorel advancing in strength from the west towards the south end of the village. The head-quarters personnel was put into the trenches at the threatened point in all haste and held the enemy, allowing the guns to get back to a rear position. The head-quarters itself was withdrawn to Moislains (9 miles from Gouzeaucourt) and the remnants of the three battalions, the 1st under Lieut.-Col. Heal and the 3rd and 4th under Lieut.-Col. Christian, were withdrawn towards the north to Fins, whence they marched west by the Nurlu road to a fresh position south-west of Nurlu, and later along the Nurlu–Peronne road to its junction with the road to Moislains. They arrived here at midnight of the 22nd–23rd, having in the two days' fighting lost 900 men. They were further weakened by the absence of two companies which

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lost contact in the dark and did not manage to rejoin for several days. Among the killed none was more regretted than Captain Garnet Green, a very gallant officer who had won his spurs at Delville and at the outset of this battle commanded at the point of most danger—Gauche Wood.

Meanwhile, the brigade's details, 650 strong, which had on the 21st been encamped at Heudicourt under Lieut.-Col. Young, had come under a heavy bombardment and lost many men. On the next day they were ordered, together with other divisional details, to retire to Nurlu and take over part of the reserve line there. On the 23rd they were attacked but held their ground and, still acting under orders, they fell back to Bouchavesnes, there joining once more the main body of the brigade. This had on that day been held in reserve on the right flank of the 27th Brigade, but it soon came into the front line as the other brigade fell back, taking post on the high ground to the east of Bouchavesnes.

The enemy now won Moislains, and late in the afternoon the left flank of the 21st Division, still on the right of the South Africans and itself outflanked from the south, fell back as much as two miles to the west, thus leaving the South Africans' right flank in the air. General Tudor, who commanded the division, thereupon ordered General Dawson to bring his brigade back, in company with the rest of the division, into the line from Government Farm by the east of St. Pierre Vaast Wood to the road west of Bouchavesnes leading to Clery. This position was by General Congreve's orders to be held at all costs.

The left brigade of the 21st Division was already more than a mile west of this line, so that the South African flank was still exposed. General Dawson therefore resolved to establish his brigade on a ridge 1,500 yards west of the prescribed line so as to lessen the gap. But the gap would still not be completely closed and he was presently informed that the commander of the neighbouring troops of the 21st Division proposed after dark to fall back still farther.

At 9.48 p.m. the brigade retired along the Bouchavesnes road, apparently unknown to the enemy, and was in position by 3 a.m. on the 24th in Marrières Wood north of Clery. Contact was now obtained with the 21st Division, but the whole corps was so far back that there was a danger of allowing the Germans to outflank the 3rd Army. It was clear that just

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here would the supreme effort be made by the enemy and supreme resolution be needed in the defence.

The morning of the 24th was again wrapped in thick fog and the position occupied by the South Africans was far from satisfactory. There was only one good piece of trench, and the position sloped to the east and then rose 1,000 yards to a ridge which afforded good cover to the enemy. The three battalions could muster only 478 rifles between them, in addition to the head-quarters staff and a machine-gun detachment. Their ammunition was limited to 200 rounds per man, they had been three nights without sleep and they had lost touch with their Divisional Artillery. Soon after daylight the enemy massed on the ridge opposite and about 9 a.m. opened fire. A little later the brigade had the bitter experience of being shelled by apparently the 21st Divisional Artillery. When this fire ceased it was because the British artillery had withdrawn. The enemy's infantry then advanced to within 750 yards, a heavy attack was delivered on the left front and flank, and with the aid of a smoke screen, obtained by firing the grass, the Germans got to within 200 yards or, in places, 100 yards of the South African position. Nearer they could not get, the South Africans using rifle and machine-gun with deadly accuracy. News was now received that the 35th Division was holding a position 1,000 yards behind the South Africans and at this time, in consequence of a misapprehension caused by the retirement of the troops on either side of them, many of the men began to withdraw, but the incipient retreat was checked by Major Cochran, the Brigade-Major, who, exposing himself in so doing, was killed. The firing line was now only maintained by the return to it of all the lightly wounded, and ammunition was running low and had to be husbanded. By 2 p.m. the gallant little force was surrounded and presently Colonel Heal, already twice wounded, but smiling to the last, was killed. At 4.30 p.m. fresh enemy battalions were brought to the attack and General Dawson and Colonel Christian, who had now only 100 effectives and not a single rifle cartridge left, surrendered to save them from useless slaughter. They had held up the Germans, at a time when every hour was of incalculable value to the Allies to bring up reinforcements, for 7 hours. So ended one of the most heroic episodes in the story of the war. General Tudor

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wrote that ' this stand will live as one of the bravest feats of arms of the war . . . it was shortage of ammunition alone which made the survivors surrender '. He also testified that it was they who bore the brunt of the fighting of the 9th Division on the 21st and 22nd. The Germans themselves have borne witness to the magnificence of the exploit.

On the same night, the night of the 24–25th, some of the brigade who had been left on the night of the 22nd to cover the withdrawal fought their way through and joined the details and transport of the brigade midway between Bray and Maricourt, and on the following day these various remnants were formed into a single composite battalion, of three companies, each company representing a former battalion. On the 26th this body, some 450 strong, under Lieut.-Col. Young, helped the other two brigades, the 26th and 27th, to hold a line south of Dernancourt till they were relieved by the Australians on the night of the 27–28th. The whole division was then withdrawn altogether from the line (the rest of the corps passing at the same time to the 3rd Army) and on the 1st of April proceeded by rail from Candas to Abeele in Belgium. The brigade was now commanded by Brig.-Gen. Tanner, who it will be remembered was the original commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion.

A short interval for reorganizing was imperative and brigade head-quarters at this time was established at Enfordon camp, where drafts amounting to 17 officers and 945 other ranks joined. But the respite was of the briefest. The Germans, foiled in their drive towards Amiens, now turned their attention to the north and made dangerous progress in the Lys valley. On this historic ground the South Africans were called on for yet another effort.

The brigade was moved on the 8th of April to La Clytte and attached to the 19th Division, under Major-Gen. Jeffreys, for an attack on the lately lost crest of Messines ridge. On the 10th it was moved to Neuve Eglise and assembled for the attack east of Wulverghem. The 57th and 58th Brigades still held parts of the ridge and the task of the South Africans was to recover the portion from Messines to Lumm's Farm. Three successive objectives were set and the assault was delivered by the 1st Battalion under Lieut.-Col. Young on the right, and the 2nd under Captain Jacobs on the left with the 4th under

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Captain Reid in support. They advanced at 5.45 p.m. from the line of the Steenbeek. It was misty and a light rain was falling. With very little artillery support the 2nd Battalion had by 6.30 passed the Messines–Wytschaete road, but they were enfiladed from pill-boxes on either flank and the companies on the right in particular lost half their effectives. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, who had to attack Messines village, met the enemy advancing from it, went in with the bayonet, and drove them back beyond the ridge, but were then after hand-to-hand fighting themselves driven back to 100 yards to the west of it. The 4th in support now got into touch with them and the ground captured was held till the afternoon of the following day (11th), when a very heavy attack drove back the left flank but a counter-attack again established the line. The Germans, however, succeeded in working round the left flank and the South Africans had to be withdrawn to a line roughly 200 yards east of Hall Farm, where they established connexion with the South Wales Borderers on the left. This line was held against repeated attacks throughout the rest of the day, but at 1 a.m. on the 12th they withdrew to the ridge west of the Steenbeek, leaving the enemy in possession of the disputed Messines ridge. There the brigade remained during the following day and on the night of the 13–14th it was relieved and returned to its own division. Since the 10th it had suffered 639 casualties out of a total strength of all ranks of 1,512, and though the somewhat hopeless task of recapturing the ridge had not been achieved it had done splendid service in preventing the enemy from advancing from the ridge, for every yard of ground at this front was of extreme value. The action had, indeed, served its purpose in allowing the necessary adjustments on the front to be made. The G.O.C. of the IXth Corps at once thanked them for their 'wonderful fighting spirit', and General Plumer, commanding the 2nd Army, put it in orders that if any unit could be selected for exceptional praise it was the South African Brigade. But in spite of its losses there could be little respite from battle.

On the evening of the 15th the brigade moved to the Reninghelst area and by midday of the 16th was in position east of the village of Kemmel, the three battalions now containing little more than 250 men apiece. The 1st on the right and the

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4th on the left were in front, the 2nd in support, but 100 men of the 2nd were moved up in advance of the line to support a counter-attack delivered by the 26th Brigade which temporarily recovered Wytschaete. On the 18th the Germans, under cover, as usual, of the mist, attacked the 1st Battalion, but the line was held. On the 23rd, by which time the worst of the danger was over, though another week's heavy fighting remained, the brigade was withdrawn, and it was necessary, since hardly any reinforcements were available, to reorganize it yet again. It was now decided to form the remnants into a single battalion (maintaining also a light trench-mortar battery) and to combine it with the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 9th Scottish Rifles into a brigade to be known as the 28th (South African) Brigade. The composite battalion was now commanded by Lieut.-Col. Bamford of the 2nd Battalion with Major H. H. Jenkins of the 1st as second in command, and, with drafts, numbered 59 officers and 1,527 other ranks.

On April 26th the newly constituted brigade was lent to the 49th (West Riding) Division and on the night of April 29–30th the South Africans relieved their fellow battalion, the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, in the front line between La Clytte and Dickebusch. The position here was dominated by the enemy on Mount Kemmel, who repeatedly attacked, and the battalion suffered 200 casualties before it was relieved on the night of May 5–6th, when the brigade returned to the 9th Division.

After a brief period for refitting at Islinghem, the South Africans were back in the support line in front of Hondeghem on the 24th in expectation of an attack by the Germans from Meteren, but the expectation, for once, was not fulfilled, and on the night of June 5–6th the battalion went back to Hondeghem. On the 17th it was again in the front line near Meteren, and a week later, just after midnight (June 23rd), it attacked in conjunction with the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade. The attack was completely successful and recovered a depth of a quarter of a mile of ground on a front of 750 yards, the Germans making no effort to regain it. At the end of the month it again had five days at Hondeghem and then returned to the front line, preparing for an attack on Meteren. It was evident now that the Germans had been brought to a standstill and the British in their turn were resuming the offensive, but as yet only in small-scale attacks. An assault had been

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projected for the 10th of July but bad weather held it up. On the morning of the 19th, however, the South Africans and the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers advanced behind a barrage and punctually reached all their objectives, including Meteren village. The South African casualties were about 130, but at this cost they took at least 225 unwounded prisoners. On the 30th of July they went out of the line but were in it again on the 5th of August, and a fortnight later (18th of August) attacked and captured Hoegenacker. This ended their period of service as a battalion, for on the same night they left the line, and at the end of the month the arrival of 1,000 reinforcements from England enabled the brigade to be reformed. Their total casualties during this period, 24th of April to 18th of August, had been 18 officers and 441 other ranks; heavy enough, but light compared to those suffered in the earlier phases of the campaign.

On the 11th of September the brigade, now wholly South African once more, left the 9th Division, with which it had served so long, and was transferred to 2nd Army Reserve.[1] Its composition was now:

1st S.A.I. commanded by Major Jenkins,
2nd S.A.I. commanded by Lieut.-Col. Bamford,
4th S.A.I. commanded by Lieut.-Col. McLeod,
S.A. Light Trench-Mortar Battery,
S.A. 1st Field Ambulance,

together with brigade head-quarters and a signal section, the whole still under Brig.-Gen. Tanner.

Meanwhile, the Allied offensive had developed into an advance all along the British line, and on September 22nd the brigade proceeded to the Le Cauroy area, where it joined the 66th Division under Major-Gen. Bethell, with which it remained for the rest of its service in France. Its fellow brigades were now the 198th and the 199th, composed of Lancashire and Irish troops, and the 9th (Pioneer Battalion) Gloucesters.

A week later the division was transferred from the 1st to the 4th Army (XIIIth Corps) and moved by way of Villers Bretonneux, Montauban, and Nurlu (not the first time the brigade had visited these parts), to the Ronssoy area. Here

[1] The South Africans were replaced in the 9th Division by the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, see vol. ii, p. 317.

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it arrived on October 5th and on the early morning of the 8th the brigade attacked the eastern outskirts of Beaurevoir, the 2nd on the right, the 4th on the left and the 1st in support. The opposition relied mainly on machine-guns, but in spite of them the objective was gained by 7 a.m., nearly 500 prisoners and 4 field-guns being captured. But the 2nd lost many officers, including Lieut.-Col. Bamford, who was wounded, Major Spranger succeeding to his command. For the objectives which followed the other brigades of the division were used, the operation resulting on the following day in the capture of Maretz. Then about 10.30 a.m. on the 9th the South Africans were called on once more and advanced in the same order. They achieved even more than was set them, carrying the villages of Bertry, Maurois, and Honnechy and clearing them of all enemy troops. Then pushing on according to orders and co-operating with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade they—the 1st Battalion—carried Beaumont. The next day they were in support, but on the night of the 11th were again in the line, just west of Le Cateau, which an Irish battalion had actually entered but been unable to hold. The Germans had orders to hold Le Cateau and the line of the Selle at all costs, in order to be in a favourable position while negotiating for an armistice, and there were four divisions in this sector, two of them newly come into the line. The Selle runs through a somewhat deep valley, but on the western or British side the ground slopes gradually, on the eastern side it rises abruptly. Le Cateau itself is about the size of Henley-on-Thames, with plenty of well-built houses and cellars, and a railway embankment on the east of the town gives additional facility for defence.

Between the 12th and 15th the South Africans pushed forward to the bank of the Selle north of the town, but the two bridges were commanded by the enemy. Nevertheless, a Lewis gun section and a party of the 2nd South Africans under 2nd Lieutenant Stewart succeeded, in spite of the enemy's bombing, in wading the river, near to one of the bridges which had been blown up, and established themselves on the east bank. This was on the 15th and they held on till the afternoon of the 17th, when the survivors, now reduced to seven, were relieved. By 5.45 on the evening before, the South Africans had cleared all the western bank and at once prepared to throw eight bridges across. They began the crossing at 8 p.m. and it

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was completed by 4.30 a.m. next morning. They consolidated their position and at 8 a.m. attacked the town from the north, the 198th Brigade attacking in the centre and the 50th Division on the south. The South Africans had advanced only 100 yards when they came upon a sunken road and a palisade. They carried this obstacle and came next to a railway cutting, which was further protected by a belt of wire, 60 yards deep. They succeeded, however, in working up an old communication trench into the cutting, where heavy hand-to-hand fighting took place. By 9.15 a.m. they had reached their objective, but found themselves enfiladed from the railway line, to which they accordingly returned, proceeded to work up it, and by midday had cleared some 500 yards. The 1st Battalion now came into the line and the next 36 hours were spent in consolidating the ground won, till finally, in the early morning of the 19th, the original objective was again attacked, carried and held till the following night (19–20th), when the brigade was relieved and moved back to rest billets at Serain. The casualties in this action were 47 officers and 1,229 other ranks, but their captures amounted to 1,242 prisoners, no less than 367 machine- and 22 field-guns, and 19 trench-mortars. The capture of the railway embankment was described by Brig.-Gen. Ian Stewart of the XIIIth Corps as ' one of the most astounding feats of the war '.

The rest of the month was needed for yet another reorganization of the brigade and was spent at Serain. Then on November 2nd it advanced on the last stage of its campaigning. On the 8th it was at Dompierre, on the 9th at Soire le Château, where the whole brigade, except the 4th Battalion, was included in a mobile column to pursue the now rapidly retreating Germans. The column moved out of Beaumont at 7 a.m. on November 10th, headed by the 12th Lancers, and came upon the enemy in force on the high ground north and south of Grandrieu. The troops here opposed to them included the Prussian Guard Reserve. At 10.30 a.m. the 1st South Africans attacked, crossed the River Thure and then waited for the bridges to be repaired. Next morning they advanced again and fighting was actually in progress when orders to cease fire were received. The Armistice was signed.

The casualties in this last fight were 73, and almost immediately after a draft of 500 arrived, too late to fight but just

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in time for the advance to the Rhine. The 66th Division was transferred to the Xth Corps and starting on the 19th it marched to the Meuse, and in the following month moved on by way of Rochefort to Marche, which was reached on the 16th of December. Here the brigade was visited by the Prince of Wales. Towards the end of January, the 1st South Africans moved forward to Hay, being joined in the middle of February by the other battalions, and here General Botha visited his countrymen. But at last their spell of European service was at an end. In the first half of March they came back to England, General Bethell, who commanded the 66th Division, referring in a farewell message to their great reputation for hand-to-hand fighting and the accomplishment of what seemed an impossible task at Le Cateau. They landed at Shoreham and thence passed on to a concentration camp at Parham Down, to wait their turn for embarkation, draft by draft, for South Africa. The biggest draft left on June 11th from Devonport, sailing, suitably enough, on a captured German liner, the *Cap Polonio*. Meanwhile, they had taken part in two impressive ceremonies, one the march of overseas troops through London on May 3rd, when the South African contingent was headed by Colonel Thackeray; the other a memorial service in Westminster Abbey for those brave sons of South Africa who had given their lives for their country.

During their 30 months of fighting on the Western Front, the brigade had taken part, and a very important part, in all the big battles—the Somme, Arras, Ypres 1917, Cambrai, the great German offensive, and the greater Allied one of 1918. In all they had borne themselves not merely well, and bravely, but with a superb gallantry that distinguished them among the many gallant units in the armies of the Empire.

Something remains to be said of the other arms of the South African Expeditionary Force.

In all six batteries of heavy artillery were raised for overseas service, but it is impossible to describe their work in any detail. The batteries were armed with 6-inch howitzers and were numbered 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th (the original five which came to England in 1915), and 125th Siege Battery, R.G.A. The batteries were at first entirely separate, but early in 1918 they were grouped into two brigades, the 44th and the 50th. 71st, 73rd, and 125th together with 20th Siege Battery composing the

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44th Brigade; 72nd, 74th, and 75th with 50th Siege Battery and 275th Siege Battery comprising the 50th. Like the infantry, these batteries were part of the Imperial Forces and their history must be included in that of the Royal Regiment to which they belonged. Heavy artillery units are corps troops and continuously in the line. The story of the six South African batteries would between them cover practically the whole story of the campaigns of 1916–18. But that they were not a whit behind their infantry brothers in gallantry is revealed in the exploit of Major Brydon.[1] This officer commanded the 73rd Battery from the first, and was deservedly its idol. In August 1916, he was wounded while observing in the trenches in the Thiepval area, returned to the battery in the last stage of the Ancre fighting, and was again wounded in the following May in the Arras battle. When he came back in July it was in the Ypres salient, and here in October he was wounded a third time. He returned to the battery, now a part of the 44th (South African) Royal Artillery Brigade, in March to find it near Bethune. Here the storm of the German spring offensive fell upon it on April 9th and things went so ill that Major Brydon was ordered to blow up his guns. Instead, he served out rifles and manned two machine-guns and stood to. He was wounded and gassed but refused to leave his guns. These he had eventually, under cover of darkness, to man-handle to a position a mile to the rear, and here again the battery came into action and stayed there, but on the 12th Major Brydon was killed by a shell. It is recorded that on the 9th, one of his gunners had his arms and legs shot away. Major Brydon went and spoke to him, asking if he could do anything for him. 'By God, Brydon,' was the dying man's reply, 'you are a man. I'm only good for the parson now, but I'm proud to die under you.' Such was the spirit of the rank and file of the South African Artillery. It should be added that South African Artillery served in Allenby's army in Palestine in 1918, the 1st South African Field Artillery Brigade (A, B, and C Batteries) forming part of the 75th Division of the XXIst Corps.

To the Royal Engineers South Africa contributed not only a signalling company which shared the fortunes of the brigade and had the reputation, we are told, of being the very best in

[1] See *The South African Forces in France*, by John Buchan, Appendix I.

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the army, but also a Miscellaneous Trades Company, raised in June 1917, which came, under Captain Mason, by way of Bordon to France in October of that year. It was then known as 84th Mechanical Transport Company, Royal Engineers (South Africa). It did valuable work at the great locomotive works at St. Etienne-du-Rouvray, near Rouen.

Two companies of the Railway Operating Department were raised in South Africa in the autumn of 1916, one of actual railwaymen, the other of men with knowledge of railway engineering. Each company consisted of 8 officers and 266 other ranks, and the whole body was commanded by Lieut.-Col. J. R. Collins, Mechanical Superintendent of South African Railways. These companies came to France in March 1917 and worked on the Light Railways, which were then being extended very greatly. No. 1 worked on the Belgian front, No. 2 at Arras. After the taking of Messines and Vimy Ridge they were transferred to broad gauge lines and Colonel Collins at this time became Assistant Director of Light Railways to the 5th Army. The two companies, now known as 92nd and 93rd Coys. R.O.D., were for a time lent to this Army and helped to operate the light railways in the Passchendaele section. In January 1918 the 93rd, still with the 5th Army, moved south first to Noyon and then to Flexicourt, where the 5th Army's retreat in that spring threw upon them the unwonted task of constructing defences for Amiens. Thereafter, when the British turn came, the 93rd moved forward to Douai and finally as far as Mons. Meanwhile, the 92nd had remained in the north—in the Armentières district—and finally ended their service on the Tourcoing–Tournai section.

The R.A.S.C. also had need of South African help, the War Office in February 1917 asking for Cape coloured drivers for service in France; and more than 3,600 men were eventually raised. The first detachment reached France towards the end of May and six companies were formed and stationed at Dunkirk and Calais, at Boulogne, at Havre, and at Rouen, to take the place of white personnel who moved up into Army areas. The whole was commanded by Colonel Anderson. Their work was very valuable and their conduct excellent, in spite of their being exposed to the temptation of large towns. Three companies were later sent up into the front areas.

There was also a white Labour Battalion and several coloured

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battalions, in one of which a Zulu chief served as a private and died of wounds. But the heaviest toll was taken by the loss of a transport which struck a mine in February 1917 and carried 615 coloured men to the bottom.

Two Forestry Companies were raised in South Africa and earned high praise from Lord Lovat, the Director of Forestry, for their practical knowledge and devotion to duty.

The South African Field Ambulance formed part of the brigade and shared its fortunes, but South Africa further maintained a General Hospital, first in Egypt, then at Abbeville in France, where the personnel arrived on the 15th of July 1916, just in time to receive cases from the Somme. Up to the end of that year, 3,032 battle casualties and 3,404 sick had been admitted. During 1917, 7,613 battle casualties and 11,496 sick, in 1918, up to the close of the fighting, 20,089 cases of all kinds were admitted.

Mr. Buchan, in *The South African Forces in France*,[1] writes that the casualties were 'close on 15,000, nearly 300 per cent. of the original strength. Of these some 5,000 were dead.' An official statement of the known deaths gives 4,648 in France and 261 in Egypt.[2] The South African Brigade was a noble band of brothers; officers and men alike attained a very high level of excellence, not in fighting alone. Classed as a unit of the British Army, they kept their individuality, but kept it in full harmony with their home-bred comrades, and their record in the Great War will live to all time, adding lustre to the Union of South Africa.

[1] p. 258.

[2] See *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1920* (The War Office, March 1922). On p. 347 under *Registration of Graves, South African Contingent* are the following figures up to the 31st of July 1919:

	Deaths.
British Expeditionary Force . .	4,648
Egyptian ,, ,, . .	261
East African ,, ,, . .	2,141
German South-West Africa . . .	254
Rebellion—South Africa . . .	409
	7,713

On p. 237 of the same White Book, the figures given, subject to correction, for the Union of South Africa are:

Deaths . . .	7,121
Wounds . . .	12,029
Prisoners . . .	1,538

Mr. Buchan in his book (p. 260) says that South Africa contributed to the different fronts over 136,000 white troops, some 20 per cent. of the white male population.

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

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CHAPTER VI

THE CAPE CORPS

By the Editor

THE 1st Battalion Cape Corps was a fighting unit, of which the rank and file were coloured men from the Union of South Africa, mainly from the Cape province. There had been a Cape Corps in former days, ancestors of the Cape Mounted Rifles, a coloured force for which a white force was substituted at a later stage.[1] When the campaign in German South-West Africa ended, the Union Government offered to the Army Council a coloured infantry battalion for overseas service, to be, like the British West Indies Regiment, an Imperial force, and to be paid for from Imperial funds. The offer was accepted in September 1915, a recruiting committee was formed with head-quarters at Cape Town, its first chairman being Sir Walter Stanford, who was succeeded by the Mayor of Cape Town, Sir Harry Hands, a vigorous recruiting campaign was taken in hand, and by the 12th of December a full complement of four double companies, 30 officers and 995 other ranks, was gathered at the mobilization camp at Simonstown. The battalion was from first to last commanded by Lieut.-Col. G. A. Morris (D.S.O., C.M.G.), of the Natal Carbineers, and the second in command, who acted several times for Colonel Morris, was Major C. N. Hoy (D.S.O. and bar). On the 9th of February, 1916, the corps embarked at Cape Town for East Africa, it landed at Kilindini on the 17th of February, and it served in East Africa continuously for 22 months, leaving on return to South Africa on the 20th of December, 1917.

Immediately on arrival in East Africa the battalion was sent up the main railway and detrained at Kajiado. It was moved

[1] For the Cape Mounted Riflemen see vol. i, p. 91. A full account of them is given in *The Cape Coloured Man in Earlier Wars*, by W. R. Morrison, being the first two chapters of *The Story of the 1st Cape Corps (1915–1919)*, by Captain I. D. Difford, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. John X. Merriman, Cape Town (Hortons Ltd., 1921). Captain Difford, who was Quartermaster of the battalion, has compiled a most exhaustive account of its life and service, from which the short notice given in the text has been taken.

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into German territory at Longido West and formed part of Major-Gen. Stewart's 1st East African Division which marched on Moshi, the railhead of the Tanga line, from the north and west sides of Kilimanjaro, coinciding with General Smuts's main advance east and south of the great mountain. After arrival at Moshi in the middle of March it was employed on lines of communication until the beginning of June, when it became divisional troops of the 1st East African Division, which was now commanded by Major-Gen. Hoskins. This continued during the advance on to the Central Railway and until Morogoro was reached at the beginning of September.

Morogoro became the depot of the 1st Cape Corps as long as it remained in East Africa. Throughout its East African service the unit was much split up into different detachments serving in different directions, and the climate took heavy toll of its effectives. In the autumn of 1916 it was decided to increase the strength from four to six double companies, roughly from 1,000 to 1,500 men, but though the numbers were multiplied, as a matter of fact the four double-company basis was retained, the two additional companies being treated as reserve companies to reinforce the fighting line. For a short time a second battalion was raised, which in the latter part of 1917 and earlier part of 1918 served with General Northey's force.

At Morogoro the battalion was transferred to Major-Gen. Beves's brigade as Force Reserve, in the middle of December it left in the southerly advance to the Mgeta and Rufiji rivers, and Colonel Morris commanded the flying column, including 500 of his own men, which on the 2nd–3rd of January, 1917, under the guidance of the famous scout Major Pretorius, in 17 hours marched 31 miles, crossed the Rufiji in Berthon boats at Kipenio, 2½ miles south-west of Mkalinzo, and entrenched a position on the southern bank—a memorable and most successful feat of endurance and skill. In the middle of January, as has been told elsewhere,[1] the Nigerians crossed at Kipenio, and carried on the southern advance. Colonel Morris with a strong detachment of the Cape Corps and an Indian mountain battery was detailed to support them, and Morris was in command at the hot fight at Kipongo on the 20th of January. In the course of March what remained of the battalion after

[1] See above, pp. 139–40 and 187–8.

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over two months' service in the Rufiji swamps in the rainy season returned to Morogoro.

From April to the end of September the battalion, in detachments, was principally concerned in hunting the Germans who broke north under Wintgens. A strong section of this force under Captain Naumann was cornered by Colonel Morris's command and surrendered on the 1st of October. A smaller party under Lieut. Zingel had a month earlier been accounted for by Major Hoy. In the latter part of October the battalion, 1,200 strong, was sent round by sea to the Lindi area and, commanded by Major Hoy—Colonel Morris having been given command of a column—saw heavy fighting under Brig.-Gen. O'Grady. Once more it was in touch with the Nigerian brigade. The stiffest action, attended by considerable casualties, was on the 6th of November in the advance from Nyangao on the enemy position at Mahiwa, and there was further fighting on the next two days before von Lettow was driven into retreat. With the other troops of its column the battalion then pressed hard upon the retreating Germans, but after the 18th of November saw no more fighting in East Africa, in December it was ordered home, and it reached Durban on Christmas Day. During its service in East Africa there had been 163 deaths from all causes and the wounded in action had numbered 106.

In view of the excellent record which the battalion had to its credit it was decided, after an interval for rest and reorganization, to employ it again in Egypt and Palestine. Its nominal establishment was now put back to four double companies, and the two additional half companies were formally consituted a reserve half battalion. The main battalion, with a strength of 37 officers and 957 other ranks, under Major Hoy's command during the temporary absence from ill-health of Colonel Morris, embarked at Durban on the 3rd of April, 1918, landed at Suez on the 19th, and went on by train to camp at Qantara. On May 21 it was moved to El Arish and, after intensive training both at Qantara and at El Arish, reached Ludd in Palestine on the 17th of July. Here it was incorporated in the 160th Infantry Brigade of the 53rd Division of the XXth Corps, the Corps commander being Sir Philip Chetwode, and the Divisional and Brigade commanders being respectively Major-Gen. Mott and Brig.-Gen.

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Pearson. It took the place of one of the British Territorial battalions, of which the 53rd Division had been originally composed but some of which in the summer of 1918 were transferred to the Western Front or amalgamated or disbanded. The XXth Corps held the centre of the British line, covering Jerusalem, and the head-quarters of the 53rd Division were at this date at Rham Alla in a direct line 12 miles north of the city. Here the 1st Cape Corps arrived on the 22nd of July. On the night of the 19th of August, the 53rd Division took over the front line about 10 miles north of Rham Alla, and on the right of the Jerusalem–Nablus road, but the Cape Corps was so reduced in numbers by an epidemic of influenza that it was moved back into reserve. Careful training, however, was taken in hand for the great attack which was now drawing near. On the 16th of September the battalion moved up towards the starting-point, and on the night of the 18–19th of September fighting began. It was desired, as preliminary to the main attack, somewhat to advance the right flank of the XXth Corps, held by the 53rd Division on the right of the Nablus road, and an Indian battalion, the 1/17th Infantry, led for the 160th Brigade, followed by the 1st Cape Corps. All the objectives were gained, the 1st Cape Corps securing with insignificant losses the position known as Square Hill, together with 181 prisoners. This was in the early morning of the 19th. On that morning the great general attack began, and in view of the sweeping success in the coastal plain a further advance was ordered for the 53rd Division. Accordingly, when night came the 1st Cape Corps was detailed to storm the hill Kh. Jebeit, on which the Turks were strongly entrenched. The attack was made in the early morning of the 20th, but after heavy fighting was beaten back, and out of 400 of the battalion who went into battle 152 were killed or wounded, the number of casualties among the officers being exceptionally high. Owing to the rapid collapse of the Turks this was the last action in which the 1st Cape Corps was engaged. At the end of October, with the other units of the 53rd Division, it was ordered back to Egypt, disturbances in Egypt delayed its repatriation, and it was not until the end of August and beginning of September, 1919, that it reached South Africa again and was shortly afterwards disbanded, having done excellent service and made for itself a worthy name.

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The enlistment of coloured men in the Union of South Africa for fighting service had been regarded as something of an experiment. It was a most successful experiment, giving to very loyal subjects of the King an opportunity of proving their loyalty in the fighting line and, in Mr. Merriman's words, setting an example of discipline, endurance, and sacrifice to duty. It was the one fighting infantry unit which the Union of South Africa sent to Sinai and Palestine. Six thousand men were enrolled for the 1st Cape Corps, and 2,000 for the 2nd. The number of lives lost in the 1st Cape Corps was about 450. The Cape Corps War Recruiting Committee was at pains to safeguard the interests of the fighting-men and their dependants and developed for their benefit a Cape Corps Gifts and Comforts Committee.[1]

It should be added that the activities of the Cape Corps War Recruiting Committee covered a wider field than the Cape Corps alone. It was estimated that the Committee enrolled some 25,000 coloured men for war service, combatant and non-combatant, among the non-combatant being the Cape Coloured Labour Battalion under Colonel Van der Byl and the much larger African Native Labour Contingent, which was commanded by Colonel S. B. Prichard, C.M.G., of the Native Affairs Department, and in which almost every native race in South Africa was represented. The interests of African labourers on the Western Front were watched over by a 'Committee for the Welfare of Africans in Europe', of which Lord Selborne was chairman.[2]

[1] See also below, p. 526.

[2] See Sir H. Sloley's article in the *Journal of the African Society*, vol. xvii, 1917–18, pp. 199–211.

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CHAPTER VII

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE WAR

By the Editor

It has been seen that the war came upon the Union of South Africa at a time when internal conditions were critical and racial and industrial disputes were rife. To these difficulties was added a severe and prolonged drought, affecting principally the eastern and midland districts of the Cape Province. Australia also was suffering from drought when the war began, but there the rains came shortly afterwards, whereas in the Union throughout 1915 the rainfall was deficient, to the detriment of crops and livestock. Eventually, in June 1916, it was found necessary to pass a relief Act, the Drought and Flood Distress Relief Act, 1916. In this respect, as in the strain imposed by the rebellion and the South-West African campaign, the Union, in the early stages of the war, laboured under special disabilities, as compared with the other Dominions. On the other hand, it had certain special advantages. Its greatest industry, gold-mining, was not, in the main, adversely affected by the war; on the contrary, gold, of necessity, was in more demand than ever; until 1918 there was no shortage of labour; and in 1916 the output on the Rand constituted a record, amounting to nearly £40 millions, the whole of which was taken by the Bank of England. War has no use for ostrich feathers, which already before the war had been in little demand; and the diamond trade also was at first greatly depressed, the Kimberley mines being for a while closed down; but the latter trade revived with a renewed demand from the United States, and the revival justified an export duty on diamonds in 1916. One result of the war, very beneficial to South Africa, was the increase in the number of ships which called at South African ports, plying between the East and Europe by the old historic route round the Cape, instead of

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using, as in peace time, the Suez Canal. This led to a growing demand for South African coal, and also to direct communication between Japan and South Africa. Germany's former share in South African trade now passed largely into American and Japanese hands.

In the first two years of the war, the war precautions Acts passed by the Union Parliament were very few, as compared with similar legislation elsewhere in the Empire. The Public Welfare and Moratorium Act, passed at the beginning of the war, in the short emergency session of September 1914, was a comprehensive law which gave extensive powers to the Executive Government, including authority to prohibit exports; and, apart from enactments arising out of the rebellion, it was not found necessary to legislate further in the direction of war precautions until 1916, when, in June, a Trading with the Enemy Act became law. Its provisions empowered the Government, *inter alia*, to wind up enemy businesses, and to take such safeguards as might be thought necessary in regard to the formation of new companies.

The war legislation of 1916 also included a War Special Pensions Act, which was re-enacted and amended in 1917 and again in 1918. When the crisis first began, the paper currency of the Union was safeguarded by a law passed in September 1914, which gave the Government power to guarantee bank-notes and declare them legal tender, and to authorize the issue of additional notes. This law expired on the 30th of June 1915. Before the war the finances of the Union had not been flourishing, and it has been told that the Imperial Government helped to relieve the situation by making a timely loan. Further help was forthcoming from the same source to meet the extraordinary expenditure which the war entailed and all of which was charged to loan funds. At the beginning of the financial year 1914–15, before the war, the Union, with a white population of under 1,400,000, had a public debt of rather over £126 millions. In the short session of September 1914 a vote on account for war expenses was taken, amounting to £2 millions and intended to cover such expenses up to the end of the financial year. But the rebellion followed, and the war expenditure for 1914–15, including the cost of the rebellion, amounted to no less than £8¾ millions, while similar expenditure for the financial year 1915–16 was estimated at

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£7¼ millions, making a total war expenditure for the two years of £16 millions of borrowed money. There was a further deficit on the current account of the year 1914–15 of more than £2 millions, also to be covered by borrowed money. A financial conference was held at Pretoria in January 1915, and in the spring session of Parliament special war taxes were levied. An income tax had been imposed for the first time exactly a month before the beginning of the war, the Act bearing date of the 4th of July 1914. It was a graduated tax upon all incomes of £1,000 per annum and upwards, varying from a minimum of 6*d.* in the £ to 1*s.* 6*d.* in the case of incomes of £24,000 per annum and upwards. By an Act, which became law in April 1915, the limit of exemption was lowered from £1,000 per annum to £300: the minimum rate was increased from 6*d.* to 1*s.* in the £: the maximum from 1*s.* 6*d.* to 2*s.* No distinction was made between earned and unearned incomes, a point which called forth criticism from the representatives of labour. At the same date the general *ad valorem* rate of Excise and Customs duties was increased by 5 per cent., from 15 per cent. to 20 per cent., and special duties were imposed upon a number of articles, ranging from sugar to playing-cards. The third war tax for the financial year 1915–16 was a special levy upon the profits of the gold-mines, to the amount of £500,000. This represented an increase in the already existing profits tax on gold-mining of from 10 per cent. to about 15 per cent.

The estimate of receipts from these three war taxes still left a prospective deficit on the account for 1915–16, and this it was proposed to meet by appropriating for the time being, or in strict financial ethics misappropriating, certain sinking fund balances and proceeds of land sales, and—to quote General Smuts's terminology—by anticipating the Government's share of the Bewaarplaatsen proceeds. These last receipts were the outcome of gold-mining at deeper levels than were reached in the earlier stages of the industry, and of mining under lands which had originally been excluded altogether from the mining area, the surface being required for other purposes. A compromise had been arrived at, though not as yet embodied in law, whereby the proceeds of these royalties were to be equally divided between the Government and the owners of the lands, and the money thus accumulating

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to the credit of the Government was made available for supplementing the deficiency of revenue. As a matter of fact, it was not found necessary to resort to this expedient, or to the appropriation of sinking funds, in order to balance the account of the year 1915–16, for the revenue receipts of the year exceeded the estimate. The Bewaarplaatsen moneys therefore remained in hand, to help in financing the following year 1916–17. The original estimate of war expenditure for 1915–16, £7¼ millions, was largely exceeded. Two additional Loan Appropriation Acts were passed, and the total war expenses of the year nearly reached the large sum of £11 millions. Similar expenditure in 1916–17 was estimated at a much lower figure, £3,225,000, and this time the estimates proved to be sufficient. For while the Union, in the early stages of the war, was, owing to the rebellion and the South-West African campaign, subjected to a relatively much greater financial strain than the sister Dominions, it had the advantage of them later, in that there was not the same progressive rate of indebtedness in South Africa as in Canada and Australia. The numbers of South African fighting-men sent beyond the seas or to Central and East Africa were smaller than the overseas contingents from the other Dominions, and their cost was borne mainly by the Imperial Government. Still the debt steadily mounted up. The total gross public debt of the Union, which before the war was £126 millions, at the end of the financial year 1914–15 exceeded £138 millions; at the end of 1915–16 it nearly reached the sum of £151 millions; and at the end of 1916–17 it was over £154½ millions. This was public debt for all purposes: out of the total increase of £28½ millions, war expenses accounted for about £23 millions. For the year 1916–17 the special levy on the profits of the gold-mines was renewed; and the additional war taxes were, a super-tax, at the same rate as the increased income-tax, upon incomes of over £2,500 per annum, a graduated export duty upon diamonds, and an increase in the Excise and Customs duties on spirits. The estimated revenue still fell somewhat short of the estimated expenditure, and again the Bewaarplaatsen receipts were counted upon to redress the balance. But once more expectations were agreeably disappointed, and once more the twice threatened proceeds of the Bewaarplaatsen were left intact. The actual revenue receipts of the year

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exceeded the estimate by about £1 million; and, in lieu of a deficit on the account, there was a handsome surplus, nine-tenths of the increase in the revenue beyond the estimate being derived in equal proportions from the Customs duties and the diamond tax. When the financial year was over, a 'Bewaarplaatsen Moneys Application Act' was at length passed in June 1917, which in the main carried out the understanding that these receipts should be equally divided between the Government and the landowners.

The Budget for 1917–18, brought in by Mr. Burton on the 30th of March 1917, like its predecessors, contemplated a deficit on the year's account. The war expenses of the year, as scheduled in a loan appropriation Act, were estimated at £3,392,500. The principal new war tax was an excess profits duty, amounting to 25 per cent. of excess profits accruing from the 1st of July 1916 onwards, for the period of the war and six months afterwards. This duty was embodied in a comprehensive consolidating Income Tax Act; but there were exceptions to it, principal among which were the profits on gold-mining. The special war levy on these profits, which had been imposed in the last two years, was also dropped. On the other hand, the new Income Tax Act contained a chapter imposing a dividend tax, specially devised to meet the case of companies. The rate of this tax was, in the case of ordinary companies, 1*s.* in the £, in that of Diamond Mining Companies 1*s.* 6*d.*, and in that of Gold Mining Companies 2*s.*, the extra 6*d.* in this last case being earmarked as a special war levy. The existing export duty on diamonds was revised and fixed at a uniform rate of 5 per cent. on the value of diamonds exported, with an anticipated increase of revenue from this source.

When the financial year was drawing to a close, once more it was found that, instead of a deficit on the working of the year, there would be a substantial surplus, in spite of the fact that the estimated expenditure of the year had also been largely exceeded. The new Finance Minister, Mr. Orr, in bringing in the budget for 1918–19, on the 15th of February 1918, foreshadowed a surplus on the outgoing year of £464,000, Customs and Excise receipts having yielded at a rate of over £1 million more than had been anticipated, and the receipts from income-tax and some other sources of revenue having

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also exceeded the estimate. The surplus eventually proved to be no less than £698,000. The truth was that in these war years, in spite of political and industrial troubles, South Africa prospered greatly: gold, wool, maize, hides, cheese, all the staple South African products, were in high demand. The weak point in the finances was that, with the exception of increased debt charges, no fraction of the war expenditure was met from current revenue. On the 31st of March 1918, the total public debt of the Union stood at nearly £160½ millions, having been increased during the year by not far short of £6 millions. The Union Government had borrowed from the Imperial Government £22 millions, of which £4¼ millions had been temporarily repaid; and two loans raised in the Union in the two years 1916 and 1917 had produced nearly £15 millions. The war expenses for 1918–19 were estimated at nearly £3 millions, the interest on public debt at nearly £6,700,000, and, following the example set him by previous ministers, Mr. Orr budgeted for a deficit of some £403,000. In the encouraging light, however, of the returns for three years past, he abstained from imposing any additional taxation, trusting to economics to redress, if necessary, the balance between revenue and expenditure. His confidence was justified. When he brought in his next budget on the 19th of February 1919, the revised estimates for 1918–19 showed an excess on the revenue side of fully £2 millions, chiefly in Customs receipts, and on the expenditure side of over £1¾ millions, the grant of a war bonus to government servants and the measures taken to cope with an influenza epidemic having greatly added to the expenses of the year. The prospective deficit on the working of the year had fallen to £70,000, and there was a probability of its being converted into a small surplus. The final result, when the accounts for 1918–19 had been made up, was a surplus of £589,000. On the 31st of March 1919, the net public debt of the Union stood at rather less than £166½ millions, having been again increased by nearly £6 millions; a Loan Appropriation Act of the 1918 session had authorized borrowing up to nearly £7 millions, rather less than £3 millions of which were for war expenses; and a loan floated in the Union in the last three months of 1918 had realized £5 millions. During the war nearly £21 millions in all were borrowed locally from the small number of 10,000 subscribers.

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The net charge to loan funds in respect of the cost of the war to the Union of South Africa from the beginning up to the 31st of March 1919, after deducting what would have been in ordinary times the normal cost of the Defence Department, was set down at £27⅓ millions, of which the rebellion accounted for over 5 and the South-West African campaign for £12 millions, the balance representing supplementary expenditure in other theatres of war. In addition, the interest on war debt up to the 31st of March 1919 was placed at £4 millions, and the capital cost of war pensions at £3½ millions.[1]

As in Australia, so in South Africa, public works of development were not discontinued during the war; and such works, especially railways, accounted for a substantial amount of the public debt. Strategic reasons combined with grounds of public utility to promote the completion by the Commonwealth Government of the Transcontinental Railway, linking up Western Australia to the more eastern states; and strategic reasons of a more urgent kind impelled the Government of the Union to connect their own system with that of German South-West Africa, the connexion in both cases being an east and west connexion. The speed at which the work was carried out in South Africa must have constituted a record. From Prieska, which before the war was the railhead in the Cape Province in the direction of the German Protectorate, to the southern bank of the Orange river over against Upington, is a distance of 142½ miles. After a week of surveys, the construction of a light standard gauge line between these two points—the standard gauge of the Union being 3 feet 6 inches—was begun on the 31st of August 1914, and it was completed on the 20th of November following, in 82 days, or 89 including the surveys, the average rate of progress being 2¼ miles a day for each day on which work was actually done. The expenditure on this section of the railway, estimated at £337,500, was authorized by a special law passed in the short session of September 1914—the 'Prieska–Upington Railway Construction Act, 1914'. From Upington to the border at Nakob is a distance of 88½ miles, and from Nakob to the then southernmost point of the German railway system at Kalkfontein 84, or 172½ miles in all from Upington to the German lines.

[1] For this last paragraph see the report of the Controller and Auditor-General of the Union for 1918–19, p. 45.

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Surveyors started in January 1915 to mark out the trace. On the 18th of that month they were taken prisoners by Maritz, who, with his rebel following, was at this date still infesting the border. They were released, but survey work was suspended till the middle of March, and the survey up to Kalkfontein was not finished till the 28th of May. By the 17th of May the rails had been laid up to the border, and the railway was completed to Kalkfontein on the 25th of June, a fortnight before the campaign in German South-West Africa came to an end; 105 days had sufficed to link up Upington to Kalkfontein. Running for its whole length along the level of the South African plateau, the line from Prieska to Kalkfontein presented few engineering difficulties, with one exception. This was the bridging of the Orange river at or near Upington. The construction of a temporary low level bridge was begun about the end of November 1914; but floods stopped the work, and it was not resumed till the middle of March, the first train running across the bridge on the 16th of April. For a month prior to that date military requirements had been met by a train ferry on pontoons. To the temporary bridge succeeded a permanent or semi-permanent low level bridge, which was completed on the following 30th of August. The whole enterprise was thus carried out in a year almost to the day.

General Botha was absent in German South-West Africa when the last session of the first Parliament of the Union was held in the spring of 1915; and after the session was over, General Smuts also took an active part in the campaign. It ended in the early days of July, the terms of surrender being signed upon the 9th, and later in the month the two Generals came back, having achieved their task with conspicuous success, and received an enthusiastic welcome. But the rebellion had left much bitterness behind, which was exploited with a view to the coming election. Under the Union Act the normal life of the House of Assembly is five years from the date of the first meeting of Parliament, and in accordance with this provision an election was due in October 1915. The Act also provides for an increase in the number of representatives returned by any one of the four provinces of the Union in proportion to the increase in the adult male European population, until the total number of members of the House

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reaches 150. The old House of Assembly consisted of 121 members; the Transvaal was now entitled to nine additional representatives, making the total number of seats to be filled 130. The real opponents of the Government in the election were not the nominal Opposition in the expiring Parliament, for they—the Unionists, the British party—were wholly at one with the Botha ministry on the all-important question of the war. Opposition came from the dissentient Boers, who stood for neutrality in the war, condoned the rebellion, and denounced Botha, Smuts, and their colleagues as having subordinated the interests of South Africa to those of Great Britain and the British Empire. The result of the election was that the Government party, the South African party, secured 54 seats; the Unionists, 40; the Nationalists, 27; and there were 3 Labour and 6 Independent members. Hertzog more than doubled the number of his followers; he swept the Free State with the exception of one seat at Bloemfontein, 16 out of his 27 supporters coming from that province. On the other hand, he failed to win a single seat in Natal; and, outside the Free State, the Nationalists were largely returned by districts in which the rebellion had been rife, Lichtenburg, Wolmaransstad, Waterberg in the Transvaal, Calvinia in the Cape. Labour had been divided on the question of the war. Its leader in Parliament, Creswell, was an unfaltering patriot and served in the South-West African campaign; but the Pacifist section, the International Socialists, in South Africa as elsewhere, were active and mischievous out of proportion to their numbers, with the result that the Labour party was completely wrecked at the polls. The net result of the whole election was that the Government failed to retain a clear majority of the House. On the other hand, their own followers were double the number of the Nationalists, and on the main issues they could count upon the support of the whole Unionist party as well as of the Independent members. Parliament met on the 19th of November, and when Hertzog tried a fall with the Ministry on the amnesty question, he was defeated by an overwhelming majority.

Under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, the Union Government had most admirably done their duty by the Empire, in undertaking and carrying through the conquest of German South-West Africa. The enterprise had involved

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large expenditure and additional taxation; and the garrisoning and administration of the conquered territory, together with the internment of German prisoners, entailed further expense. Consequently, while most substantial help to the common cause was still forthcoming from South Africa, alike on financial and on political grounds, both before and after the General Election, the Ministry found it necessary to limit, as far as possible, the demands made by the war upon the public purse. Politically they were under a cross-fire. The Unionists held that South Africa should stand in line with the other Dominions, that a South African army should be raised and dispatched at the expense of South Africa to fight for the Empire. The Nationalists were, and always had been, opposed to co-operation in the war in any form, and resented the expenditure which had already been incurred. Under these circumstances, the Government could not do otherwise than take a middle course; but while driven to a compromise by force of political conditions, none the less they gave continuous and most effective support to the Mother Country, and personal evidence of determination on the part of the leaders to see the war through to a successful issue.

In the early months of the war many British citizens of the Union left for England at their own expense to join the British Army; and in the latter part of June 1915, before the South-West African campaign was ended, but when the end was well in sight, the Ministry notified to the Imperial Government that, while the Union could not afford to pay from its own funds for the cost of a South African force for service in Europe, every facility would be given for raising a contingent which, from the date of leaving South Africa, would become part of the Imperial forces and be paid from Imperial funds at Imperial rates. On these conditions definite steps were taken to raise a contingent, and, as has been told already, an infantry brigade of four battalions, in all not far short of 6,000 strong, left in the autumn, the large majority being British with General Lukin in command. It was supplemented by five batteries of heavy siege artillery, subsequently raised to six, and by engineering, signalling, flying, and medical units, the total number of the Expeditionary Force being nearly 7,000. It was a sore point with the Unionist party in the House of Assembly that no part of the pay of these troops was con-

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tributed from South African funds, that the Union Government would not even make good the difference between British rates of pay and those prevailing for the Union Active Citizen Force in South Africa, seeing that even these latter rates were lower than the pay drawn by other Dominion troops on active service. When the new Parliament met in November 1915, General Botha was pressed strongly on the matter, but he refused to give way, and the question was not carried to a division for fear of endangering the life of the Government. Thus the South African contingent in France began and continued throughout the war on the footing of a unit—a hard-fighting unit—of the British Army; but at a later date the Home Government made the concession of paying the South Africans, as from the 1st of January 1917, at South African rates, and the Union Government, for their part, agreed to contribute £1 million to the general expenses of the war. In July 1915, concurrently with the end of the fighting in South-West Africa, there came a request from England that a small body of South African troops should be sent to garrison Nyasaland. In agreeing to send them, the Union Government stipulated that the expense should be borne by Imperial funds and urged that pay should be at South African rates. In this case a compromise was arrived at whereby the difference between British and South African rates was made good from Union funds, and the same arrangement held good in regard to the Union troops sent to German East Africa. In addition very large incidental expenses, in connexion with pay prior to embarkation, equipment of outgoing and care of returned soldiers, fell to the charge of the Union.

By the beginning of September 1916, over 43,000 members of Union contingents had been dispatched to the various fronts, of whom nearly 11,000 were sent to Europe, over 30,000 to East Africa, nearly 2,000 to Central Africa. They included the coloured Cape Corps, of which an account has been given. The casualties so far reported had not been far short of 5,000, three-fourths of which had been in Egypt and France, and the drafts sent to Europe to make good the casualties, numbered by the end of 1916 nearly 5,000. In addition to fighting-men, two Indian bearer companies, 355 men in all, were raised in the Union for the medical service, and over 10,000 coloured labourers were recruited for East

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Africa and for France. Moreover, South Africans were in evidence on water as on land. From the small South African division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, three detachments were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty at different dates before the end of 1916, their services being praised in the highest terms. A prelude to the South African rebellion, and one of its contributing causes, had been the widely spread report that the citizen soldiers of the Union would be commandeered for the campaign in South-West Africa. The arguments against commandeering for more distant service were obviously still stronger, and though compulsory military service for home defence in the form of the commando system had always been in existence among the Boers, the political conditions of the Union placed conscription for foreign service outside the scope of practical politics. Recruiting for the infantry brigade to serve in Europe, which had begun at the end of July and in August 1915, was suspended towards the end of March 1916. It was resumed in the latter days of July 1916, in which month the brigade suffered very heavy losses in their memorable fight in Delville Wood. In August the Prime Minister made a public appeal for recruits, a war recruiting committee was formed, and a recruiting campaign was instituted; but, partly because of the low rate of pay, the reports of which were exaggerated, and largely because African service was naturally more congenial to the Dutch Afrikander than service in Europe, recruiting for East and Central Africa was much more fruitful of results than recruiting for the Western Front; and in September 1916, recruiting for East Africa was stopped for a while in order to leave the field clear for a response to the urgent demand for drafts to replace the losses in France. When Parliament was opened on the 16th of February 1917, the subject of recruiting held a prominent place in the Governor-General's speech; an earnest hope was expressed 'that it may be found possible, not only to maintain the oversea contingent at its full strength, but to augment it in accordance with the military resources of this country'; ministers, it was stated, were continuing 'to organize as many volunteers as possible both for service overseas and elsewhere'; and further proposals with a view to increasing the number of recruits were foreshadowed. Prior to the opening of Parliament, correspondence had, in December 1916, passed with

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the Home Government, embodying the arrangement with regard to the pay of the overseas contingent, to which reference has already been made. A year later, when the 1918 session was opened on the 18th of January 1918, the Governor-General's speech again laid stress on the importance of recruiting: the ministers expressed a hope that the strength of the overseas contingent 'may not be only maintained but substantially increased', and a recruiting conference was held in February. German East Africa was now cleared of the Germans, and the bulk of the white forces which had been employed in the campaign had been released, setting free trained men to volunteer for service on the Western Front.

East Africa, as a field for active service, had an additional attraction, as against Europe, for Dutch Afrikanders, in that here they were serving under generals of their own race. Conversely, in estimating the value of the contribution made by the Union to the war, the leadership of General Smuts in the East African campaign must be reckoned as an important asset. He took up the command in February 1916, and held it till the following January, when he left for England to attend the Imperial War Conference, and there, as statesman and member of the Imperial War Cabinet, supplemented his work as a soldier and added to his high reputation. He had conducted the campaign in East Africa, amid infinite difficulties of climate, transport, and communications, with marked skill and success; and before he resigned his command, he had brought the operations to much the same point as was reached by Lord Roberts in the South African War, when he handed over his duties to Lord Kitchener. Prominent among the divisional commanders who served under Smuts were the Boer generals, Brits and J. L. Van Deventer, the latter of whom took over command in the latest stages of lingering guerrilla warfare.

In the prolonged absence of Smuts from South Africa, a heavier burden than ever was laid upon the Prime Minister's broad shoulders. His principal lieutenant was now Mr. Henry Burton, a British Afrikander, born at Cape Town in 1866, and a leading member of the Cape bar. He had been Attorney-General in Merriman's ministry and after the creation of the Union became a member of General Botha's government, first as minister for native affairs, subsequently, upon the

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reconstruction of the Cabinet, as minister of railways and harbours, to which duties, after Smuts left for East Africa, he added the charge of finance. He lost his seat at the 1915 election, but was soon provided with another. The combination of such heavy duties as charge of railways and charge of finance was, not unreasonably, made the subject of criticism, and in October 1917 he was replaced as minister of finance by Mr. Thomas Orr, who sat in the House of Assembly for Pietermaritzburg, and who in pre-Union days had been Auditor-General of Natal. In 1918 Mr. Burton, with General Smuts, represented the Union of South Africa at the Imperial Conference in London.

The political story of the Union of South Africa during the war may be summed up as one of constant friction between the friends and foes of the Empire. The year 1916 was a year of continued anxiety and unrest. There were indications which foreboded another rebellion, and it stands to the credit of de Wet that he gave to the Government full and timely warning of the danger. Within Parliament and outside, the Nationalists were persistent in opposition, and aggressive Nationalism began openly to advocate republican independence. The session of 1916 was long and heavy, and every step taken by the Government in the direction of Imperial co-operation was challenged by the Nationalists, whether it was the sending of coloured labour to France or the passing of a bill to prevent trading with the enemy. From the date of the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915 feeling against Germany had run high among the British citizens of the Union, leading to anti-German riots and to an organized anti-German campaign under the name of the British citizen movement. In response to this feeling the Government, late in the day, brought the Union into line with the Mother Country and the other parts of the Empire in the matter of trading with the enemy; but the Act which, as has been told, was passed in the summer of 1916, because it commended itself to the Unionists, was violently attacked by the Nationalist party, ostensibly on the ground that it would cause injury to unoffending citizens or residents of German origin. No opportunity was lost of ranging the material interests of the Boers against the British connexion and against the Government which upheld it. This was illustrated in 1917 in the matter of the season's wool.

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The whole output had been bought for the Imperial Government at 55 per cent. over pre-war prices, but, as higher prices still had lately been ruling in the open market, the transaction could be and was misrepresented as a case of mulcting the Afrikander farmer for the benefit of Great Britain. A great figure in Boer nationalism passed away with the sudden death of Ex-President Steyn at the end of November 1916, but the spirit survived and grew in strength, as was shown by the results of the elections to the Provincial Councils in 1917. Toleration, which membership of the British Empire brings with it, was used for malign purposes, and self-government was interpreted as implying separation. On the 19th of June 1917, Merriman moved a resolution in the House of Assembly, condemning the republican propaganda. His motion was carried by 73 votes to 21, but none the less the propaganda went on. The Loyalists were weakened year by year, in proportion to the number who went forth—very especially from the Rand—to fight for the Empire. To the Nationalists this was not a ground for making allowance but a reason for taking advantage. In 1918 the political outlook was more threatening than ever. In Parliament the requisitioning of Dutch ships by the Allies was made a text for attacking a Government subservient to an Empire which trampled on the rights of small nations, the case in point, that of the Dutch nation, being admirably adapted for the purpose of embittering Nationalist feeling in South Africa. A message of congratulation to Sir Douglas Haig, which was moved by the Prime Minister in the last days of March, was opposed on the ground that it was a tribute to an Empire built on conquest and aiming at expansion. On this occasion Merriman once more took up the cudgels, and the debate ended with the singing of God Save the King in the House of Assembly, of which demonstration the Nationalists signified their disapproval by remaining seated. A grievance was made of recruiting. Everything was a grievance that savoured of co-operation with Great Britain and her cause. Before Parliament adjourned on the 8th of May, there were ugly signs in the country of raising commandos and taking up arms. The Prime Minister made strong speeches denouncing the republican propaganda as a device for catching votes, which was leading to civil war. The Governor-General spoke in warning terms

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at Graaf Reinet in the Cape Colony, a centre of Dutch feeling, and later in Natal. Hertzog himself, having fanned the flame, now wished not to put it out but to abate it with a minimum of cold water. He postponed the republic till after the war, when it was to be brought into being by what he designated constitutional methods, and, somewhat turning his back upon his cherished two-stream doctrine, he made overtures to British Afrikanders to join with the Dutch in repudiating the sovereignty of the King. The word Empire he held to be incompatible with the freedom of small nations, and the small Afrikander nation to be debarred from freedom as long as it was part of the Empire. The political crisis was all the more dangerous in that it coincided with restiveness on the Rand of both white and coloured labour, and at the beginning of July Botha issued a public manifesto to the effect that the Government had information 'pointing to the existence of a movement having for its object the subversion of the Constitution by methods of violence'. He hinted that enemy agencies had been at work, intimated that adequate military and police measures had been taken, and invited the co-operation of all good citizens of the Union. No new rebellion took place and the crisis was held to have been exaggerated, but Nationalist bitterness remained to the end of the war and, when the Armistice had come, the Nationalists carried to Europe their claim to republican independence under the specious guise of the right of self-determination.

The last year of the war, the calendar year of 1918, was an uncomfortable year in South Africa, but not unprosperous, except for the great loss of life and expenditure of money caused in the latter half of the year by the plague of influenza, which within two months carried off nearly 12,000 Europeans and over 127,000 coloured men. The value both of exports and of imports was largely in excess of 1917, the result not of greater bulk but of higher prices. South African wool was at a premium, and so was angora hair. There was a smaller output of gold, largely due to labour conditions and cost of living, but, on the other hand, the diamond industry flourished. The export of diamonds showed an increase both in amount and in value and gave ground for imposing a higher duty in the 1919–20 budget. During the session which lasted from the 18th of January to the 8th of May 1918, the growing

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importance of Labour and Labour questions was illustrated by the passing of a Factories Act and a Wages Regulation Act. The effect of the war upon necessaries of life and the cost of living was responsible for a law giving powers to a standing Commission which had been appointed in this connexion in 1917, and also for a Wheat Conservation Act, the supply of Australian wheat having latterly fallen short for want of shipping; while, apart from the war, electoral and university questions received attention from the Legislature. It was not in session when the Armistice was proclaimed, and, when it met again, the Prime Minister, who throughout the war had remained in South Africa, had left for Europe to join General Smuts in speaking for the Union at the Peace Conference and to ensure to the Union the permanent control of German South-West Africa. He achieved his purpose and went home, but only to die; and, when he died, the Union and the Empire lost a man who by his lifework in war and peace and by the ascendancy of a high and chivalrous nature was incomparably the greatest of the sons of South Africa.

The Parliamentary Paper of December 1914, in its list of gifts from the Overseas Dominions and Colonies at the outset of the war, mentions gifts from South Africa as diversified as a South African Field Ambulance placed at the disposal of the French Government by the Société Française at Cape Town, which was utilized in connexion with the French Military Hospital at Cannes; a gift of invalid port for the wounded in British hospitals from the Paarl Wine and Brandy Company; and of fruit and eggs for the same purpose from the Bathurst Farmers Union. The great riches acquired in South Africa have in turn begotten, alike in peace and war, much liberality for public and philanthropic purposes; and, as from the beginning of the war citizens of or residents in the Union crossed the sea to give personal service, so from the first the purse-strings of the rich or well-to-do in the Union, of British birth or sympathies, were untied for the purposes of the war. But in dealing with any part of the Empire it is hardly possible to do more than note the subscriptions to and the work of the main agencies which were constituted for purposes of relief. These agencies again, it is difficult to follow up: they were formed in the Union itself, and, by the friends of the Union in the Mother Country; the work on the two sides of the

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ocean being co-ordinated, but not, as a rule, unified; and, as the war went on, and the calls became more numerous and more diverse, the organizations were subdivided into committees, which constantly and inevitably, at one point or another, overlapped each other.

In the case of the Union of South Africa for charitable purposes, as indeed for other purposes also, the first year of the war was marked off from the succeeding years; for it was not until a full year had passed, and the South-West African campaign was ended, that a South African contingent was sent to Europe, and therefore it was not until the latter months of 1915 that what may be called an organized stream of South African liberality began to flow outside South Africa, and corresponding effort was made in England. In what follows, it is proposed to summarize first the work done in South Africa, and secondly the work done in England.

The funds collected in or by the Union, and the work carried out from those funds for the benefit of fighting-men and their dependants, and for the relief of suffering and distress caused by the war, fall under three main heads, the Governor-General's Fund, the Red Cross, South Africa, and the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee. The first of these three agencies, the Governor-General's Fund, deserves very special mention. Before the rebellion or the South-West African campaign, before the Union was distracted by civil war or had its immediate attention concentrated upon war at its own doors, long before any steps were taken to raise an overseas contingent, in August 1914, at the very outset of the Great War, it was decided to create a National Fund. It was instituted, the reports tell us, by Mrs. Louis Botha, the wife of the Prime Minister, and Lord De Villiers, then acting Governor-General. Thus it was of Dutch Afrikander inception, a welcome and most practical sign of community of feeling. The consent of the newly appointed Governor-General, Lord Buxton, was obtained prior to his arrival in South Africa; and after his arrival he took the chairmanship of the fund and gave to it unsparing interest and attention. The fund was based upon two main principles, that South Africa was responsible for the welfare of all South Africans on active service and of those dependent upon them, and that this responsibility could be adequately discharged only through the medium of a central

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fund, which would ensure uniform and economical application of relief, where relief was actually wanted. But, in order to make good this latter object, it was obviously necessary that central control should be supplemented by local knowledge. The working of the fund, therefore, was organized on the lines of a Central Executive Committee, linked to and exercising a general supervision over a network of local committees throughout the Union, these local committees being active alike in raising and in distributing money. The number of voluntary workers was so large that the administrative expenses of the fund were less than 2 per cent. of the receipts. England, as well as South Africa, was the scene of action, the administrator of the fund in England being the then High Commissioner for the Union, Mr. Schreiner, whose subsequent death in June 1919 was a grievous loss to the Union and to the Empire, and who, with his staff, gave to this, as to all the war funds and organizations, untiring and invaluable service. Mr. Schreiner and his office enabled the fund to do for South African soldiers and their dependants in the United Kingdom what would have been done for them if they had been resident in South Africa, and the organizations of the Mother Country were thereby freed from calls from South Africans on their funds, even though the South Africans were at the time ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. The beneficiaries of the fund were the dependants of South Africans on active service in any part of the world; the dependants of those who had fallen in the war; temporarily or permanently disabled soldiers, and discharged soldiers. The outstanding feature of the fund was a combination of uniformity of system with elasticity in the methods and the amount of relief. Individual cases were individualized, and relief was varied in extent and kind according to the extent and the nature of the need. Every year of the war necessarily added to the calls upon the fund. The number of its beneficiaries steadily increased, and there was a progressive extension of its scope as the magnitude of the effects of the war came to be realized. The public of the Union, together with South African circles in the United Kingdom, responded liberally to all appeals, and after four and a half years a constant stream of contributions was still flowing in. By March 1919 the fund had received in round figures £2½ millions and had disbursed £1½ millions. Its work did

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W. P. SCHREINER

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not end with the war but will continue for a generation. It is the aim of the committee to supplement pensions where that is necessary; to see that every child whose father gave his life in the war receives a suitable education; to provide every fitting opportunity for disabled men and to watch over their interests in civil life. In a word, the fund undertook functions which in the United Kingdom were discharged by such varied authorities as War Office, Admiralty, Officers' Families Fund, Soldiers and Sailors Families Association, Soldiers and Sailors Help Society, the Statutory War Pensions Committee, and the Ministry of Pensions. It included in its scope South Africans and their dependants in the United Kingdom, it was in a very real sense a National Fund, and it is not too much to say that but for its existence very many of the men who represented the South African nation in His Majesty's forces during the war would have been unable to leave their civil occupations.

Connected with the Governor-General's Fund, subsidiary to or subsidized by it, were Local Boards for disabled soldiers at some of the chief town centres of the Union and convalescent homes in charge of Voluntary Aid Committees. Early in the war the Chamber of Mines gave to the Government a sum of £30,000, and the Government handed it over to an 'Official Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid', under the chairmanship of Sir Thomas Smartt. Throughout the South-West African campaign this committee, which had raised another £12,000 by public subscription, managed the hospital ship *Ebani*, which was chartered for it by the Government, and maintained a convalescent home in Cape Town and another in Johannesburg. In September 1915 the *Ebani* was taken over by the Imperial Government and transferred to Egypt and East Africa, being mainly employed in bringing wounded men from East Africa to the base hospital in the Union. The Union Government ceased to have any responsibility for the ship, though the Red Cross and South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee kept up a supply of medical and other comforts for the men which it carried. At the same time (September 1915) the Johannesburg Convalescent Home was closed, and the Official Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid, out of a balance of £20,000, gave £15,000 for South African hospital work in England and kept the rest for what was then thought would be the winding up of the Cape Town Home.

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A year later, however, that home, instead of being wound up, was expanded into four and eventually into five homes in order to provide not only for South Africans from East Africa, but also for Imperial troops from East Africa, Mesopotamia, and India. In the last two years of the war this second class of inmates was much the more numerous, and none of the expense fell upon the Imperial Government. The committee's money having become exhausted, the financing of their work was, as from the 1st of January 1917, taken over by other funds, though the committee still continued in existence. In Natal there were two and at one time three convalescent homes, but they were financed and managed entirely by the Natal Red Cross, and had no connexion with the Official Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid.

During the South African War a Red Cross Society was formed in the Cape Colony under the title of the Cape of Good Hope Red Cross Society. It survived the war, with several hundred pounds still to its credit, and did useful work in supplying and teaching first aid to the miners of the Transvaal. When August 1914 came, it renewed its active life, as the Good Hope Red Cross Society, under the management of a central committee, of which Sir John Buchanan was chairman, Senator Lance hon. treasurer, and Mr. John Fairbairn hon. secretary. The war called into existence various Red Cross agencies throughout the Union, and various Red Cross efforts, but there soon emerged two main agencies for Red Cross work in South Africa, the Good Hope Red Cross Society, with head-quarters in Cape Town, and the South African Red Cross Society with head-quarters at Johannesburg. The creation of the latter society was largely due to the efforts of Mr. William (afterwards Lieut.-Col.) Cullen, Professor Wilkinson was its chairman and Mr. Fred Rowland its hon. secretary. It took charge of the inland hospitals, north of and including De Aar, while the Good Hope Red Cross Society or Committee charged itself with the care of the hospitals at the base and on the coast. A little later it was decided to bring the two Societies into closer relations with each other, and this was formally done by a notice of the 22nd of September 1915 in the Government Gazette, which announced that the two Societies had 'agreed to federate during the continuance of the present war under the title "Red Cross, South Africa", and to act together in the

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supply of comforts for the relief of the sick and wounded in the war and the collection of comforts therefor'. At the time there was no central organization in Natal, and, when such an organization was formed, the Natalians, while ready for close co-operation, preferred to constitute a separate society with a separate fund, under the title of 'Red Cross, South Africa, Natal Branch'. Similarly, Red Cross effort in the Orange Free State Province also remained more or less outside the Federation, the chief organization in this Province being the Red Cross branch of the Victoria League. 'Red Cross, South Africa' followed up sick and wounded South Africans wherever they were, in the Union, in Central and East Africa, in Europe. Within the Union it filled the place of the British Red Cross, providing all auxiliary equipment for hospitals and convalescent homes, in some cases supporting convalescent homes without Government assistance, transporting wounded men to hospital from train or ship, ministering to them in hospital with comforts of all kinds. Two special features may be noticed. It has already been pointed out that one effect of the war was to make South African ports more frequented as ports of call than in ordinary peace time. As at the dawn of overseas history ships plying to and from the East called at Table Bay to replenish their stores of water and supplies and to recruit their sick, so transports carrying Australians and New Zealanders back to their southern homes in these years of war continually came and went, and comforts for the sick and wounded on these ships formed one of the many beneficent activities of 'Red Cross, South Africa'. A second special feature was the result of the South African contingent in Europe forming an integral part of the British Army. This meant that the sick and wounded among them were as much the charge of the British Red Cross as any sufferers among the home battalions. In consequence, 'Red Cross, South Africa' was in somewhat closer relation to the Red Cross of the Mother Country than was the case with the other Dominions, for money sent to the British Red Cross was in effect ministering to South African wounded. Hence, the proceeds of 'Our Day' collections in the Union were equally divided between the two bodies, and both participated in the care of the sick and wounded in East Africa. In Red Cross work, as in all other works of mercy, the women of South Africa were

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indefatigable in raising funds, making clothing, and supplying other comforts. So plentiful were volunteer helpers that the cost of administration of the funds was absurdly low, apparently less than 1 per cent. on the money expended. It is impossible even to estimate the total amount of contributions for Red Cross work, seeing that so many gifts were made which did not pass through the accounts of the main agencies. But a report on the Red Cross, South Africa for the six months ending on the 31st of December 1917, stated that from the beginning of the war up to that date over £125,000 had been expended, and that the value of the gifts in kind must have been at least half as much again. An audited balance-sheet for the first six months of 1918 showed that £41,500 had been expended in that period, of which rather more than half was oversea expenditure, including a contribution of £10,000 to the British Red Cross and £1,200 to the South African Field Hospital in France. The administration expenses of every kind, including postage and travelling expenses, amounted only to ¾ per cent. of the total expenditure. The Red Cross funds came, we are told, 'not in large sums from wealthy corporations or individuals, but in small amounts from the rank and file of people up and down the country'. South Africa was no exception to the rule that in all lands, among all classes, when the cause is that of the Red Cross, the quality of mercy is not strained. Shortly after the Armistice, 'Red Cross, South Africa' assumed financial responsibility for all purely Red Cross work, and after the Armistice a last 'Our Day' collection in the Union realized nearly £196,000, over £91,000 of which came from the Cape Province and over £81,000 from Natal. It was a splendid final tribute from South Africa to the Red Cross.

The third main agency in the Union for war relief was the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee. It was created by the Prime Minister, who became its president, and its objects, as defined in a Government notice of the 10th of September 1915, were 'to co-ordinate, assist, and direct all public efforts in South Africa which are not covered by the work performed by the Governor-General's Fund and the Red Cross Society (1) for the supplying of gifts and comforts for the use of the South African forces whether in Europe or in Africa, (2) for the rendering of such similar assistance as may be possible to His Majesty's Government for the forces of the

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Empire '. Thus the sick and wounded and discharged soldiers were outside the scope of its work, which was devoted to the well-being of men on active service, including prisoners of war.

The term ' comforts ' was most widely interpreted, including articles as diverse as aeroplanes for the Imperial forces and tobacco for individual soldiers. The committee was organized as a federation, on very much the same lines as the Red Cross, and in some cases the local agencies for the two objects were one and the same. A General Committee was formed, with a Central Executive Committee sitting at Cape Town. The chairman was the Chief Justice of the Union, Sir James Rose Innes. The Central Executive Committee co-ordinated the efforts of the whole organization and, in addition, specially supervised the work of the Cape province. A branch was formed in the Transvaal. In Natal the work was undertaken by the Women's Patriotic League, which in turn had separate branches at Durban and Maritzburg—the Durban branch having been originally formed in 1900 at the time of the Anglo-Boer War; and in the Orange Free State Province by the Provincial War Relief and Victoria League Committee. Throughout the provinces there were many local sub-committees; and in Cape Town a women's depot committee was markedly effective and successful. In 1916 the work was allocated between the four provinces, on the principle that the Cape should take charge of the South African contingent in Europe, and the other three provinces make themselves responsible for comforts to South African troops in Central and East Africa. But in January 1918 the total expenditure was shared on a percentage basis, the Cape and the Transvaal contributing each 35 per cent. of the main expenses, Natal 20 per cent., and the Orange Free State Province 10 per cent. The Union Government gave the privilege of free carriage of articles by rail and post. The Union Castle Company provided free transport by sea; and the Central Committee became a forwarding agency for parcels from friends and relatives of South African soldiers, as well as a general inquiry office on all matters affecting the welfare of South African fighting-men. Outside the organization, but supplementing its work, were some special agencies. There was a Johannesburg Comforts Fund for the benefit of the Sportsmen's Regiment; a similar fund was raised by the Scottish community in the Union for the

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South African Scottish Regiment; and affiliated to the main committee was a Cape Corps Gifts and Comforts Committee, which attended to the needs of the coloured men on active service, the Cape Corps in East Africa, and in France the Cape Labour Regiment and the Cape Auxiliary Horse Transport Corps, a coloured troops' rest-house being provided at Cape Town by the main committee.

The South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee ministered to many more fighting-men than South Africans alone, as, for instance, to British, Australian, New Zealand troops on their way to and from the East and Mesopotamia. As many as 5,000 Australians at one time have been known to be the guests of the Organization at the one port of Durban. At Cape Town a special agency was created in August 1916 for the purpose of entertaining men on active service who passed through the city. It was the outcome of a public meeting called at the instance of the President of the Y.M.C.A. at Cape Town; it took the title of the Visiting Troops Entertainment Committee; and the main scene of its operations was a building lent for the purpose by the Corporation of Cape Town, the Feather Market in the Dock Road. It worked in full co-operation with, and received some financial help from, both the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee and Red Cross, South Africa; and in turn, affiliated to it, there was an Anzac Committee for the special benefit of Australian and New Zealand troops. In 1917, 350,000 men were entertained, an average of nearly 1,000 a day; and over and above the entertainment of passing troops, the Committee extended their work to wounded and convalescent men, temporarily accommodated in the local military hospitals.

The contributions to the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee were very largely made in kind. Of the funds a considerable proportion was expended beyond the sea, especially in subsidizing the work done in England. Some account must now be given of that work and of the agencies which were formed for carrying it on in concert with the organizations in South Africa.

When the decision to send a South African contingent to Europe was known in England, a meeting was held at the Royal Colonial Institute on the 26th of August 1915 to form a South African Hospital and Comforts Fund. The late Governor-

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General of the Union, Lord Gladstone, presided and became chairman of the Executive Committee, the hon. secretary was Mr. Seymour Fort, and the hon. treasurer, Sir Otto Beit. In the first year and nine months rather more than £100,000 had been received by the fund, of which about £70,000 were subscribed in England, and the balance was sent from South Africa. The work of the fund was soon subdivided, and various committees or sub-committees were formed, the first two, which dated from October 1915, being a Hospitals Committee and a Comforts Committee. At a later date, in September 1916, a combined head-quarters was found for all the committees, at 39 Grosvenor Place, London, S.W.

The provision of a hospital for South Africans was foremost among the objects of the main organization, and was the special charge of the Hospitals Committee, of which Sir Lionel Phillips was chairman. His Majesty gave a site in Richmond Park, close to the main Richmond gate of the Park: the construction was begun in March 1916, and the hospital was opened in the following June. As the South African contingent was, it will be remembered, an integral part of the British Army, the hospital, when available for patients, was handed over to the Army Council, who became responsible for the cost of maintenance and for the management. It was not confined exclusively to South African sick and wounded, but five-sixths of the patients were South Africans, and South Africa provided nearly the whole of the medical and nursing staff. When the hospital was first opened it contained 300 beds; but 500 had been contemplated; and, when the War Office proposed to increase the accommodation, the fund relieved the Government of the expense and by the middle of April 1917, with valuable financial help from Sir Otto Beit, over 600 beds were provided. Early in 1918 it was amalgamated with the South African Military Hospital; and eventually the number of beds rose to 991, 265 being given at £25 apiece by the schools of South Africa. Up to November 1918 the admissions had been 274 officers and 9,686 other ranks. No account of the Great War would be complete which omitted to notice a feature which was absent from all former wars, the manifold and fruitful efforts made to turn to good account the off-time of soldiers on active service or of convalescents, and to qualify the permanently disabled for useful work in

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after-life. The annexes to Richmond Hospital well illustrated how much might be attempted on these beneficent lines and with what success. Attached to the hospital were a recreation hall and workshops, provided by the fund, where technical and commercial training were given to a steadily growing number of soldier pupils: at hostels adjoining the workshops South African soldiers permanently disabled for active service, but no longer requiring continuous hospital treatment, were provided free of charge with board and lodging and instruction, drawing in addition their regimental pay, and not discharged from the Army until they had finished their training and returned to their homes in South Africa. It had been intended that the whole cost of the scheme should be borne by the fund; but, inasmuch as the objects were essentially within the scope of the Governor-General's Fund, the main expense of equipment and instruction, together with current charges, was met from that fund with the help of the Government of the Union.

The Hospitals Committee had also within its purview the South African Field Hospital in France, though its equipment and maintenance were undertaken by the Government, and the South African Ambulance for French soldiers at Cannes, which has been already mentioned. But its main work ended when provision had been made for all the many calls of Richmond Hospital.

Meanwhile, a new sub-committee of the main fund came into active life. This was—to give it its full title—the Red Cross Committee of the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund, the chairman being Colonel William Cullen, and Mrs. Cullen its hon. secretary. It had started in February 1916 as the Convalescence and Hospitality Committee of the fund, and hospitality continued to form part of its functions, free hospitality for ten days being given to all men on discharge from hospital. The expenses of this branch of the committee's work were shared by the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee, while all the other expenses were halved with Red Cross, South Africa.

The Comforts Committee was presided over by the Hon. Mrs. Wilson Fox. It was charged with providing comforts for South African troops, at the front, in camp, in hospital, on sick leave. Its activities were most diversified, including

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provision of workrooms; depots for clothing and comforts—one of them an overseas depot, established in Trevor Square in January 1916, to receive consignments of gifts from South Africa; inquiries for missing and wounded; and dispatch of parcels to prisoners of war. It acted as the agent in England of the South African Gifts and Comforts Organization Committee. A Personal Service Committee, which had originally been formed under Mrs. Rutson independently of the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund, was, in February 1916, linked on to it as a sub-committee. Under the chairmanship of Mrs. Frood, it undertook the task of getting into personal touch with all South Africans on active service, whether in the contingent or in the Home battalions; it gave guidance to women wishing to work for South African soldiers; and it kept the Press in South Africa fully informed of the extent to which South African organizations were being supplemented in England. It was concerned entirely with the able-bodied and effective fighting-men, on arrival from South Africa, on departure for the front, on leave from the front, and its work was supplemented by that of yet another committee, the Non-contingent Committee, formed to safeguard the special interests of South Africans who were serving outside the South African contingent, and who, owing to the special conditions of South Africa, were nearly as numerous as the members of the contingent. There were probably more South Africans than citizens of any other Dominion serving in the Home naval and military forces, and they were spoken of in very high terms. The chairman of this last committee was Sir Herbert Sloley, lately retired from the duties of Resident Commissioner of Basutoland. There is no space to give an account of the South African Workrooms, presided over by Mrs. Schreiner and Mrs. Friedlander, which were closed on the 28th of February 1919, after ministering to the Richmond Hospital for 3 years and 2 months; of the South African Officers' Club, which the South African Hospital and Comforts Fund called into existence; of subventions in the interests of South Africans to other soldiers' clubs. Assuredly in England, as in South Africa, there was no stint of loving care for South African soldiers, hale or sick; and the work was very largely women's work. The debt of the Empire to the women of the Empire during the war will last, with compound interest, to all time.

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What has been written above inevitably fails to give any adequate impression of the extent to which work in England supplemented work in South Africa, and vice versa, of comforts and Red Cross aid accruing at the various fronts in Europe and Africa. It does not note in clear detail the points at which this or that committee met and carried forward the agency of others. Still less does it attempt the impossible task of estimating the total value of South African benefactions during the war, including subscriptions to Belgian or Serbian funds, to St. Dunstan's Home for Blinded Soldiers, and many other objects of world-wide sympathy. It is wholly in consonance with the essence of generosity that of the givers and the gifts much should be unknown. All that has been attempted is the record of some outstanding facts and names, some indication of the lines on which South African effort was conspicuously well organized in the interests of fighting South Africans and of those who spared them to go to war, in sadly many cases never to return.

A word of tribute is due to the Editor and Principal Proprietor of the *African World* for their efforts during the war. At the very beginning, at an emergency meeting held on the 4th of August 1914, it was decided to establish a Red Cross and War Comforts Service to supplement by personal service and the supply of comforts for the troops at the front or in hospital the work of the official Red Cross Societies. An *African World* Red Cross Service went to work until 1916, when the title was changed to *African World* War Comforts Service, Mr. Leo Weinthal being chairman of the Executive Committee, and a Ladies' Committee being also constituted. The activities of this organization were maintained until the end of 1918, when it was formally closed, but for a year after the Armistice it continued to minister to the comfort and entertainment of wounded South Africans in the Richmond Park Hospital. Approximately £12,000 were collected from readers and friends of the paper, no other appeals being made, very large quantities of bandages, clothing, and similar articles were made and contributed by voluntary helpers, and in December 1915 a great African bazaar was organized for which 150,000 gifts arrived from all parts of Africa—from north, south, east, and west, from Egypt to South Africa, from Nigeria to Zanzibar, natives of Africa giving generously. The

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scope of the benefactions was very wide, including especially destitute Belgians and Belgian children, and all kinds of war charities were supported. Africa gave and Africa received. St. Dunstan's benefited by £875 from an *African World* regatta at Warri in Nigeria. Comforts were sent to the troops, both white and native, serving in East Africa, and a complete organization was established for the supply of extra comforts to all South African troops. £500 were subscribed for five rooms in the Union Jack Club Extension in Waterloo Road, three in memory of General Botha, Captain Douglas Brodie, and Captain Selous respectively, and two recalling great supporters of the organization, viz. Sir Reginald and Lady Wingate and General and Mrs. Smuts.

If the record of the Union of South Africa in the Great War is studied in the light of the extraordinarily complicated conditions and the antecedent history of South Africa, there can be but one conclusion, that it was a most worthy record, which will always hold a high place in the story of the Empire. It tells of statesmanlike leadership, of grasp of the great issues at stake, of resolute triumph over singular difficulties, of hard fighting in many scenes of action, of most generous giving. No better testimony could be given to the righteousness of the cause of the Empire at its most critical time than the support which was accorded to it, when and where support was most needed, from the Union of South Africa.

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PART V

AFRICAN ISLANDS

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PORT LOUIS HARBOUR, MAURITIUS

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SECTION I

MAURITIUS

By the Editor

MAURITIUS, lying in the Indian Ocean, some 1,550 miles north-east of Natal and over 2,000 miles south-west of Ceylon, is of much the same size as the county of Berkshire, but with a very much larger population. In 1914 the population was about 376,000, well over 500 to the square mile. The island became a British possession early in the nineteenth century as the result of the world-wide war with France, its special value to Great Britain consisting in the fine harbour of Port Louis on the north-west coast, upon which the chief town stands, a town of 50,000 inhabitants.

Mauritius entered the war with a constitution which embodied an elective element in the Council of Government or Legislative Council and an unofficial majority. The Governor was Sir John Chancellor, K.C.M.G., D.S.O., a Royal Engineer officer, who had seen service in the Sudan and on the north-west frontier of India, and had subsequently been secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee. He became Governor in 1911, and when, amid warm expressions of esteem, he left the island at the beginning of 1916 to take up the government of Trinidad, he was succeeded by Sir H. J. Hesketh Bell, K.C.M.G., of long West Indian and African experience.

In order to appreciate the position of Mauritius during the war and the part played in the war by the island and its people, some outstanding features must be noticed. Though it is geographically an African island, 70 per cent. of the population are Asiatics, immigrants or the descendants of immigrants from India, brought in to work the sugar plantations. In normal times India is the main market for Mauritian sugar, and from India supplies of rice and other food-stuffs are brought to Mauritius. It has, in short, an Eastern much more than an African outlook and connexion. The white population is predominantly French, justly and tenaciously proud of their French origin and traditions, for, as the Île de France, Mauritius had a great historic record. Its nearest neighbours are French,

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the sister island of Bourbon, and Madagascar. Sugar, with its by-products, accounts for nearly nine-tenths of the exports, and hardly any country in the world is so dependent upon a single industry. In turn, Mauritius imports something like nine-tenths of its food-stuffs. It is fed from outside and its sustenance depends upon an open sea. Hence, when war came, the island was singularly fortunate in possessing a harbour so good and so well placed as to be a fortified and garrisoned Imperial coaling-station. The constant presence and coming and going of ships of war meant a safeguard at once against actual privation and against unrest arising from apprehension of privation. When the German raiders had been accounted for, the Indian Ocean was comparatively safe; and, while the toll taken by the U-boats in other seas gravely affected the amount of available shipping, to the end the island was in no danger of starvation. Its staple product was in great demand, and the ships that fetched the sugar brought food. It was a case of a community to which war might have meant complete ruin, whereas the actual conditions of the particular war combined to bring great prosperity. The brotherhood in arms of France and Great Britain was as beneficial to Mauritian interests as it was congenial to Mauritian sentiment. The Mauritians from first to last were in safe keeping; in spite of inevitable difficulties, from first to last they had more or less assured markets with abnormal prices; and in turn they requited their safe keeping with patriotism.

It was disappointing that no definitive Mauritian contingent was raised for the war, but there was no local defence force in the island, and there were no volunteers to form the nucleus of a contingent. The civil police alone supplemented the Imperial garrison. Like the three eastern colonies, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, and Hong-Kong, Mauritius contributed an annual sum to the Home Government in part payment of the cost of the garrison. The amount had been fixed at 5½ per cent. of the annual revenue, round about the sum of Rs. 500,000, and, as will be seen, during the war the Council of Government, on their own initiative, increased for a time the amount of the contribution.[1]

[1] What follows has been reproduced in the main from very full notes compiled for the purpose of this book by Mr. Leon Koenig, Assistant Colonial Secretary, and forwarded by the Colonial Government.

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M. Robert Edward Hart, in *Les Volontaires Mauriciens aux Armées*, places the number of Mauritians known to have gone on active service, otherwise than in the Mauritius Labour Battalion, at 520. With the exception of four, who served with the Americans, they joined the British or French armies. Early in the war the Governor gave notice that he had been authorized from home to select suitable candidates for commissions in the New Armies, and from a number who came forward and offered their services, five were granted commissions, including one head of a Government Department, Captain B. A. Francis, Protector of Immigrants. Two other Government officials, who were on leave in England when war broke out, were engaged for war service, and three others of French nationality were summoned for service in the French Army. A large number of officials offered their services unreservedly, but were prevented from serving outside the Colony by the exigencies of the public service. Twenty-eight picked volunteers were enabled to enlist in the British Army by the help of a fund from which their transport and expenses were paid, Dr. de Chazal having been prominent in raising the fund. More than fifty paid their own passages in order to offer their services direct to the British or French authorities; and the students who were at the time in residence in England or France unhesitatingly joined the armies. Their names and services have been recorded by M. Hart in his book. Those who were killed in action or died on active service numbered 30 in the British armies, 19 in the French, and the honours won included 1 D.S.O., 12 M.C.'s, 2 D.C.M.'s, 4 M.M.'s, 19 Croix de Guerre, 1 Medaille Militaire, 1 Medaille d'Honneur, and 3 Legions d'Honneur. No fewer than 195 old students of the famous Royal College of Mauritius served in the Allied armies, and 29 of them gave their lives. Their honours, included in the above, were 10 M.C.'s, 15 Croix de Guerre, and 3 Legions d'Honneur.

Meanwhile, the Mauritians set free the troops which garrisoned their island for active service at the front by establishing a volunteer force for the defence of the Colony and the protection of life and property. A Bill embodying the principles of the Ceylon Volunteer Ordinance was introduced into the Council of Government, with the consent of the Secretary of State, and the measure, which was a substantial contribution

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to the needs of the Empire, passed the Council on the 14th of December 1915 and was brought into operation on the 18th of February 1916. Enlistment began in April. Mr. A. C. Godfrey, Inspector-General of Police, was appointed Commanding Officer, Captain J. T. G. Tremlett, Adjutant, and many of those who had volunteered for overseas military service, but could not be spared from their civil duties, now 'did their bit' by enlisting in the Volunteer Force. The number of recruits soon amounted to over 500, and eventually the force comprised three companies of infantry, a company of artillery, a company of engineers, and an ambulance corps. By the end of 1917 the Government expenditure on the force amounted to about Rs. 92,000, and the average annual expenditure for four years was £4,660. The effect of raising this force, which operated in advance of the actual passing of the Ordinance, was that by November 1915 every available man of the British troops in the garrison had been withdrawn, and from that date the Imperial garrison in Mauritius was a mere skeleton.

Coloured Mauritians, officered by white men, gave personal service in a labour battalion raised for Mesopotamia during the latter part of the war. In all over 1,500 men were recruited and the number of deaths in the battalion up to December 1919 was 68. The Mauritian Government contributed towards the expenses of separation allowances, from March 1917 to December 1919, nearly Rs. 206,000, in addition to one half of a small sum for war pensions.

Apart from contributions to war charities, which will be noted later, the Mauritian Government and the Mauritian community was conspicuously generous in the matter of financial support for the war. On the 14th of August 1914 the Council of Government, at the instance of the unofficial members, voted a resolution that the military contribution for the year should be increased by Rs. 150,000, to meet in part the cost of the special measures undertaken for the defence of the island. A similar sum was voted in each of the two following years, and thus an additional military contribution of Rs. 450,000 was paid, although the garrison, the cost of which was the ground for the normal contribution, had almost ceased to exist. Throughout the war, although from 1915 onwards the garrison was a mere cadre, the Colony paid the full rate of its pre-war military contribution, the payments for the years

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1916–19 inclusive amounting to £175,000. On the 18th of October 1916 the Governor informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the unofficial members of the Council were anxious to vote a war contribution of Rs. 500,000 to the Imperial Government to be provided from surplus funds. Almost simultaneously the following resolution was moved in the Chamber of Agriculture by the president, Sir Henry Leclezio :

'The Chamber of Agriculture desires to offer the Imperial Government, in the name of the sugar planters of Mauritius, the sum of Rs. 500,000, and suggests that this sum be applied towards the creation of a battle-plane squadron or the building of an airship.'

These patriotic contributions towards war expenses were gratefully acknowledged and, with the money offered, 30 aeroplanes were presented to His Majesty's Government, 15 being allocated to the Naval and 15 to the Military Air Service.[1] These gifts took effect in 1917, an Ordinance being passed in that year to realize the planters' contribution by means of a special export tax on sugar. The planters had already given generously in kind to the Navy and Army, as is told below. Apart from the payment of the ordinary military contribution, the total amount contributed directly to the war by the Mauritius Government was Rs. 1,028,000, and the planters contributed Rs. 500,000. Meanwhile, the project of a local loan was evolved to help the Empire in the prosecution of the war, and in a minute to the Council, dated the 20th of October 1916, the Governor submitted the outlines of a scheme by which bonds would be issued for a term of three years at 6 per cent. interest, payable locally and without deduction, the loan and interest thereon being guaranteed by the Imperial Government. The loan was to be for an unlimited amount, and the bonds ranged from Rs. 300 to Rs. 3,000. The necessary legislation was passed on the 5th of December 1916, and it was arranged that the loan should be issued on the 1st of January 1917. The debentures were printed in the Government printing office, and all the arrangements in connexion with the issue of the loan were carried out locally. The people of Mauritius made an

[1] As shown in the next paragraph, three aeroplanes were also presented by public subscription.

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eager and liberal response and the amount raised exceeded Rs. 8,000,000.

Much money was raised by private effort for war charities, which was sent through private channels, and it is only possible to note contributions which were publicly recorded and dispatched. In the first days of the war, on the initiative of the Council of Government, a committee was formed to receive from the public subscriptions in aid of the victims of the war: there was an immediate and generous response, and in the first three months Rs. 168,000 were received, while the total collection reached the sum of Rs. 236,000. Subscription lists were also opened for the Belgian Relief Fund and liberal amounts were collected. From a record sugar crop the sugar planters offered 1,000 tons of white sugar for H.M. Navy and Army, the value of the gift being Rs. 250,000. At the same time large gifts of sugar were made to the French Army. Throughout 1915 the various funds in connexion with the war were well supported and large sums raised by private subscriptions and entertainments were remitted through the banks. Groups of ladies engaged in war work were unremitting in their efforts, with the result that many thousands of articles were shipped to the various war centres. Gifts of fruit products and other comforts for the Army and Navy were also sent to the United Kingdom and to France. Early in 1916 public subscriptions were raised for the purchase of aeroplanes to be presented to the War Department, and before the end of the year the Colony had contributed Rs. 101,000 for three fighting planes. On the 4th of August a large and influential meeting was held at the Champ de Mars, over which the newly arrived Governor, Sir Hesketh Bell, presided, to commemorate the second anniversary of the war. A resolution, which was warmly approved, declared 'the inflexible determination of the citizens of Mauritius to continue to a victorious end the struggle for the maintenance of those ideals of Liberty and Justice which are the common and sacred cause of the Allies'. Collections made at that time in aid of the Union Jack Club and the British Red Cross Society produced a total of Rs. 22,500.

The 19th of October 1916 was kept as 'Our Day', a sum of over Rs. 50,000 being raised for the British Red Cross Society, and at the end of 1916 the sums raised by public subscription

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and remitted through the Government since the commencement of the war, other than the Government and planters' contributions to the direct cost of the war which have been already recorded, amounted to over Rs. 900,000, and were distributed as follows :

	Rs.	*Rs.*
Prince of Wales's Fund :		
Souscription nationale (31.1.15)	2,778.87	
Private Donations	84,000.00	
		86,778.87
Contributions in aid of the British Red Cross :		
Souscription nationale (23.3.16)	20,000.00	
„ „ (7.8.16)	6,000.00	
Private Donations	671.00	
Second War Anniversary (6.11.16)	7,500.00	
'Our Day' (19.10.16)	51,242.00	
		85,413.00
Contributions towards the Union Jack Club :		
Second War Anniversary (6.11.16)		15,000.00
Subscriptions for 3 aeroplanes		101,250.00
Value of sugar presented by Planters to His Majesty's Land and Sea Forces		258,780.00
Lord Kitchener's Memorial Fund		13,000.00
Contributions in aid of Wounded French Soldiers :		
Souscription nationale (31.1.15)	84,000.00	
Contributions towards the French Red Cross :		
Souscription nationale (23.3.16)	20,000.00	
„ „ (7.8.16)	6,000.00	
Private Donations and Œuvre de la Cigarette	9,380.00	
Value of sugar presented to French Army	114,600.00	
		233,980.00
Contributions in aid of Wounded Belgian Soldiers and for relief of destitute Children		112,514.63
Polish Relief		3,695.00
	Rs.	910,411.50

In 1917 'France's Day', on the 14th of July, called forth subscriptions to the amount of Rs. 48,000, and 'Our Day', on the 18th of October, produced Rs. 91,963. In 1918 'France's Day' realized Rs. 72,083, and 'Our Day', Rs. 96,889. All told, the recorded subscriptions to war charities by the people of Mauritius may be set down on a rough estimate, at Rs. 3,578,000.

There could not have been so much giving had not the community prospered. All turned, on the one hand, upon securing a remunerative market for Mauritian sugar and transport to the market, on the other upon securing food for a dense population, which could not be fed without supplies from

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overseas. The two problems were interdependent, and the record of their more than successful solution is of much interest as illustrating Empire partnership and co-operation, which is the main theme of this book.

When the war began a record crop of sugar was expected, and the anxiety felt with regard to the disposal of the Colony's produce was only ended when the announcement was made on the 24th of August 1914, that the Imperial Government was prepared to purchase 100,000 tons of vesou sugar[1] at 17*s.* 6*d.* per cwt. f.o.b. Confidence was at once restored, and the result of this arrangement was that one half of the production of sugar was disposed of at a remunerative price while giving a quick market, the quantity of sugar cleared by the Home Government by the 31st of December being 125,000 tons. This purchase greatly facilitated the sale of the balance of sugar, other vesous being sold for France, Ceylon, and India, and the syrups for India and England.

The food supply problem, and in particular the supply of rice, presented difficulty, owing to the entire dependence of Mauritius on India for the principal necessaries of life, and the Colony would have been in a precarious position in the event of any interruption to shipping from India. Early steps had therefore to be taken by the civil administration to regulate the importation of food-stuffs, to prevent hoarding or inflation of prices by importers or dealers in supply, and generally to conciliate all business interests. These measures became progressively more comprehensive as the war went on, but all parties responded patriotically, acting in concert with the executive from the outset. Thus, throughout the first year of the war, the trade conditions of the Colony remained comparatively unaltered. The high prices of cane and sugar benefited almost all classes of the community, and practically no curtailment of Government expenditure was rendered necessary.

In 1914–15 the Colony registered the highest revenue then on record, viz. Rs. 12,113,910. The total output of sugar, owing to the excellence of the season, was the largest ever produced, the tonnage having risen to 277,360 tons, valued at Rs. 62,000,000, and owing to the high prices realized the

[1] Vesou sugar is the first running of the Mauritius crop. It is a white sugar closely resembling granulated.

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sugar industry was most prosperous. Of this crop over 161,000 tons of vesous were sold to His Majesty's Government.

The fibre industry, which, after sugar, is the most important agricultural industry of the Colony, also showed prospects of expansion—the price ruled high and large profits were available.

The year 1915 was very unfavourable in the matter of weather for the sugar crop, and though the acreage planted showed an increase, the yield was reduced owing to a severe drought which did not break before the end of February. This set-back, however, was compensated for by the high prices realized for the previous year's crop, there was plenty of cheap money in the Colony and considerable purchases of land were made. A committee of food supplies, appointed shortly after the outbreak of war, continued to regulate the prices of various articles of food-stuffs and there were few contraventions of the scales fixed, which were advertised by posters throughout the country. By the end of August the Governor was able to announce that His Majesty's Government offered to purchase the whole output of vesou sugar of the 1915–16 crop. A fair standard price was offered and, after negotiations between the Chamber of Agriculture and the Royal Sugar Commission, the Commission agreed eventually to contract for 125,000 tons at prices ranging from 16*s*. 10*d*. to 17*s*. 6*d*. per cwt. The Commission had an option to cancel a portion of the contract, and any producer who did not want to accept the price offered could stay out and take his chance of getting transport for his sugar some other way. Only 4,500 tons were thus retained and were shipped to India.

The estimated revenue for the year 1915–16 was Rs. 10,649,150, and the actual revenue Rs. 12,975,041 or Rs. 2,328,891 above the estimates and Rs. 861,230 above the revenue of the previous year. Both import and export duties showed large increases, and the Treasury balance on the 30th of June had risen to Rs. 2,335,000.

At the beginning of the year 1916 everything pointed to an exceptionally good sugar crop, but the Colony was visited by a cyclone late in the season which seriously affected the standing harvest, the diminution from this cause being to the extent of about 20 per cent. as compared with the previous year's crop. The grades were also lower owing to the adverse

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winter conditions. Happily the increase in the average prices received by the planter and producer was a measure of compensation for the low yields and grades. The war made the outlook as regards the disposal of the sugar very uncertain, but fortunately His Majesty's Government offered again to purchase the vesou sugars. The same price (17*s.* 4*d.* f.o.b.) as in the previous year was offered and the only objection made locally was that the rate was too low. But the main consideration was the difficulty of getting freight, and eventually a full agreement was reached. The sugar was sold at prices ranging from 17*s.* 4*d.* to 18*s.*, and the bulk of the shipments went to France. The food supply was plentiful during the year in spite of the difficulties of freight. On the 3rd of April 1916, with the double object of securing a supply of oxen for slaughter and draft, and of maintaining steam communication with Rodriguez, the steamship *Secunder*, which for a number of years had been engaged in bringing cattle from Madagascar, was requisitioned, the ship being subsequently purchased for Rs. 300,000. A food controller was appointed and the necessary orders were made to regulate the prices of various products. Although the cost of most of the necessaries of life pressed heavily on the weaker portion of the community, the price of sugar relieved the situation by providing ample employment throughout the year for the labouring classes.

Soon after the assumption of the Government in May 1916 by Sir H. J. Hesketh Bell, efforts were made by him to stimulate the production of maize, manioc, and other provision crops with the object of endeavouring to lessen the cost of food to the people. The question of making provision for the efficient drying of maize was also considered, and in August a vote of the Council was obtained for the provision of maize-drying machinery.

The war demonstrated in a manner more convincing than any figures how dependent Mauritius is upon outside supplies of food-stuffs. The efforts of the administration for the increased development of food crops were continuous, but the expansion remained comparatively small relatively to possibilities, and the island still produces barely one-tenth of its food requirements. The total sugar crop in 1916 was 209,000 tons, the lowest recorded since 1911 and about 15 per cent. below the normal sugar production. The condition of the island, however,

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remained prosperous, there was again a record revenue, and the financial position continued quite satisfactory. It was found possible to maintain fully all departments of the public service, as well as to provide moderate increases of pay and allowances for the subordinate officials to meet the additional cost of living, but expenditure on public works was confined to maintenance and repairs.

The Mauritius exports reached in money value a total of upwards of Rs. 70,000,000, making about £18 per head of the population, and were substantially heavier than in 1915, due, not to greater production but to higher prices. The value of the exports in 1916 was double that of 1912.

The steady decrease of available tonnage due to the submarine campaign and the increasing need of transport had raised freights to figures largely in excess of anything paid in the past. These freights materially added to the cost of food and other essential materials and thus reacted on the prices of home-grown products and materials, which also increased proportionately. Mauritius by her insular position was severely affected by this world situation, and the effect was especially noticeable with the advancing months of 1917. Another complexity was added by the temporary cessation of the voyages of the Government steamer *Secunder* to Madagascar, which at one time seriously threatened the meat supply of the Colony. The need of a much greater measure of Government interference and control became apparent, and in July a new office of Food and Trade Controller was created, with the necessary powers for controlling the imported supplies and regulating the distribution of essential commodities within the island. In the endeavour to eliminate profiteering and to place essential food-stuffs within the reach of the poorest, the price of almost every article of food was controlled, and with the object of economizing consumption of meat, two beefless days in every week were made compulsory, and the slaughter of local live stock was stringently restricted. The satisfactory carrying out of the food problem was in great measure due to the ceaseless activities of the Food Controller. No serious injury resulted to any commercial interests or any section of the community, and in spite of the great increase in the cost of living it cannot be said that the Colony suffered privation in regard to any articles of food. Further efforts were made

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during the year to encourage the cultivation of food crops. In the course of his address to the Council of Government in May 1917, at the opening of the session, the Governor emphasized the seriousness of the position and made an earnest appeal for concerted effort. Subsequently, a special appeal to the landowners, which received the widest publicity, was issued to stimulate increased production and, at the same time, steps were taken by the Agricultural and Forestry Departments to provide further areas of Crown land for agricultural production, partly in the form of direct settlement and partly through the Co-operative Credit Societies. As a result of these combined movements at the end of the year the area under food crops and vegetables had increased from 9,400 acres to 15,675 acres, an increase of 66 per cent. Arrangements were also made for a still more extensive campaign in 1918. The growing strain that was placed upon shipping by submarine depredations in the course of 1917 made the question of securing a regular and adequate supply of rice one of special difficulty to the Administration. There was no reserve of any of the principal food-stuffs and the inadequate production of food in the island made it of increasing importance to obtain sufficient tonnage for the transport of rice to Mauritius. The annual import of rice amounts to 60,000 tons, and almost all of this comes from India. Accordingly, early in the year, negotiations were entered into with His Majesty's Government, promises of ships were ultimately obtained, and the shipping arranged for was secured as a result of the co-operation of the Royal Commission on wheat supplies. The measure of the assistance rendered is shown by the fact that not only were the actual requirements met till the end of the war, but cheap rice from Burma continued after the war to be placed within reach of the poorest classes.

The difficult question of how to finance Indian purchases was the complement of the other, and no problem presented such difficulties to the Colony as the regulation of its financial arrangements with India. So long as the exchange between the two countries remains stable there is no difficulty, and the local banks are able to draw on India for all the rice required. But by the diversion of the Colony's staple export from its natural market to Europe exchange was interrupted, the disturbance of trade with India grew more and more profound,

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and a situation arose in the third year of the war which threatened to become very serious, for the banks found themselves unable to issue drafts on India to meet the demand for remittances on account of essential supplies.

The sugar crop of 1917–18, like those of the two preceding years, was bought by the Royal Commission on the sugar supply. Negotiations were concluded with the Royal Commission in July 1917 for the whole of the vesou crop to be sold for exportation to England on a basis of 17*s*. per cwt. The price enabled the planter to realize a satisfactory profit, but difficulties arose in connexion with payment for the sugar. The situation was serious for some time, but the pressure was relieved at a later date by the Royal Commission consenting to relinquish a considerable proportion of the vesous which they had bought, together with the whole first syrup sugar, thus enabling the Government to ship to India a quantity of sugar sufficient to adjust the balance of exchange between the Colony and India. By the end of the year, 121,385 tons of sugar had been shipped from the Colony, the actual prices which were realized ranging between 16*s*. 4*d*. and 17*s*. per cwt. f.o.b. for vesou shipments to Europe. Owing to the great fluctuations that existed in the Indian sugar market the consignments to India resulted in a certain amount of loss to the Treasury, but the planters received the full price of their product and commercial confidence was restored. No account of the financial operations, outlined above, would be complete without acknowledgement of the liberality and public spirit shown by the directors of the two local banks.

There was no important change in taxation during the year except an increase of the export duty on sugar to meet the expenditure on the railways, and the revenue amounted to Rs. 12,365,000.

The 1918–19 sugar crop promised to be one of the largest ever reaped, but anxiety prevailed as to the disposal of the produce. Early in July the Sugar Commission made the important announcement that they would be willing to buy vesou sugar for export to the United Kingdom, but that in view of shipping difficulties they could not purchase more than 50,000 tons. At the same time it was stated that the embargo on the export of sugar would be raised so soon as arrangements had been made to ensure the provision of

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adequate funds in India for the purchase of essential supplies during the ensuing twelve months. A serious commercial crisis was only averted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in August 1918 suggesting the following simple machinery: That the Government should take over the whole of the vesou crop not already contracted for and should sell it on behalf of the planters on the following terms:

Advances to be made at the rate of Rs. 7·50 per cwt. against all sugars delivered in Port Louis. The sugar would then become the property of the Government and would be sold by the Government to the best advantage. All profits obtained after payment of expenses for storage, interest, &c., would be distributed to planters in dividends as soon as it would be safe to do so.

This offer was gladly accepted by the planters, and the local Government under the Sugar Purchase Ordinance of 1918 became vested with the whole of the vesou crop for the purpose of sale, on the 11th of September. A special body of planters and brokers was appointed to advise the Government on the sale and disposal of the sugar, Mr. Justice Prichard being selected as chairman of this committee, and in order to enable the operations under the Ordinance to be carried out, the Secretary of State made arrangements with the Federated Malay States whereby a sum of £1,750,000 was placed at the disposal of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, bearing interest at the rate of 5¼ per cent. per annum. The scheme worked most satisfactorily and the committee in due course disposed of the whole crop under very profitable conditions, declaring a dividend of Rs. 2·50 a cwt. on the 24th of December and obtaining an average net price, after all expenses, interest &c., had been paid, of about Rs. 12·60. The Royal Commission made a preliminary purchase of 50,000 tons, a second of 45,000 tons, and two others of 6,000 and 25,000 tons. The two first were at the rate of 17*s.* 8*d.* per cwt. f.o.b., the 6,000 tons at 18*s.* 8*d.* per cwt., and the 25,000 tons at 19*s.* 4*d.*, this last amount being remitted to India to the credit of the Mauritius Government to preserve the balance of exchange in financing essential imports. The total vesou crop was 235,000 tons, private purchases accounting for well over 100,000 tons, while a certain quantity was retained for local consumption. It was found that only £1,200,000 were required as advances from the

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Federated Malay States, and by the 31st of March 1919 this sum and the interest thereon had been entirely paid off.

With the disposal of the sugar crop secured the next problem to be faced was that of railway transport. With repairs and renewals of plant, machinery, and rolling-stock more than two years in arrears, there resulted a great shortage in number of available wagons and locomotives. A very resolute effort was made to meet these difficulties. Particular attention was given to the consumption of coal and, to meet the reductions in engine power, the passenger train services were curtailed and Sunday traffic was cut off. It was also decided to restrict all cane traffic beyond a maximum of seven miles, except in very special cases, and to refuse all new cane transport. It was further found possible by arrangement with the planters and estates to effect considerable economies in the transport of canes by railway. The rolling-stock available for the conveyance of cane and sugar was thus largely increased, and as a result the railway, which had suffered from two years of insufficient maintenance and renewal, succeeded in carrying a greater traffic than at any previous period.

The financial position of the Government throughout the year 1918 was not free from difficulty, as the advance in prices of all supplies and stores greatly added to the cost of the public departments, while, at the same time, the revenue was largely affected by the restrictions on importation. However, with the improved conditions which followed the signature of the Armistice the general strain was removed.

When opening the session of the Legislature on the 25th of May 1920, the Governor noted ' the extraordinary development of the Colony's wealth '. During the five years prior to the war, the average annual value of the sugar export of the island had been Rs. 40,000,000. During the five years 1915–19 it was Rs. 70,000,000 ; and the annual reports state that the sugar crop of 1918 was the best in the war years, and that of 1917 the second best. In spite of the war and during the war, an irrigation scheme, strongly backed by the late Governor, Sir John Chancellor, was partially carried out in the Black River district, and in June 1916 water began to be available for the conversion of waste into sugar-growing lands. The war, too, was responsible for the erection of a wireless station at Rose Belle, which was completed in October 1915, ensuring

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to Mauritius uninterrupted communication with other countries and ships within its radius. As, when the Colony was threatened with financial straitness, the co-operation of the Home Government, and funds lent from the surplus revenues of the Federated Malay States, removed the difficulty, so Mauritius extended its hand in turn. Over and above the contributions to the war and to war charities, which have been already noticed, the Council of Government in January 1918 voted a free grant of Rs. 100,000 to the Seychelles, which had been sorely tried



and impoverished by the war, and whose fortunes, until recent years, had always followed those of Mauritius.

After the Armistice had been signed, speaking on the 17th of November 1918, Mgr. Murphy, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Port Louis, referred to the islands of the British Empire in all parts of the world, and to the way in which they rallied to the aid of the Mother Country in the hour of danger: 'Parmi ces îles de l'Empire,' he continued, 'l'île Maurice, l'ancienne Île de France, la Perle de l'Océan Indien, est au premier rang par son dévouement éclairé et généreux à la cause commune.'[1] His claim for Mauritius was well founded. It had a worthy record in the Great War.

[1] Quoted in *Les Volontaires Mauriciens aux Armées*, 1st ed., p. 92.

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MAURITIUS WAR MEMORIAL

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SECTION II

SEYCHELLES [1]

Mainly supplied by Sir Charles O'Brien, K.C.M.G.

THE Seychelles islands became, like Mauritius, a British possession, as the result of the Napoleonic wars. In history they have always followed the lead of Mauritius, and they were a dependency of that island until 1903, when they were finally severed from it and constituted a separate Colony, with Governor, Executive, and Legislative Councils. Throughout the war, until the last two or three months, the Governor was Lieut.-Col. (now Sir) C. R. M. O'Brien, C.M.G.

The Colony includes some ninety widely scattered islands, of which the Aldabra group are 600 miles distant from Mahé, the centre of administration; but the total area does not greatly exceed the size of the Isle of Wight, and the total population, mainly coloured, was in 1914 hardly 24,000. The central group includes the main island Mahé, called after the great Frenchman, Mahé de Labourdonnais. The island is rather larger than Jersey, and on the north-eastern side is a fine natural harbour, Port Victoria, on which stands the capital of the islands. Far away in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Mahé is none the less on the route from the Red Sea to Mauritius, and from East Africa to India; well placed for coaling, and used for coaling by the Admiralty as well as by merchant vessels, though entirely undefended. It is between 900 and 1,000 miles from Mauritius on the south, and Zanzibar on the west, and has cable communication with both islands. One outcome of the war was the erection in 1915 of a wireless telegraphy station.

The war found the Seychelles quite defenceless. There were no armed or disciplined forces in the islands, and no armament —not even a single modern rifle. As long as the *Emden* and the *Königsberg* were in being and at large, there was obvious

[1] This account is mainly taken from a memorandum supplied in 1918 for the purposes of this book by the then Governor, now Lieut.-Col. Sir C. O'Brien, K.C.M.G.

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danger of raids by German cruisers looking for supplies of coal, but as a matter of fact no enemy craft disturbed the peace of the Colony. At the beginning, such precautions as were possible were taken. A reserve supply of rice was obtained from Bombay. Measures were adopted to ensure due notice of the approach of enemy vessels by means of observation posts, bonfires, and a system of cyclists. The police was strengthened to meet the possibility of internal disorder, though no disturbances of any kind occurred; committees were appointed to control prices of necessaries and deal with unemployment; and orders were given to plant up Government lands with food-stuffs, a lead which was followed by many private proprietors. Among other war measures, a law was passed in August 1914 empowering the Government to issue locally printed currency notes of the values of Rs. 10 and Rs. 5 respectively, up to a total sum not exceeding Rs. 180,000. Cash and securities to cover the full issue were deposited to the credit of the Government, by the Bank of Mauritius, with the Governors of Bombay and Mauritius. These notes having served their purpose were called in and destroyed in July 1916. In the early days of the war, from midnight on the 18th, until midnight on the 27th of August 1914, the Colony was completely isolated owing to the breakdown of the cable connexion with Zanzibar and with Mauritius, but no ill results followed, and the conduct of all classes during these days of isolation was commendable. On the 27th the line to Zanzibar was restored, but communication with Mauritius was not re-established till the 25th of November. From the 29th of November to the 13th of December 1914, 25 officers and 74 warrant and non-commissioned officers of the French Colonial Army were guests of the Colony, having been recalled to Madagascar when *en route* to France. The behaviour of all ranks was exemplary and their entertainment gave pleasure to the whole community.

Early in the war nearly all the young men of British birth, whether in Government employment or engaged in business, left to take their part. Their numbers were necessarily small, but the Colony had to mourn the loss on active service of Captain Fowler Newsam, Imperial Yeomanry, killed in Palestine; of Mr. Lonnen (Manager, Branch Mauritius Bank), killed when flying in the Royal Flying Corps; and of Second Lieutenant Mytton, Royal Fusiliers, killed in action in France.

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Lieutenant MacLeod (Principal of King's College), Gordon Highlanders, was twice wounded, and so was Rifleman Crabtree Thomas (Master, King's College). Major Power, S.A.M.C. (late Assistant Medical Officer in this Colony), served in German South-West Africa, in Egypt, and on the Western Front, and gained the Distinguished Service Order, and Captain N. P. Jewell, East Africa Medical Corps, gained the Military Cross in action in German East Africa. In addition a number of young men served in France, East Africa, and Salonika, both in the British and French armies. The full numbers were about 100.

A Labour Force was organized for service in East Africa at the latter end of 1916. It consisted of 791 officers and men. They did good work at the base, but suffered so seriously from malaria and bacillary dysentery that they had to be repatriated at the end of about six months. No less than 250 died on active service or shortly after their return. Many others would willingly have gone on active service, but the very slender finances of the Colony would not admit of assisted passages. It may fairly be said, however, that considering the total numbers of the population, which do not exceed five thousand adult males, of whom nine-tenths are coloured labourers, the response was good. Every official who could possibly be spared answered the call. It must be borne in mind that the people of the Seychelles are largely illiterate coloured persons, with little knowledge of the outside world. Their natural language is a creole patois and their sentiment for long years has been distinctly French. Undoubtedly, the effect of the war was to introduce among the French-speaking people of all classes a far more earnest view of their position and duties as members of the British Empire.

The outbreak of war was followed by a decline of revenue and a decrease of trade. Towards the end of 1915 Customs duties and licences were increased, an export duty was imposed upon copra and other coco-nut products, and a tax upon sugar-growing lands—sugar being grown in the Seychelles for the purpose of extracting a local spirit. For a time the increase in Customs duties was met by a boycott on the part of the local merchants, who refused to import or take out of bond articles subject to the higher duties, but in the course of 1916 the difficulty was adjusted. The years 1916 and 1917 showed slightly better revenue returns, and by strict economy in 1917

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the expenditure was kept within the revenue. The difficulties of communication and transport, however, increased as the war went on, the stocks of copra could not be shipped and the islands became more and more cut off from the world. The difficulties culminated in 1918, when there was a further fall in revenue, and the trade returns were the lowest since 1900. Cost of living rose greatly, there was much unemployment, and laws were passed to control the sale of food-stuffs, to establish a Labour Bureau, and to make the cultivation of ground crops compulsory. Under the circumstances it spoke well for the



Seychellois that there was no local disturbance or unrest. It was evident that among all classes there was a deep feeling of loyalty to the Crown and admiration for the Empire and its armed forces. In particular, the visits of British and allied ships of war, including Japanese vessels, brought home to the islanders the meaning of sea-power and illustrated the extent to which the Colony depended for its very existence upon the British Navy. A very pleasing reminder of the historic connexion between Mauritius and the Seychelles, and an illustration of the extent to which the different parts of the Empire held out a helping hand to one another during the war, was a vote by the Mauritius Council of Government in January 1918 of Rs. 100,000 as a free grant to the Seychelles.

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The good feeling of the inhabitants was shown by the support given to war charities. Early in September 1914, a local branch of the Red Cross was formed under the Chairmanship of Mrs. O'Brien, the Governor's wife, with Dr. J. B. Addison, Chief Medical Officer, as treasurer and secretary. Owing to the impossibility of obtaining flags from the United Kingdom for sale on 'Our Day' in 1914, Mrs. O'Brien and her lady helpers organized the manufacture, locally, of 25,000 small flags, many of which were bought by the very poorest inhabitants. 'Our Day' was most enthusiastically held each year. In 1916 and 1917, in the absence of Mrs. O'Brien in Europe, the chairmanship devolved on Mrs. Logan, the wife of the Chief Justice, most ably seconded throughout by Dr. Addison. Half of all the sums received by the Red Cross was sent to the British Society and half to the French Society. Sums of money obtained for war charities, up to the end of 1917, amounted to well over £3,000, and in 1918, in spite of the great depression, 'Our Day' was a record, producing Rs. 9,500. In addition, in the early days of the war 1,878 garments were locally made for dispatch to the Red Cross. This work had to be stopped owing to the impossibility of obtaining material of suitable quality and of sufficient quantity, and efforts were centred on monetary contributions. The sums seem very small as compared with the munificent gifts of other parts of the Empire, but, in view of the conditions in the Seychelles, they represented a very great deal of self-denial in a small and poor community.

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SECTION III

ST. HELENA AND ASCENSION

ST. HELENA

Mainly by Lieut.-Col. Wm. Dixon, C.M.G.

THE Governor of St. Helena throughout the war was Major (now Sir) H. E. S. Cordeaux, C.B., C.M.G. When he was absent, the officer in command of the troops, Lieut.-Col. W. Dixon, R.M.A., acted for him. Major Cordeaux became Governor in 1912, having previously been Commissioner of Somaliland, where he had long service, and, for a short time, Governor of Uganda. He ruled an island rather larger than Jersey, with some 3,500 inhabitants, the Governor being also the Legislator, for St. Helena had no Legislative Council. The island had long fallen from the high estate which it held in the days of the East India Company, before steamers supplanted sailing ships and the Suez Canal became the high road to and from the East. Napoleon's exile to and death in St. Helena came towards the end of its busy life, and it had sunk into retirement and decay when, at the time of the South African War, it became once more for a short period a prison-house, harbouring from 4,000 to 5,000 Boer prisoners. Subsequently, left derelict both of prisoners and of garrison, the island was a scene of unemployment and distress, until a fibre industry was developed. This prospered greatly during the war owing at once to high prices and to exceptionally good fortune in the matter of transport. During the war, too, a garrison reappeared for the time being. On the other hand, no new inmate was found for Longwood when the war came to an end.

The following account was supplied by the Acting Governor, Lieut.-Col. Dixon, in 1919. It should be added that, as soon as the Governor was notified that war had begun, martial law was proclaimed in the island.

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St. Helena, 1914–1918

The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 found St. Helena without adequate means of defence until the arrival of the war garrison. Up to the year 1906, the inhabitants had rested secure in the protection of a permanent garrison, under whose aegis a local Volunteer Defence Corps was maintained, though but little reliance was placed on it. Shortly after the withdrawal of the permanent garrison in that year the local Defence Corps, mainly on account of its expense which the Colony found difficult to meet, was disbanded, and henceforth there was no teaching given to the inhabitants in the principles of self-defence. Little being known amongst them of the trend of European politics, several German war vessels visiting the Colony early in 1914 were received with every hospitality, their officers and crews overrunning the island and improving their already good knowledge of its geography by questioning its inhabitants. The outbreak of war with this same Power, therefore, and the knowledge that German war vessels were at large, brought home the exposed position of the Colony to its inhabitants. This was fostered by wild rumours of all sorts, spread without any foundation and often believed in the absence of confirmation, but their effect was only to steel the people to the fact that the Empire, and St. Helena in particular, was in danger, and they rose well to the occasion. The question of resuscitating the old Volunteer Corps was at once put forward by the leading inhabitants, the necessary Proclamations bringing it into being were issued on the 5th of August 1914, and practically every able-bodied male in the Colony offered his services gratuitously. Arms and equipment for all were lacking, but such as were available were used for a mobile force whose knowledge of the island and its intricate tracks would have given them, in the earliest days, a decided advantage over any raiding force attempting a landing. Unarmed look-outs were also organized, and stationed on the heights overlooking the possible landing-places round the coast, being subsequently connected with the military telephone system. Armed pickets were also stationed in positions near the possible landings, and though for some months the Corps was only partially trained, these duties were carried out through the

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first exceptionally cold winter, and thereafter, with conspicuous zeal and devotion to duty. This Volunteer Corps, trained by officers and non-commissioned officers of the Royal Marines, was eventually organized into an 'embodied' force of sixty men, receiving pay, rations, and uniform, and an unembodied force, consisting of practically every able-bodied man, periodically drilled and responsible for the defence, if necessary, of various districts of the island. As time went on and the danger of hostile attack lessened, large numbers of the volunteers, both embodied and unembodied, were anxious to get to one or other of the active fronts, and it was always a matter of keen regret amongst them that means were not available to enable them to proceed to England or South Africa to enlist. Had they been available the response would have been large, and the St. Helena men would have acquitted themselves well in the fighting line, thus proving their loyalty to the Empire and all that it means.

Beyond the first few months of wild rumours of impending attack—which in nowise disturbed the equanimity of the inhabitants—the island experienced neither the excitement nor the sorrows of war, but its progress was followed throughout with keen interest by the humblest and by the children in the Government schools.

Early in 1917 its effects began to be felt in the steadily decreasing service of mail steamers, and a very increased but inevitable rise in the prices of essential food-stuffs, the bulk of which had to be imported from South Africa, on the closing of exports of food-stuffs from the United Kingdom. As it had been the custom for years of those who imported only to obtain just enough to last for the month until the arrival of the next steamer, difficulties were raised when the advisability of ordering larger stocks was suggested, in spite of the decreasing number of steamers in the service and the ever-present submarine menace. As a result, the Colony was on the verge of starvation for ten days in November 1917. It is greatly to the credit of the working-classes in the Colony, that this period of acute shortage and the inevitable high prices without any substantial increase in the standard of wages to meet them were borne without disturbance and almost without grumbling. At the end of 1917, steamship communication became so irregular that it was deemed advisable to lay in a stock of six

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months' essential food supplies. The principal importers being unwilling to do this, it fell to the Colonial Government to arrange it, and the ready and willing assistance of the Union Government of South Africa and the Government of Mauritius in obtaining and shipping what was required is an instance of Imperial co-operation, without which the islanders might have been faced with frequent periods of starvation, and certainly with considerably higher food prices. The supply of essential food-stuffs by the Colonial Government was continued into 1919, ordinary trading in the various commodities being resumed as the Government stocks were exhausted. The benefit of the Government food supply was realized throughout by the bulk of the inhabitants, in spite of the great opposition shown towards it by those same importers who were unwilling in the first instance to provide it themselves. In spite of the general scarcity of shipping, the Colony suffered in a very small degree only. It was more fortunate than many other dependencies, in that the whole of its staple product of fibre and tow was exported to the United Kingdom, with but short delay. No homeward and only one outward cargo was lost during the war, and the high prices obtained for both fibre and tow in London were the means of more firmly establishing the industry and brought a large measure of prosperity to the Colony.

Early in 1916 it was intended to intern certain malcontents in the Colony, and wooden huts were erected at Longwood for their accommodation. The intention was subsequently abandoned. A party of Mohammedan political deportees arrived, however, from the East Coast of Africa, towards the end of 1917, and many of the inhabitants speculated on the possibility of the history of 100 years ago repeating itself in their being again entrusted with the custody of a disturber of the world's peace.

Considering their small resources and the isolated position of the Colony, contributions to war funds and charities were marked by the generosity of the poorer inhabitants, few of whom failed to contribute their mite. A branch of Queen Mary's Needlework Guild was established early in the war and continued work until its close.

Monetary contributions to the various war funds and charities, the proceeds of collections by individuals and children,

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public lists, entertainments organized by the garrison and others, &c., were as follows :

	£	s.	d.
Prince of Wales's Fund	138	0	0
British Red Cross	621	7	1
Belgian Red Cross	77	10	0
Belgian Relief Fund	37	2	0
Disabled and Blinded Soldiers and Sailors	20	0	7
Children of Empire Fund for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors	20	9	0
Star and Garter Home	249	0	7
St. Dunstan's Home	48	2	0
Total	£1,211	11	3



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ASCENSION

By the Editor

THE Island of Ascension lies in the South Atlantic 800 miles north-west of St. Helena and about 8 degrees south of the Equator, in size larger than Guernsey, smaller than Jersey. It is in the main a barren island of volcanic formation, with forbidding shores except at Clarence Bay on the north-west, the lee side of the Island, where is the one anchorage and landing-place and the small settlement known as Georgetown. British occupation of the Island dates from 1815, and until 1922, when it was transferred to the charge of the Colonial Office, it was always under Admiralty control. At the time of the war the landing-place was safeguarded by forts and heavy guns, and the Island was garrisoned by Royal Marines, Artillery, and Light Infantry. It is a great meeting-place of submarine cables, which connect with Sierra Leone, the Cape Verde Islands, the Cape, and South America, and, during the war, outside the garrison and Government employees, the staff of the Eastern Telegraph Company, who averaged about 40, were the principal element in the small community. In consequence of the war, a wireless station was, in 1915, erected in the Island. It was a small naval fortress, coaling station, and sanatorium in mid-ocean, with turtle fishing for the staple local industry. Its geographical position and its cables made it of substantial importance as a point of call and a centre of telegraphic communication when enemy raiders and submarines infested the seas, and throughout the war the cable service was successfully maintained, but so far as the naval history of the war has been disclosed, no striking incident is connected with Ascension Island.

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PART VI

SOMALILAND AND THE SUDAN

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SECTION I

SOMALILAND [1]

Mainly by Lieut.-Col. G. H. Summers, C.M.G.

THE acquisition of Aden in 1839, one of the first-fruits of Queen Victoria's reign, was followed in 1840 by treaties made between the East India Company and native potentates on the opposite African coast, the Sultan of Tajura and the Governor of Zeila; but the Somaliland Protectorate, as it stands to-day, came into being after the breakdown of the Egyptian power in the Sudan and on the Red Sea littoral. Then in 1884–6 Great Britain made treaties with various Somali tribes, and in 1887 a British Protectorate on the Somali coast was formally notified to the other Powers.

The boundaries were gradually determined. On the west of the coast, towards the Red Sea, the mutual limits of the French and British Protectorates were, in 1888, defined by exchange of Notes, the Gulf of Tajura being left to France. On the east and south, towards the Indian Ocean, the boundary between the British and Italian spheres was finally settled by an Agreement of 1894; and a treaty with Abyssinia of 1897 fixed the inland boundary with that country. The result was to give to Great Britain a Protectorate, in area about twice the size of Ireland, with some 300,000 Mohammedan inhabitants, and having 440 miles of coast-line, including the ports of Berbera and Zeila. Berbera, the chief centre of the coast, has a population varying, according to the season of the year, from 10,000 to 30,000.

From the first the object of the Protectorate had been to keep under British influence and control the African coast over against Aden, so as to safeguard the Red Sea route and communication with India. For the same reason, a formal Protectorate was, in 1886, proclaimed over the island of Socotra. The Protectorate was in short, in its inception, a dependency of Aden, and with Aden it always has been and still

[1] As stated in the text, Lieut.-Col. Summers was good enough to contribute the latter part of this section.

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is principally connected. Up to 1898 it was administered under the Resident of Aden and was therefore subordinate to the government of Bombay and the India Office. In that year its charge was transferred to the Foreign Office and in 1905 to the Colonial Office. The head of the administration under the Colonial Office was the Commissioner, who had power of legislation by ordinance, though, up to the date of the war, laws and administration were practically confined to the coast towns. The Commissioner throughout the war was the present Sir G. F. Archer, K.C.M.G., who had served in the Protectorate since 1912, after ten years of previous service in East Africa. In his absence on leave the officer in command of the troops, during the latter years of the war Lieut.-Col. Summers, acted for him.

Some account of the wars with the Mullah in the interior of Somaliland has been given in the first volume. In 1910 the British Government decided to withdraw to the coast-line, but the withdrawal was followed by inter-tribal fighting and renewed aggression on the part of the Mullah, and in 1913 a small corps of camel constabulary, which had been raised in the previous year, suffered a somewhat serious reverse. The military forces were then strengthened, and the beginning of the Great War found Somaliland one of the disturbed corners of the Empire. As is told in the following account, supplied by Lieut.-Col. Summers, the dervishes were held in check during the war, and after the war ended their power was broken with some hope of finality.

At the time of the outbreak of war the coast towns of Berbera, Bulhar, and Zeila only were under administration, and, prior to an extension of the sphere of administration, the troops were stationed at Sheikh and Gololi, undergoing the reorganization and increase sanctioned subsequent to the event of 1913. By November 1914 this reorganization was complete and the troops were ready to take the field. The Camel Corps had been raised to a strength of 600 rifles (450 Somalis, 150 Indians), and the infantry force consisted of the Indian Contingent King's African Rifles, 250 strong, and a temporary garrison of 150 Indian infantry lent by the Government of India. The Camel Corps and Indian Contingent infantry reoccupied Burao on the 7th of November, and shortly afterwards the fort at Las Dureh was also reoccupied by infantry.

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REPRESENTATIVE TYPES OF SOMALILAND FORCE, 1915

(1) Illalo levy (Somali); (2) Private, Indian contingent, Camel Company; (3) Private, temporary garrison Indian Infantry; (4) Private, Somaliland Camel Corps, Camel Company; (5) Corporal, Somaliland Camel Corps, Pony Company

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In November 1914 and February 1915 operations were carried out against the dervish position at Shimber Berris which dominated the Ain Valley and the whole of the eastern area of the Protectorate from Burao to the Nogal Valley. These operations were entirely successful, the dervish forts being captured and demolished and their forces driven out with severe loss. By these means the Burao district and Ain Valley was freed from dervish domination. No further offensive operations could be sanctioned at the time, as it seemed probable that, owing to the distance involved, they would necessitate additional reinforcements which could not be spared from more important theatres of war. It was therefore decided to hold on to and consolidate the area regained from the dervishes and to adopt a defensive policy till a suitable time came for a final advance which should overthrow and drive the dervishes from the Protectorate. Every endeavour was to be made in the meantime to keep down dervish aggression. For this purpose an irregular levy, some 300 strong, was organized and posted in strong positions along a line running roughly from Ankhor on the Makhir coast to the south of the Ain Valley. The posts were to watch the dervish front by constant patrolling and deal with small parties of raiders, while the Camel Corps, with advanced bases at Las Dureh and Burao, was free to move to any threatened point and from time to time to patrol the whole front. The policy proved entirely successful. Though at times small isolated raiding parties broke through the line, dervish aggression became weaker and weaker and several severe defeats were inflicted on the raiders who attempted to push too far forward, notably at Endow in October 1917, and Ok and Rajuna in March 1919. Enfeebled by sickness and desertion and the hostilities of their neighbours, the dervish forces were unable to recoup themselves as in the past at the expense of our eastern tribes, they became steadily weaker in personnel and poorer in stock, their trade with Abyssinia and elsewhere diminished, and with it their supplies of ammunition. In the meantime the troops were preparing for the final offensive, which was successfully carried out by the combined operations of the Royal Air Force and the local forces, reinforced by a battalion of King's African Rifles, in the early months of 1920.

The only increase in the Protectorate forces during the war

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was one additional company of Indian infantry from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force for the occupation of Las Khoral to afford a measure of protection to the Warsangli tribe.

After the successful operations in 1914 and 1915 active administration of the interior of the Protectorate west of the line held by the irregular levies was immediately undertaken. Civil stations were opened at Burao and Hargeisa and the tribes of the interior were once more brought under administration. Inter-tribal fighting among the friendlies quickly ceased and was followed by greatly increased prosperity and trade, though both were much prejudiced by the constantly rising prices of imported food-stuffs and other commodities and the decrease of available shipping throughout the war. The re-establishment of peace in the interior enabled such resources of the country as were of value outside the Protectorate to be utilized. The whole of the meat supply of the Aden Field Force and the civil population of Aden as well as the naval forces in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden was provided from Somaliland, and the coast towns exported regular consignments of cattle, sheep, and goats up to a maximum of 10,000 head a month. Some 9,000 transport camels were purchased and dispatched for the use of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and Aden Field Force at rates considerably cheaper than those prevailing elsewhere. Some 1,500 recruits for service overseas with the King's African Rifles and other allied forces were obtained in the Protectorate during the war in addition to the maintenance of the local military forces, irregular levies, and police.

In spite of much propaganda emanating from German and Turkish sources in Abyssinia the Somali population of the occupied areas of the Protectorate remained loyal throughout the war. Owing to constant rumours which gained some credence among the people, that the Germans and Turks had driven the British from Egypt, a party of Elders was sent there in August 1916, and this visit had excellent results, as they returned to Somaliland deeply impressed with all they had seen. On the occasion of the Id-el-Fatr in 1916, five leading Sultans and Sheikhs submitted an address of loyalty to His Majesty the King, and throughout the remainder of the war a satisfactory attitude was maintained by all the friendly tribes of the Protectorate.

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

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SECTION II

THE SUDAN

By the Editor

THE great Anglo-Egyptian Protectorate of the Sudan is credited, on the roughest estimate, with an area of round about one million square miles, and a population of some 5½ millions. It marches with Egypt at one end, with Uganda at the other. At different points its frontiers touch French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo, Italian Eritrea, and Abyssinia. In the war it was exposed to no attack from outside enemies, except the Senussi tribes of the Libyan Desert; but it is a stronghold of Mohammedanism, 66 per cent. of the inhabitants being Moslems, and the entry of Turkey into the war, coupled with German propaganda, gave cause for constant watchfulness by patrols on the Red Sea coast and along 600 miles of the western frontier, and, as will be told, entailed a certain amount of desert warfare.

Its line of life and trade had been northwards, along the Nile to Egypt, of which it had been the hinterland, until in 1906 the completion of a railway from Atbara Junction north-east to the newly constructed Port Sudan, a little north of Suakin on the Red Sea, gave it an adequate outlet in its own territory, over against the Hejaz and Jidda, the landing-point for pilgrims to the Holy Places of the Mohammedan world. The grain of the country was dura (millet). The exports were at the first mainly desert produce, such as gum arabic and ivory. But, as the years went on, under British control fresh resources were developed and articles of export multiplied. There was a growing trade in live cattle, principally for the Egyptian market. With the help to be derived from irrigation, cotton growing promised well, especially in the Gezira plain between the Blue and White Niles, and just before the war the interest on a loan of no less than £E.3,000,000 had been guaranteed by the British Government and a first instalment

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SIR REGINALD WINGATE

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of the money had been already received. Hides and oil seeds (sesame) were largely exported, and among minerals gold was already becoming an appreciable export. Admirably handled, the Sudan was, in 1914, a part of the world in which British trusteeship had been most conspicuously successful. Peace, order, and contentment were the ordinary rule, administration was widening in area and growing in efficiency, railways were being extended and irrigation works taken in hand.

Rescued from barbarism by Lord Kitchener, whose final victory over the Mahdi's forces at Omdurman only preceded the war by 16 years, it was under his general supervision as British Consul-General in Egypt when the war came and he remained in England to take up the heavy duties of the War Office. The Governor-General was Sir Reginald Wingate, in 1914 a man of 53. Well he knew Egypt and the Sudan, having joined the Egyptian Service as far back as 1888. He had stamped out the smouldering ashes of Mahdism, and from 1899, when Lord Kitchener went to South Africa, he had taken charge of the Sudan, governing it continuously until, in January 1917, he became High Commissioner in Egypt. His great experience and his personal character ensured the confidence of white men and natives alike: under him administration took form and shape: provinces were marked out and organized: and year by year the Sudan grew and prospered. It was of necessity at first under martial law, and martial law was not formally abolished. But the system was steadily assimilated to that of other British Protectorates, and civil life ran a widening course. The Governor-General, who was also Sirdar or Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, exercised both executive and legislative powers, legislating by ordinances and proclamations; but from 1910 onwards he was assisted by a council, comprising four official members and two to four others nominated by himself, the fountain of legislation being then the Governor-General in Council, subject always to supervision by the general Government at Cairo, in plain words, by the British Consul-General, afterwards High Commissioner, in Egypt.

The Egyptian Army, as reorganized by Lord Kitchener, had in conjunction with British troops recovered the Sudan. In 1914 the Regular armed forces in the Protectorate were Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers belonging to that army, native troops of

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of the sanctity and inviolability of the Holy Places. As previously, she will shelter and protect all Mohammedans and mosques within her borders in the same way as, for over one hundred and fifty years, she has guarded the interests of the sixty-two millions of Mohammedans of our Indian Empire—many thousands of whom are now fighting alongside their British fellow subjects against the German army. She will continue to improve in every possible manner the facilities for the pilgrimage and for the practice of the Mohammedan religion.'

Finally, he appealed to his audience, 'men of religion, learning, and experience, to give honourable and wise counsels to the people'. There was something Homeric about the gathering: the words were as those of a shepherd of the people, and the wise men lent willing ears. In vain Enver and his German-bought colleagues called for a Holy War. Enemy propaganda work was skilfully countered, and only in the far-off province of Darfur was serious trouble caused.

Evidence was soon forthcoming of British care for Moslem pilgrims to the Holy Places. It has been seen that the construction of the Red Sea railway and the founding of Port Sudan gave, so to speak, an orientation to the policy and trade of the Sudan. The Hejaz was a Turkish province, and Jidda was a Turkish port; but, in spite of the entry of Turkey into the war, the export of dura to Jidda was at first continued, until it was found that the Turk, *more suo*, was appropriating the grain intended for the pilgrims for the benefit of his own plundering and oppressive soldiery. The export was then prohibited, but, at the instance of the Viceroy of India, the prohibition was cancelled by Proclamation on the 22nd of December 1914, and grain reached Jidda from India, Egypt, and the Sudan. Again it was prohibited on the 20th of March 1915, and again the distress thereby caused to pilgrims and resident Arabs caused the order to be revoked on the following 22nd of May, the Arabs being warned that it lay with them to prevent confiscation of the grain by the Turks. Once more, in 1916, the trade was for a short time closed down, but once more reopened, and, as in the Sudan, so in the Hejaz, the bond of common religion gave way in face of the plain meaning of Turkish domination over other Moslems.

Up to the end of the first quarter of 1915 there was a great

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falling off in the export trade of the Sudan. Then came a revival and, in spite of restrictions directed against enemy countries, in spite of inevitable shortage of shipping, the war acted as a strong stimulus to trade. It was the same throughout the Overseas Empire. The war brought in its train an urgent demand for the raw products which the other continents could supply to Europe. Europe was drawing to itself a perpetually growing number of fighting-men from all quarters of the globe. It was necessary to follow them up with the required material for food, clothing, equipment, munitions. Abnormally high prices encouraged producers. New uses were found, in the manufacture of munitions and otherwise, for articles which had been previously classed as luxuries or by-products. Even difficulties of communication tended to promote production, on the one hand by making each province of the Empire more dependent upon its own products, on the other by holding out the prospect of rich reward for every successful venture. Thus, side by side with financial strain, military precautions or actual operations, and political anxieties, inventiveness was called into play, known resources were further developed, new resources were brought to light, all enuring to the benefit of the Empire. In this year, 1915, the value of the exports from the Sudan for the first time exceeded the net value of the imports. The large armies concentrated in Egypt were profitable to the Sudan, the trade in live-stock revived, and camels were in demand. The export of gum exceeded expectation, a good market being found for it in Great Britain and France. More gum, more cotton, and cotton seed was sent to Great Britain than before the war. Italy and Italian Eritrea took Sudan hides and Sudan dura. The Hejaz, as has been seen, welcomed whatever grain was allowed to pass. Meanwhile, trouble had been brewing in the west.

The westernmost province of the Sudan is Darfur,[1] adjoining Wadai in French Equatorial Africa. It has an estimated area of nearly 150,000 square miles, and had a population in 1914 of under a million. Its capital, El Fasher, is more than 300 miles west of El Obeid in the province of Kordofan. El Obeid,

[1] I am indebted to Captain H. A. Macmichael, D.S.O., of the Sudan Civil Service, for various corrections and suggestions in the following account of the Darfur campaign. (Ed.)

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which was the railhead in this direction, lies south-west of Khartoum, by rail over 400 miles away. The railway runs south from Khartoum, following the course of the Blue Nile, as far as Sennar, then turns west and crosses the White Nile at Kosti, whence it takes a course a little to the south of west, and finally turning due north-west reaches El Obeid. Originally an independent Sultanate, Darfur lost its independence to Egypt in 1874. The Mahdi and his followers put an end to the Egyptian régime; and, after Mahdism had in its turn been overthrown at the battle of Omdurman, a descendant of the old Royal family of Darfur, Ali Dinar by name, established himself as ruler of the Sultanate, was recognized by Lord Kitchener, and appointed representative of the Sudan Government in Darfur, paying a moderate annual tribute from 1901 onwards. The personality of von Slatin, who knew Darfur, was the principal element in maintaining for a while good relations between the Sultan and the Sudan administration. Otherwise, Ali Dinar kept Europeans at arm's length from his territory and himself. Before the war, being irritated, so Sir Reginald Wingate held, by delay in settling certain boundary questions, he had already imbibed disaffection. Upon the entry of Turkey into the war, disaffection ripened into defiance. The Turks infected the Senussi, the Senussi infected Ali Dinar: in April 1915, he publicly renounced his allegiance to the Sudan Government and, as the months went on, proclaimed a Holy War against the Christians, preparing to invade Kordofan, while the Senussi invaded Egypt. Till towards the end of 1915, Wingate was concerned with suppressing minor disturbances at other points in the vast area which he had in charge, assuring tranquillity outside this one distant and hitherto semi-independent province. Then it became evident that the apparent immunity of the recalcitrant Sultan was being interpreted in the native mind as a sign of British impotence, and it was necessary to forestall actual invasion. Ali Dinar had an army of some 10,000 men, a force of native janissaries, such as African potentates collect to be their personal following. Most of them were armed with modern rifles and well supplied with ammunition. Against a civilized expeditionary force he was further and more adequately protected by long intervals of roadless, waterless desert, almost impassable except in the rainy season which comes in July. There were two waterless belts

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to be traversed, 100 miles across in either case, in which the only water along the route was such as had been stored in hollow trees. The face of the country favoured the Sultan and frowned on the invaders; on the other hand, the native population of Darfur had no love for him or his armed men. As a first precaution, Wingate, in December 1915, dispatched a detachment of the Camel Corps to El Nahud, an important trade centre, especially for gum and ostrich feathers, some 140 miles west of El Obeid, in the direction of Darfur and El Fasher, but well within the borders of Kordofan. Difficult and dangerous as was a further advance under existing conditions, it was not safe to postpone it until the rains came on. During the wet season the enemy would have been able to enter Kordofan, at will, along the whole length of the border, whereas in the dry months movement was only possible along certain well defined lines, where water was to be found. With the rains Ali Dinar might have been reinforced by Senussi levies from the north; and already the border tribes of Kordofan were growing nervous at the prospect of their herds being carried off and their water-trees tapped by enemy raiders. Accordingly, by the middle of March 1916, a small mobile force of some 2,000 men all told was concentrated at El Nahud, including infantry, mounted infantry, camel corps, and two batteries of mountain-guns and Maxims, Lieut-Col. Kelly being in command. On the 16th of March the advance began; the Darfur boundary was crossed by the 20th, a watering-place in Darfur territory, Um Shanga, some 90 miles west of El Nahud, was occupied, and a flying column, sent on 22 miles farther to the north-west, after some fighting, took possession on the 22nd of the wells at Jebel el Hilla. Starting from this latter point at the beginning of April, a strong reconnoitring force, sent on by way of Berush and Um Kedada, and dispersing enemy parties at both places, on the 9th reached Abiad, a good watering-place some 70 miles north-west of Um Shanga and very roughly 80 miles east of El Fasher. Abiad was garrisoned, later attacks were beaten off, and by the end of the month communications up to that place, so far as communications are possible in a region of endless sand-dunes, had been made secure, the troops being stationed at intervals along the line of route wherever there were wells. Steps were also being taken to improvise some rude form of motor transport

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between El Obeid and El Nahud, to supplement the camels' work in bringing up supplies. Camels were none too plentiful, owing to the numbers which had been sent north for the use of the British forces in Egypt. The question now arose whether to wait for the rains and with them the possibility of employing a larger army which would make a certainty of occupying El Fasher without mishap, or whether to take the inevitable risk in striking with a smaller force, in order to avoid the evils of delay. In favour of the latter alternative was the consideration, already noticed, that want of water, which straitened the advance of the invaders and tied them down rigidly to one main route, at the same time and to the same extent circumscribed the movements of Ali Dinar's followers and kept them concentrated, with the prospect of a decisive action. Accordingly, Wingate authorized Kelly to press forward, and meanwhile the French co-operated by threatening Darfur from Wadai. In the early days of May more troops were brought up to hold the long line of communications: the former garrisons along the line were thereby released for the front; and eventually some 3,000 men of all services were concentrated at Abiad. A very valuable adjunct to the force was a section of the Royal Flying Corps, sent up from head-quarters in Egypt, peculiarly valuable in this desert warfare, in reconnaissance as in action, dropping proclamations into El Fasher as well as bombs on Ali Dinar's men. On the 15th and 16th of May, when the moon was full, two columns, one more mobile than the other, moved on in a north-westerly direction, separated from each other on account of the difficulties of watering. The division of the troops had the further advantage of giving the impression to the enemy that he might be attacked from two different directions. Forty miles farther on they reunited on the 17th, and on the next day the combined force advanced 28 miles and occupied Melit, over 40 miles north by east of El Fasher. Here water was plentiful and meat and vegetables could be procured from the natives.

The last stage had now been reached and the time had come for the enemy to make a final effort if El Fasher was to be saved. So far they had only worried and molested Kelly's force as it moved from point to point, and there had been no stand-up fight. Kelly gave his men a badly needed short rest and then, early on the morning of the 22nd, the troops

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marched on in square formation, traversing a dangerous series of sand-hills, amid low bush and scrub, where scouting was difficult and surprise was easy. The advance was to the southward, in which direction lay El Fasher. Ali Dinar's horsemen and camel-riders were in evidence from the first: the guns were quickly at work dispersing and driving them back, until, rather over a quarter of a mile short of a village named Beringia, 10 miles north of El Fasher, Kelly found a suitable position for a halt. On the opposite side, the south side, of the village Ali Dinar's forces had dug some rude entrenchments wherein to lie concealed. Some of the Camel Corps pushed into the village and beyond: they came under fire and retreating brought the enemy out of their would-be ambush in hot pursuit. This was their undoing. Leaving their lines *en masse*, they attacked in full strength, with much determination, at the closest quarters. There were 40 minutes of hard fighting, then, mown down by guns, Maxims, and rifle fire, they broke and fled with losses of over 1,000 out of a total number of 3,600 riflemen over and above spearmen and auxiliaries. The casualties on the British side were only 26. The march on El Fasher was resumed on the same afternoon, at nightfall the troops encamped in a square within a short distance of the town, in the very early morning of the next day there was another small attack, it was driven off, and Kelly with his mounted men rode into the town. Ali Dinar with the remnant of his beaten army had already fled to the south-west, leaving behind him guns, rifles, and ammunition, and being bombed as he went by the British aeroplanes. The male population had also fled, but most of them came back in a few days' time, and there was a very general surrender of the great men of Darfur.

Such was the successful outcome of a most hazardous enterprise, boldly and skilfully carried out. Well it merited Wingate's modest claim for it as a military feat of some distinction, all the more noteworthy in that, with the exception of a handful of Garrison Artillery, all the rank and file employed were native troops. It was, above all, a triumph of transport service, attained by untiring effort day and night, a task accomplished amid endless difficulties of drawing, carrying, and distributing water, a conquest of the desert in its worst phases and at its worst season. The country traversed was high

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ground between the water basins, a waste of sand wholly impracticable for road or rail. It fell to Major-Gen. Stack, who became Acting Sirdar and Governor-General when Sir Reginald Wingate went to Egypt as High Commissioner, to tell the sequel to the story, again a tale of success. For some time after the occupation of El Fasher, Kelly's men and camels were not in a condition to follow up Ali Dinar. Moreover, the latter made overtures for surrender, and fruitless negotiations continued for two months. He had taken refuge in broken, mountainous country beyond the long range of hills known as Jebel Marrah, which lies a few days' march to the south-west of El Fasher. He had enough armed men with him to raid his neighbours and, in order to curb his activities, Kelly, in September and October, when the rains were over, established two posts, one at either end of Jebel Marrah. The men of the southern post, commanded by Major Huddleston, came in for some skirmishing. Ali Dinar, whose followers were leaving him, again tried to gain time by negotiations, which again came to nothing, and on the 3rd of November, Huddleston, with a flying column, beat up his quarters 50 miles away to the west, capturing large quantities of material and livestock, and receiving numerous surrenders. Following up his success and Ali Dinar, who had fled with a handful of men 30 miles farther to the south-west, Huddleston effected a complete surprise at dawn on the 6th of November, and Ali Dinar was shot through the head, the news reaching Khartoum, appropriately enough, on the anniversary of the death of the Khalifa. This was the end of any dangerous resistance in Darfur. There were roving bands of the dead Sultan's followers still to be dealt with, and more serious raids, fomented by the Senussi, from the north and north-west. But against the latter the French co-operated effectively with the Sudan Government, co-operation being facilitated by the establishment of wireless telegraphy between El Fasher and the French centre of Abeshr, the people settled down under the new administration, and by the end of the Great War Darfur had come into line with the other provinces of the Sudan.

This desert fighting took place far away in the year 1916, while on the very threshold of England greater hosts than had ever been gathered together in the world's history were striving for the mastery. Infinitesimal in comparison were

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the numbers which sufficed to ensure British control over Darfur. Yet their achievement was one of very substantial value and great significance. Had Kelly's force been badly cut up, British power and prestige in Central Africa might have been rudely shaken, wavering friends turned into open foes, and the hard-pressed Empire more sorely strained than ever. What came to pass was an object-lesson in the courage and resourcefulness of the race, a notable illustration of the capacity of the men who held the outposts to hold them to the end. In a book whose theme is the Empire at war, an honoured place is due to the Wardens of the Marches, who rose to each occasion, kept the frontiers of the Empire safe, and proved to demonstration the length of the British arm.

While there was warring in the far west, the Sudan as a whole was comparatively tranquil, hardly less so than in normal times. In some outlying areas there were small expeditions to quell insubordination and put an end to unrest, but in the northern and central Sudan, where the natives were most habituated to British administration and that administration was most fully organized, their attitude was reported as 'not merely one of acquiescence in the supremacy of the Government, but of active sympathy and goodwill'. Prosperity engenders loyalty, and the Sudan prospered greatly during the war and largely because of the war. It was not a war-stricken but a thriving province that the Prince of Wales visited, when he came to Khartoum in April 1916. The years of drought were followed by three consecutive seasons of good rains. In 1917 there was a surplus of rains and consequent floods. The value of the exports in 1915, a record value, was exceeded in 1916 by 45 per cent., and in the first three months of 1917 the value was higher again by 63 per cent. than in the corresponding period of 1916. Never, so the reports said, had the native population been so prosperous as in the early months of 1917. It was significant that the circulation of silver coin in the Sudan almost doubled during the war. In 1916 it was found necessary to supplement the Egyptian coinage by British silver coins imported from England, which became very popular among the Sudanese. Gum and dura accounted for nearly half the exports. Gum found a ready market in England. For dura there were abundant markets, in England, in France, in Malta, in Eritrea, in the Hejaz, above all close at home in

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Egypt, to which it was shipped in army transports from Port Sudan. Before the war the maximum export of dura from the Sudan in any one year was 32,000 tons, in 1915 it was 46,000 tons, in 1916–17–18, 57,000, 85,000, and 54,000 tons respectively. The great export in 1917 followed upon instructions received from England at the end of 1916 to increase to the utmost the grain production of the Sudan, coupled with an urgent request from the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt for food supplies to meet the shortage caused by want of shipping. The Sudan Government thereupon constituted a Resources Board to control food supplies, wheat growing was extended, 10,000 additional acres being placed under wheat in 1917, 11,000 more in 1918, and cattle and sheep were multiplied. In the last two years of the war the output of food products in the Sudan was, roughly speaking, doubled. From the Sudan Egypt drew camels and donkeys for military transport, food, live-stock and grain to an amount unknown before the war. All the cotton that could be produced was eagerly welcomed in England at high prices, in the Tokar district there was a record crop in 1916–17, and the native cultivators made corresponding profits. That the cotton industry was making substantial progress was shown by the opening of a cotton ginning factory at Port Sudan. There were, no doubt, countervailing drawbacks. Imports were crippled by the war and the difficulties of shipping. The railways had to look to Natal for their coal. Port Sudan, which was used by the Navy as a coaling station and naval base, was, on the other hand, during the war more or less closed to private ships, and both imports and exports were mainly through Egypt, with a consequent large increase in cost, due to transhipment at Luxor, Shellal, and Halfa. Still, on the balance, the war brought very large profits to the Sudan. A revenue of £E.1,654,000 in 1913, in 1918 had risen to £E.2,775,000, and a surplus on the current account in 1913 of £E.40,000 to a surplus on the current account in 1918 of £E.438,000. The value of the imports doubled in these war years, the value of the exports increased between three and fourfold. But whatever profits accrued to the Sudan through the war were requited both inside and outside its borders.

When the war came, the safekeeping of Egypt was placed in the hands of the British Army of Occupation, while the

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Egyptian Army, with the help of the small British garrison at Khartoum, took all responsibility for the security of the Sudan. How well the Sudan was held has been told, but the services of the Egyptian Army to the Empire did not end there. In the course of the war Sudan soldiers gave active help near but beyond their own frontiers, in East Africa, Uganda, and French Equatorial Africa. They shared in the defence of the Suez canal, in the Senussi campaign, in holding the posts in Sinai. A Works Battalion was sent to the Dardanelles in 1915: in 1917 and 1918 units of the Army and an Army Transport Corps played their part in Palestine. The stores, hospital, and ordnance departments of the army were placed at the disposal of the Expeditionary Forces from Egypt: the Sudan railways sent rolling-stock to Palestine: the Sudan Government steamer was lent to the Admiralty to patrol the Red Sea. The administrative staff of the Sudan was depleted for active war service, and those who remained behind did double work without relief or change. It was a great record of duty crowned with success; the handful of Englishmen living among and knowing the natives secured the firm confidence and willing co-operation of native leaders and tribesmen; and at the end of the war, Sir Lee Stack could report that 'the four years of war have wakened a consciousness of the Empire which did not exist before, and which may, I trust, in coming years develop into a spirit of citizenship'.

Among subscriptions to war funds and charities raised in the Sudan were £34,000 for the British Red Cross and nearly £18,000 for the Prince of Wales's Fund.

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

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ABBREVIATIONS

B.E.A. = British East Africa (now Kenya)
Cam. = Cameroons
G.C. = Gold Coast
G.E.A. = German East Africa (now Tanganyika Territory)
G.S.W.A. = German South-West Africa
Moz. = Mozambique, Portuguese East Africa
O.F.S. = Orange Free State
Som. = Somaliland

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
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